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Selânik/Thessaloniki/Solun/Salonika/Salonica/Saloniki. These are 
just a few versions of the name of the largest city in Ottoman Macedonia, 
and it was hard to choose one that would be used consistently throughout 
the book (I opted for Salonika in the end). I hope the reader will understand 
the “hybrid” method I have used for place names based on this example. 
For large cities such as Salonika and Monastir I have used the version most 
common in contemporary English transliteration. For smaller towns I have 
tried to use the Ottoman version, transliterated in modern Turkish, followed 
by the contemporary name in parentheses the first time it is mentioned (e.g., 
Demirhisar (Sidirokastro)). Given the subject matter of the book, a large 
number of small villages are mentioned, especially in the last three chapters, 
and these were the most challenging: again, I tried to provide the Ottoman 
Turkish version (which could vary depending on transliteration) followed 
by alternative spellings and the current name of the locale in parenthesis 
(e.g., Graçen/Gratsiani (Agiohori)). I hope this will make it easier to identify 
the exact locations of these villages. I have used modern Turkish spelling 
for Ottoman Turkish transliteration, and the Library of Congress style for 






Macedonia is the most frightful mix of races ever imagined. Turks, 
Albanians, Greeks and Bulgarians live there side by side without 
mingling—and have lived so since the days of St. Paul.
—John Reed, The War in Eastern Europe, 1916
From the Congress of Berlin to the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, a potent combination of zero-sum imperialism, irredentist na-tionalism, and modernizing states transformed southeast Eu-
rope into a violent conflict zone. As empires collapsed and the boundaries of 
nation-states were drawn, first on paper and then through the land, a long 
period of suffering started for the people inhabiting an area stretching from 
Eastern Europe though the Black Sea littoral and Asia Minor into the Fer-
tile Crescent; they were caught in the riptide of geopolitics, and worse was 
yet to come. The demarcation lines drawn on paper cut through not only 
topographical markers but also ordinary people’s lives, which no longer 
were that ordinary. Communal solidarities broke down, time and space were 
rationalized, the fluidity of vernaculars was replaced by the rigid rules of 
literary languages, and the immutable form of the nation and the boundaries 
of the nation-state replaced the polyglot associations and ways of life that 
had formerly characterized people’s connections with those beyond their 
immediate kin or community.
The residents of the Ottoman Balkans, including Macedonia, were not en-
tirely unfamiliar with coercive violence, lawlessness, and depredations. All 
were occasionally visited on them by a variety of bandits and state agents—
who sometimes were one and the same. The violence that sprang up in the 
nineteenth century and escalated to the point of all-out war at the turn of the 
twentieth century, however, was qualitatively different: it was systemic, was 
pervasive, and pitted one community against another, whether the members 
of those communities desired to be active participants in this struggle or not. 
Back then it was called a “war of races.” Today it is called “ethnic conflict.” 
The principal question I raise in this book is how a region inhabited by a 
population that had not experienced any sustained, systemic, or high level of 
intercommunity violence until the turn of the twentieth century turned into 
one synonymous with ethnic conflict.
Introduction
2  Introduction
The association of the name Macedonia with ethnic conflict has a long 
history. Writing during World War I, John Reed described it as “the most 
frightening mix of races ever imagined,”1 and he was not the first to have said 
so. In 1925, A. Pallis called the situation “chronic racial warfare” caused by 
“the inextricable mixture of Greeks, Bulgars, Turks, and others.”2 It is true 
that Macedonia was home to an unusual diversity of “races,” even by the 
standards of the notoriously mixed Ottoman Empire, and it is also true that 
it was a frightening place by the time of Reed’s visit; it was definitely a 
zone of violence. Reed and Pallis, like many at the time and since, assumed 
wrongly that the “fear” was an outcome of this presumably anomalous 
“mixture of races.” The violence that accompanied the unmixing of the 
same people should have taught them otherwise. The “racial” violence in 
Macedonia was not the natural outcome of (presumably) mutually hostile 
groups of people living in close proximity to one another; it was, instead, 
the combined result of three factors: adoption by the elites of the neighbor-
ing Balkan states of an exclusionary nation-state model as the only path to 
modernization and prosperity; the determined refusal of Ottoman statesmen 
to accept any political reorganization, such as autonomy, that might result 
in their loss of these territories; and the reckless pursuit by the Great Powers 
of a policy that would preserve the European balance of power until, obvi-
ously, they could not. The bizarre mingling of several languages, dialects, 
religions, and sects in an area roughly the size of Maryland was secondary 
to this tension and became a pretext for violence only after the scramble for 
territory had already started.
Macedonia was hardly unique in its ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
makeup; heterogeneity was the rule, not the exception, in imperial territo-
ries ruled by the Habsburg or the Romanov dynasties such as Transylvania, 
Moravia, Bohemia, Galicia, and the Caucuses. Although the path to na-
tional consolidation differed in each of these territories, the goals were the 
same and in each case involved violent social upheavals and transformative 
population movements. The transition from empire to nation-state created 
citizens out of subjects even as it transformed some populations into minori-
ties in their former homelands, who were then forced to leave in campaigns 
of deportation and emigration, cynically called repatriation.
In the words of Ernest Gellner, nationalism is “the general imposition of 
a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the 
lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population.”3 
Although his theory has helped to shape the debate about nations and 
nationalism for the last four decades, it has also been subjected to a good 
1. John Reed, The War in Eastern Europe, 1916.
2. A. Pallis, “Racial Migrations in the Balkans during the years 1912–1924,” Geographical 
Journal 66, no. 4 (1925), 316.
3. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, 1983), 57.
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deal of criticism.4 Like all such theoretical approaches to nationalism, Gell-
ner’s presents a universal framework to explain an ideology that has adapted 
and replicated itself in different guises with the resilience of tuberculosis bac-
teria.5 The success of nationalism in contexts where the connection between 
elites and agro-literate masses was tenuous at best and nonexistent at worst 
is particularly difficult to explain. To speak of imposition from above is to 
suggest strict limits on the agency of the very masses whose collaboration 
was necessary for the completion of the elites’ nationalist agendas. Yet it is 
hard to deny the universal role played by the elites and the high culture they 
represented—even as they embraced a romantic notion of the volk as the 
essence of the nation—in initiating the process that culminated in the foun-
dation of nation-states. The nationalist movements in the Ottoman Empire 
were no exception to this pattern.
But how did the masses connect with the elites if they did not already 
share similar values and aspirations? To answer this question, I explain in 
this book the transition to nationhood not through a textual analysis of 
the record left behind by national visionaries but through the experience 
of the common folk. I trace the paths to nationhood “in terms of the as-
sumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which 
are not necessarily national and still less nationalist,” as Eric Hobsbawm 
urges.6 This is not to deny the importance of works that have analyzed the 
course of nationalism in the Balkans based on the written work, activities, 
and testimony of national leaders, intellectuals, and elites.7 Rather, I build 
here on that framework to understand the dynamics of nation-making that 
depended on the diffusion among the peasant masses of what was essentially 
an elite ideology.
This book therefore has two axes: one follows the agendas and actions 
of state and nonstate political actors with competing visions for the region, 
and the other traces the experiences of the people who continued to make 
a living in the territory staked out between these competitors. At the center 
of my argument are the ways in which difference—religious, sectarian, 
4. For a comprehensive evaluation and critique of Gellner’s theory of nationalism, see the 
collection of essays in John Hall, ed., The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of 
Nationalism (Cambridge, 1998). For an emphatic defense, see David McCrone, The Sociology 
of Nationalism (New York, 1998), 64–84.
5. The exceptional adaptability of nationalism can be explained more easily if it is treated 
“as if it belonged with ‘kinship’ and ‘religion,’ ” as Benedict Anderson suggests, rather than as 
ideology. Imagined Communities (London, 1991), 5.
6. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality 
(Cambridge, 1990), 10.
7. Historiography is particularly rich in this regard for the Greek case; see, among many 
others, Paschalis Kitromilides, The Enlightenment as Social Criticism: Iosipos Moisiodax and 
Greek Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1992); Stathis Gourgouris, Dream Nation 
(Stanford, 1996); Peter Mackridge, Language and National Identity in Greece, 1766–1976 
(Oxford, 2009).
linguistic—was constructed and compounded.8 While acknowledging the 
roles played by literary elites and competing educational establishments, I 
do not consider these the factors that dismantled the “complex structure of 
local groups” (pace Gellner). In Ottoman Macedonia, elites and the peas-
ants were brought together through the reappropriation of existing mark-
ers of collectivity, such as religion, and through the politicization of those 
reworked differences through violence.
Nationhood, Nationalism and Eastern Backwardness
As the Cold War came to an end and communism seemed to collapse like a 
house of cards, nationalism experienced a resurgence that proved how pow-
erful it still was. It became “the hegemonic discourse of sovereignty and the 
unavoidable language of those who want to play the game of statehood.”9 
Decades later, the nation-state, far from withering after an interlude of vital-
ity, has proved extremely well suited to the globalizing world capitalist sys-
tem, which presumably thrives on transnationalism rather than nationalism. 
Because the nation-state retains its robust presence, it is all the more difficult 
to avoid a teleological bias when analyzing the emergence of nationhood, 
regardless of the context and period. Therefore, it is important, first, to sepa-
rate nationalism from nationhood: the former is a basis of political legiti-
macy, whereas the latter is a basis for collective identity. We might assume 
that nationalism follows naturally from nations, collectivities mobilized for 
attaining the ultimate goal of nationalism, namely statehood, or, as Gellner 
put it, “the congruence of the boundaries of state with those of the nation.”10 
The case studies detailed in this book demonstrate a different trajectory, how-
ever, outlining the historical process by which the category “nation” came to 
complete the ideology of nationalism.11 I consider the category “nation” pri-
marily as an interest group and nationalism as a mobilizing ideology that cre-
ates nations where they did not exist before.12 I engage with the micro rather 
 8. See Fredrik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization 
of Cultural Difference (London, 1969). Barth’s amended model resonates better with 
studies on ethnicity outside the field of anthropology; see Fredrik Barth, “Enduring and 
Emerging Issues in the Analysis of Ethnicity,” in The Anthropology of Ethnicity: Beyond 
Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, edited by Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers (Amsterdam, 
1994), 11–32.
 9. Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford, 1993) 14.
10. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1.
11. Some have even argued in favor of entirely doing away with “nation” as an analytical 
category; see Valery A. Tishkov, “Forget the ‘Nation’: Post-Nationalist Understanding of 
Nationalism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23 (2000), 625.
12. The Gellnerian tone of this statement is obvious; however, by locating the roots of 
nationhood in the process of mobilization, I veer from a strictly Gellnerian framework. In fact, 
the definitions here owe much to Barry Barnes’s theory of interest groups, which posits that an 
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than the macro level of the transition to nationness and, therefore, focus more 
on the process of nationalist mobilization than on its putative inspiration.
To speak about the emergence of nationhood as a process is to place one-
self firmly within the modernist camp of the scholarship on nationalism.13 
I do not, however, subscribe to a strictly modernist reading of nationhood, 
not least because the usual trappings of modernity did not reach the major-
ity of the people whose lives were nevertheless being claimed by fighters 
for the national cause. I do acknowledge the roots of nationalist mobiliza-
tion in earlier markers of belonging, especially in religious belonging. After 
all, even Gellner followed his famous declaration that “nationalism is not 
the awakening of nations to self consciousness” with the acknowledgment 
that it “does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even 
if . . . these are purely negative.”14 I frame the central question about the 
emergence of nationhood in the following manner: How does a transition to 
nationhood occur in the absence of the commonly accepted prerequisites for 
that process such as public education, universal conscription, industrializa-
tion, and the spread of print culture? The answer developed in this book is 
that the early subscribers of nationalism in Ottoman Macedonia—including 
members of the nascent bourgeoisies, state elites, the men and women of let-
ters, and young political activists—understood well the need to recast it in a 
new and overtly religious language. Nationalism and mass political partici-
pation went hand in hand to redefine the basis of political legitimacy in the 
nineteenth century. If the same trend were to have any shot at prevailing in 
the Ottoman Balkans, it was exigent to make it accessible to the only demo-
graphic contingent that had the potential to carry it to the mainstream—the 
peasantry. The operative realm of religion was the most effective medium 
through which the gospel of nationalism could be preached to a skeptical 
audience, and the ultimate catalyst in the process that would render free-
floating allegiances hard and fixed was political violence. In other words, vi-
olence was not a by-product of but a real force in the genesis of nation-ness.
Having spelled out violence and religion as the two major factors in the 
popularization of nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, I find it necessary to 
briefly address the possibility that the arguments of this book will be associ-
ated with two of the famous canards attributed to Balkan history and histori-
ography. The first of these is the notion, peddled especially by western media 
outlets during the breakup of Yugoslavia, that nationalism in the Balkans 
interest group is constituted by the very process of its mobilization; Barry Barnes, The Elements 
of Social Theory (Princeton, 1995).
13. Theories on the origins of nationhood are aplenty, and they do not fall into neat 
clusters. However, it is fair to say that the most visible demarcation line is between modernists 
and primordialists. Elie Kedouri’s Nationalism (London, 1960) was a milestone in the 
establishment of what later would be called the modernist paradigm or, alternatively, modernist 
orthodoxy by its critics.
14. Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London, 1964), 168.
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is, and has always been, atavistic and innately violent. The second is the 
primordialist conception of religion as the vault where nations preserved 
their core values through centuries of subordination under the Ottomans.
This book directly challenges these two stereotypes, which have long bur-
dened the study of the Balkans. Fortunately it does not stand alone; since 
1993, when Michael Ignatieff associated the term ethnic hatred with for-
mer Yugoslavia and Robert Kaplan introduced “ghosts” that apparently 
haunted the same country, scholarship on the Balkans has come a long way 
toward shedding the weight of such ahistorical notions as “national awak-
enings” and “ancient hatreds.”15 The Ottoman period has become better 
integrated into historiography in the Balkans as professional historians have 
distanced themselves from the official establishment narratives of national 
history and revisionism has become more common.16 Unfortunately, the 
attraction of facile classifications and Manichean divisions block the effect 
of scholarly writings that might trickle their way into works of general read-
ership. At the same time, despite modest gains, the resistance of education 
ministries in the Balkans to revisions in history textbooks means that stu-
dents are indoctrinated in the same narratives of national liberation and are 
conditioned to think of history as National History.17 Rogers Brubaker calls 
primordialism a “long-dead horse that writers on ethnicity and nationalism 
continue to flog.”18 In the realm of banal nationalism, however, the horse 
seems to be in rude health and still kicking.19
Historiographically, this book is part of a growing literature that seeks 
to normalize Ottoman and southeast European history. It shows that the 
transition to nationhood as experienced in Ottoman Macedonia was not 
an aberration to the purportedly serene progress of civic values enjoyed 
elsewhere. It contends that ethnic nationalism, commonly used to refer to 
Balkan nationalist movements, including those that precipitated the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire, is an analytically redundant categorization because 
violence, symbolic or physical, is the midwife of nation-ness, even in its 
15. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging (New York, 1993); Robert D. Kaplan: Balkan 
Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York, 1993). For a corrective, see Mark Mazower, 
The Balkans: A Short History (New York, 2002).
16. Yet the gains have so far been modest and uneven across countries in southeast Europe; 
for a review, see Ulf Brunnbauer, ed., (Re)Writing History: Historiography in Southeast Europe 
after Socialism (Münster, 2004).
17. For an evaluation of the records of the individual Balkan countries on this 
issue, see Christina Koulouri, ed., Clio in the Balkans: The Politics of History Education 
(Thessaloniki, 2002).
18. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in 
the New Europe (Cambridge, 1996), 15.
19. Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London, 1995). As Ronald G. Suny argues, 
“there is a selective affinity between nation, essentialism, and primordialism.” “Constructing 
Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations,” Journal of Modern History 73, no. 4 (2001), 
892. Despite what historians and theoreticians of nationalism have been writing for decades, 
primordialism, it seems, is here to stay.
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“civic” version.20 The ethnic versus civic distinction, originally developed 
by Hans Kohn and further elaborated by John Plamenatz, has served pri-
marily as a typology that distinguishes nationalism in its “eastern” versus 
“western” versions.21 Political scientists and historians alike have widely 
adopted this categorization, primarily to explain the volatility of late-comer 
(read: eastern) nationalisms as opposed to the stability enjoyed through the 
“daily plebiscite” of earlier nations.22 More recently, the civic versus ethnic 
division was implicit in the liberal defense of nationalism because it allowed 
the easy attribution of the destructive, oppressive manifestations of bigotry 
and xenophobia around the globe to the “dark gods” of nationalism and 
the prosperity of western democracies, presumably, to its better angels.23 
Nationalism, according to this scheme, is a benign, even progressive ideol-
ogy and the best foundation we have for political modernization and social 
equality; yet it can go haywire in certain “cultural” contexts. Notable ex-
ceptions notwithstanding, scholars usually see the Balkans as exhibiting this 
cultural proclivity to ethnic violence.24
There are quite a few problems with this approach. To begin with, con-
sidering the semantic proximity of and the highly elastic conceptual distinc-
tions theorists have drawn between the categories “ethnie” and “nation,” 
pitting the term ethnic against civic to qualify different forms of national-
ism serves only to bolster the assumption that ethnic nationalism is deviant 
from the norm, unique to cultures that have been late in making the leap 
from ethnie to nation.25 The categories “ethnie” and “nation” are different 
20. On the analytical shortcomings of the civic versus ethnic nationalism distinction, see 
Brubaker, “The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction between ‘Civic’ and ‘Ethnic’ 
Nationalism,” in Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective, 
edited by Hanspeter Kriesi, Klaus Armingeon, and Hannes Siegrist (Zürich, 1999), 55–71. 
Brubaker proposes that a “less ambiguous” distinction would be between “state-framed” 
and “counter-state” understandings of nationalism. The term civic nationalism has also been 
critiqued as a by-product of the necessary lore-making by the nation-state to obfuscate the 
origins of its historical evolution. For a discussion, see Bernard Yack, “The Myth of the Civic 
Nation,” Critical Review 10, no. 2 (1996): 193–211; Nicholas Xenos, “Civic Nationalism: An 
Oxymoron?” Critical Review 10, no. 2 (1996): 213–31.
21. Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East (New York, 1929); Hans Kohn, 
The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background (New York, 1944); John 
Plamenatz, “Two Types of Nationalism,” in Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an 
Idea, edited by Eugene Kamenka (London, 1976), 23–36.
22. See, for instance, Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central 
Europe, Russia & the Middle East, 1914–1923 (London, 2001). Gellner also subscribes to this 
distinction, which he finds consistent with his time zones model of nationalism in Europe; 
Nations and Nationalism, 97–101.
23. For a sophisticated defense of liberal nationalism, see Craig Calhoun, Nations Matter: 
Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream (New York, 2007).
24. Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism, 6. Valère P. Gagnon takes exception to Balkan 
exceptionalism and the presumed link between ethnic difference and violence in The Myth of 
Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s (Ithaca, 2004).
25. The state, or state-seeking, occupies a great place in discussions concerning the 
differences between an ethnie and a nation. According to Craig Calhoun, for instance, “a 
crucial difference between ethnicities and nations is that the latter are envisioned as intrinsically 
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yet cognate concepts, and they are similarly contingent and process-depen-
dent. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ethnographers 
described them as objectively distinct entities along an evolutionary or ideo-
logical spectrum. The designation ethnic nationalism, in seeking an analyti-
cal distinction between these two categories, duplicates the same assump-
tions that nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century ethnographers made (if 
with the best of intentions) while categorizing social groups.
Second, the civic designation is imprecise at best and cynical at worst, 
considering that it refers to nationalisms that motivated colonialist ventures, 
drew impenetrable boundaries between citizens and imperial subjects, and 
sustained slavery. The legacy of civic nationalism cannot be separated from 
the qualities of its flip side—state consolidation, religious purges, colonial-
ism, and racism—which ultimately made possible the homogeneity that the 
nation-state required.26 Or, as John Hall puts it, “liberal tolerance is easy 
once there is actually little to tolerate.”27
Finally, even after admitting that nationhood imbues people with a 
sense of solidarity and coherence, laying the ideal social foundation for a 
smoothly functioning and egalitarian political system, we cannot overlook 
the historical connection between mass political participation and the move 
toward national homogenization—through violence when necessary. This 
is why Michael Mann has aptly called ethnic cleansing the “dark side of 
democracy.”28
By questioning the civic versus ethnic categorization, I do not argue that 
nationalism is inherently and necessarily violent. We need to recognize, how-
ever, that changing the basis of sovereignty and establishing a nation-state, 
which is the ultimate goal of nationalism, requires certain social and politi-
cal processes that cannot easily be separated from violence.29 Even Craig 
Calhoun, who has written most empathically of nations as the ideal basis of 
democratic polities concedes the “the founding of a new nation has never 
political communities, as sources of sovereignty, while this is not central to the definition of 
ethnicities.” “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993), 229.
26. For the exclusionary and violent backgrounds to European civic nations, see Anthony 
Marx, Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism (Oxford, 2003). See also Michael 
Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge, 2005), 42–54.
27. John A. Hall, “Conditions for National Homogenizers,” in Nationalism and its 
Futures, edited by Umut Özkırımlı (New York, 2003), 25. Hall uses the terms ethnic nationalism 
and civic nationalism but argues that “civic nationalism may be as resolutely homogenizing 
as is ethnic nationalism.” John A. Hall, “Conditions for National Homogenizers,” in 
Nationalism and Its Futures, edited by Umut Özkırımlı (New York, 2003), 28. Another 
theoretical possibility, according to him, is civil nationalism, but he adds that this is mostly a 
“prescriptive” suggestion and extremely hard to achieve in practice.
28. Mann, Dark Side of Democracy.
29. Note that state-seeking is not the exclusive goal of nationalist projects. As Rogers 
Brubaker argues, another type consists of “nationalisms that aim to nationalize an existing 
polity.” Nationalism Reframed, 79. However, the nationalisms discussed in this book all 
belonged to the former category.
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been simply the uncoerced and egalitarian project of all potential citizens.”30 
Instituting the will of the nation as the source of political legitimacy requires 
social homogenization; it requires cultural, temporal, linguistic, and, in most 
cases, religious unity that can be attained only through violent means, physi-
cal or symbolic. Whether the resulting political formations legitimize this 
violence is another matter, but one that is immaterial as far as the relation-
ship between nation-making and violence is concerned.
Names and Places
The territory that was once Ottoman Macedonia now lies within the 
borders of four nation-states: the eponymous Republic, which gained its 
independence relatively recently and just as soon found itself embroiled in 
a diplomatic fight with Greece over who had the historical copyright to 
the name Macedonia; Greece, the self-proclaimed descendant of Alexander 
the Great, which contains a region called Macedonia, otherwise known as 
 Aegean Macedonia; Bulgaria, the principal claimant to the entire region at 
the turn of the twentieth century, which had to give up hope of recreating the 
borders of San Stefano Bulgaria but still includes Pirin Macedonia within 
its national borders; and finally, Albania, which currently holds a diminu-
tive section of historical Macedonia in Mala Prespa and Golo Bardo, slivers 
of territory that flank the western shores of the Prespa and Ohrid lakes. 
Despite the wars, campaigns of ethnic cleansing, and assimilation, and use 
of demographic engineering tools such as population exchanges that have 
taken place since the turn of the twentieth century, Macedonia is still an 
ethnically diverse place, but that diversity pales compared to what it was a 
century ago. Given the ultimate historical triumph of the nation-state, it is 
difficult to envision a time when it was not the norm, but we still need to ex-
plain how exactly those nations were forged and, more important, how that 
process affected the lives of those who for the first time became acquainted 
with nationhood, whether they wanted to or not.
A few words are in order concerning the term Ottoman Macedonia, which, 
it could fairly be argued, is an oxymoron because the Ottomans themselves 
never had a province called Macedonia. The questions of what and who con-
stitute Macedonia and the Macedonians has generated speculation since the 
early nineteenth century. “Macedonia is a field of illusions where nothing is 
entirely real,” wrote Maurice Gandolphe, a journalist who toured the region 
30. Calhoun, Nations Matter, 155. He adds, however, that even the “subjugation of large 
populations” that coincided with the creation of nations does not bring their legitimacy into 
question because “the new nations, especially where they embraced democracy, did create 
conditions for continued struggles for fuller citizenship” (155).
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after the Ilinden Uprising in 1903.31 Gandolphe’s professionalism may be 
subject to debate in that he was rumored to have completed his inquiries in 
the pay of Sultan Abdülhamid II and the book relating his experiences was 
unusually favorable to the Ottoman government, but his words did capture 
the elusiveness of a definition for Macedonia quite well. “A field of illusions” 
was an apt metaphor for Macedonia, not because it was “false” in a positiv-
ist sense but because Macedonia was and is still a topos that evokes mutu-
ally exclusive realities for different groups of people. Its people, on the other 
hand, with what seemed like an unnerving mix of languages and religions 
even to the best-equipped ethnographer, defied the researcher’s resolve to 
categorize them. It must have been this frustration that inspired one of them 
to declare, “Verily no country ever was in such need of a herald’s office or 
of a lunatic asylum, as Macedonia. It may be described as a region peopled 
with new-born souls wandering in quest of a body, and losing themselves in 
the search.”32 As for the geographical boundaries of the region, there was 
never a consensus on where they started and where they ended, except in the 
descriptions of those who fought for an independent Macedonia: “the topo-
graphic features of Macedonia are quite irregular and rather mountainous; 
the geographic boundaries of the country are, for the most part, natural,” 
one of them asserted.33 Henry Roberts Wilkinson, who compared “natural 
frontiers” of Macedonia based on ethnographic maps of southeast Europe, 
none of which seemed to agree with another one, concluded that “of all at-
tempts to define Macedonia, that which makes its appeal to physical geogra-
phy is the least profitable, and also the easiest to refute.”34
Nonetheless, I use the term Ottoman Macedonia in the title and through-
out the present book without further befuddling qualifiers. The logic that 
justifies such a choice was inspired by the correspondence of the superin-
tendent of Bulgaria, a high-level functionary of the Ottoman government. 
The superintendent was in trouble for having uttered the word Macedo-
nia during an interview with a reporter from Neue Freie Presse in March 
1903. During the time of Abdülhamid II, the Ottoman bureaucracy was 
not allowed to use the word Macedonia (along with many others consid-
ered harmful and seditious) in its official correspondence because the mere 
designation was considered a heinous concession to all the parties, especially 
the insurgents fighting in the region, that anticipated the Ottomans’ im-
minent and complete departure from Europe. The superintendent defended 
his choice by indicating he had explained to the reporter that calling the 
31. Maurice Gandolphe, La Crise Macédonienne: Enquête dans les Vilayets Insurgés 
(Sept.–Dec. 1903) (Paris, 1904), 1. Compare this with, for instance, Gaston Routier, La 
Macédoine et les Puissances, l’Enquête du Petit-Parisien (Paris, 1904).
32. George F. Abbott, The Tale of a Tour in Macedonia (London, 1903), 81.
33. Christ Anastasoff, The Tragic Peninsula (St. Louis, ca. 1934), 10.
34. Henry R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography 
of Macedonia (Liverpool, 1951), 2.
“contagious imperial provinces [vilâyât-i mütelâhike-i Şâhâne]” with the 
“inappropriate name of Macedonia [tâbir-i nâsavabin]” was akin to calling 
contemporary France “Gaul,” and he reaffirmed that he had used this term 
only in reference to the “malice committees [fesad komiteleri].”35
His apparent attachment to the sycophantic rules of the Hamidian bu-
reaucracy and desire to save his skin notwithstanding, the superintendent 
made a good point: Macedonia was indeed the name of an ancient kingdom 
that occasionally graced historical atlases, but in reference to a region, not 
a political entity. On the other hand, it made no sense (although he did not 
push this point too strongly) to retort with a cumbersome alternative each 
time the issue was invoked because the presence of armed political com-
mittees that called themselves Macedonian made the term Macedonia as 
current as it could be. Likewise, it was somewhat pedantic to insist on the 
term European Provinces of the Ottoman Empire to avoid using the word 
Macedonia, not least because these provinces included areas that did not 
fall under even the most generous delimitations accorded to Macedonia, but 
also because the term had been firmly placed in international parlance by 
the 1900s. Even though Rumeli, the word the Ottomans used to describe the 
territories on the western side of the Bosphorus, remained in use and Tur-
key in Europe continued to be the international designation of choice, the 
insurgency completed the task that the European geographers had started a 
generation earlier. They shifted the meaning of Macedonia from an ancient 
and legendary kingdom to that of a territory with a particularly volatile mix 
of populations. In other words, my adoption of the term Ottoman Macedo-
nia here is not meant to assign historical credence to the insurgents or the 
geographers over the Ottomans but, rather, a choice of convenience.
To continue the question of terminology, it is also necessary to explain 
the names I use throughout the book in reference to the main protagonists, 
namely the many “racial” groups of Macedonia. Finding names for the 
complex mass of humanity that made up the population of Macedonia is 
not an easy task; none of the ethnographers who undertook this endeavor 
seemed to get it right, at least according to their critiques, and one divided 
them up into no less than twenty-one distinct groups.36 Using these names 
accurately is quite another matter; one, it must be admitted, that can never 
fully be accomplished. Static epithets such as Bulgarian or Greek certainly 
fall short of describing what essentially was a situation in flux.37 On the 
35. BOA, Y.PRK.MK, April 3, 1903.
36. Sax, Carl. “Ethnographische Karte der Europäischen Türkei und ihrer Dependenzen 
zu Aufang des Jahres,” Mittheilungen der Wiener Geographischen Gesellschaft, Vol. 21 (Wien, 
1878), plate III.
37. For more on the problem of terminology, see Anastasia Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, 
Hills of Blood: Passages into Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870–1990 (Chicago, 1997), 
21–24. How a person’s nationality was to be determined became problematic, especially 
after the formation of nation-states that sought to homogenize their populations through 
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other hand, introducing additional terminology such as proto-Greeks or 
ultra-Bulgarians, following Jeremy King’s use of “Ultra-Czech” and “Ultra-
German” Bohemians,38 would not only be cumbersome but would also im-
ply that it is somehow possible to objectively distinguish the various stages 
in the transformation of Christian peasants into nationals. My solution, 
dictated by necessity, is to use terms such as “Greek,” “Bulgarian,” and 
“Vlach” in quotation marks and to convey the complexity of the situation 
by refraining from using ethnic epithets wherever possible. In direct quota-
tions from Ottoman documents I use the term Rum, which the Greek Ortho-
dox overwhelmingly used for self-reference, rather than Greek (Greeks from 
the Hellenic kingdom were called Ellines). For nationals of the Hellenic 
kingdom and the Bulgarian principality, the terms Greek and Bulgarian, 
respectively, are used without quotation marks.39 Religious affiliation, also 
extremely fluid at the time, is treated in a similar manner, the terms Greek 
Orthodox, Patriarchist, and Exarchist refer to self-declared followers of the 
Patriarchate and the Exarchate.40
Equally (if not more) fraught is the choice of a designation for the Balkan 
Slavic dialects spoken by the residents of Macedonia at the time. There is a 
good argument to be made in favor of Bulgarian because this was the term 
of choice for most of the contemporaries, including the locals. Yet this is 
a highly problematic choice because the distinction between Macedonian 
and Bulgarian is a result of locally variant dialects and was certainly dis-
cernible in the nineteenth century, not least because Bulgarian had already 
been codified based on the dialect spoken in the northeastern parts of the 
country (especially that of Veliko Turnovo). It is important to understand 
that South Slavic dialects constitute a geographical continuum with zones 
of transition and that the differences between the modern standard ver-
sions of these languages rely heavily on the dialect that was chosen to be 
the basis of the national language during the period of standardization, 
this choice itself being constitutive of the national identities it presumably 
reflected.41
demographic and social engineering tools such as “population exchanges.” See, for instance, 
Theodora Dragostinova, Between Two Motherlands: Nationality and Emigration among the 
Greeks of Bulgaria, 1900–1949 (Ithaca, 2011).
38. Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian 
Politics (Princeton, 2002).
39. Greek or Bulgarian citizenship, of course, was not necessarily isomorphic with Greco/
Bulgarophony. For more on this issue, see Victor Friedman, “Macedonian Language and 
Nationalism during the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” Balkanistica 2 (1975): 83–
98. Many thanks to Dimitar Bechev for pointing out that for the Slavs, “risjanin” (Christian) 
or “Bugar” were commonly used in self-reference.
40. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople did not recognize the Exarchate as a 
legitimate Orthodox church after the Schism of 1872.
41. Victor Friedman, “Language in Macedonia as an Identity Construction Site,” in 
When Languages Collide: Perspectives on Language Confl ict, Language Competition, and 
Language Coexistence, edited by Brian D. Joseph, Johanna Destefano, Niel G. Jacobs, and 
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Where does this leave us, then, with regard to naming the Slavic dialects 
spoken across Macedonia at the turn of the twentieth century? What differ-
ence does it make as far as daily patterns of speech are concerned that there 
certainly existed—at least among the intellectuals—a consciousness about 
geographical variance in Slavic dialects and that some argued in favor of 
a split between Macedonian and Bulgarian? It means that someone from 
Plovdiv would not be speaking the same dialect as a resident of Ohrid circa 
1900. This does not, however, change the fact that both would likely have 
called the language they spoke Bulgarian and found common ground between 
them to communicate with few, if any, difficulties, especially if the Ohrid resi-
dent had been through formal schooling. In other words, although we need 
to acknowledge this variance, we should not ascribe a national meaning or 
national preference to the terms people used for the language they spoke. 
This is not only because nationality and language were not isomorphic in 
this context but also because neither had yet acquired the exclusive mean-
ings that the nation-state assigned them. Moreover, we should not assume 
that language built insurmountable barriers between communities. Interac-
tions in the marketplace were common enough between speakers of Greek 
(or Rumca or Romaika, as the locals would have called it) and Slavic—not 
to mention all the other languages used by the residents of Macedonia.42 
More strikingly, intermarriages were also common enough among Greek and 
Slavic speakers.43 In most of these cases, the marriage served as an agent of 
Hellenization—which underscores the point that the struggle of Bulgarian 
and Macedonian intellectuals against the hegemony of Greek over the Slavic 
speakers of Macedonia was more vital than their own differences as to which 
dialect should serve as the basis of a standardized language.44
Almost all the case studies discussed in this book, especially in the last three 
chapters, come from communities in the district of Serres and neighboring 
Ilse Eliste (Columbus, 2003), 257–98. It has been argued that the Central Macedonian dialect 
was chosen to form the basis of standard literary Macedonian because it also happened to be 
the dialect “most unlike Serbian and Bulgarian.” Stephen E. Palmer Jr. and Robert R. King, 
Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question (Hamden, 1971), 155.
42. Anastasia Karakasidou showcases the role of the marketplace, which she calls 
a “forum of cross-boundary transaction” in creating communities that overcame linguistic 
barriers. Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood, p. 75; for more on the marketplace, or the aghora, 
see esp. 54–76.
43. Karakasidou notes that after the Balkan wars Slavic-speaking women from other 
villages around Guvezna, a Greek-speaking village, who had married Guvezna men were 
“actively forbidden by their husbands to speak Slavic at home or to teach it to their children.” 
Ibid., 125. Mixed marriages also occurred among Greeks and Bulgarians in Bulgaria, some 
families following the Greek custom of the husband living with the family of the wife; 
Dragostinova, Between Two Motherlands, 182–83.
44. In the nineteenth century, marrying into a Hellenizing family indicated upward social 
mobility; Galia Valtchinova, “Nationalism at Symbolic Work: Social Disintegration and the 
National Turn in Melnik and Stanimaka,” in Confl icting Loyalties in the Balkans: The Great 
Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Nation-Building, edited by Hannes Grandits, Nathalie 
Clayer and Robert Pichler (London, 2011), 231.
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areas in the province of Salonika, roughly corresponding to the southern 
Struma Valley. This region is currently divided between Bulgaria and Greece, 
in Pirin and Aegean Macedonia, respectively. Starting with the Balkan Wars, 
successive waves of emigration, deportation, ethnic cleansing, and assimila-
tion sorted its population in nation-states aspiring for homogeneity. At the 
turn of the twentieth century, the outlook was strikingly different: these 
communities were suspended in the quickly narrowing space between em-
pire and nation. Not only were people’s self-ascriptions of identity labile 
and fluid, but so too was the content of the languages that facilitated daily 
interaction. Therefore, the term Bulgarian as it is used in this book should 
be understood to refer to the territorial dialects of Macedonia (which are 
quite different than standard Macedonian) as well as standard Bulgarian.
I must add that by making this distinction I am not taking a position on 
the question of Macedonian ethnogenesis. This book is a plea to understand 
the dynamics behind the makings of nationhood—but a genealogy of the 
Macedonian nation it is not. All nation-making efforts involve projecting 
the putative nation into antiquity, as if it were a stable entity with a shelf 
life of millennia, and the Macedonian case is no exception to this practice. 
The issue here is not to test the validity of modern Macedonian national-
ists’ claims against the claims of competing national agendas.45 As long as 
there are thousands of people who call themselves Macedonians, as distinct 
from Greeks or Bulgarian Macedonians, the insistence that they are con-
fusing a communist supra-identity with genuine nationhood—however we 
define it—is intellectual thuggery. Their sense of belonging to a particular 
nation is no less valid than that of any other national group, and their na-
tional identity is no less authentic than others. On the other hand, this does 
not mean that we should read the events that took place in Macedonia at 
the turn of the twentieth century in a manner consistent with the official 
historiography of the Republic of Macedonia, which maintains that the 
revolutionary movement against Ottoman rule in Macedonia was a libera-
tion struggle of the Macedonian nation, or espouse the Skopje-based notion 
that all Slavs who inhabit geographic Macedonia are the co-nationals of 
modern Macedonians.46
45. For a discussion of the contested meanings of Macedonian see Jane K. Cowan and 
Keith Brown, “Introduction: Macedonian Inflections,” in Macedonia: The Politics of Identity 
and Difference, edited by Jane K. Cowan (London, 2000), 1–28. Hugh Poulton’s Who Are 
the Macedonians? (Bloomington, 2000) focuses on the citizens of the contemporary Republic. 
Even though it focuses on the conflict between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia over 
ownership of the term Macedonian, Loring Danforth’s anthropological study, which is based 
on ethnographic research done in Melbourne, Australia, remains a reference on the topic of 
modern Macedonian nationhood; Loring M. Danforth, The Macedonian Confl ict: Ethnic 
Nationalism in a Transnational World (Princeton, 1995).
46. Ulf Brunnbauer notes that, although the “first generation of Macedonian historians 
traced the emergence of the Macedonian nation back to the beginning of the nineteenth century,” 
an important break occurred after the Stalin-Tito split (Ulf Brunnbauer, “Historiography, 
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It is not, to be sure, only Macedonian nationalist historians who saw the 
first indications of a Macedonian national identity in the Internal Macedo-
nian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO; Internal Organization)47 agenda 
and conflict with the Exarchate.48 There was, in fact, an undeniable at-
tachment to the ideas of autonomy for Macedonia and action independent 
of Bulgaria in the program and manifestos of IMRO from its inception, 
which can reasonably be considered as indication of a separate Macedo-
nian identity. Whether that attachment should be viewed exclusively as 
one borne out of nationalism is, however, a different matter. The modern 
Macedonian historiographic equation of demands for autonomy with a 
separate and distinct national identity does not necessarily jibe with the 
historical record. A rather obvious problem is the very title of the organiza-
tion, which included the word Thrace in addition to Macedonia—Thrace 
was a region, as Tchavdar Marinov points out, “whose population was 
never claimed by modern Macedonian nationalism.”49 As for the tension 
between the Exarchate and the Internal Organization, that has been read 
as symptomatic of IMRO uneasiness with Bulgarian influence; we should 
not lose sight of the facts that promoting membership in the Exarchate was 
the principal means of IMRO propaganda and mobilization, and that the 
schoolteachers who doubled as IMRO recruiters were appointed to their 
posts by the Exarchate.
There is, moreover, the not less complicated issue of what autonomy 
meant to the people who espoused it in their writings. According to Hristo 
Tatarchev, one of the leaders of IMRO, their demand for autonomy was 
motivated not by an attachment to Macedonian national identity but out of 
concern that an explicit agenda of unification with Bulgaria would provoke 
Myths and the Nation in the Republic of Macedonia,” in Brunnbauer, (Re)Writing History, 
178.) Now, the origins were traced further back in time, to the medieval empire of Tsar Samuil, 
who was appropriated as Macedonian rather than Bulgarian. In the 1990s, when Greece 
started a campaign to deny the use of the name Macedonia to the newly independent Republic, 
Macedonian historiography carried the origins back even earlier, to antiquity. For more on the 
myths of origin of the Macedonian nation, see Brunnbauer, “Historiography, Myths and the 
Nation in the Republic of Macedonia,” 176–86.
47. I use the common acronym IMRO for this organization throughout the book, 
even though it is not strictly accurate; this acronym dates from 1918. Over the years, the 
organization acquired many different names that can be Latinized in various forms, and it 
originally included Adrianople in its title, so VMRO, IMARO, VMORO, and TMARO are 
alternative acronyms. For the various titles and short biographies of the leaders of IMRO 
see Dimitar Bechev, The Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Macedonia (Plymouth and 
Maryland, 2009).
48. See, for instance, Fikret Adanır, Die Makedonische Frage: Ihre Entstehung und 
Entwicklung bis 1908 (Wiesbaden, 1979).
49. Bulgarian and Macedonian nationalists have different reasons for disputing the 
various names of the organization. Marinov notes that, even though to date no record has 
been found to verify the claim, Bulgarian historians assume that the original name was 
Bulgarian Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Revolutionary Committees; Tchavdar Marinov, “We, 
the Macedonians,” in We, the People: Politics of National Peculiarity in Southeastern Europe, 
edited by Diana Mishkova (Budapest, 2009), 114–15.
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other small Balkan nations and the Great Powers to action.50 Macedonian 
autonomy, in other words, can be seen as a tactical diversion, or, as Marinov 
calls it, the “Plan B” of Bulgarian unification.51 As problematic as it is to 
accept the plans for an autonomous entity modeled after Switzerland as the 
progenitor of the modern Macedonian nation-state, simply capitulating to 
Bulgarian nationalists’ claims (i.e., that Macedonian Slavs were in fact Bul-
garian) or to Greek nationalists’ dismissal (i.e., that Macedonian Christians 
did not know what they were) does not do justice to the people who lost 
their lives as these competing national projects claimed their loyalty.52 Here, 
it would behoove us to pause and consider whether by thinking of them as 
either this or that we place ourselves in an analytical straight jacket symp-
tomatic of our own internalization of the notion that national conscious-
ness is inherently exclusive and immutable.53 It is instructive to note that 
Jane Sandansky, the fiercely independent leader of the IMRO left wing, had 
a slightly different justification for demanding autonomy, which involved 
keeping Macedonia within the Ottoman framework to maintain its territo-
rial integrity. These plans did not necessarily include an ethnic purge as the 
basis of a nation-state. An important distinction that often gets lost in the 
tunnel vision of nation-states is that state-seeking is not necessarily indica-
tive of nation-state-seeking, at least in the sense that we overwhelmingly 
understand the nation-state to be—ethnically homogenous and territorially 
stable. Despite the myths of national purity and continuity that came to 
dominate the official historiographies in the Balkans—as elsewhere—there 
is not much to be gained from a search for Macedonian national lineage as 
if it was already there to be discovered and tagged. The politics of modern 
Macedonian nationhood, on the other hand, is another matter altogether, 
the defining elements of which were shaped more in the decades following 
World War II than in the prelude to World War I.54
The struggle for Macedonia at the turn of the twentieth century is a 
difficult story to relate because it was not simply a war fought between states 
with conventional armies. It was not a purely diplomatic crisis either. It was 
a protracted conflict, finally a civil war, fought as an insurgency, where the 
50. It is important to note that Tatarchev wrote this in 1928 in Bulgaria; Mehmet 
Hacısalihoğlu, Jön Türkler ve Makedonya Sorunu (Istanbul, 2008), 47.
51. Marinov, “We, the Macedonians,” 119.
52. Dimo Hadzidimov was the chief architect of the federative Switzerland model; see 
Hacısalihoğlu, Jön Türkler ve Makedonya Sorunu, 122.
53. For comparison, see Marinov’s discussion of the Lozars’ (publishers of the 
literary magazine Loza [The Vine]) seemingly perplexing loyalty to both the Bulgarian and 
Macedonian causes, which, as he points out, was “hardly surprising.” Marinov, “We, the 
Macedonians,” 120–21.
54. The classic work on communism and the politics of Macedonian nationality in the 
English language is Palmer and King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question. 
Marinov’s recent work focuses more explicitly on the link between Yugoslav communism and 
the construction of Macedonian national consciousness and also covers the period after the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia; Tchavdar Marinov, La Question Macédonienne de 1944 à Nos 
Jours: Communism et Nationalisme dans les Balkans (Paris, 2010).
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lines separating fighter from civilian, perpetrator from victim, traitor from 
hero, were not clearly drawn. When it comes to Macedonia, we should keep 
in mind that even the commemoration of national heroes is fraught well be-
yond the selective reading and polishing of history common to all nationalist 
hagiographies.55
Organization of the Book
In this book, I engage with historiography at three main levels: the con-
struction of nationhood and nation-states, Ottoman imperial disintegration, 
and, finally and more specifically, the role of violence in these two pro-
cesses. I contend that looking at violence as incidental to nation-making 
and imperial disintegration obscures the role that violence actually played 
as an independent variable in creating the differences and animosities that 
were purportedly its cause. In the first two chapters, I introduce the better-
known historical actors of the Macedonian Question and summarize the 
events that constituted the larger background against which the remain-
ing four chapters should be read. The first chapter provides the historical 
background to the crisis in Macedonia, starting with the integration of the 
Ottoman Empire into the Concert of Europe after the Crimean War, and its 
 transformation into the sick man of Europe, and ending with the period of 
European- enforced reforms in Ottoman Macedonia and the Constitutional 
revolution in 1908 (otherwise known as the “Young Turk” revolution) in 
the Ottoman Empire, which, despite the initial euphoria it generated, pre-
cipitated a much worse conflict and hastened the end of Ottoman presence 
in Europe. The second chapter, “From Ecclesiastical to National Space,” 
focuses on the religious and secular elites’ (often divergent) agendas of na-
tional consolidation. I discuss the establishment of the Exarchate, one of 
the formative events in the struggle for Macedonia, as well as the rivalry 
between the Greek and Bulgarian camps to socialize the youth of Macedonia 
into a national mold through education.
In the third chapter, I trace the development of an interest in the cartog-
raphy and the ethnography of the European provinces of the Ottoman 
 Empire in the early nineteenth century. A series of geographical works and 
ethnographic maps demonstrates how the nation first was imagined as a 
blueprint on a map before its boundaries were drawn across the land and 
the people. In the fourth chapter, I take up the highly controversial and 
55. For more on this issue, see James Frussetta, “Common Heroes, Divided Claims: 
IMRO between Macedonia and Bulgaria,” in Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of 
Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe, edited by John Lampe and Mark Mazower (Budapest, 
2004), 110–30. The ambiguous place of Ilinden in Macedonian historiography is discussed in 
Keith Brown, “A Rising to Count On: Ilinden between Politics and History in Post-Yugoslav 
Macedonia,” in The Macedonian Question: Culture, Historiography, Politics, edited by Victor 
Roudometof (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2000), 143–72.
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 politicized issue of population counts. The main focus of this chapter is the 
population count of 1905–1906, which recorded people’s sectarian affilia-
tions on their identity cards. The experience of those counted (the inhabi-
tants of Macedonia) as well as the counters shows how this exercise of 
state power influenced people’s self-perceptions of their ethnic and religious 
identities.
In the fifth chapter, I analyze the escalation of the sectarian tension within 
the Orthodox Church into a full-blown conflict and its absorption into the 
fight for territorial gain through struggles over sacred spaces, such as church 
buildings and parish schools. Here I contrast the visions of nationalist lead-
ers and state actors with the reality of the peasants’ worldview and expose 
how the actions of nationalist elites and guerrilla leaders politicized religion, 
making it a frame of reference for national belonging. The sixth and final 
chapter, is a taxonomy of physical violence and the conceptual culmination 
of the book as a whole. In this chapter, I substantiate the image of a world 
coming undone using archival evidence read against a framework informed 
by recent theoretical literature on political violence, most notably the work 
of Stathis Kalyvas. I analyze the process through which neighbors became 
enemies and people lost their trust in all the institutions they should have 
relied on for protection: the state, the military, the guerrillas, and the na-
tional elites—and even representatives of European Powers stationed in the 
region. The questions of indigenous violence and the motives and degree of 
involvement of civilians in acts of violence against members of rival groups 
take center state in this chapter, whereby a pattern and logic to the seemingly 
all-pervasive and indiscriminate violence emerge.
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The primary and most essential factor in the problem [of the Near East] 
is then, the presence, embedded in the living flesh of Europe, of an 
alien substance. That substance is the Ottoman Turk.
—J. A. R. Marriott, 1917
The Crimean War marked the accession of the Ottoman Empire into the Concert of Europe, which, ironically, was also a confirmation of Ottoman dependency on external 
power to preserve its territorial integrity.1 The positive publicity and sympa-
thy the Crimean War generated in favor of the Ottomans faded as quickly 
as it appeared. No sooner had the ink on the Paris Treaty dried than the 
Ottomans found themselves back in the position they would occupy until 
the end of the empire: as an entity too big to be dismantled without major 
disruption to the European balance of power. Even though the Great Powers 
kept up the appearance of preserving Ottoman sovereignty on paper, this 
policy did not extend to cases where the Sublime Porte could be coerced into 
concessions that would not directly alter the status quo to the point of caus-
ing an open conflict among the Powers. Crises such as the uprising in Crete 
and the violent conflict in Mount Lebanon were resolved with the interven-
tion of the Great Powers and resulted in special administrative status for 
the island and an internal constitution for Mount Lebanon. For this reason, 
understanding the shifting relations between the European Powers and their 
ambitions beyond southeastern Europe would become the cornerstone of 
1. In the words of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha: “While Rumelia, the most precious of European 
lands was under Ottoman control, the Europeans refused to consider the Sublime State as 
European. After the Crimean War, the Sublime State was included in the European state 
system.” Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Ma’ruzat (Istanbul, 1980), 2, quoted in Selim Deringil, The 
Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 
1876–1909 (London, 1999), 135–49. The wording of the treaty, while confirming the 
membership of the Ottoman Empire in the Concert of Europe, did not explicitly guarantee 
territorial integrity; Roderic Davison, “Ottoman Diplomacy and Its Legacy,” in The Imperial 
Legacy, edited by L. Carl Brown (New York, 1996), 174–201. As later crises showed, this was 
an important omission, and the Ottomans sought a formal alliance with a European Power 
until the outbreak of World War I; Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The 
Ottoman Empire and the First World War (Cambridge, 2008).
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Ottoman foreign policy, which, despite its obvious shortcomings, managed 
to preserve the standing of the empire as a member of the European Powers 
until the dawn of the twentieth century.
As the Ottomans responded to their growing loss of prestige among the 
European Powers with successive reform attempts, they met with obstacles 
from within and without that demonstrated the limited potential of these 
reforms for lasting change. Their diplomatic and military dependency was 
accompanied by growing indebtedness to European financial institutions, 
which eventually resulted in the Ottomans’ loss of control over their pub-
lic finances when they became unable to service their debt and had to de-
clare bankruptcy in 1876.2 The financial crisis was partially averted in late 
1879 when the government reached an agreement with domestic creditors 
to forgo its “indirect revenues from stamp, spirits, and fishing taxes, the silk 
tithe, and salt and tobacco monopolies.”3 When the arrangement, overseen 
by the Ottoman Bank and other local creditors, turned out to be a success, 
it drew the ire of foreign debtors, who wanted a restructuring of the Otto-
man foreign debt and lobbied their governments to force the Ottomans to 
the negotiation table. The result was the establishment of the Public Debt 
Administration in 1881, which essentially handed direct control over Otto-
man public finances to debtor governments by forcing the Ottoman govern-
ment to agree to relinquish a considerable part of its tax revenues for the 
payment of the foreign debt.4
As the financial crisis unfolded, a series of crises of another nature was 
brewing in the Balkans that would culminate in one of the worst disasters 
of the nineteenth century for the Ottomans. The first sign of trouble came 
from Hercegovina. Facing a financial crisis and dwindling tax revenues from 
Anatolia following the double calamities of draught and flood in the early 
1870s, the government had put an undue tax burden on the peasants of 
Rumeli. In 1874, the peasants of Hercegovina rebelled, refusing to pay their 
taxes. Soon the rebellion had spread to Bosnia, and it seemed that Bul-
garia and Serbia were getting ready to join in a general insurrection. Despite 
promises of reform by the Sublime Porte, the insurgents were not satisfied 
and pushed on against the Ottoman troops sent to quell the revolt. Coin-
ciding with the first phase of the Ottoman government insolvency crisis, 
the situation was dire enough to warrant Great Power intervention, which 
came in the form of a note presented to the Sublime Porte in January 1876.5 
2. For developments leading up to the financial crisis of 1875 and the subsequent 
establishment of the Public Debt Administration, see Edhem Eldem, “Ottoman Financial 
Integration with Europe: Foreign Loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman Public Debt,” 
European Review 13, no. 3 (2005): 431–45.
3. Ibid., 441.
4. For the restructuring of Ottoman debt and the institutional composition of the 
Public Debt Administration, see Emine Kıray, Osmanlı’da Ekonomik Yapı ve Dış Borçlar 
(Istanbul, 1995).
 5. F. A. K. Yasamee, Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 
(Istanbul, 1996).
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The Andrassy note, as it was called after Habsburg Foreign Minister Gyula 
Count Andrássy, who drafted it, required further reforms than those already 
promised by the Ottomans concerning local representative governance, tax 
reform, and religious liberty. The Sublime Porte accepted the note with the 
exception of the provision calling for direct local taxation in Bosnia Herce-
govina; the insurgents, however, were not satisfied.6
In early May 1876, the Ottomans had to confront another diplomatic 
nightmare in Salonika when a Muslim mob, agitated by news that a Bul-
garian girl who had come to town to convert to Islam had been seized by 
Christians and taken to the U.S. vice consul’s residence, attacked and killed 
the French and German consuls who were trying to mediate the conflict.7 
It seemed that there was no end to troubles in spring 1876, and the worst 
was yet to come. In April, a group of Bulgarian revolutionaries gathered 
outside Panagiurishte to discuss the course of action for a rebellion soon to 
take place. One among their numbers was an informer, who went straight 
to the Ottoman authorities to report the plans, and the revolutionaries were 
ambushed. When they retaliated and were soon joined by groups elsewhere 
in the region, the April Uprising began.8 The rebellion lasted about a fort-
night and was brutally suppressed by the Ottomans with assistance from 
groups of başıbozuks, or irregulars, many of whom were apparently Cir-
cassian refugees from the Caucasus who had settled in the area after being 
driven out by the tsar’s armies in the 1860s.9 The worst of the atrocities oc-
curred in Batak.10 The final death toll was estimated to be 10,000–15,000. 
As the irregulars went on a murderous rampage, local Muslim peasants re-
portedly “gave shelter to the revolutionaries on occasion, refused payment, 
and did not inform the authorities.”11
 6. Ibid. See also John A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in 
European Diplomacy (Oxford, 1947), 318–25.
 7. Mark Mazower, Salonika, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430–1950 
(New York, 2004), 160–63.
 8. The starting date was in April, according to the Julian calendar. Duncan Perry, Stefan 
Stambolov and the Emergence of Modern Bulgaria, 1870–1895 (Durham, 1993), 29–30.
 9. Marin V. Pundeff, “Bulgarian Nationalism,” in Nationalism in Eastern Europe, edited 
by Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (Seattle, 1969), 118; Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: 
The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1912 (Princeton, 1996), 60. Large numbers 
of Circassians, escaping Russian armies, were settled in the Ottoman Empire starting in 1862. 
According to Kemal Karpat, these migrations “radically affected the social, ethnic, and religious 
composition of the Ottoman state.” Ottoman Population, 1830–1914 (Madison, 1985), 66.
10. The Batak massacre was the subject of a national controversy in Bulgaria in 2008, 
when Martina Baleva and Ulf Brunnbauer organized a conference with the main theme of 
the memory of the massacre in Bulgarian national consciousness. The conference did not 
take place because of protests, but the would-be presentations were published as Martina 
Baleva and Ulf Brunbauer, eds., Batak: Das Bulgarischer Erinnerungsort (Berlin, 2008). The 
protesters were not just a fringe group of extreme nationalists but also included, among 
others, members of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. For a critical evaluation of the Batak 
controversy, see Evelina Kelbechova, “The Short History of Bulgaria for Export,” in Religion, 
Ethnicity, and Contested Nationhood in the Former Ottoman Space, edited by Jørgen Nielsen 
(Leiden, 2012), 223–48.
11. Perry, Stefan Stambolov, 31.
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The massacres, or the “Bulgarian horrors,” as the tragic event was named 
by William Gladstone’s pamphlet, irrevocably destroyed what little remained 
of the positive publicity the Ottomans had briefly enjoyed at the time of the 
Crimean Wars. Gladstone, British member of Parliament and former pre-
mier, used the reports of unspeakable violence to rejuvenate his political 
career by attacking the conservative government, which, in his estimation, 
had stood by while innocent Christians were massacred. Gladstone also 
gave voice to what would remain the liberal European public opinion of 
 Ottoman Turks, who were, in his memorable words, “upon the whole, from 
the black day when they first entered Europe, the one anti-human speci-
men of humanity.”12 The Ottomans certainly did not fail to deliver more 
material to confirm this opinion, as racist as it may have been, during the 
decades that followed. The notion that the “Turks” must be thrown out of 
Europe with their “bag and baggage” was only reinforced as news of further 
atrocities against Bulgarians, Armenians, and other Christian communities 
periodically circulated, followed by increasingly hollow-sounding promises 
of reparation, retribution, and reform.13
The month of May had one more crisis in store before it came to a close: a 
coup d’état in Istanbul deposed Sultan Abdülaziz and brought to the throne 
his nephew Murad V, who had a psychological breakdown only three months 
after his accession and was replaced by Abdülhamid II in August 1876. As 
the rebellion in Bosnia went on, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the 
Ottoman Empire in July. Montenegrin forces were able to hold their own, 
but the ill-prepared Serbian army proved to be no match for the Ottoman 
forces. Worse, hopes of a general Balkan rebellion were dashed, and Russia 
was not initially forthcoming with military assistance. In October, after the 
Ottoman army started to advance into the Morava valley, Russia finally in-
tervened and presented an ultimatum to the Sublime Porte.14 In November 
an armistice was signed, but the Bosnian rebellion carried on. In Decem-
ber the Great Powers convened in Constantinople to discuss the terms of a 
new reform program that would be imposed on the Sublime Porte. Sultan 
Abdülhamid II took them by surprise by announcing that a parliamentary 
constitution had been proclaimed, making the reform proposals redundant. 
Count Pavel Ignatieff, the Russian representative, immediately withdrew 
from the conference, but the remaining diplomats formulated a revised set of 
demands and presented them to the Sublime Porte. The new terms included 
“concession of autonomy to Bosnia and Hercegovina and Bulgaria under 
an international commission.”15 The conference broke up after the sultan 
12. William E. Gladstone, The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East (London, 
1876), 9.
13. Ibid., 31.
14. Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National 
States, 1804–1920 (Seattle, 1986), 145.
15. Marriott, Eastern Question, 332–33.
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categorically refused these terms. Russia had threatened war, and now it 
seemed inevitable.
The Russo-Ottoman war of 1877–1878, one of the pivotal events of Eu-
ropean history, started on June 22, after the Russian army, already mobi-
lized at the Romanian border, marched south across the Danube. The other 
theater of war was in the Caucasus, where the Russians advanced as far as 
Erzurum. On the Balkan front, they were met with unexpected resistance in 
Pleven, which the Ottoman troops held until December. The fall of Pleven 
changed the course of the war, galvanizing Serbia and Greece to commit to 
the action, albeit a little too late. By the time they mobilized, the Russians 
had signed an armistice with the Ottomans.16 Adrianople fell on January 20, 
1878, and the Russian army proceeded to Agia Stefanos, or San Stefano, a 
suburb of the imperial capital. The peace treaty of San Stefano, signed on 
March 3, 1878, came as a shock to Serbia, Romania, and Greece, as well 
as Austria-Hungary. Bulgaria was the indisputable winner: the borders of 
“Greater Bulgaria” drawn up by the San Stefano treaty could satisfy even 
the most ambitious Bulgarian nationalists’ territorial aspirations. They were 
formed by the Danube in the north, the Rhodope Mountains in the south, 
the Black Sea coast in the east, and Vardar and Morava valleys in the west. 
The territories included most of Macedonia and even had an opening to the 
Aegean near Kavala and the Gulf of Orfano, although Salonika and Edirne, 
two other prizes the Bulgarians would have liked, were left out.17 Montene-
gro, having nearly tripled its territory, was the other winner.
The treaty was in complete violation of the Reichstadt Convention of July 
1876, an agreement between the Russian and Habsburg foreign ministers 
in which the two countries pledged to partition the Ottoman Balkans if the 
Balkan states won a victory against the Ottomans, “but with the provision 
that no great Balkan state should be established.”18 The British were not 
happy with its terms either, which, according to Lord Beaconsfield (Benja-
min Disraeli), would “make the Black Sea as much a Russian Lake as the 
Caspian.” A detachment of the British fleet, which was already at Besika 
Bay, was ready to sail into the Marmara Sea, ostensibly for “the protection 
of British subjects in Constantinople,” but action was halted after the sultan, 
fearing a Russian reaction, pleaded with the British to remain where they 
were.19 Pressure to revise the terms of the treaty was mounting from another 
side—the Austrians, mobilized in the Carpathians, and the Emperor Francis 
16. Jelavich and Jelavich, Establishment of the Balkan National States, 153.
17. The Russian ambassador, Count Ignatieff, who had played an active role in the 
establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate was also the “chief architect” of the St. Stefano 
treaty Bulgaria and, apparently, at one point had considered including Salonika within its 
borders because it was “the birthplace of Cyril and Methodius.” Pundeff, “Bulgarian 
Nationalism,” 120.
18. Jelavich and Jelavich, Establishment of the Balkan National States, 147.
19. Marriott, Eastern Question, 339.
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Joseph demanded that a congress be held in Vienna. As Şükrü Hanioğlu puts 
it: “Russian territorial gains at the expense of the Ottomans were one thing; 
the wholesale transformation of the Balkans into a Slavic federation under 
Russian hegemony was another matter altogether.”20 Finally, the Russians 
agreed to a revision, but the congress would be held in Berlin, not Vienna, 
under Otto von Bismarck’s “honest brokerage.”21
The status of the Ottoman Empire as a secondary power at the congress 
could not have been made clearer than in the words of the host, Chancellor 
Bismarck, apparently fortified with “full tumblers of port”: “If you think 
the Congress has met for Turkey,” he told Karatheodoris Pasha, a Phanariot 
diplomat and the head of the Ottoman delegation, “disabuse yourselves. 
San Stefano would have remained unaltered, if it had not touched certain 
European interests.”22 It certainly was altered: Bulgaria, which appeared as 
an immense satellite of Russia in the Balkans, was now partitioned in a way 
that did not threaten British and Austrian zones of influence. None of the 
Balkan states sat at the table during the congress. They were relegated to the 
kids’ table, so to speak, having been allowed to send representatives to par-
ticipate in a separate session that did not have any binding power over the 
outcome. In the end, Macedonia was restored to the Ottomans on the con-
dition of their implementing reforms to improve the living conditions of its 
Christian inhabitants. Similar reforms were called for in the Six Provinces of 
Eastern Anatolia to protect the Armenian population from the exactions of 
Kurdish and Circassian marauders. What remained of Bulgaria was divided 
into two parts: the Principality in the north, between the Balkans and the 
Danube, and the province of Eastern Rumelia in the south. The latter would 
nominally remain under Ottoman sovereignty but retain autonomy under a 
Christian governor approved by the Great Powers. In sum, the Bulgaria that 
emerged out of the Congress of Berlin had only 37.5 percent of the territory 
accorded to the Bulgaria of the San Stefano treaty, which for Bulgarians 
remained “the real Bulgaria” so that “the new Bulgarian state was to enter 
into life with a ready-made programme for territorial expansion and a burn-
ing sense of the injustice meted out to it by the great powers.”23
None of the Balkan states returned from Berlin with a territorial gain 
that satisfied its desires. Nor was the restoration of Ottoman sovereignty 
in Macedonia and Thrace a diplomatic victory for the Ottomans. On the 
contrary, it essentially marked the end of centuries of Ottoman presence in 
the Balkans. The Ottoman Turks, the “alien substance” in the “living flesh 
20. Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton, 2008), 121.
21. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, 67–68. Apparently Lord Beaconsfield (Benjamin 
Disraeli) dominated the congress with his personality, prompting the following remark from 
Bismarck: “Der alte Jude, das ist der Mann.” Quoted in Marriott, Eastern Question, 341.
22. Quoted in Leften S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York, 2000), 410.
23. Richard J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria (Cambridge, 1997), 83–84.
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of Europe” were on their way out of the continent for good.24 The Otto-
man Empire had lost “more than a third of its territory and much of its 
non-Muslim population.”25 It had to cede control of Bosnia Hercegovina 
to Austria. Russia retained Bessarabia as well as its acquisitions in the east: 
Batum, Kars, and Ardahan. Britain took control of Cyprus under a separate 
convention. Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania were recognized as inde-
pendent states. Greece was not immediately accorded any territorial gains, 
but a conference held in Berlin two years later made a frontier settlement in 
its favor. As a result, the Hellenic Kingdom extended its borders to include 
Thessaly and Epirus in 1882. All these border changes were accompanied by 
voluntary and involuntary emigrations of large numbers of Muslims from 
former Ottoman territories into the receding empire.26 The aim of the Con-
gress of Berlin had been to prevent a total breakdown of the Concert of 
Europe; this it did, but only temporarily and at a high cost. Its higher aim, 
to settle the Eastern Question, was quite far from fulfilled. The political map 
of southeastern Europe that emerged as a result of the Congress of Berlin 
would precipitate decades of violent struggle for territory and set in motion 
events that ultimately resulted in the deaths, deportations, and ethnic cleans-
ing of thousands of people. The epicenter of the first round of the struggle 
was Macedonia, a region that did not easily lend itself to partition along 
ethnic lines.
The Establishment of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization and the Supreme Committee
When the Bulgarian Principality united with Eastern Rumelia in 1885 as 
the result of a swift coup by revolutionaries on either side of the Balkans, 
and with the acquiescence of Alexander of Battenberg, the prince of Bulgaria, 
a diplomatic crisis ensued. The Russians withdrew their support of the 
Bulgarian military, which left Bulgaria unprepared against the Serbian ag-
gression that followed the unification. The dream of a pan-Slavist federa-
tion under Russian tutelage had crumbled to pieces. Despite the lack of 
support from Russia, the Bulgarian army prevailed over the Serbian forces 
and was stopped from proceeding to Belgrade only by the intervention of 
Austria-Hungary.27 The military victory did not bring much in terms of 
territorial gains, but the unification of Bulgaria was complete—although 
24. Marriott, Eastern Question, 3.
25. Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1923 
(New York, 2006), 486.
26. Alexandre Toumarkine, Les Migrations des Populations Musulmanes Balkaniques en 
Anatolie (Istanbul, 1995).
27. Crampton, Concise History of Bulgaria, 91.
26  Chapter 1
Macedonia still remained an unfulfilled promise.28 After the abdication 
of Prince Alexander in 1886, an interim regency consisting of the Prime 
Minister Petko Karavelov and Stefan Stambolov, the former revolutionary 
(later, speaker of the sûbranie), took charge until a suitable replacement for 
Alexander could be found. Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was 
instituted as the new regent of Bulgaria in 1887, without Great Power sup-
port or endorsement.29 The person who really was in charge until 1894, 
however (and has given the period his name, Stambolovshtina), was Stefan 
Stambolov.
The Stambolov-Ferdinand team was not without its detractors, includ-
ing those who were in favor of a more proactive policy in Macedonia. An 
important figure among them was Major Kosta Panitsa, who was of Mace-
donian origin and a close ally of the former prince. Panitsa was convinced 
that mending relations with Russia was the only option Bulgaria had for 
furthering its cause in Macedonia. To achieve this, he hatched a plan to 
assassinate Prince Ferdinand in February 1889, but when his valet spilled 
the beans about the planned coup, the assassination was aborted and Pa-
nitsa arrested and executed.30 After the coup attempt, Stambolov resolved 
to use diplomacy to further Bulgarian interests in Macedonia; at this he 
proved to be quite successful. He had a long-term vision for the Bulgari-
anization of Macedonia through churches and schools rather than using 
weapons.31 The good relations of the Stambolov regime with the Sublime 
Porte bore their first results in 1890 in the form of berats for new bishoprics 
in Uskub, Monastir, and Ohrid. The Exarchate was also allowed to publish 
a newspaper in Constantinople and establish direct relations with the Bul-
garians in the Adrianople province.32 Despite these accomplishments, his 
determined pursuit and suppression of Macedonian revolutionary activity 
made Stambolov many enemies within the Macedonian circles in Bulgaria.33 
In 1891, there was another assassination attempt, this time on Stambolov, 
which he survived.34 He then tightened his grip on the pro-Macedonian 
circles even further. As Bulgaria moved further away from Russian influ-
ence (and favor) during the Stambolov regime, things could not have been 
28. The treaty signed in Bucharest to end the conflict essentially preserved the status quo; 
Pundeff, “Bulgarian Nationalism,” 126.
29. Duncan Perry, The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Liberation Movements, 1893–
1903 (Durham, 1988), 32.
30. His sentence was carried out by a firing squad of fellow Macedonians; Crampton, 
Concise History of Bulgaria, 105–6.
31. Perry, Politics of Terror, 32–33.
32. These concessions also helped to mend the relations between the Stambolov 
government and the church in Bulgaria. In 1889, the Bulgarian government had suspended 
the payment of subsidies to the Exarchate because the clergy in Bulgaria refused to pray for 
Ferdinand, who was a Catholic; Crampton, Concise History of Bulgaria, 106–7.
33. Pundeff, “Bulgarian Nationalism,” 129.
34. Duncan Perry and R. J. Crampton differ on the dates of the assassination attempt on 
the prince; Perry mentions that it was after the attempt on Stambolov in 1891, but according 
to Crampton the plan had been foiled a year earlier.
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rosier with the Sublime Porte. Despite Russian attempts to disrupt the visit, 
Sultan Abdülhamid II hosted Stambolov and his wife with great pomp and 
circumstance in Istanbul in August 1892. During his visit, Stambolov also 
met with the Exarch and left the city having secured further privileges for the 
Bulgarian community from the Sublime Porte: the Exarch’s seat would be 
moved to Pera, where all the embassies were located, and Bulgarian schools 
in Macedonia would be granted autonomy.35
Meanwhile, the experience of political autonomy and representative 
government in Bulgaria and the success of the Exarchate in expanding its 
base in Ottoman Macedonia gave the local dissidents hope, but many of 
them were convinced they could obtain their goals only through armed 
struggle. In the 1880s, a number of them had started to organize in small 
paramilitary bands, but these remained under the radar of Ottoman officials. 
A group of young men based around Salonika started the conspiracy that to 
organize these paramilitary groups into an army of insurgents fighting for 
Macedonian autonomy. They were Damian “Dame” Gruev, Georgi “Gotse” 
Delchev, Ivan Hadzi Nikolov, Andon Dimitrov, and Hristo Tatarchev. Gruev 
had been educated in Serbia and Bulgaria and had briefly been jailed in 
connection with the assassination attempt against Stambolov. Delchev was 
a cadet in the Bulgarian army, and Hadzi Nikolov was a schoolteacher. They 
were all natives of Macedonia who decided to go back there to start a revo-
lutionary movement in 1891. Dimitrov was another teacher who happened 
to meet Gruev and Hadzi Nikolov in Salonika. Soon Tatarchev, a physician 
who had recently returned from Zurich and, incidentally, had been treating 
Gruev for eczema, joined them. The other two founding members, Petûr 
Poparsov and Hristo Batandzhiev were also schoolteachers. These men con-
stituted the core group that formed the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization (IMRO) in Salonika in 1893.
In Bulgaria, opposition against Stambolov was mounting with the conniv-
ance of Prince Ferdinand, whom Stambolov had single-handedly propped 
up during his early years as the unwanted Bavarian, mentored, and liter-
ally saved from death. Finally, Ferdinand and his supporters managed to 
force the prime minister–president’s resignation in May 1894, although not 
without resorting to a number of vaudevillian tricks.36 The former prime 
minister–president was brutally murdered on a Sofia street only fourteen 
months after his resignation.37 After Stambolov’s resignation, the tenor of 
the relations between the Sublime Porte and Bulgaria changed consider-
ably.38 The Armenian massacres in 1894 led to the commonly held opinion 
35. Perry, Stefan Stambolov, 190–91.
36. Stambolov was accused, among other things, of having had an affair with a minister’s 
wife; Crampton, Concise History, 110.
37. The assassins hacked him to pieces; Crampton, Concise History, 109. His funeral 
became another scene of scandal when his widow was insulted and the supporters of one of his 
rivals chanted as he was being laid to rest; Perry, Stefan Stambolov, 209–33.
38. Jelavich and Jelavich, Establishment of the Balkan National States, 168.
2. Dame Grueff’s detachment. Courtesy Princeton University Library.
1. Dame Grueff with companions. Courtesy Princeton University Library.
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in Bulgaria that it was only a matter of time before the Ottoman Empire 
crumbled and a rapprochement with Russia brought benefits.39 The new, 
pro-Russian regime quickly shelved Stambolov’s policy toward the Sublime 
Porte, and the leaders looked favorably on plans to incite a rebellion in 
Macedonia that might invite European intervention.
In 1895, a second organization for Macedonian independence had been 
founded in Sofia, the Supreme Committee, or the Vŭrhovists (also known as 
the External Organization). The Supreme Committee attempted a rebellion 
the same year with the support of officials from the Bulgarian army, which 
would presumably have put pressure on the Sublime Porte to approve the 
Exarchate petition for new berats for more bishoprics.40 But the revolt was 
a failure; the Ottoman army apparently expected it and responded swiftly, 
but, more important, the Supremists were not successful in convincing the 
local population to participate.41 On the other hand, the revolt did serve as 
39. The symbolic culmination of the rapprochement with Russia was the baptism of 
Prince Ferdinand’s son as an Orthodox Christian with Tsar Nicholas II in attendance as the 
godfather; Crampton, Concise History, 110–11; Fikret Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, translated 
by İhsan Catay (Istanbul, 1996), 112.
40. Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 124.
41. Boris Sarafov, a former officer in the Bulgarian army who eventually rose to 
leadership of the IMRO-Supremist merger, made his reputation during this revolt by managing 
(temporarily) to capture Menlik.
3. Detachments in meeting. Courtesy Princeton University Library.
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enough of a threat that Abdülhamid II approved a new reform program for 
Macedonia shortly afterward, which, alas, remained a dead letter.42
In the meantime, IMRO was occupied with setting up a secret network 
throughout the region, accumulating weapons and recruiting supporters to 
form village chetas (militias) which would later be mobilized for a general 
uprising. It had chapters that coincided with local administrative units such 
as the kazas and sancaks, and each sancak was assigned a voyvoda (leader). 
IMRO also acted like a shadow government within the Ottoman domains, 
dispensing “justice” and collecting “taxes” through the local chapters—not 
to mention its control over the means of coercion. The taxes were supposed 
to be voluntary contributions paid in liras and recorded in the currency unit 
of the organization to be paid back after independence, but more often than 
not they were exacted from the population at gunpoint.
The Ottoman authorities did not detect the existence of IMRO for years, 
thanks to its secretive methods of recruitment and organization and its ruth-
less punishment of any violation of its rules. It was only chance that gave 
it away in November 1897.43 That month, a group had crossed the border 
from the Bulgarian principality into Uskub, to rob one of the local notables, 
which was the main method of fund-raising for the organization. After rob-
bing and murdering a landowner, the band apparently took off with 800 
liras.44 The incident, which normally might have been considered a com-
mon act of brigandage revealed the existence of a wide-reaching organiza-
tion when the authorities found caches of weapons and ammunitions in 
peasants’ houses during the search for the “brigands.” It was clear that the 
disturbances in the region could not be attributed solely to infiltrations from 
across the border and that there was a homegrown movement developing. 
The Exarchist population, now collectively branded as subversives, bore the 
brunt of the insurgents’ activities and suffered at the hands of the Ottoman 
military and paramilitary forces. Following the searches, most schools in the 
region were closed after their teachers were arrested, and the Exarchate was 
dealt a major blow to the (relatively) favorable relations it had been enjoying 
with the Sublime Port.
Gotse Delchev and Gorce Petrov established an external branch of the 
IMRO in Sofia in 1896 to foster connections with the immigrants in the prin-
cipality and the Supremists. Relations between the two organizations were 
not extremely harmonious in the beginning. Supremists insisted on having 
42. Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 125.
43. Duncan Perry cites two prior incidents when IMRO mules were seized and arrested, 
and he argues that it is extremely unlikely that the Ottoman authorities were completely 
unaware of the existence of the organization until the Vinitza affair but that they probably 
considered it to be “inconsequential”; Politics of Terror, 61–78.
44. Christ Anastasoff, Tragic Peninsula, 48. Given that the going rate for 50 kilos of 
wheat was about 30 kuruş, 800 liras was a considerable sum.
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Bulgarian army officers dominate their actions, whereas IMRO wanted to 
stay independent of government control. Delchev and Petrov envisioned a 
local grassroots revolt, whereas the Supremists favored tactics such as form-
ing small militias and influencing public opinion through demonstrations 
and publications.45 In 1899, IMRO and the Supremists temporarily merged 
under the leadership of Boris Sarafov.46 The change in leadership was not 
sufficient for the two factions to work out their differences, however, and 
now they disagreed on the timing of the planned rebellion. The Supremists 
wanted to act faster because they were convinced that sufficient effort had 
been expanded for agitating the peasants and a widespread popular revolt 
was a utopian idea. The safest bet, according to the Supremists, was to start 
a rebellion with the help of the Bulgarian military and have the European 
Powers intervene on behalf of Macedonians.
The Internal Organization, on the other hand, considered that a rebellion 
was premature. Its members had been preparing by extending the cheta 
networks throughout the regions. These bands regularly carried out attacks 
against noncooperating Christians or Muslims as part of the IMRO agi-
tation campaign, the purpose of which was to stigmatize the population. 
These operations required considerable financial outlay because they needed 
to maintain the chetas and provide them with weapons and ammunition. 
The “contributions” collected from peasants were not sufficient to support 
such an enterprise, even when supplemented with the spoils from robber-
ies; this induced the IMRO leaders to turn to more inventive methods of 
raising cash, such as kidnappings. After a few amateurish and failed at-
tempts, the guerrillas hit the jackpot when they seized Miss Ellen Stone, a 
U.S. missionary, and her companion Mrs. Tsilka, a Bulgarian Protestant, 
in Razlog in 1901.47 As protracted negotiations went on for the delivery 
of the ransom, Stone and Tsilka, who was pregnant during the time of the 
kidnapping, were forced to hike into the mountains by Jane Sandansky’s 
cheta. This was Sandansky’s first (and arguably most) high-profile action, 
and his name would soon become known throughout the region. Stone and 
Tsilka were released, exhausted but unharmed, after spending six months 
with guerrillas, during which time the pregnant Tsilka gave birth to a girl 
and, it seems, Stone developed an early case of Stockholm syndrome.48 The 
45. Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 155–56.
46. Perry, Politics of Terror, 82.
47. The first three people kidnapped by IMRO, two Muslim landowners and a Greek 
moneylender, managed to flee and almost kill their kidnappers; Laura Beth Sherman, Fires on 
the Mountain: The Macedonian Revolutionary Movement and the Kidnapping of Ellen Stone 
(Boulder, 1980), 8. During the Stone kidnapping, the target had apparently been someone 
else, Dr. House, another missionary, who happened to change his itinerary, so Stone and her 
companion were taken instead; Anastasoff, Tragic Peninsula, 67.
48. The affair was especially sensational because Miss Ellen Stone was evidently the “first 
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amount that IMRO received was 14,500 liras, significantly discounted from 
the original demand of 25,000 but still sufficient to buy the rebels 5,000 
rifles and 200,000 rounds of ammunition.49 The kidnapping had the added 
bonus of generating considerable international publicity for the Macedonian 
independence movement.
Support for the Macedonian revolutionary organization from Bulgaria 
and Russia had considerably been toned down by 1902. The crisis in Crete, 
which had resulted in a war between the Ottoman Empire and Greece, had 
proved that the Ottomans were not yet ready to throw in the towel. Russia, 
meanwhile, was more interested in pursuing its goals in the Far East and 
preferred that the Macedonian issue lay dormant in the meantime. In early 
1902, Bulgarian Minister President Stoyan Danev asked the Russians for 
financial help. He was told that such help would be provided only if Bulgaria 
agreed to curb the activity of the Macedonian revolutionaries.50 Danev ac-
cepted the condition and started taking measures against the Macedonian 
activists, but these measures were in the main designed to convince the Sub-
lime Porte and the Great Powers that the Bulgarian government was in con-
trol of the situation. In reality, the Supremists remained largely unchecked 
because a great part of the Bulgarian officer corps actively supported them.
The Supremists were actually preparing for another rebellion, which fi-
nally took place in September 1902, despite the IMRO opposition to it. 
The Gorna Dzhumaia, or Cuma-i Bâlâ (today Blagoevgrad), revolt, named 
after the district where it started, was another failure for the Supremists. 
Popular support was low, IMRO refrained from participating, and the dis-
turbances did not spread over a large area. The Ottoman army suppressed 
the revolt by November. The purpose of the revolt was never entirely clear, 
but the most likely explanation, according to Duncan Perry, is that the Su-
premists were trying to take control and show the IMRO committees that 
“professional military leaders in Macedonia were much more effective than 
schoolteachers.”51 The reprisals were harsh, and the regrettably predictable 
script of burned villages, murdered noncombatants, and violated women 
was played out once again.52 A large number of the inhabitants of the region 
American to be kidnapped outside the continental United States.” Stone was full of praise 
for her kidnappers and wrote articles in support of their cause upon her release. Sherman, 
Fires on the Mountain, 37. See also Teresa Carpenter, The Miss Stone Affair: America’s First 
Modern Hostage Crisis (New York, 2003). Martin Wills, another victim kidnapped in summer 
1905 was not as lucky; he had to escape on his own and, having lost an ear for the ransom 
note, his thoughts for his kidnappers were quite different than those of Miss Stone. Martin 
Wills, A Captive of the Bulgarian Brigands, Englishman’s Terrible Experiences in Macedonia 
(London, 1906).
49. Anastasoff, Tragic Peninsula, 68.
50. Crampton, Concise History of Bulgaria, 127.
51. Perry, Politics of Terror, 117.
52. There are contradicting reports on exactly how many villages were burnt; Adanır puts 
the number at fifteen and Perry at twenty-eight; Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 163; Perry, The 
Politics of Terror, 117. No matter which is correct, the damage was significant.
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fled to Bulgaria. Fikret Adanır notes that the Cuma uprising was significant 
in terms of signaling the growing control of the Supreme Committee; the 
Supremists now dominated the movement and they had demonstrated that 
Macedonia was a national issue for Bulgaria by engaging Bulgarian offi-
cers.53 Moreover, the Macedonian question was now developing into an 
issue that the European Powers could not ignore for long.
After the Cuma uprising, Austria and Russia took the initiative for 
instituting reform in Macedonia. Agenor Maria Goluchowski, the Austro-
Hungarian foreign minister, and Heinrich Freiherr von Calice, the Austro-
Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople, along with their Russian 
counterparts, Vladimir Lamsdorff and I. A. Zinoviev, exercised great influ-
ence on the successive reform attempts.54 Abdülhamid II was aware of the 
imminent imposition of radical reforms and preempted them by introduc-
ing his own program in December 1902.55 The program was not directed 
only at the “Macedonian” vilâyets (provinces) of Monastir, Salonika and 
Kosovo; all provinces of the empire in Europe were made subject to the new 
measures, which added Yanya, I
.
şkodra, and Edirne to the new administra-
tive unit, called the Rumeli Umum Müfettişliği (General Inspectorate of Ru-
meli). Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, a veteran of Ottoman administration who had 
held, among other posts, the governorship of Adana and Yemen, was ap-
pointed to head the inspectorate with the title Rumeli Vilâyetleri Müfettiş-i 
Umûmîsi (General Inspector of Rumeli Provinces).
The reform program pledged to ameliorate problems with public works 
and services, which would presumably improve the lot of the locals and 
mend their relations with the government. A new gendarmerie force would 
be recruited from among the Christian as well as the Muslim population. 
Criminal law was to be put under the jurisdiction of new local courts, and 
legal clerks would be appointed equally from Christian and Muslim com-
munities. A school would be provided to any village with more than fifty 
households, and 5 percent of the provincial revenues would be allocated for 
public works.56 Goluchowski and Lamsdorff did not find these measures 
satisfactory. Calice and Zinoviev, the Austrian and Russian ambassadors, 
drafted supplementary measures for the program to be presented to the 
other Great Powers. In addition to the original proposals of the Sublime 
Porte, the “Wiener Punktation” (as it was later named) called for the intro-
duction of Christian fieldguards in Christian areas, the expansion of valis’ 
(governors’) authority, financial regulations that involved separate budgets 
for the three Macedonian provinces and supervision by the Ottoman Bank, 
53. Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 164.
54. Steven Sowards, Austria’s Policy of Macedonian Reform (Boulder, 1989), 17–23.
55. Abdülhamid II had commissioned a proposal for this purpose before the uprising, in 
July 1902; Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 166.
56. Ibid., 167; Sowards, Austria’s Policy of Macedonian Reform, 23.
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the protection of the population from Albanian excesses, amnesty for politi-
cal prisoners, and a predetermined tenure for the general inspector.57 These 
proposals were presented to the Ottoman government in February 1903 
and were immediately accepted—but they remained a dead letter in terms 
of implementation.
The Ilinden Uprising
The consensus among the Great Powers was in favor of maintaining the 
status quo in Macedonia rather than supporting autonomy, but nothing 
short of independence would satisfy the leaders of the Macedonian move-
ment, especially after the example of Crete, which had gained its autonomy 
despite the failure of Greece in the war with the Ottoman Empire in 1897. 
Danev, the Bulgarian minister president, was feverishly trying to control the 
Supremists, but his efforts, such as banning the organization and arresting 
some of its leaders in January 1903, only drew the ire of the Macedonian 
circles and nationalist Bulgarians. So, another minister president buckled 
under pressure from the pro-Macedonian camp and had to resign in April 
1903. He was replaced by Racho Petrov, a general in the Bulgarian army.58
The Gemidzis, an anarchist fraction that had branched off from the Mace-
donian revolutionary movement based in Salonika, carried out a series of 
bombings in Salonika in April 1903.59 The Guadalquivir, a French steamer 
in the harbor, was the faction’s first target, followed a day later by a bomb 
planted on the railroad tracks at the main train station, which exploded 
when the train arriving from Istanbul rolled over it. An attack on the gas 
plant left the city in darkness the following day, preparing the stage for a 
more spectacular attack: the Ottoman Bank and the neighboring German 
bowling club blew up in flames as dynamite charges set in tunnels under the 
bank exploded. The German school also suffered a great deal of damage 
from the explosion. Attacks on a café, the post office, and the Russian con-
sulate were next, and these were stopped only after a show of force by the 
squadrons of European Powers that were in the bay. These operations did 
not, however, publicize the Macedonian cause, as had been hoped, because 
these acts harmed mostly European interests and the reaction in Europe was 
far from favorable.60 The attacks were followed by reprisals by the  Ottoman 
57. Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 170–71; Sowards, Austria’s Policy of Macedonian 
Reform, 24–26.
58. Perry, Politics of Terror, 129.
59. Ibid., 100. For more on this group, see Giannis Megas, Oi “Varkarides” tēs 
Thessalonikēs: ē Anarchikē Voulgarikē Omada kai oi Vomvistikes Energeies tou (Athens, 1994).
60. The principal exception to the condemnation coming from the European press was 
Victor Bérard, a long-time supporter of the Macedonian revolutionaries. In an article published 
in La Revue de Paris on June 15, 1903, he made the following remarks about the activists: 
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army and irregulars in the countryside, and more IMRO operatives were 
arrested. The IMRO changed its course of action partly because of the nega-
tive reaction generated by the activities of this radical group. In May 1903, 
IMRO held a congress in Smilevo, in Monastir province and decided to 
prepare for a general uprising in the summer. Thanks to the combined efforts 
of Patriarchists and Ottoman officials organized by Germanos Karavange-
lis, the charismatic Metropolitan of Kastoria, to chase the chetas out of the 
region, IMRO suffered several blows to its operations during spring and 
summer 1903.61 Despite these setbacks, the uprising broke out in Monastir 
province on August 2, the day of Saint Elijah, or Ilinden.
The insurgents first cut telegram lines and disabled the railroads to halt 
communications across the region. The greatest accomplishment of the reb-
els was the capture of Kruševo, where they proclaimed a short-lived republic 
after they set government buildings on fire and killed the officials.62 After a 
few days, on the Feast of the Transfiguration, or Preobrazhenie, the rebellion 
spread to Adrianople province, where the rebels were briefly able to set up a 
government in Strandja. In principle, the uprising was meant to be an invita-
tion to the entire population, without respect to language or religion, to rise 
up against tyranny, but in practice this proved to be an improbable ideal. 
In fact, in many places the insurgents did attack Patriarchists and Muslims 
despite prior orders to the contrary. Other acts such as singing Bulgarian 
marching songs and waving the Bulgarian flag undermined the committee 
claim that this was a general uprising and associated the insurgents—more 
or less accurately—with Bulgaria.63
By September, the Ottoman army had suppressed the rebellion and hun-
dreds of villages were left devastated after the guerrillas pulled out and the 
soldiers and militias exacted the toll from the local population.64 The Mace-
donians’ plight did garner sympathy in Europe, and relief missions were or-
ganized and sent to the smoldering villages, but contrary to the expectations 
of the committee, the European Powers did not intervene on behalf of the 
Slav population, let alone demand autonomy for Macedonia.65 The revolt 
“Their crime is, perhaps, inexcusable, but their courage was without any doubt, of the most 
heroic!” Quoted in Michel Paillarès, l’Imbroglio Macédonienne (Paris, 1907), 13. (Michel 
Paillarès was rumored to be in the pay of the Greek government.)
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(Princeton, 2003).
63. Ibid., 196–99.
64. According to Adanır, the auxiliary Albanian militias, not the regular infantry troops, 
were responsible for the atrocities following the uprising; Makedonya Sorunu, 203.
65. Ibid., 195–206. For the aftermath of the uprising, see Henry Brailsford, Macedonia, 
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Intervention in Macedonia, 1903–1908: An Instance of Humanitarian Intervention?” in 
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had come as a surprise and cast doubt on the effectiveness of the reform at-
tempts. Nevertheless, again under Austrian and Russian leadership, the idea 
of reform within Ottoman sovereignty was accorded another chance. The 
Mürzsteg Reform Program, as it came to be known, was accepted by the 
Sublime Porte in November 1903.
Implementation of the Mürzsteg Reform Program
The Mürzsteg Program was not fundamentally different from the previ-
ous “Wiener Punktation,” except for the provisions it introduced for im-
plementation of the measures. The program was criticized for being merely 
a continuation of the agreement between Russia and Austria dating from 
1897 to not disturb the status quo in Macedonia.66 Whether the program 
was indeed prepared with such a cynical agenda would be hard to ascer-
tain, but it is true that, having been formulated and implemented under the 
stewardship of Russia and Austria, it had a decidedly conservative tone. 
Under the program, Austria-Hungary and Russia would directly oversee 
its progress through the two special civil agents whom they appointed. 
Even though they carefully limited the interference of other European Pow-
ers in the design of the program, as a concession Austria-Hungary and 
Russia invited other signatories to the Berlin Treaty to participate in the 
discussions. The status of the civil agents became a continuous source of 
conflict between the Great Powers and the Sublime Porte. Proponents of 
more efficacious reforms considered the civil agents to be a half-hearted 
attempt by Austrian and Russian diplomats to give the illusion that they 
had some purchase on the actions of the Ottoman government, embodied 
by Inspector General Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha. They were “not representatives 
of European control,” writes Draganoff, “but functionaries who are to be 
absolutely at his disposal and whose office is to lighten the responsibility 
in the eyes of Europe.”67 The Sublime Porte, on the other hand, viewed 
even this concession a potential breach of sovereignty and insisted that 
Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha’s authority be paramount in the region and over the 
implementation process, and that the civil agents’ role not exceed that of 
assistance.
Establishing stability and ensuring the security of the inhabitants were 
the two priorities of the program. Consequently, the reorganization of the 
gendarmerie, which the Great Powers considered to be the prerequisite for 
Humanitarian Intervention: A History, edited by Brendan Simms and David J. B. Trim 
(Cambridge, 2011), 205–25.
66. Draganoff, Macedonia and the Reforms translated by Victor Bérard (London, 
1908), 8.
67. Ibid., 61.
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both goals, became the primary focus. The French consul in Salonika, Louis 
Steeg, had made a similar proposal a year earlier, emphasizing the impor-
tant role that a reformed gendarmerie, “well paid, well selected and com-
manded by first-class officers,” could play in preventing the activities of 
the revolutionary bands and the abuses of the “Turkish gendarmerie, who 
are recruited from a bad class, irregularly paid, and obliged to ‘live on the 
inhabitants.’ ”68 Steeg’s proposal, which had not found an enthusiastic audi-
ence at the time he drafted it, now seemed to constitute the centerpiece of the 
reform program, and it indeed had potential to ease the tension in the region 
if implemented in good faith. There were, however, too many obstacles to 
this good faith effort. The reforms got off to a slow start due to the difficulty 
of accommodating varying desires of the Great Powers as well as the diffi-
culty of persuading the Ottoman government to agree to the plan once it was 
drafted. Colonel Wladimir Giesl, the military attaché of Austria-Hungary in 
Istanbul, conceived the original plan, which proposed that a large force of 
foreign officers command the reformed gendarmerie.69 The Austrians rec-
ommended that an Italian officer be in charge of the organization, which 
was accepted by all the Powers, and the Sublime Porte formally asked Italy 
to appoint one of its officers to the mission.70 General Emilio Degiorgis was 
thus appointed to command the reformed gendarmerie.
The first disputes over the plan broke out over the proposed headgear 
for the officers.71 Giesl had suggested that the uniform be identical to that 
of Ottoman soldiers, including the fez, which became an issue of discord, 
presumably because of ideological connotations. This issue was temporar-
ily resolved with a compromise suggested by the Russians: instead of the 
quintessentially “Turkish” fez, the officers could don kalpaks, which were 
also used by the Ottoman army but did not have the same connotations. But 
the kalpak could also pose a small problem: “It appears,” remarked General 
Degiorgis, “that in the regions where the foreign officers will be operating, 
the kalpak is the habitual headgear of the Bulgarians, and could expose the 
officers to danger.”72 The resourceful general added that they would “look 
for a different model of kalpak that did not resemble that of the Bulgarians,” 
and the headgear issue was resolved.73 Another bone of contention was the 
68. Ibid., 54–55.
69. Sowards, Austria’s Policy of Macedonian Reform, 35.
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issue of command; instead of forming mixed battalions from different coun-
tries, as has been originally envisioned, the final resolution favored the divi-
sion of officers according to their countries with a specific zone accorded to 
each division. This was tantamount to creating spheres of influence, which, 
not surprisingly, generated another round of struggle among the European 
Powers.
The final plan demanded that the foreign officers be authorized to give 
direct orders to their Ottoman subordinates and to dismiss officers and sol-
diers whom they deemed unfit for their mission. The foreign officers would 
be appointed at one rank above the one they held in their country of origin 
and would be allotted generous salaries and benefits.74 The total budget was 
estimated to be around a quarter of a million liras, which would be secured 
through the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.75 The proposals were 
presented to the Sublime Porte on February 29, 1904, and promptly refused.
As the talks were going on, the uniform problem surfaced again; this time, 
the issue was not the headgear but the fabric, color, and style of the officers’ 
garb.76 The dispute was apparently settled by accepting the original pro-
posal, which was a uniform similar to the one worn by the Ottoman officers 
with a kalpak as the headgear. A new draft proposal, which toned down 
the European demands from the Ottoman side concerning command, was 
formulated. Now the adjoint generals’ orders would be transmitted through 
Ottoman officers, and the right to dismiss unfit soldiers was rephrased as the 
right to transfer them outside the Macedonian command. The total num-
ber of foreign officers was reduced to sixty.77 The Italian carabinieri model 
would be adapted for a gendarmerie school to be established in Salonika to 
train the new recruits.78 The final arrangement of zones was as following: in 
Kosovo, the district of Uskub was assigned to Austria-Hungary: in Monastir, 
the town of Monastir as well as Kastoria and Serfice were to be under Ital-
ian command; and the province of Salonika was to be divided among the 
Russians, British, and French, who took over the sancaks (subprovince) of 
sultan’s insistence on the fez made matters more complicated. When it was finally resolved, the 
Austrians, Russians, and French opted for the kalpak, whereas the Italian and English agreed 
to the fez; Colonel Léon Lamouche, Quinze Ans d’Histoire Balkanique (Paris, ca. 1928), 45.
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ary 20, 1904.
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Salonika, Drama, and Serres, respectively.79 In addition to the military ad-
joints, all the Great Powers (except for Germany) committed five officers 
to the mission. The Ottomans approved this revised draft, and the reforms 
officially started.
Armed Activity and the Appearance of Greek and Serbian Bands
A short-lived détente between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire resulted 
in an agreement signed by the two countries in March 1904, according to 
which Bulgaria pledged to suppress Macedonian insurgent bands and the 
Ottoman Empire promised a general amnesty.80 With the general amnesty, 
in April 1904 all political prisoners, including participants and organizers of 
the Ilinden Uprising, were set free, which created a temporary sense of joy 
among the population. Shortly afterward, the recently liberated rebels took 
up arms again and the Ottomans were back in pursuit.
In 1904, the first incursions of Greek bands or andartes into the region 
started. The activity was in retaliation for Bulgarian support of the komi-
tajis that menaced the Patriarchist, especially the Slavic-speaking Patriar-
chist population, and to curb the growing Bulgarian influence in a region 
to which Greeks maintained they could lay at least as legitimate a claim. 
Similarly, Serbian bands started to organize in the northwest, in the areas of 
Kosovo that the Serbs considered to be part of “Old Serbia.” Into this mix 
was added the Muslim and Albanian bands, the self-proclaimed protectors 
of the Muslim population, who menaced Christian villages in retaliation for 
attacks against Muslims.81
IMRO, after the Ilinden Uprising, was a “shadow of its former self,” 
and the Supremists used this opportunity to take over the organization.82 
Fragmentation within the organization started shortly afterward, and two 
camps emerged, known as the right wing and the left wing. The right wing 
were the Supremists such as Ivan Garvanov and Boris Sarafov, who fa-
vored close relations with Bulgaria.83 The left wing was dominated by the 
79. Partition was a touchy subject given the different and contradicting interests of the 
Great Powers in the region. Austria-Hungary was not content with Italian control over Monastir 
but had to strike a compromise that allowed it control over Skopje, which was strategically 
more significant because of its proximity to Bosnia-Hercegovina; Routier, Macédoine et les 
Puissances, 19. Areas in the north where the Albanian population was the overwhelming 
majority were not included in the reform; Lamouche, Quinze Ans d’Histoire Balkanique, 44.
80. Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 231.
81. The Ottoman government vehemently denied the existence of these bands, but they 
were undeniably active by 1905; Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution (Oxford, 
2001), 221. See also Nadine Lange-Akhund, The Macedonian Question 1893–1908 from 
Western Sources (Boulder, 1998), 199.
82. Perry, Politics of Terror, 141.
83. This was not a monolithic group either; Boris Sarafov espoused more radical and 
violent activities even when there was a tendency within the group, under the influence of 
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Serres-Strumnitza group and was under the leadership of Jane Sandansky, 
who supported autonomy for Macedonia. The Congress of the Revolu-
tionary Organization at the Rila Monastery in October 1905 did not 
succeed in bringing together the opposing factions.84 On the contrary, 
Sandansky was expelled from the group, and the Supremists decided 
to tone down armed activity and instead channel their energies toward 
“educating” the population.85 The two groups staked out two separate 
zones of influence: the right wing dominated the Monastir and Uskub 
region, whereas the left wing was in charge of the south, the districts of 
Salonika, Serres, and Strumnitza, where its primary engagement was with 
the Greek bands.86 The two camps convened separately for the next con-
gress: the Supremists (rightists) in Sofia in January 1907 and the leftists 
in Doubnitza a month later. By this time, the rift within the organization 
was beyond repair. There were failed attempts on Sandansky’s life by 
the Supremists. In retaliation, Sandansky’s associates assassinated Boris 
Sarafov and Ivan Garvanov, after which point the separation of the two 
groups became irreconcilable.87
Meanwhile, there was a dramatic increase in Greek armed activity in 
Macedonia. It was no coincidence that this development occurred after the 
appointment of Lambros Koromilas as consul general of Greece in Salonika 
in May 1904.88 Early signs of armed activity came from Kastoria, where 
Germanos Karavangelis, the district Metropolitan, attempted to organize a 
band and buy off IMRO members; however, this venture failed to transform 
into a tangible network.89 Against the rise in the perceived threat to Greek 
interests, civil organizations and paramilitaries coordinated their efforts 
with that of the state in a common cause in Macedonia. The first forays into 
Ottoman territory were initiated by officers of the Greek army, such as the 
legendary Pavlos Melas, with the support of Cretan volunteers, who could 
travel into the region with ease because of their official status as  Ottoman 
moderates such as Damian Gruev, to renounce violence. Some sources indicate that he 
even considered a “central committee” separate from IMRO; Lange-Akhund, Macedonian 
Question, 206–7.
84. For more information on the contentious issues of the congress, see ibid., 231–38.
85. Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution, 245.
86.  Ibid.
87. Ibid.; Lange-Akhund, Macedonian Question, 263.
88. Koromilas served as consul until October 1907. His predecessor, Eugenios Eugeniadēs, 
had been appointed to the job at a critical time, after the Greek-Ottoman war of 1897, and 
had managed to maintain good relations with the Ottoman establishment despite the post-war 
bitterness and the ongoing crisis in Crete. He was one of the early architects of the Greek policy 
that favored collaboration with the Ottomans in Macedonia until the greater common enemy 
(i.e., the Bulgarians) could be eliminated. For a summary account of the two consuls’ activities 
in Macedonia, see Vasileios Laoudras, To Ellinikon Genikon Proxeneion Thessalonikēs 
(Thessaloniki, 1961).
89. Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897–1913 (Thessaloniki, 1966), 
120–24; Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu, 191.
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subjects.90 At this stage, local Patriarchists did not have a significant presence 
in the armed activities. Consuls such as Lambros Koromilas in Salonika and 
Antonios Sachtouris in Serres assisted in supplying weapons, facilitated re-
cruitment, and protected the interests of the Patriarchate through methods 
not always approved by the Patriarchate itself.91 Their task was facilitated 
by the indifference—and even active collaboration—of the Ottoman author-
ities, who saw the Greek bands as a welcome counterweight against the Bul-
garian “bandits.” The local Muslim population also actively collaborated 
with them, and apparently, “Greek committees that did not have Turkish 
members were rare.”92
Despite the reforms and the European presence in the area, security did 
not improve; in fact, it deteriorated between 1904 and 1908. With the ex-
ception of brief interruptions in armed activity, the monthly casualty records 
told a grim story. One estimate puts the number of people killed in Mace-
donia between 1903 and 1908 at 8,000; of these 3,500 were guerrillas and 
the rest civilians.93
Problems with Financial Reform and 
the Customs Duty Increase
Financial difficulties beleaguered the gendarmerie reorganization from 
the start. The Ottomans had pledged to finance the new force, but the truth 
of the matter was that this new commitment imposed an enormous burden 
on a budget already bursting at the seams. This problem was the basis of the 
reluctance by the administration to accept more foreign “advisors,” an issue 
brought up again by Austria-Hungary and Russia late in 1904. The treasury 
was in such a dreary situation that oftentimes Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha himself 
had to plead with the Allatini brothers, owners of the largest mill in the 
region, in Salonika, which supplied flour to Macedonian garrisons, to con-
tinue shipments despite payments being in arrears so that the soldiers would 
have bread to eat. On occasion, the government had to borrow money from 
the Salonika industrialists, including the Allatinis and the Kapanzades, so 
that it could pay soldiers, orphans, and widows. Or the government dipped 
90. The young and dashing Pavlos Melas became the proto-martyr of the Greek cause 
in Macedonia when he was killed in a skirmish with Ottoman forces in Siatista on October 
13, 1904. His death was considered a turning point that finally shook Athens to take action 
to protect Greek interests in Macedonia; Alexandros D. Zannas, O Makedonikos Agōn 
(Anamnēseis) (Thessaloniki, 1960), 19.
91. For a list of local participants from the Serres region, see Iakōvos D. Michaēlidēs 
and Kōnstantinos S. Papanikolaou, eds., Aphaneis Gēgeneis Makedonomachoi (1903–1913) 
(Thessaloniki, 2008), 138–60.
92. Letter from Dr. Nâzım to Bahaeddin Şakir, cited in Hanioğlu, Preparation for a 
Revolution, 222.
93. Sowards, Austria’s Policy of Macedonian Reform, 76.
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into the purses of the Anatolian provinces, which hardly had any extra funds 
to spare.94
Work toward a financial commission that would serve as an advisory 
body to solve the budgetary problems in Macedonia started shortly after 
the gendarmerie reforms in 1904. Calice and Zinoviev were the architects of 
the early proposals. Compared with later proposals, these were rather con-
servative schemes that essentially aimed to rectify the revenue base without 
creating any major upheaval of the existing framework. One of the major 
concerns at this stage was the payments to the civil personnel that were in ar-
rears, which, the civil agents held, should take priority over payments to the 
military. After Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha warned that this kind of prioritization 
might cause a military revolt, another proposal that balanced the needs of 
the Ottoman administration with the demands of the European Powers was 
formulated. According to this plan, revenues from the Macedonian prov-
inces would be allocated to cover both civil and military expenses, but the 
amount earmarked for military expenses would be capped at peacetime lev-
els and the difference would be covered by an extraordinary fund supplied 
by the imperial center.95 The Ottoman Bank was instituted as the treasurer 
for Macedonia.
In December 1904, Lord Landsowne (Henry Charles Keith Petty-
Fitzmaurice) was not content with the work of Zinoviev and Calice, and 
was already sounding the alarm about a looming crisis because of financial 
difficulties. He proposed that an international commission be established 
to oversee the financial reforms.96 In February 15, 1905, the Sublime Porte 
made a formal request to increase the rate of custom duties from 8 to 11 
percent to defray the costs of the reforms. Austria-Hungary and Russia 
were in favor of accepting the increase provided that the Ottoman state met 
certain conditions regarding the administration of the extra revenue.97 But 
the tariff increase would prove to be one of the most problematic issues in 
the execution of the Mürzsteg Program, as benign a proposal as it might 
seem. Even though all the Great Powers concurred on the need to raise 
additional resources to finance the rising expenditures, there was hardly 
any consensus on how to raise them. A tariff increase was a measure that 
directly interfered with British commercial interests in the Ottoman Empire. 
94. I have documented these dealings between the Allatini brothers and Hüseyin 
Hilmi Paşa, and the extraordinary measures taken to procure bread for the troops in İpek 
K. Yosmaoğlu, “Ekmek Parası: The Allatini Brothers and the Ottoman Army in Macedonia 
at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” paper presented at the conference on Local and 
Imperial Histories: Approaches to Ottoman/Greek Civilization, Chios, Greece, September 
2000. The correspondence between the Allatinis and other army contractors can be found in, 
BOA,TFR.I.SL 1/25, December 21, 1902; TFR.I.SL 8/782, April 7, 1903; TFR.I.ŞKT 9/185, 
April 27, 1903; TFR.I.SL 48/4724, July 25, 1904.
95. Sowards, Austria’s Policy of Macedonian Reform, 51–52.
96. Draganoff, Macedonia and the Reforms, 63–64.
97. Dakin, Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 303.
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The Anglo-Ottoman Convention of Baltalimanı in 1838 had abolished all 
internal customs in the Ottoman Empire, ensuring an open market for Brit-
ish goods. Since then, Britain had established a profitable market for its 
manufactured goods and dominated the foreign trade of the empire.98 De-
spite the facts that the current tariff rates were among the lowest in Europe 
and that increasing that rate was the only unexplored source of revenue that 
could be diverted for the benefit of the reforms, Britain found this an unde-
sirable measure and jealously protected its interests even though that meant 
jeopardizing the implementation of the reforms.
Another obstacle in the way of financial restructuring was the objections 
raised by the Sublime Porte against the proposed financial commission, 
which it considered to be a violation of its sovereignty. Between the Otto-
man objections and the assorted attempts by the European Powers to assert 
their own concerns, the shape and function of the financial commission were 
revised six times from the beginning of 1905 until the year’s end, with the 
proposals delivered to the Sublime Porte with a note verbale each time.99 
In November 1905, a seventh note verbale was presented, which included 
not only the new proposal concerning the financial commission but also 
a bundle that contained the renewal of the foreign officers’ and the civil 
agents’ contracts, and the reappointment of Hilmi Pasha. This seventh note 
was also rejected, precipitating a demonstration of gunboat diplomacy by 
the Great Powers. With the exception of Germany, all the Powers contrib-
uted to a fleet that appeared before the port of Mytilene in the northern 
Aegean on November 26, 1905.100 After the demonstrators threatened to 
move to Lemnos, the Sublime Porte agreed to all the demands: the tenures of 
the inspector general, general of the gendarmerie, civil agents, and adjoints 
were extended for two more years, and the International Commission for 
Financial Control in Macedonia was officially recognized.101
The financial commission was not a body under the leadership of Austria-
Hungary and Russia; all six Great Powers had an equal say in its function-
ing, which proved to be a recipe for delays and inefficiency and seriously 
hampered the progress of the proposals. With the Ottoman agreement to 
the financial commission, the issue of the tariff increase was revived. Draft-
ing an agreement that satisfied all the Powers and the Sublime Porte at the 
same time took another year after the financial commission authorization, 
and then it took another six months for the increase to come into effect. 
The British aversion to the idea and mistrust of the management of the tariff 
revenue were largely responsible for the delay. Each time a note verbale 
 98. Reşat Kasaba, Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, the Nineteenth Century 
(Albany, 1988).
 99. Sowards, Austria’s Policy of Macedonian Reform, 55–59.
100. Draganoff, Macedonia and the Reforms, 65.
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on the conditions for a tariff increase was presented to the Sublime Porte, 
Britain heaped another set of demands on the original text, seeking further 
concessions for its commercial associates, which confirmed the prevailing 
opinion that the British government was “acting in bad faith.”102 Finally, on 
July 12, 1907, the tariff increase was put into effect. Steven Sowards notes 
that “[w]hen the protocols [for the tariff increase] were signed in April, the 
Macedonian garrison had been paid just once in the preceding six months, 
the civil administration only twice.”103 Meanwhile, Britain had obtained 
every single concession it sought, including the regulation of porters in the 
Salonika harbor.
End of the Leadership a Deux, End of Reforms
Judicial reform had been included among the provisions of the Ottoman 
reform proposal of 1902, as well as in the Mürzsteg Program, but until 1907 
not much attention had been paid to this part of the plan; in fact, there were 
very few complaints about judicial abuse in Macedonia.104 In March 1907, 
a new set of measures were put into effect that called for an increase in the 
number of courts, better pay for the judiciary, curbs on corruption, semi-
annual inspections, and assurance of judicial autonomy.105 These measures 
were not found to be satisfactory by the European Concert, which meant 
that additional demands were made of the Sublime Porte and, consequently, 
another chapter of protracted struggle among the Powers and with the Otto-
man government began. After long negotiations, two alternative plans were 
drafted in June 1907 by Zinoviev and Johann Markgraf von Pallavicini, 
the Russian and Austro-Hungarian ambassadors. The plans were essentially 
the same and called for the financial commission to be involved in the judi-
ciary reform through its chancery and to appoint the judicial inspectors who 
would supervise the courts. The discord stemmed from Pallavicini’s convic-
tion that the Ottomans would not accept an arrangement in which they 
would not have some degree of control over the appointment of inspectors, 
whereas Zinoviev insisted on complete European control. The question of 
the degree of Ottoman control over the judiciary deepened the rifts among 
the Great Powers, and the final note verbale drafted in December 1907, 
which favored Zinoviev’s position, was more the result of a begrudging com-
promise than a real consensus.
102. Ibid., 69.
103. Ibid., 72.
104. Dakin, Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 347. This may also be attributed to the local 
population’s lack of trust in the Ottoman judicial system.
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As the year came to a close, the civil agents’ and other reform personnel’s 
mandates, which had been approved for another two years by the Sublime 
Port in November 1905, were again about to expire. The request for re-
newal of the mandate was presented along with the judiciary proposal in 
a note verbale to the Sublime Porte on December 15, 1907. The response 
received “said nothing of the extension and proposed that the foreign agents 
in Macedonia be taken into Ottoman service.”106 An identical note was sent 
a week later, but the Great Powers lacked the cohesion necessary to con-
vince the Sublime Porte to accept the extension. Sir Edward Grey, the British 
foreign secretary, found the performance of the Ottoman administration 
since the reforms started to be far from satisfactory and was vocal about his 
disapproval of a plan that would continue to defer to Ottoman authorities. 
The leadership of the program, which had been assumed by the Austro-
Hungarian and Russian alliance, was no longer in effect. It had already 
been eroded by the financial commission, which relied on all six powers 
equally, and further eroded by the resignation of important diplomats who 
had originally conceived of the plan. The Russian and Austro-Hungarian 
foreign ministers, Lamsdorff and Goluchowski, and Ambassador Calice had 
all left office in 1906.107 The death knell for the alliance sounded when 
Austria-Hungary obtained the concession of the Uvać-Mitrovico railroad.108
Russia blamed the Dual Monarchy for engaging in secret dealings with 
the Ottoman Empire to obtain commercial concessions in return for favor-
able conditions in the reform proposals. Britain suspected that Germany was 
involved in the deal. Even though there is no evidence to suggest that this was 
the case, the railroad concession effectively ended the collaboration between 
the Dual Monarchy and Russia, which did not bode well for the future of 
Macedonian reforms.109 It seemed that the leadership was gravitating toward 
Britain, and now that the former alliance was broken, a new alliance was be-
ing formed between Britain and Russia, making it more likely that subsequent 
European demands for reform from the Sublime Porte would be more extreme 
than ever. In fact, on March 3, 1908, Sir Edward Grey repeated his proposal 
in a formal note that the number of regular Ottoman troops in the region be 
reduced and that of the gendarmerie be augmented. In addition, the influ-
ence of the palace had to be reduced to a minimum if the reforms were to be 
effective, and this would be achieved only with a truly autonomous, European-
appointed Turkish governor, answering only to the Powers.110 Despite Austro-
Hungarian commitment to the conservative reform scheme, Russia seemed 
106. Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution, 233.
107. Sowards, Austria’s Policy of Macedonian Reform, 66–70.
108. Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution, 234.
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46  Chapter 1
to be willing to cooperate with Britain. To avert further British demands, on 
March 13, 1908, Sultan Abdülhamid II preemptively renewed the mandate of 
the civil agents and the program until July 1914.111
Despite the long diplomatic work hours devoted to it, the Mürzsteg Pro-
gram had accomplished little in the way of ensuring the safety of the lo-
cal population. To the contrary, it indirectly contributed to the increase in 
armed activity and violence. One of its major flaws was the provision that 
provincial administration be rearranged according to national principles, 
which the fighting camps understood as clear indication that the next stage 
of the reforms was autonomy and partition according to national boundar-
ies. Another outcome of the reforms was the effect they had on the local 
Muslim population, who did not figure in any European plan for the re-
gion, except in references to their brutality against their Christian neighbors, 
and who viewed the European agents in the region as an occupation force 
engaged in the final preparations for the secession of the country from the 
Ottoman Empire. Consequently, local Muslims also started to take up arms 
and form bands.
More important, the Ottoman Committee of Progress and Union 
(CPU),112 which had merged with the Macedonian-based Ottoman Freedom 
Society in 1907, used this atmosphere to boost its recruitment and network-
ing efforts in the region, connecting the independent and scattered bands to 
form a single organization.113 Rumors of an impending  Macedonian auton-
omy, which peaked after the meeting of the Russian tsar Nicolas II and the 
British monarch Edward VII in Reval, served as a catalyst the CPU agitation 
plans.114 The affiliated Ottoman officers and clandestine agents were the or-
ganizational backbone of the CPU in the region, but its final plan of action 
also depended on an elaborate network that involved local notables, former 
brigands, and the neutralization, if not cooption, of the fighting bands in the 
region.115 Their subsequent success in the revolution of 1908 put an end to 
111. Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution, 235.
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the European reform program and brought about a fleeting sense of peace in 
the region. The restoration of the constitution was celebrated across Mace-
donia, where people rejoiced together on the streets regardless of their dif-
ferences and where armed bands, even though they held on to their arms, 
came out from hiding. One of the most dramatic scenes was the legendary 
Sandansky’s arrival in Salonika, where he was welcomed like a comrade in 
arms by Enver Pasha, one of the CPU leaders who had planned the revolu-
tion. The euphoria, alas, would prove to be another Macedonian illusion.
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ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ ΚΑΛΟϒΝΤΑΙ ΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΠΑΙΔΕϒΣΕΩΣ ΤΗΣ ΗΜΕΤΕΡΑΣ 
ΜΕΤΕΧΟΝΤΕΣ
[Greeks they are called those who assume our education.]
—Isocrates, Panegyricus, inscribed across the façade of 
Gennadius Library in Athens
The Museum of Macedonian Struggle in Salonika occupies an elegant neoclassical building that used to be the Consulate of the Hellenic Kingdom in Ottoman Selânik. The street in 
which the museum is located is named after Consul Koromilas, who was 
one of the most illustrious residents of the building and a chief facilitator 
of the Greek nationalist movement in Macedonia. Material and personal 
belongings of the heroes of the Greek struggle for Macedonia are kept and 
displayed here, much like relics in a shrine, as is an impressive collection of 
photographs from the era. Before a recent upgrade, the basement was dedi-
cated to a permanent exhibition behind glass screens of dioramas that rep-
resented important scenes from the struggle. The combination of dimmed 
lights and the musty smell in the hall gave the place an eerie and bizarre feel, 
one reminiscent more of a taxidermy exhibit than a museum of national 
history, but this also contributed an unexpected charm to the somber atmo-
sphere. As far as one can tell from the information website for the museum, 
the dioramas still stand, but the museum has acquired a more contemporary 
outlook with new lighting, flooring, and impressive photo-essays about the 
protagonists of the Greek struggle for Macedonia.
Except for a few stray foreign tourists who happen to stumble on the 
place by mistake, the Museum visitors are almost exclusively Greek, and a 
significant portion is under ten years of age. They are schoolchildren, some 
kindergarteners, whose teachers are presenting what is likely to be their 
earliest lesson in national history. One of the scenes they observe represents 
the classroom in village school in Macedonia. The keen interest with which 
the pupils appear to listen to their teacher suggests a degree of wishful pro-
jection. The effect, nevertheless, is quite impressive. The children staring 
into this time capsule may be too young to be subject to some of the more 
sophisticated tools of national indoctrination; they are years away from the 
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draft, hardly able to read newspapers, and placed in a playground of sorts. 
But, prompted by their teacher, they are able to make a connection between 
themselves and the figures in the box, just like other groups of kindergar-
teners and elementary schoolchildren before and after them. The diorama 
establishes a visible link between the schoolchildren and their predecessors 
a century earlier while enshrining the classroom in a special place in the 
collective memory of the nation. The dioramas represent critical moments 
during the national struggle for its rightful territory, and just like the legend-
ary “secret schools” of the Greek revolution, the classroom in Macedonia 
symbolizes resistance against foreign domination and assimilation—a bea-
con of light showing the way to those who would follow it.
The schools that became the scene of violent opposition between the 
Greek Orthodox and Exarchist communities in the countryside carried 
little resemblance to the institution that the word school elicits in con-
temporary minds. They occupied either a small building or a few rooms 
of a relatively bigger structure, and they were each run by a couple of 
teachers—ideally one each for boys and girls—and enrolled ten to fifty stu-
dents.1 In fact, even the diorama in the museum, which idealize the humble 
resources the Greek scholastic establishment had at its disposal—present 
a rather sterilized version of what an actual classroom in the Macedonian 
countryside would have looked like circa 1900. George F Abbott, who 
toured the region around that time, had a Greek schoolmaster as one of 
his travel companions. The schoolmaster, after having been removed from 
several positions due to his “arrogance,” was desperately looking for a new 
outlet for his nationalist fervor. They finally reached Tachino (district of 
Serres), where he had secured a position. Here, Abbott describes the idealist 
teacher’s post in his trademark sardonic style: “The school was in harmony 
with the sty aspect of the village. Repeated outpourings of ink had lent to 
the floor the appearance of a map of the world on a large scale, while the 
walls bore evidence of the cacoethes scribendi, the characteristic malady of 
youthful scholars the world over. The schoolroom contained a dozen rows 
of decayed desks covered with initials carved deeply into them. I should not 
have been at all surprised had I found a class of young pigs ranged behind 
them. Above the master’s desk there hung an icon of Christ, and in the desk 
lay a register. . . .”2
This register contained names of students, all boys, who had had to aban-
don their studies for various reasons, including, their parents’ whim. This 
was hardly the school environment that some nationalist visionaries yearned 
for, which would have been clean and orderly, with a map hanging beside (if 
not in lieu of) the icon of Christ, a refuge where all peasants’ children would 
be initiated into the national community by learning about its glorious past 
1. Carte des Écoles Chrétiennes de la Macédoine (Paris, 1905).
2. Abbott, Tale of a Tour in Macedonia, 244.
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4. Priest, teacher, and schoolchildren. From Leonidas Papazoglou, “Photographic 
Portraits from Kastoria and Its Vicinity at the Time of the Macedonian Struggle,” 
George Golobias Collection, Museum of Photography, Thessaloniki. Used with 
permission. (Credit applies to figures 4–13.)
and heroic present and, more important, by learning how to write and speak 
its language.
If language is the most important indicator of cultural affiliation, the 
Greeks certainly started with a clear advantage in the Ottoman Balkans. 
Greek was the language of the Enlightenment in the Balkans in the late 
eighteenth century and continued to be so for most of the nineteenth. It 
was also the lingua franca of the “conquering Orthodox merchant” and the 
language of the high clergy and other learned classes.3 Regardless of the lan-
guage that one spoke at home, becoming a member of the nascent bourgeoisie 
meant learning to speak Greek in public.4 This was in large part a result of 
the domination of the Greek establishment over education in the Ottoman 
3. Traian Stoianovich, “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant,” Journal of Eco-
nomic History 20, no. 2 (1960): 234–313.
4. By contrast, among the Greek bourgeoisie outside the Balkans (in Alexandria, for in-
stance), no refined Greek would consider a language other than French to be the utmost indica-
tion of civilization.
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Balkans, where it reached non-Greek ethnic groups such as the Vlachs and 
Slavs, and even non-Orthodox groups such as the Catholic Albanians.5
By the first decade of the twentieth century, Greek had lost its cultural 
monopoly. Education, and especially education in parish schools, had tra-
ditionally been under the control of the Patriarchate, which appointed the 
teachers and also provided the curriculum and instructional materials. After 
the 1850s, however, the demand for Bulgarian schools—or at least schools 
where instruction was in Bulgarian—started to increase in the Macedonian 
provinces, and the trend was bolstered by the gains made in the north, in 
the Danube Province, during the Tanzimat. Vlach and Serbian schools con-
stituted the secondary tier of competition to Greek Orthodox schools. Al-
though the representatives of Greek national interests were vexed by the 
proliferation of Vlach schools, functioning almost exclusively courtesy of 
Romanian subsidies, they presented a negligible disturbance compared to 
the effects of the Bulgarian schools. The majority of Vlachs, either out of 
choice or exigency, still continued to identify as Greek Orthodox.6 Moreover, 
5. Selçuk Akşin Somel, Modernization of Public Education, 1839–1908 (Leiden, 2001), 
213.
6. A Vlach teacher reportedly insisted on teaching Slavic-speaking children Greek to, in 
his words, “open up their eyes.” PRO, FO 195/1849, Samokov, December 11, 1894.
5. Gymnasium, teacher and students.
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Vlach speakers were more scattered and less numerous than the Slavic 
speakers of the area. As for Serbian schools, they were more a nuisance 
for Bulgarian nationalists than for their Greek counterparts because they 
concentrated their propaganda efforts not in eastern and south-central 
Macedonia but in the northwest, a region in which Greeks did not have 
strong claims.
In November 1886, the French consul in Salonika called the prolifera-
tion of “Bulgarian schools” a “scholarly awakening” that checked the 
hegemony of the Greeks, who were used to a position of superiority in 
cultural matters thanks to their schools and the influence of the Greek 
Orthodox clergy. “Seeing reappear in Macedonia an element, which we 
would hardly pay any attention to in Athens fifteen years ago, would not 
be the least interesting spectacle of our times,” he wrote to the minister of 
foreign affairs. “[B]y this awakening, which did not surprise the literati, the 
Greeks were stopped in the tracks of an ethnic assimilation that promised 
to take Cineas as its guide.”7 Less than two decades later, the Bulgarian side 
was so confident in the success of its challenge to Greek cultural hegemony 
that a pundit declared, “The century of Pericles marked the apogee of the 
Greek genius. Immediately after that was the decline. The Greek genius 
abandoned Athens. It made a few short appearances again in Byzantium. 
Then, it fell into lethargy . . . and since then, its slumber has rarely been 
interrupted.”8
The Greek and Bulgarian educational establishments resembled each 
other in their reliance on the religious establishment, rather than secular insti-
tutions of learning, to reach the masses. In this respect, the rivalry between 
the two closely paralleled the uneasy relationship between the Exarchate 
and the Patriarchate that resulted in the schism in 1872, only two years after 
the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate by imperial decree. Years later, 
the leading cadres of the Revolutionary Organization, founded in Salonika 
in 1893 with independence for Macedonia and Thrace as its aim, would 
come from among the products of the Bulgarian higher-educational estab-
lishment and would use their credentials as teachers to reach deep into the 
remote corners of the Macedonian countryside and enlist volunteers for 
their cause. The Greek side, for its part, enlisted the help of an Athens-based 
organization, the Society for the Dissemination of Greek Letters, to coun-
ter the efforts of Bulgarian activists and adopt the Patriarchate-dominated 
schooling system into its irredentist agenda.
7. MAE, vol. 7, Consul to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Salonika, November 30, 1886.
8. D. M. Brancoff, [Dimitar Mishev] La Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne (Paris, 
1905), 62.
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The Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate
On September 16, 1872, the Local Synod, convened in Constantinople 
at the behest of Patriarch Anthimos VI (Koutalianos) declared the newly 
formed Bulgarian Exarchate to be schismatic by reason of committing 
the heresy of ethnophyletism9 despite the ongoing efforts by several cler-
gymen, diplomats, and politicians to forge a reconciliation of the dispute 
between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate.10 The 
decision was a turning point not only in terms of the relationship between 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Exarchate but also the intercommu-
nal relations of Christian Orthodox communities in the Ottoman Balkans. 
We could also argue that the Church schism indirectly—but profoundly—
affected the evolution of Greek nationalism by compounding its emphasis 
on a collective consciousness defined and reinforced by membership in the 
Greek Orthodox Church.11
An imperial ferman issued on March 12, 1870, had recognized the estab-
lishment of a semi-autonomous Bulgarian Church in Constantinople, with 
an Exarch, a rank that fell somewhere between Archbishop and Patriarch in 
the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The ferman was the culmination of a protracted 
struggle that had started in the late eighteenth century, led by influential lay 
members of the Bulgarian community in Istanbul and by clergy frustrated 
by what they perceived to be an openly Greek bias and domination in the 
church organization. This particular cause of discontent with the Patriarch-
ate was also duly noticed and exploited by Catholic and Protestant mission-
aries, who played a significant role in the evolution of Bulgarian nationalism 
throughout the nineteenth century.12 These missionaries recruited increasing 
numbers of converts by taking advantage of Ottoman Bulgarians’ desire for 
an independent church.13 Encouraged and financed in large part by France 
 9. This is a specific form of nationalism based on race, declared heretical in 1872.
10. The Ecumenical Patriarch had convened in Constantinople the patriarchs of Jerusa-
lem, Antioch, and Alexandria; the archbishop of Cyprus; and several bishops; A. Ischirkoff 
[Anastas Ishirkov], La Macédoine et la Constitution de l’Exarchat bulgare (Lausanne, 1918), 
28; Thomas A. Meininger, Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, 1864–
1872 (Madison, 1970), 181–89.
11. Paschalis Kitromilides argues that it was in the “symbolic universe of the Great Idea” 
that the Church and the nation could finally come together. “ ‘Imagined Communities’ and 
the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans,” in Modern Greece: Nationalism and 
Nationality, edited by Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis (Athens, 1990), 60. For a general 
discussion of the Greek historiographic treatment of religion as an element of Greek national-
ism, see Effi Gazi, “Revisiting Religion and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Greece,” in 
Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), 
edited by Roderick Beaton and David Ricks (Aldershot, 2009), 95–106.
12. Victor Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy, the Social Origins 
of Ethnic Confl ict in the Balkans (Westport, 2001); 133.
13. James F. Clarke, The Pen and the Sword, edited by Dennis P. Hupchick (Boulder, 
1988), 328–30.
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and also supported by Austria, the Uniate movement, which professed 
canonical communion with the Roman Apostolic See, started to make mod-
est but considerable headway in the Ottoman Balkans.14 In fact, conversion 
to Catholicism of the Eastern rite continued to be a viable option for some 
Bulgarian communities wanting to sever their ties with the Patriarchate even 
after the establishment of the Exarchate, despite the growing antagonism of 
local clergy and civil administrators, but this option lost momentum after 
the church struggle spread into and concentrated in Macedonia during the 
first decade of the twentieth century.15
Protestant missionaries, on the other hand, who were relatively late ad-
ditions to the religious rivalry in the Balkans, created an alternative to the 
Uniate movement by emphasizing the reformation of preexisting beliefs 
and practices.16 Although the Evangelical Alliance faced an uphill battle in 
spreading the gospel and “reforming” the Slavic-speaking Orthodox into 
a Protestant Church, the Bulgarian nationalists made apt use of the mis-
sionaries’ presence when mustering up diplomatic support for their cause, 
especially from Britain and later from the United States.17 Even though 
a proponent of the Bulgarian national movement has given credit to U.S. 
missionaries for contributing more directly—if unintentionally—to the cre-
ation of an independent Bulgarian Church by publishing the first bible in 
modern Bulgarian (Eastern dialect) in Istanbul in 1871, the Exarchate pre-
ferred Old Church Slavonic for the liturgy.18
The establishment of the Exarchate is viewed, with good reason, as the 
outcome of the Bulgarian community’s frustration with its subjugation by 
the Patriarchate and with Bulgarian clergy’s inability to participate in the 
higher church hierarchy. The Bulgarian community, constrained by the 
“double yoke” of the Patriarchate and the sultan, followed through with 
its plans for independence by, first, throwing off the former in prepara-
tion for throwing off the latter. The Exarchate, briefly put, is considered a 
14. MAE, vol. 7, Salonika, May 23, 1885, Consul to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
15. MAE, vol. 7, Salonika, September 14, 1881, Consul to the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, concerning the activities of Lazarists and the conversion of the 
Bulgarian community of Goumendje (in Yenice-Vardar) into Catholicism, and threats from the 
Ottoman police and bishop of Vodena.
16. They actively pursued the mission of “reforming” the Greek Orthodox Christians of 
Asia Minor; Gerasimos Augustinos, “’Enlightened Christians and ‘Oriental’ Churches: Protes-
tant Missions to the Greeks in Asia Minor, 1820–1860,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies 4, 
no. 2 (1986): 129–42.
17. James Baker, who resided in Macedonia in the 1870s claimed that “In 1874 the Bul-
garians in Macedonia, in their religious struggles, actually petitioned the British embassy to 
interfere in their behalf, and to have them placed under the ecclesiastical rule of the Bulgarian 
Exarch! They even went so far as to ask whether, in the event of their becoming Protestants, the 
British Government would watch over their interests!” Turkey in Europe (London, 1877), 57.
18. Clarke, Pen and the Sword, 290.
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direct product of the culmination of Bulgarian nationhood.19 Although this 
statement is largely accurate, at least as far as the Bulgarian clergy and intel-
ligentsia of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are concerned, 
the events and personalities involved in the establishment of the Exarchate 
were so complex that this proposed linear connection between Bulgarian 
nationhood and the formation of the Exarchate as its utmost expression is 
inadequate. In fact, the most recent revision of this consensus argues that the 
establishment of the Exarchate should be seen as part of a broader process 
of secularization that transformed the Patriarchate in the second half of the 
nineteenth century; that the movement for the Exarchate was a product 
of the same process; and that the Exarchate cannot be viewed as an entity 
entirely separate from and antagonistic to the Patriarchate, even after the 
Schism of 1872.20 This, I must add, speaks more to the motivations of the 
Greek clergy and lay elite in finally coming to terms with the establishment 
of an autocephalous church than to the desire of the Bulgarian side to under-
mine the influence of the Patriarchate (and, by implication, Greek cultural 
hegemony) over what they viewed as their own turf.21
During the second half of the nineteenth century the Ottoman imperial 
capital, rather than areas with large Bulgarian-speaking populations in the 
Balkans, hosted the most influential elements of Bulgarian nationalism.22 
The first concession that the Bulgarian community obtained from the Sub-
lime Porte was the right to build a church in Istanbul in 1848 that would still 
be ecclesiastically subject to the Patriarchate but also serve as an “advisory 
body for Bulgarian communities everywhere in the Empire.”23 The lay elite 
of the Bulgarian community of Istanbul assumed most of the responsibility 
in the church struggle, and their leadership would greatly influence the 
19. See, for instance, Ishirkov, La Macédoine et la Constitution. The classic work on the 
formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate published in Bulgarian is Zina Markova, Bŭlgarskata 
Ekzarhiya, 1870–1879 (Sofia, 1989). An early classic, first published in German, is Richard 
von Mach, Der Machtbereich des bulgarischen exarchats in der Türkei (Leipzig, 1906); this 
was published in English: The Bulgarian Exarchate: Its History and the Extent of Its Authority 
in Turkey (London, 1907).
20. Dēmētrios Stamatopoulos, Metarrythmisē kai Ekkosmikeusē: Pros mia Anasynthesē 
tēs Istorias tou Oikoumenikou Patriarcheiou tou 19o Aiōna (Athens, 2003).
21. In fact, the first instance of an autocephalous church sparking tensions within Greek 
Orthodoxy was the formation of the National Church of Greece; Paraskevas Matalas, Ethnos 
kai Orthodoxia: Oi Peripeties mias Schesēs apo to “Elladiko” sto Voulgariko Schisma (Irak-
leio, 2002).
22. Ishirkov notes that, although there were highly educated Bulgarians in the service of 
the governments in Russia, Romania, Greece and Turkey, one of the most striking elements of 
the “Bulgarian renaissance” was the sheer number of Bulgarian periodicals appearing in Con-
stantinople in the mid-nineteenth century; La Macédoine et la Constitution, 8–13.
23. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy, 133. According to 
Ishirkov, Sultan Abdülmecid, after listening to the complaints of his Bulgarian subjects during 
his tour of the “Bulgarian provinces” (presumably referring to his tour of Rumeli in 1846), 
asked the Patriarch to defer to their wishes, again to no avail; La Macédoine et la Constitu-
tion, 10–11.
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unfolding of this bitter quarrel within the Orthodox hierarchy. The Pa-
triarchate agreed to a few more concessions in 1858 and 1859, such as 
the permission to use Slavonic in liturgy in certain regions and to name 
Ilarion of Macariopolis “Bishop in partibus (without seat) of the Bulgarian 
Church” in Constantinople.24 The council convened by the Patriarchate 
deemed these concessions sufficient for the time being, and after delibera-
tions that continued from October 1858 to February 1860, the council re-
fused further concessions, including a proposal to grant parishioners the 
right to elect their bishop and to require bishops to speak the language of 
their congregations.25
It is important to note, first, that this council, which was known, some-
what anachronistically, as the first Ethnosyneleusē (National Assembly), 
was a response to the demand of the Sublime Porte, from the heads of the 
millets, in accordance with the 1856 Islahat Fermânı, to form representative 
councils.26 More important, the work of this assembly between 1858 and 
1860 resulted in instituting the participation of lay representatives in the 
election of Patriarchs and the establishment of a permanent Diarko Ethniko 
Symvoulio (Mixed Council), whose members included lay elements and had 
control over the Patriarchate’s administration.27 This council later played a 
great role in curbing the powers of the Holy Synod and became instrumen-
tal in unseating Patriarchs who did not agree with the influential members’ 
agendas, bringing the networks between powerful members of the lay com-
munity, called the Neophanariots; representatives of foreign powers; and 
the clergy directly into ecclesiastical politics. The Mixed Council, according 
to Anastas Ishirkov, included only four Bulgarian members, three of whom, 
in protest over the council refusal to take up the issue of administrative 
changes in dioceses with Bulgarian populations, did not participate in the 
final sessions of the council. When Stephanos Karatheodori, a prominent 
Phanariot and the sultan’s physician, issued an angry statement concerning 
Bulgarian demands, it triggered a response, composed in Greek, from Gâvril 
Krastevič.28 Krastevič was a protégé of Stephan Vogoridis, a prominent 
24. Tozer notes that in certain districts “as for instance, in the neighborhood of Ochrida, 
permission has been given within the last few years to introduce the Slavonic tongue . . . but 
these are quite exceptions.” Henry F. Tozer, Researches in the Highlands of Turkey (London, 
1869), Vol. 1: 182. It seems that the use of Slavonic, although not officially condoned by the 
Patriarchate, had made its way into a few churches, at least for nonliturgical purposes out of 
local exigencies, much earlier than the 1860s; Cousinéry, for instance, notes that all the arch-
bishops in Vodena had to learn Bulgarian even if they were of Greek descent if they wanted 
a good level of donations to the church in their diocese; E. M. Couisinéry, Voyage dans la 
Macédoine, contenant les recherches sur l’histoire, la géographie et les antiquités de ce pays 
(Paris, 1831), 77.
25. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy, 138.
26. Stamatopulos, Metarrythmisē kai Ekkosmikeusē, 77.
27. Ibid., 121.
28. The response was presented under the name of Hatzi Nikolas Mintzoglou, the Bulgar-
ian representative from Tirnovo, according to Ishirkov, La Macédoine et la Constitution, 15.
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Phanariot who was, just like Krastevič, of Bulgarian origin. Although 
Krastevič, unlike his patron, was quite far from being entirely Hellenized, 
his close relations with other Phanariot families even after the establish-
ment of the Exarchate, in which he had played an important part, is one 
among many examples that underscore the important role played by ex-
tremely complicated power, social, and political networks that had nothing 
to do with nationalism in shaping the relationship between the two rival 
Orthodox churches.29
On Easter Sunday 1860, Ilarion of Macariopolis performed a highly sym-
bolic act of protest by omitting the name of the Patriarch from the liturgy, 
which earned him his excommunication from the Church and established 
him as one of the bravest voices against the hegemony of the Church el-
ders.30 Four years later, Nikolai Ignatiev, argu ably the most influential Rus-
sian ambassador to the Sublime Porte in the nineteenth century, arrived to 
take up his post. After 1872 Ignatiev directed his energies to the mending of 
the division in the Orthodox oikoumene, to which he felt he had partially 
and unwittingly contributed.
Although the separation of the Exarchate had been in the works long 
before Ignatiev set foot in the Ottoman capital, his meddling in the affairs 
of the Church, including the election of Patriarchs, and the ties he cultivated 
with Ottoman statesmen that allowed him to exert just the right amount of 
pressure both on the Patriarchate and the Bulgarians, did contribute to the 
schism that occurred in 1872. The initiative he took to reconcile the two 
churches had to strike a very fine balance between catering to the desires 
of Bulgarians on the one hand and not alienating the Patriarchate on the 
other—and it was doomed to failure for the same reason. Ignatiev could 
not have lived to see the schism eliminated, which happened only in 1945.
The ferman that established the Exarchate was promulgated on March 12. 
The text was based loosely on an earlier blueprint drawn up by a Bulgarian 
council consisting of lay notables as well the clergy. It granted the Exarchate 
complete autonomy in administrative matters while preserving its ecclesias-
tical subordination to the Patriarchate. The Exarchate, in other words, was 
neither independent nor autocephalous but was granted fifteen dioceses, 
almost all of which were in Danubian Bulgaria. In this form, it far from 
satisfied the demands of the more ambitious nationalists in the Bulgarian 
29. For a summary of Krastevič’s career and other examples of such complicated net-
works, see Demetrios Stamatopoulos, “The Splitting of the Orthodox Millet as a Secularizing 
Process,” in Griechische Kultur in Südosteuropa in der Neuzeit, edited by Maria A. Stassino-
poulou und Ioannis Zelepos (Vienna, 2008), 243–70. The competing influences of Russia and 
Britain should not be overlooked in determining the outcome of power struggles within the 
Patriarchate; Christine Philliou, Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of 
Revolution (Los Angeles, 2010), 143–44.
30. Ishirkov, La Macédoine et la Constitution, 17.
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side but it was acceptable to the moderates and—with reservations—even to 
the Patriarchate. There were two major “time bombs” planted in the text, 
however, and these two issues would thwart all future actions taken to lift 
the schism. The first one was the location of the Exarch’s seat in Constan-
tinople, which was a disturbing but not extremely egregious decision to the 
Greek side when there was as yet no Bulgaria in existence. Yet many Greeks 
wondered why the Exarchate had not been located in Tirnovo, where Tsar 
Ivan Asen II had revived the Bulgarian Patriarchate in 1235. The second 
issue was even more menacing in terms of its long-term consequences: this 
was the clause sanctioning that, after a plebiscite, if two-thirds or more of 
the population of a given district voted in favor of it, the Exarchate could 
establish a diocese in that district.31
Immediately after the promulgation of the ferman, the Bulgarian commu-
nity started to organize its own council of lay and clerical leaders to finalize 
a governing statute. Among the delegates who arrived in Constantinople for 
the occasion were those from Macedonian provinces, none of which was in-
cluded in the jurisdiction of the Exarchate. A new demand emerged, namely, 
the official recognition of Bulgarian dioceses in Macedonia. This was not a 
matter that could simply be brought before the Ottoman government be-
cause the ferman clearly stated that the Exarch had to be recognized by the 
Patriarch. The efforts of Ambassador Ignatiev, Greek Ambassador Alexan-
dros Rizos Rangavis, and the moderates on both sides to find a compromise 
seemed within reach, but the extremists on the Bulgarian side, such as Stoian 
Chomakov, who were not willing to settle for a solution that left out Phil-
lippopoli, Strumnitza, Moglena, and Monastir (Bitola), went against the 
instructions of the Patriarch and celebrated Epiphany on January 6, 1872, 
with a ceremony conducted by the bishops of Makariopolis, Phillippopoli, 
and Loftzo. As a result, the last two bishops were dismissed from their du-
ties, whereas Ilarion of Makariopolis, having already received this distinc-
tion, was excommunicated.32 The Ottoman government tried to placate the 
Bulgarian side by approving the election of an Exarch, and Bishop Anthimos 
of Vidin received the title after the other four candidates were eliminated. 
He was presented to the sultan during a ceremony in Dolmabahçe Palace 
on April 12—but without the approval of the Patriarch.33 Subsequent at-
tempts by Anthimos, who, unlike the other candidates to the position, had 
kept his ties to the Patriarchate,34 to earn the Patriarch’s endorsement were 
all turned down. The weakening ties between the Patriarchate and the new 
31. A. Schopoff, Les Reformes et la Protection des Chrétiens en Turquie (Paris, 1904), 
134–37.
32. Ilarion (Stoianov Michailovski) and Stoian Chomakov had both trained at the school 
of Theophilos Kaïris, the Greek theologian. Matalas, Ethnos kai Orthodoxia, 89–193.
33. Ibid., 297–99.
34. Anthimos had remained as the director of the Theological Seminary in Halki; 
ibid., 298.
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autocephalous church finally broke completely after the Exarch, along with 
the three (by now notorious) bishops, Panaretos, Ilarion of Loftza, and Ilarion 
of Makariopolis, celebrated mass on the day of saints Cyrill and Methodios, 
and declared the independence of the Bulgarian Church on May 11, 1872. 
On May 13, the general synod convened by the Patriarchate defrocked the 
former bishop of Vidin, excommunicated Panaretos and Ilarion of Loftza, 
and anathemized Ilarion of Makariopolis, condemning him to eternal hell.35 
The Local Synod convened in Constantinople officially declared the Bulgar-
ian Church schismatic on September 16.
At first, it seemed that the schism was not final; lay and clerical actors 
on both sides of the split worked for a reconciliation until well into the 
first years of the twentieth century. After the settlement in 1878, all the 
dioceses originally recognized by the ferman of 1870 within the jurisdiction 
of the Exarchate fell outside the borders of the Ottoman Empire. Between 
the schism and 1876, when insurrectionary activity in the Danubian prov-
inces soured the relations between the Sublime Porte and the Exarchate, 
the Bulgarian Church had secured several concessions and expanded its ju-
risdictional reach to include Skopje and Ohrida. The Russo-Ottoman War 
reversed these gains and left the Bulgarians in a precarious position until 
the 1890s, when the Sublime Porte finally approved the berats (licenses), 
first for the dioceses of Ohrida and Skopje and then for Veles (Köprülü) and 
Nevrekop.
Patriarch Ioachim III, who ascended the throne for the first time in 1878 
(his second term was from 1901–1912), now faced the daunting task of 
preserving the Orthodox oikoumene that remained in the Ottoman lands. 
Maintaining the schism and further antagonizing Slavophone Christians, 
Exarchist or Patriarchist, against the Patriarchate would not be conducive to 
this end. Ioachim’s conciliatory attitude toward the Exarchate was inspired 
by this concern. However, the loss of territory also resulted in a sudden loss 
of revenue, which forced the Patriarchate to accept financial assistance from 
the Greek government, weakening its institutional position and establishing 
an external dependency.36 Financial support from the Greek government 
compromised the Patriarch’s credibility vis-à-vis his goal of mending the 
schism and reasserting his role as the head of the imperial Orthodox com-
munity. He astutely tried to circumvent this problem by enlisting the help 
of wealthy Greek Orthodox families in Istanbul, which did not sit well with 
the Greek government.37 In the end, Patriarch Ioachim III’s efforts proved 
35. Ishirkov, La Macédoine et la Constitution, 28.
36. Evangelos Kofos, “Patriarch Joachim (1878–1884) and the Irredentist Policy of the 
Greek State,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies 4 no. 2 (1986): 107–20.
37. Another source of conflict between Ioachim III and the Greek government was the in-
creasing Russian influence in Mount Athos, which the Greek nationalists viewed as a bulwark 
against Slav encroachment on Macedonia. Ioachim III’s views on how to deal with this issue 
were again conciliatory, which the Greek side took as “anti-national.” Ibid., 115–16.
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insufficient to, on the one hand, counteract the divergent positions of the 
Patriarchate and the Greek irredentists and, on the other, reconcile the dif-
ferences between the Patriarchate’s and the Exarchate’s visions for the future 
of Macedonia.
The seat of the Exarchate in Istanbul became an extremely important 
bone of contention, especially after the formation of the Bulgarian princi-
pality in 1878 and the unification of the principality with Eastern Rumelia 
in 1885. The Exarchate was not the first Orthodox Church to become in-
dependent of the Patriarchate without the Patriarchate’s approval; even the 
Church of Greece, which was established in 1833 and actually had served as 
a model for the Exarchate, had not been recognized by the Patriarchate until 
1850. The Exarchate was exceptional, however, in the sense that church 
autonomy had preceded political independence from the Ottoman Empire.38 
This meant that the rival Church in Istanbul challenged the Patriarchate’s 
authority within the Empire. After the formation of Bulgaria under Rus-
sian patronage, the Exarchate could not be marginalized outside the borders 
of the Empire, despite efforts to do so, because the Bulgarians were un-
willing to give up the central position of the Exarch’s seat in the imperial 
capital and the rights grandfathered in with the plebiscite clause. As the 
influence of nationalists on both sides drowned out the dissenting voices 
of the moderates, the schism was gradually accepted as a permanent situa-
tion. Even as late as 1901, when Ioachim III came into his second term as 
Patriarch, the views of the Patriarchate on the issue of an autonomous Bul-
garian Church were not definitive, and they clearly acknowledged the need 
for special arrangements for “Bulgarian” speakers in Macedonia.39 This is 
in striking contrast to the attitude and actions of the representatives of the 
Great Church in Macedonia only a few years later, including Ioachim III 
himself, when refusing peasant demands for priests who could understand 
their language became a matter of course. Even though the dominant opin-
ion among lay and clerical members of the leadership in Istanbul seemed 
to favor the possibility of a reconciliation with the Exarchate, this opinion 
lost its relevance as the struggle for Macedonian dioceses transformed from 
ecclesiastical rivalry into armed warfare. It seemed that the ties between the 
two churches were now cut off for good. By this time, the schism was no 
longer an issue originating and contained within the capital, but had spread 
and mutated into a relentless struggle that claimed the lives of Macedonian 
peasants by the thousands.
38. The Serbian Church, which was restored in 1557, was abolished again in 1766.
39. Evangelos Kofos, “Attempts at Mending the Greek-Bulgarian Ecclesiastical Schism 
(1875–1902),” Balkan Studies 25 (1984), 365–66.
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The Growth of Bulgarian Schools
Köprülü (Veles), Kukliş (Koukoush), and Cuma-i Bâlâ (Gorna Djoumaya) 
were the earliest among the districts of Macedonia to acquire Bulgarian 
schools.40 The Bulgarian nationalist intelligentsia of Constantinople viewed 
the new schools with enthusiasm and raised funds for their support and 
maintenance. In May 1858, for instance, an article in Bulgarski Knizhitsi 
reported the introduction of Bulgarian into the churches and schools in 
Koukoush, replete with allegories of awakening and quenching the thirst 
for hearing “the word of God in their native tongue” following a period 
of sadness. The author warned the readers that a sorry state of affairs was 
still the case in many dioceses: “Ohrid, Bitola, Kostur, Moglena, Voden, 
Stroumnitza, Polyanino (Doyran), Melnik, Serres, Drama, and a few more, 
where the inhabitants intermingle with Greeks.”41 Not surprisingly, this list 
overlapped with the dioceses, where the “interests of Hellenism” should 
be protected through schools, according to the Athens-based Society for 
the Dissemination of Greek Letters (Syllogos pros Diadosin tōn Ellinēkōn 
Grammatōn; henceforth, Syllogos).42 We must note, however, that some of 
the schools described as “Bulgarian” were officially under the control of 
the Patriarchate, and in many cases Bulgarian was taught or used in church 
services (Slavonic, in this case) without the knowledge of the local Greek 
Orthodox bishop.43 After the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate 
in 1870, the number of communities demanding instruction in Bulgarian 
started to increase. In 1895, an irâde placed Bulgarian schools under the au-
thority of the Exarchate, following the existing model for Greek Orthodox 
(Rum) schools. According to this, teachers would be appointed directly by 
the Exarchate, subject to the approval of local authorities.44 As the con-
flict in Macedonia crystallized around the Exarchist-Patriarchist division, 
schools, like church buildings, came to represent entities much larger than 
themselves.
The irâde of 1895 that placed Bulgarian schools officially under the au-
thority of the Exarchate was in accordance with established imperial proce-
dure and required a protocol of scrutiny over their activities. The Exarchate 
would present a list of appointed teachers to the local civilian authorities, 
40. See Macedonia, Documents and Material (Sofia, 1978), 142–51.
41. “Report from Koukoush,” Bulgarski Knizhitsi, no. 10 (May 1858), cited in ibid., 149. 
(All citations from this source are transliterated as in the original.)
42. Mavrokordatos and Pantazidis to Kontostaulos, Athens, December 11, 1875 (Ta ar-
cheia tou Ypourgeiou Exoterikōn, Archives of the Foreign Ministry, [henceforth AYE]), a.a.k. 
1876–77/3, in Sophia Vouri, Pēges gia tēn Istoria tēs Makedonias: Politikē kai Ekpaideusē 
[Sources for the History of Macedonia: Politics and Education] (Athens, 1994), 30–33.
43. Russian Consul in Manastir, M. A. Hitrovo to Ignatiev, August 6, 1864, cited in 
Macedonia, Documents and Material, 212–14.
44. MAE. vol. 39, Consul to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Salonika, February 6, 1904.
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who would then perform a background check to see if the teachers were 
“trustworthy” individuals.45 Textbooks were subject to inspection by an of-
fice specifically created for this purpose, namely, the inspector of Bulgarian 
schools. After the Ilinden Uprising, the level of surveillance increased signifi-
cantly. The inspector kept detailed registers of Bulgarian teachers, includ-
ing their names, places of birth, past appointments, and any information 
on their ties to the “Committee,” which were then presented to the Inspec-
torate.46 If the administrative council of a village could not vouch for the 
character of a teacher and report his or her whereabouts, the teacher would 
be denied permission to work and confined to his or her place of birth.
During the early stages of the Bulgarian educational project in Macedo-
nia, a mix of local communal support and donations from wealthy patrons 
elsewhere financed the schools. The latter category included members of 
the Bulgarian bourgeoisie in the imperial capital, who established national-
ist civil organizations such as the Macedonian Society of Constantinople. 
Support from Russia, which the Greeks found so irritating, did not come 
until later, in the 1860s, along with support for the Church movement in 
response to the increasing influence of the Uniate movement, which the Pa-
triarch of Moscow perceived as a threat to Eastern Orthodoxy.47 The Rus-
sian consuls in Macedonia actively sought information on the state of the 
Bulgarian schools in the area and reported on their need for support by the 
Russian government.48 Another important link to Russia at the time was 
the Russian-educated nationalists of Macedonian origin. Many of them had 
completed their education thanks to scholarships provided by the Moscow 
Benevolent Society and by the Russian Embassy in Istanbul. They replaced 
the earlier generation that had studied in Greece, and they usually returned 
to Macedonia as teachers and to raise consciousness for the Bulgarian 
national cause.49 Finally, commercial guilds made important contributions 
to the educational effort in the region.50 Funding Bulgarian education was 
a mark of social distinction, and failing to do so might cause considerable 
damage to one’s social capital; periodicals announced the names not only of 
the benefactors but also of their less generous compatriots to the community. 
45. Ibid.; BOA, TFR.I. SL 14/1381, Director of Educational Affairs [Maarif Müdürlüğü] 
to the Inspectorate, Salonika, July 12, 1903.
46. BOA, TFR.I.SL 144/14331, Inspector of Bulgarian Schools, Salonika, May 19, 1907.
47. Jelavich and Jelavich, Establishment of the Balkan National States, 133; Macedonia, 
Documents and Material, 186.
48. Consul Hitrovo to Novikov, Manastir, January 16, 1864 and July 1864, cited in 
Macedonia, Documents and Material, 209, 211–14.
49. All but one of the six teachers cited in the Russian consul’s report on Bulgarian edu-
cation in Macedonia had been trained in Russia; Macedonia, Documents and Material, 298.
50. The first Bulgarian schools were founded in commercial centers. Some of the com-
munities that later sent financial contributions to Bulgarian schools in Macedonia were also 
important trade towns such as Plovdiv, Pazardjik, and Kalofer; “Report from Nevrokop,” 
Turtsia, June 20, 1865, cited in ibid., 219.
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An article published in the newspaper Turtsiia, January 8, 1866, praised the 
kindness of those notables who were participating in the efforts to provide 
Bitola (Monastir) with a Bulgarian school and berated those “who still tarry 
and keep aloof,” identifying the members of this category by name in the 
hopes that “God will enlighten and strengthen them.”51
The Greek state was actively interested in raising national consciousness in 
the “enslaved lands,” including Macedonia, even before the Exarchate’s 
sphere of influence had started to spread through the few dioceses it was 
originally granted. As early as 1871, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
identified, in a circular to the consulates, the need for more schools because 
nothing would “support Hellenism and national sentiment like Greek edu-
cation and language.”52 After the Greek state and literary societies started 
to appreciate the significance of the scholastic rivalry and the influx of funds 
from Russia and independent Bulgaria into Macedonia, they increased their 
financial assistance to the Macedonian schools and sought further funds. 
Syllogos, after 1869, and the Committee for Support of Greek Church and 
Education, after 1886, were the two proxies through which the Greek state 
lent support for the cause of Hellenism in the “enslaved lands.” By the 
1900s, when the struggle with the Exarchate reached its zenith, the efforts 
of these organizations were combined with those of the Patriarchate, and a 
full counteroffensive was launched against the proliferation of Bulgarian 
schools. According to Captain Leon Falconetti, who was with the French 
gendarmerie in Serres, the Greek government had spent 1.5 million drach-
mas in 1906 from its meager budget just for this purpose.53 In this later part 
of the counteroffensive, the Patriarchate and Greek learned societies (which, 
despite having joined forces tactically, were at odds with each other more 
often than not) benefited from the Ottoman authorities’ somewhat justified 
distrust of the Bulgarian educational establishment.
When a community could not agree on the medium of instruction, dis-
putes arose regarding the use of the school building, very similar to those 
arising regarding the use of church buildings. In fact, in many cases, the dis-
putes involved both the church building and the school building, if there was 
one, because the latter was seen more or less as an extension of the other. 
Just as in the disputes concerning the use of church buildings and newly ap-
pointed priests, in solving problems relating to the schools the authorities 
usually sided with the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan. Problems did occur 
frequently, especially when communities that were at least nominally under 
51. “Report from Bitola,” Turtsiia, Constantinople, no. 27, January 8, 1866, cited in 
ibid., 221–22.
52. Eleni D. Belia, “Ē Ekpaideutikē Politikē tou Ellinikou Kratous pros tēn Makedonia kai 
o Makedonikos Agōn” [The Educational Policy of the Greek State toward Macedonia and the 
Macedonian Struggle], in O Makedonikos Agōnas: Symposio, [Macedonian Struggle, Sympo-
sium Proceedings] (Thessaloniki, 1987), 30.
53. MAE, vol. 416, Report by Captain Falconetti, March 19, 1906.
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the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate demanded Bulgarian-speaking teachers. 
Even though authorities usually attributed this “extraordinary” demand to 
the pressures of armed bands in the area, it was equally, if not more, likely 
that the demand for a Bulgarian-speaking teacher was motivated by more 
practical concerns, such as the desire to have the children learn to read and 
write in their native tongue or, more precisely, in an idiom closer to it than 
Constantinople-approved Greek. Note that these communities were not ex-
clusively those that wanted to sever their ties with the Patriarchate. In April 
1883, a scandalized Greek consul in Monastir reported to the president of 
the Syllogos in Athens that not only the “schismatic but also some Bulgaro-
phone Orthodox communities” supported Bulgarian schools with “monies 
from the church fund and monastic revenues.” He blamed the bishops for 
this outrage because, although it was actually within their authority to for-
bid the use of church money for such purposes, they did not do so for fear 
of alienating the population that they depended on for their own living.54
Some clergymen’s tendency to accommodate and appease the locals, as 
opposed to the “take-no-prisoners” approach of action-minded consuls and 
other representatives of the Greek national intelligentsia, was a recurring 
source of tension. The conflict between the lower clergy in Macedonia and 
the Greek national elites in the Hellenic kingdom as well as the Ottoman 
Empire became more pronounced, particularly with regard to the language 
of instruction in parish schools during the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century, when there still seemed to be a chance to mend the schism. The 
Ecumenical Patriarch Ioachim III (who had ancestral roots in Macedonia), 
for instance, was in constant conflict with Athens, specifically with represen-
tatives of the Syllogos, during his first term as Patriarch between 1878 and 
1884 over the need to reconcile with the Exarchate. Leaders such as Kon-
stantinos Paparrigopoulos viewed the schism as beneficial for the interests 
of Hellenism in Macedonia, whereas Ioachim III was convinced otherwise.55 
Likewise, even a Patriarch such as Anthimos VII (1895–1897), who was 
thought to be much less lenient toward Bulgarian demands for ecclesiastical 
authority, criticized the actions of the Greek government during a visit to 
the Hellenic embassy in Constantinople and defended a policy of appease-
ment toward the “fellow Orthodox,” especially the Serbs, to overcome the 
“isolation” that the Greek Orthodox were mired in. The views of His All 
Holiness were not welcome by Mr. Zalokostas, the secretary of the Syllogos, 
who rebutted that as long as the Serbs did not limit themselves to their logi-
cal “ethnological boundaries” there would be no use in a reconciliation, and 
54. AYE, fak. 1883, Consul Dokos to President of the Society for the Dissemination of 
Greek Letters, Monastir, April 1883, in Vouri, Pēges gia tēn Istoria tēs Makedonias, 46.
55. Kofos, “Attempts at Mending,” 357.
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that they were trying to overthrow a status quo in the church, which it was 
in the interests of the Greek nation to preserve.56
The most common method of resistance that Slavic-speaking villages dis-
played against Greek-speaking teachers was to prevent the newly appointed 
teachers from taking up residence. An angry Metropolitan of Vodine wrote 
to the Inspectorate in September 1904 that this was exactly what was going 
on in several villages under his jurisdiction. According to the Metropolitan, 
the behavior of the villagers was the result of threats by “Bulgarian brig-
ands” who had been circulating the vicinity, telling people “you are Bulgar-
ians, you will read Bulgarian, don’t accept the Rum teachers sent to your 
villages.”57 On receiving the letter, the Inspectorate warned the local author-
ities about the Metropolitan’s concerns and ordered that they provide the 
Rum teachers with all the protection they needed to assume their positions 
because such “harassment” and the intervention of Bulgarian priests and 
teachers in these villages were utterly “inappropriate.” The village councils 
were duly warned to properly welcome the new appointees because they 
would be held personally responsible for the safety and well-being of the 
teachers.58 When the Inspectorate was flooded with angry petitions from 
Greek Orthodox bishops in the area about similar cases of resistance, as 
happened often, they routinely demanded from local authorities that the 
Greek Orthodox Metropolitans’ concerns be fully addressed. Some officials 
carried out their assignment with exceptional zeal, not only giving a warning 
to the village heads and notables but also ensuring that they were detained 
and duly reprimanded by the Greek Metropolitan himself.59 Having been 
berated by the Metropolitan and roughed up by the gendarmes, it was then 
the villagers’ turn to send protest telegrams to the authorities.60 It is hard 
to tell whether the children received any schooling at all in either language 
after such heated exchanges among their parents, the Metropolitan, the in-
surgents, and the government.
Higher Education for Higher Classes
Schools of higher learning, the gymnasia and secondary schools that 
served the important mission of training teachers, proliferated in Macedonia 
56. AYE, fak. 1895, Ambassador Mavrokordatos to Minister Deliyianni, Istanbul, March 
11, 1895, in Vouri, Pēges gia tēn Istoria tēs Makedonias, 269–70.
57. BOA, TFR.I.SL 53/5289, Metropolitan of Vodine to the Inspectorate, September 4, 
1904.
58. BOA, TFR.I.SL 53/5289, Inspectorate to the Kaymakamlık (Prefecture) of Yenice 
Vardar and Vodine, September 6, 1904.
59. BOA, TFR.I.SL 53/5204, Inspectorate to the Prefecture of Vodine, September 26, 
1904.
60. BOA, TFR.I.SL 52/5186, Telegram to the Inspector, September 1904.
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after the 1890s. The graduates of these schools spread the national gospel to 
their less unenlightened brethren in the countryside. By 1905, according to 
D. M. Brancoff (Dimitar Mishev) there were thirty-seven Bulgarian (and one 
Bulgarian Uniate) and twenty-three Greek secondary schools in the province 
of Salonika; the numbers of these schools in Monastir were sixteen and 
twelve and in Kosovo eighteen and two. Although there were, in fact, only a 
couple of large gymnasia in centers such as Salonika, Serres, and Monastir, 
and Mishev’s numbers included any institution slightly more sophisticated 
than a parish school with one or two teachers, he was correct in noting a 
trend to augment the capacity of national schools in Macedonia belonging 
not only to Greeks and Bulgarians but also to Vlachs and Serbs.
The town of Salonika hosted the best-known gymnasia, while a majority 
of provincial centers had at least one, and as many as five, secondary schools 
by 1905.61 In 1882, however, according to a report of the French consul in 
Salonika, the Bulgarian community had one high school and the Greek com-
munity one école normale, both exclusively for boys.62 Higher education 
for girls was not offered. The consul noted the great importance for Greek 
national interests of the école normale, which trained the teachers that were 
to staff the village schools in Macedonia, a task that had become even more 
critical in the face of growing competition from the schools of other groups. 
All students enrolled in the school received a monthly stipend for food and 
lodging, but the school did not have boarding facilities.
The curriculum of the Greek école normale concentrated on history, math-
ematics, and philosophy. It was among the best, according to the consul, 
except for language instruction, which was limited to ancient and modern 
Greek. The duration of studies was six years, and there were six classes. The 
consul also noted that Greeks were exceptionally quiet about the activities 
of the school, especially concerning its finances. The annual costs were esti-
mated at 70,000 French francs; instruction was free in principle, except for 
a small entry fee, so most of this amount was covered by donations from 
well-to-do families and other philanthropic benefactors.
According to the same report, the Bulgarian high school in Salonika was 
the top such institution in Macedonia in terms of its quality of instruction, 
and the administration had plans to turn it into a gymnasium.63 There were 
three classes, and all students learned Bulgarian, French, and Turkish. Most 
61. Unlike the primary schools, which were scattered around the countryside and con-
sisted of a room, a teacher, and a few students, it was more difficult to manipulate number of 
secondary schools. For this reason, the “Greek” and “Bulgarian” sets of statistics published by 
Mishev concur on the number of secondary schools in the vilâyet (province) of Salonika; La, 
Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne, 240–41, 260–61.
62. MAE. vol. 6, Consul to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Salonika, May 30, 1882.
63. Bernard Lory notes that the school was founded in 1880; “Soloun, Ville Slave?” in 
Salonique, 1850–1918: La “Ville des Juifs” et le Réveil des Balkans, edited by Gilles Veinstein 
(Paris, 1993), 133. However, there had been a Bulgarian school in Salonika since 1870, which 
had operational difficulties because it did not have a stable residence. The Vuzrozdeni (Revival) 
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of them came from the interior of the province, and the demand for enroll-
ment was so high that the school was forced to turn down some of the can-
didates. The student body was all boarding, and they also received a yearly 
stipend of 345 French francs. Fifteen of the students were on scholarships 
from the Exarchate.64 The state-of-the-art facilities included, among other 
things, fully equipped chemistry and physics laboratories and a biology hall 
(complete with a grand taxidermy collection), which apparently served dou-
ble duty as an entertainment center for the town.65
The Ottoman authorities and members of the rival sects alike loathed 
secondary schools of this kind because they were seen as indoctrination 
centers dispensing hatred rather than enlightenment to young minds.66 The 
Bulgarian school in the town of Serres, for instance, was continuously the 
target of the wrath of the Serres Greek community. In July 1873, final ex-
ams in the school were interrupted by a Greek mob that stormed into the 
building, cried “Damnation to all Bulgarians,” and ran away. They were fol-
lowed by Greek students, who “noisily climbing the stairs . . . began stamp-
ing with their feet and hooting at those present.” Following this incident, 
local Greeks reportedly harassed the schoolteacher and his wife whenever 
they walked about town, swearing and throwing stones at them.67 This was 
not the only instance in town when the Greek community creatively used 
schools and their pupils to stage a protest against their Bulgarian neighbors. 
In November 1905, students of the Greek Orthodox gymnasium in Serres 
marched around the Bulgarian establishments in the town, loudly singing 
songs that seemed to have been written precisely for the purpose. The lyrics, 
far more graphic in their violence than the usual marching song, a genre not 
known for its subtlety, were:
It is my duty to declare
the Bulgarians schismatics
arsonists and murderers
as well as savage and bloodthirsty
Being merciful to murderers
is not philanthropy
it is an outrage
Society of Salonika was raising funds for a new school building in May 1873; Macedonia, 
Documents and Material, 292.
64. MAE. vol. 6, Consul to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Salonika, May 30, 1882.
65. Lory, “Soloun, Ville Slave?” 143.
66. The contribution of schools to intercommunal violence was undeniable. For an over-
view of the situation in Monastir, see Bernard Lory, “Schools for the Destruction of Society: 
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67. “Report from Serres,” Pravo, July 30, 1873, cited in Macedonia, Documents and 
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and a crime against God
For the vile and cruel enemies
of the glory and honor of my country
for the arsonists and authors of all our troubles
a bitter hatred is a hard thing
Divine punishment and the world’s opprobrium
will be the bloodthirsty savages’ punishment
and if ever the history of this country is written
a dark page will open for them68
Another marching song of Greek schoolchildren recorded by a French 
gendarmerie officer in Serres suggested “setting the Bulgar on fire,”69 and 
apparently this is exactly what some Greek activists in the town attempted 
to do to the Serres Bulgarian gymnasium in May 1907 before their plans 
were foiled.70 The Greek family renting a building to the Bulgarian school 
was not spared either; Colonel Vérand seized a threatening letter sent to the 
family by “the Invisible Macedonian Committee.”71
Regardless of the background of a pupil who attended one of the distin-
guished secondary schools, such as the gymnasia in Salonika and Serres, 
by the time of graduation he would have taken the first steps in joining the 
national elite of his community, instilled with a sense of distinction that set 
him apart not only from the members of the other community but also from 
the uneducated youths of his own, who, in their backwardness occupied a 
different temporal space. This notion continued to hold sway in much later 
accounts of national awakening. James Clarke, for instance, denies the peas-
ants “coevalness,” to paraphrase Fabian,72 even as he notes that the edu-
cated few and the peasants both carried nationality, albeit in different ways: 
“At almost any time in the last two centuries the educated few were closer 
to Europe than to their own simple peasant, whether he was Albanian, Bul-
garian, Greek, Romanian or Serb. Conversely, the peasants remained in the 
Turkish era . . . long after political Europeanization.”73
That there was a conceived difference between the elite and the peas-
ants in terms of their intellectual proximity to Europe and, hence, national 
consciousness hardly needs an explanation. What is more interesting is how 
some of the national elites applied this principle to their ambitious enter-
prise of spreading national sentiment through schools, for what we see here 
68. MAE, vol. 147, Serres, November 29, 1905.
69.  Ibid.
70. PRO, FO 195/2263, Vice Consul Bosanquet to Consul Graves, Serres, May 30, 1907.
71. MAE, Turquie, Question de Macédoine, Gendarmerie Internationale, vol. 416, Colo-
nel Vérand’s report, Paris, July 2, 1907.
72. Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New 
York, 1983).
73. Clarke, Pen and the Sword, 52.
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is entirely different than the educational policy of the modern nation-state, 
whereby the ideal is to create a common denominator for the model citizen 
that goes across class lines, at least in principle, if not in practice. On the 
contrary, the scholastic mission of nationalist visionaries in Macedonia was 
a two-tiered process that aimed, through village schools, to recruit foot sol-
diers for the struggle from among the peasantry and, through institutions of 
higher learning, to train the children of the middle and upper classes, who 
would lead the way for their underprivileged co-nationals.
It is important to note that the Greek government under Trikoupis had 
signed an agreement with the Syllogos, essentially outsourcing the applica-
tion and oversight of Greek educational policy in Macedonia to this orga-
nization. The Syllogos was extremely active and influential in furthering the 
Greek claim on Macedonia through cultural, ethnographic, and educational 
channels. While the Patriarchate had no serious disagreements with the Syl-
logos educational agenda, relations at the local level seem to have been less 
than harmonious. The representatives of the Syllogos were unhappy with 
what they perceived to be an unwillingness to cooperate with the national 
mission, and they demanded more direct Greek government control over 
the religious establishment in the Ottoman Empire while the local bishops, 
in their letters to the Patriarch, revealed what Evangelos Kofos describes 
as a patriotism “imbued with the ethnarchic mission of the church.”74 The 
subtlety in this patriotism was apparently lost on the more zealous members 
of the Syllogos.
In a report addressed to the Greek minister of foreign affairs in 1883, 
Paparrigopoulos and G. I. Zolotas, the president and secretary, respectively, 
of the Syllogos, discussed the relative advantages of the dimotika (primary 
schools) and gymnasia for the national cause to determine how limited funds 
could be allocated most efficiently. The former category targeted a larger 
segment of the population and required more modest resources, whereas 
the latter demanded more investment, both human and financial, from the 
Greek state through the agency of the Syllogos. While the ministry was in 
favor of more impact with less immediate investment, favoring the prolif-
eration of the dimotika instead of the dedication of precious resources to 
the gymnasia, Paparrigopoulos and Zolotas insisted on striking a balance 
because, they argued, “however extensive and well-organized our primary 
education became, if this primary education did not get refined both in heart 
and in spirit via the establishments where the youth of the middle classes, 
who in fact, hold the future of external Hellenism in their hands, study, this 
[primary] education would not only collide with the centuries-old national 
tradition, it would also become leaderless.”75
74. Kofos, “Patriarch Joachim,” 111.
75. AYE, fak. 1883, K. Paparrigopoulos and G. I. Zolotas to Kontostaulos, Athens, Oc-
tober 13, 1883, in Vouri, Pēges gia tēn Istoria tēs Makedonias, 88.
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Like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Patriarch Ioachim III was also of the 
opinion that small grammar schools rather than extravagant high schools 
in urban centers were more appropriate for the educational mission of 
the Church in Macedonia.76 At this point, there seemed to be a consensus 
among the Greek national elite that the elementary schools in the Mace-
donian countryside and their pupils had special needs that could not be 
met through curricula or material appropriate for schools in Greece or even 
other parts of the “enslaved lands.” Most of these needs stemmed from the 
facts that, in large parts of the area where they sought to Hellenize the popu-
lation, demotic Greek was not the spoken language and that there was little, 
if any, familiarity with kathareusa (the version of Greek that was taught 
in secondary schools), even among the priests and teachers serving these 
regions. Some of the schoolteachers had only a rudimentary knowledge of 
Greek in any form.77 This was recognized by some of the Greek consuls in 
Macedonia, who argued that establishing schools in rural areas inhabited 
by Bulgarophone communities, although having potential in the long run, 
was not an efficient policy for the time being. Unlike their more urbane 
neighbors, who traveled around for commerce—and hence appreciated the 
importance of speaking Greek—these communities consisted of “peasants 
who cultivate the land and never move around.”78 The only feasible method 
for coopting these communities, then, was not through education but with 
the help of “zealous and influential priests.”79 What James Clarke defines as 
“remaining in the Turkish era” was seen to be the lot of the peasants, who 
were to be included in the national community not through modernizing 
institutions such as schools but through more traditional means found ap-
propriate for their standing, such as the village church.
The logistical difficulties of convincing Slavic-speaking peasants to send 
their children to Greek schools notwithstanding, there was also an element 
of bon pour l’orient in the Greek intelligentsia’s attitude concerning the rural 
masses. In their opinion, given the insularity and backwardness of these com-
munities, it sufficed to instill only an elemental sense of nationhood in their 
children rather than aiming for full-scale socialization. At this point, they 
differed from the Patriachate’s educational ideals. For instance, Ion Dragou-
mis, reporting to Athens in his capacity as a member of the Committee for 
the Support of Greek Church and Education (Epitropē pros Enischysēn tēs 
76. Kofos, “Patriarch Joachim,” 115.
77. Abbott, Tale of a Tour in Macedonia, 104. Similar questions about the linguistic ca-
pabilities of teachers appointed by the Exarchate were also current; Alexandar Trajanovski, 
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après la fondation de l’Organisation Revolutionnaire Macedo-Adrinienne Secrète,” Macedo-
nian Review 1 (1981), 191.
78. AYE, fak. 1883, Consul Dokos to President of the Society for the Dissemination of 
Greek Letters, Monastir, April 1883, in Vouri, Pēges gia tēn Istoria tēs Makedonias, 48.
79. Vouri, Pēges gia tēn Istoria tēs Makedonias, 59.
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Ellēnikēs Ekklēsias kai Paideias; EEEP), complained about the hopeless situ-
ation in the schools, not because the teaching departed from the centralized 
curriculum, as we might expect, but because it did not. In his complaint was 
also a frustration with the old-fashioned and Orthodox-centered methods of 
the Patriarchate, which sent the same primers to all the schools, but his 
real concern was that peasants’ children needed more “simple” material. 
“Very rarely do teachers understand what they should not teach,” he wrote, 
and, “they try to infuse the peasants’ children hard-to-digest and useless or 
even redundant courses in syntax and [make them] parrot analytical gram-
mar always in accordance with the curricula from Constantinople instead 
of teaching them how to more fluently use Greek in a simple form. . . . The 
primers in use are rarely well-chosen and they usually contain material that 
is useless or very heavy for villagers’ kids and they are written in a difficult 
and scholarly language.”80
In other words, sophisticated articulations of what it meant to be “Greek” 
were neither necessary nor useful for the peasant masses. This and the other 
consul’s remarks reveal that socialization into the national community was 
seen to require a different process for peasants’ children than for middle- 
and upper-class urbanites; the former were expected to contribute to the 
cause as its human weight, or “in bulk,” whereas the latter were to distin-
guish themselves as the leaders of the crowd.81
In Bulgarian institutions of higher learning such as the gymnasium in Sa-
lonika, the student body came from geographically diverse areas in the coun-
tryside, and it consisted not only of the children of the Bulgarian-speaking 
middle and upper classes but also youths of more modest means. But what 
we might today celebrate as diversity was not a quality that impressed the 
(pro-Greek) anonymous author of The Population of Macedonia, Evidence 
of the Christian Schools, who held that Greek schools were genuine cen-
ters of learning, whereas Bulgarian schools were simply propaganda tools. 
The fact that they offered tuition waivers and free food and lodging was 
proof of this according to the author: “the place of origin of the pupils is 
important, not only from an ethnological point of view, but also from the 
point of view of its social consequences. The fact of filling the colleges with 
lads who attend them only because they find material advantages there, has 
really created an intellectual laboring class, which has become a charge on 
80. AYE, a.a.k. K’ 1907, Vice Consul Ion Dragoumis to EEEP, Dedeagaç, July 1906, in 
Belia, “Ē Ekpaideutikē Politikē tou Ellinikou Kratous,” 39. Dragoumis made a similar point 
in relating a conversation with a school teacher in Iōnos Dragoumis, Ta Tetradia tou Ilinten, 
edited by Giōrgos Petsivas (Athens, 2000), 435–37.
81. Greek high schools were not entirely inaccessible to children of the lower classes. 
Many of the philanthropic organizations in Greece and the Ottoman Empire, such as the 
Ellēnikos Philologikos Syllogos Kōntantinoupoleōs [Greek Literary Society of Constantino-
ple] ensured that scholarships were provided to needy children; Chares Exertzoglou, Ethnikē 
Tautotita stēn Kōnstantinoupolē tou 19o Aiōna: O Ellēnikos Syllogos Kōnstantinoupoleōs, 
1861–1912 (Athens, 1996).
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the government that has encouraged it. . . . The case of Greek schools is 
quite different. There, only young men in comfortable circumstances and 
those who feel themselves really capable of carrying on superior studies 
become bachelors.”82
Even though Dragoumis’s, Dokos’s, or the anonymous author’s hardly 
concealed condescension and patronizing attitudes may appear cynical, we 
should not lose sight of the fact that they were not only idealists, who pre-
sumably subscribed to notions of national brotherhood, but also realists, 
actively working to attain results for a cause with an uncertain outcome. 
The transition to nationhood could not occur as the result of a uniformly 
applicable process under the prevailing circumstances. In the absence of the 
resources that a modern state could mobilize to ensure attendance, ideo-
logical content, and centralized curriculum and method in schooling, a 
one-size-fits-all education policy was impossible to sustain, and even coun-
terproductive as far as the elite leadership was concerned.
For the Slavic-speaking community, the relationship of higher education 
to class differentiation was more complicated, given the historical role that 
Greek educational institutions played as the vehicle for upward social mo-
bility for Greek and non-Greek speakers alike. Traditionally, acceptance into 
the upper classes implied a certain degree of (if not complete) assimilation 
into the Greek linguistic community and culture, but with the establishment 
of Bulgarian high schools that could easily rival their Greek counterparts 
with their modern facilities, young and energetic faculty, and European-
inspired curricula, refinement and enlightenment were no longer the exclu-
sive domain of Greek institutions. The establishment of these schools and 
the spread of literacy among Slavic speakers in the Macedonian country-
side were the culmination of a process that had started to bear fruit, as we 
have seen, in the mid-nineteenth century. This process naturally required 
the material support of a rising middle class, which it had, but the sense of 
distinction between the rural and urban, and the upper and lower classes, in 
terms of their contribution to the national cause was not as keen among the 
Bulgarian intelligentsia as it was among their Greek counterparts. We may 
attribute this to a number of factors, principal among them the definition 
of Bulgarian nationalism from its beginning as the fight of the doubly op-
pressed people (by the “Turks” and the “Phanariots”) and its championing 
of the simple but hard-working peasant as the real and deserving owners of 
Macedonia.
The pursuit of knowledge despite all obstacles was a sentiment proudly 
espoused by the Bulgarian national intelligentsia, such as Grigor Purlichev, 
or the Miladinov brothers, the pioneers and heroes of Bulgarian education 
in Macedonia. Purlichev and the Miladinov brothers had been educated in 
82. The Population of Macedonia, Evidence of the Christian Schools (London, 1905).
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Greece, and they had utmost facility with literary Greek, which was not 
atypical of young Bulgarian nationalists in mid-nineteenth-century Mace-
donia.83 Instead of Hellenizing the Miladinovs and Purlichev however, the 
Athens experience had actually aroused a more conscious sense of being 
Bulgarian—and different—in them. Purlichev wrote in his autobiography 
that he had worked hard to raise the money necessary for his training in 
Greece. He had enrolled as a medical student but continued to compose 
poetry, which was his real passion. In fact, his poem “Amartōlos” won 
first place in 1860 at a poetry contest in Athens, where he competed against 
acclaimed poets and philology professors. Purlichev’s reminiscence of his 
victory exuded not so much of elation as bitter redemption:
We, Bulgarians, have been so abused and despised by other nationalities that it 
is high time we regained our dignity. When one reads our folk songs, in which 
every beauty is called a Greek woman, then one will instinctively conclude that 
wretched self-contempt is a national characteristic of the Bulgarian. It is high 
time we prove ourselves men among men. Bulgarian industriousness is rarely 
to be found among other nationalities; it has ennobled us, and it will be our 
salvation. . . . Having listened to the abuses heaped upon all the Bulgarians, I 
have lived all my life with the idea that I was a nonentity. The same thought has 
kept me away from the highest circles of society without which no one has ever 
become a famous citizen, or a man of letters. It is true that a proud man comes 
to no good, but it is also true that he who despises himself is a suicide [sic].84
Purlichev, in describing his encounter with Rangavis, the head of the or-
ganizing committee and renowned man of letters, emphasized Rangavis’s 
apparent scorn for his decision to donate only half, not the entire amount, 
of the monetary prize he received. When he told Rangavis “the other half I 
need for myself, I am not rich,” Rangavis was clearly displeased with his an-
swer, or so Purlichev reported. In either case, we can sense the assumption, 
likely but not necessarily on Rangavis’s part, but certainly on Purlichev’s, 
that composition of fine poetry was a vocation normally reserved for the 
well-off and not for poor students from the Macedonian countryside.
Despite the Bulgarian intelligentsia’s vehement desire to teach their na-
tional brethren to celebrate their differences from the Greeks, we can won-
der to what extent they had subconsciously internalized philhellene notions 
about the superiority of certain cultural traits and were competing with 
83. Dimitar Miladinov penned his opinions about the need to educate children in their 
mother tongue (i.e., Bulgarian) entirely in Greek; Miladinov to Alexander Exarch, Bitola, Au-
gust 20, 1852, [The Miladinov Brothers Correspondence] (Sofia, 1964), cited in Macedonia, 
Documents and Material, 145–47.
84. Grigor Purlichev, [Selected Works] (Sofia, 1939), cited in Macedonia, Documents and 
Material, 401–2.
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Greek nationalism within these accepted, externally set parameters.85 Bul-
garian nationalists often complained about the lack of enlightenment among 
their co-nationals in Macedonia, which also happened to be a favorite theme 
of Greek propagandists. For instance, a notable from Prilep, trying to con-
vince a teacher to accept a post in his town, wrote in June 1865 that “Here, 
as almost all over Macedonia, learning, as well as national consciousness, 
are still in their infancy. Therefore, a good and capable educator is needed 
to bring up the new generation properly. But such educators are scarce and 
costly, and our compatriots, apart from the fact that they do not know 
where to search for such, what is worse, they are not yet used to offering 
what they would describe as huge salaries. . . . They are not, however, against 
learning or slow in understanding, but only ignorant, and at first they find 
it strange to offer a high salary.”86
That most people did not appreciate the importance of training in their 
mother tongue and the need to provide financial support to that end was a 
common source of grief among the Bulgarian intelligentsia during the for-
mative years of Bulgarian nationhood in Macedonia.87 This point is signifi-
cant because of the disputes between the two communities concerning how 
the schools were to be financed. The nature of that support presumably 
determined which movement was “authentic,” and because this was under-
stood to be a winner-take-all situation, the possibility that both could be 
“authentic” was not one that was entertained often. Despite both parties’ 
insistence that theirs were the “authentic” educational institutions, function-
ing due to great sacrifices on the part of their respective communities, both 
sets of schools were assisted by extra-communal benefactors.
Education and Cultural Superiority
Not surprisingly, each side claimed that its schools were better institutions 
of academic excellence. In addition to sources of funding, which presumably 
constituted a measure of “authenticity,” the location of schools, the num-
bers enrolled, and the teachers were all taken as indications of one move-
ment’s dominance over the other. Even more striking were the comparisons 
made on the basis of the methods of teaching, which revealed the self-image 
85. Desislava Lilova argues that European cultural superiority was internalized by the 
Bulgarian intelligentsia, who also saw themselves at a disadvantage in terms of the Europeans’ 
regard for their culture as opposed to that of Greeks, which was considered part of a univer-
sal cultural heritage; “Barbarians, Civilized People and Bulgarians: Definition of Identity in 
Textbooks and the Press (1830–1878),” in We, the People: Politics of National Peculiarity in 
Southeastern Europe, edited by Diana Mishkova (Budapest, 2009), 181–206.
86. Kouzman Shapkarev to Georgi Ikonomov, Prilep, June 8, 1865, cited in Macedonia, 
Documents and Material, 217.
87. See also “Report from Veles,” Tsarigradski Vestnik [Constantinople Newspaper], no. 7, 
October 28, 1850, cited in Macedonia, Documents and Material, 142–43.
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as a nation of each side. These self-images were clearly influenced by ac-
cepted and generalized notions of each nation’s characteristics—character-
istics originally observed by a western gaze, articulated in a rich literature of 
travel writing and fiction as well as ethnographic and geographical works. 
The characteristics then found their way into the national elites’ definitions 
of their own community and perceptions of what made that community dif-
ferent from the other.
In Greek-Bulgarian polemics concerning schools and learning, the vestiges 
of these deeply engrained notions are hardly disguised. Bulgarians empha-
sized the industrious and humble nature of their nation, in line with the 
commonly accepted stereotype of the Bulgarian as a simple, honest peasant, 
and based their arguments of scholastic superiority not only on having suc-
cessfully taught peasants how to read and write in their “mother tongue” 
but also on having raised a new generation through a rigorous but practical 
system of education. On the opposite side, Greek nationalists invoked their 
special connection to the heritage of antiquity, the very source of western 
civilization and higher culture as the world knew it. It was not sheer quan-
tity but quality that mattered, and the Greeks were the sole bearers of that 
quality.
The first modern Bulgarian schools were the result of the efforts of Vasil 
Aprilov, who founded a school in Gabrovo in 1835.88 Aprilov’s school fol-
lowed the Lancaster model. Its popularity aside, the Lancaster model was a 
perfect fit for the Bulgarian scholastic movement, which was defined against 
the hegemony of the Patriarchate, just as Joseph Lancaster had been driven 
by his isolation from the English educational establishment because of his 
Quaker faith. The model was emulated by many small schools opening up 
in Macedonia, and Bulgarian schools came to be known for their emphasis 
on practical knowledge such as language and vocational training, whereas 
the majority of their Greek counterparts continued to teach a classical cur-
riculum.89 The relative merits of these two approaches differed considerably, 
depending on the referee’s subjective notions of what constituted superior 
national education.90 Not everyone agreed, for instance, on the principle of 
88. Jelavich and Jelavich, Establishment of the Balkan States, 131. Mishev dates the first 
school to 1821; Brancoff [Mishev], La Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne, 53.
89. This was also mentioned in the French consul’s report in 1882; MAE, vol. 6, Consul 
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Salonika, May 30, 1882. The Bell-Lancaster method was 
originally not used solely by the Bulgarian community. In 1830, before the emergence of a 
scholastic rivalry between Greeks and Bulgarians, the first school was established for the Chris-
tian community of Monastir, Greek was the medium of instruction, using the Bell-Lancaster 
method; Lory, “Schools for the Destruction of Society,” 50. The heyday of the method was the 
beginning of the nineteenth century in Europe, and the Greeks in Chios, the Ionian islands, and 
Jassy were among the early adopters, even though the Church viewed the method with suspi-
cion; Christina Koulouri, Dimensions Idéologiques de l’Historicité en Grèce, 1834–1914: Les 
Manuels Scolaires d’Histoire et de Géographie (Frankurt, 1991), 38–41.
90. See, for instance, Victor Bérard’s evaluation of Bulgarian and Greek schools in Mace-
donia, cited in Brancoff [Mishev], La Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne, 77.
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functional education favored by the Bulgarian gymnasia. For the defend-
ers of the Greek educational establishment, institutions of higher education 
were not simply vocational training centers; they were representative bodies 
of a national cultural heritage and civilization. Greek nationalist discourse 
adopted and nurtured this position, eventually integrating it into the official 
historiography of the era as exemplified by Douglas Dakin: “Greek com-
munities and wealthy Greeks of Macedonian origin had built up a relatively 
large educational system. Greek education, however, did not altogether meet 
the requirements of a modern age, and in some respects Bulgarian education 
which, though of poorer quality, emphasized languages and useful knowl-
edge, had in some quarters the stronger appeal: nevertheless Greek educa-
tion had social standing and maintained in vigorous existence that culture, 
that ecclesiastical rule and that way of life which we call Hellenism.”91
Going back to the period in which this discourse was being established, 
we must also note the importance placed on the way Hellenism was repre-
sented outside the Hellenic world. In this respect, educational institutions, 
and especially those of higher learning, were yet another indicator of the 
superiority of that culture. In the words of Paparrigopoulos and Zolotas, the 
president and secretary of the Syllogos: “to those from abroad who study 
the national struggles in the East, institutions of such caliber inspire a belief 
in the vital powers and the superiority of the nation that sustains them.”92
This belief in the ultimate role of schools as the face of Greek civiliza-
tion to the rest of the world was a corollary to the elite discourse on the 
hierarchical order of nations and Greek superiority within that hierarchy. 
Less conspicuous within that discourse was also a conviction that some kind 
of “civilizing mission” was accorded to the Greek nation, which it was to 
perform through institutions of learning and culture. One of the instances 
when that conviction revealed itself was a July 14 celebration performed by 
Greek schoolchildren in Serres. According to a Piraeus newspaper, a student 
of the gymnasium delivered a speech in French that compared the civilizing 
missions of the Greek and French nations. The lecture was meant to make 
an impression on Captain Lamouche, chief of the French gendarmerie in the 
Serres sector, who had been invited to the school for the occassion. Alas, 
Lamouche (whom the newspaper repeatedly referred to as ‘M. Mouche’) 
proved to be a complete disappointment and disgrace to the finest Gallic tra-
dition of discourse, according to the paper, and delivered “a few banalities, 
such as saying that France cares about the people of the Orient and has their 
interests in mind.” He did not “even deign to take to his bulgarophile lips a 
statement of courtesy with regard to the Greeks.”93 The Greek elite of the 
91. Dakin, Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 19.
92. AYE, fak. 1883, K. Paparrigopoulos and G. I. Zolotas to Kontostaulos, Athens, Oc-
tober 13, 1883, in Vouri, Pēges gia tēn Istoria tēs Makedonias, 88.
93. MAE, vol. 416, August 4, 1904.
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town were apparently offended but also bemused by Captain Lamouche’s 
behavior. A representative of French civilization, who, by definition, should 
have appreciated Greek culture and been favorably disposed to the Greek 
position in Macedonia, had completely let them down by his indifference.
The Greek side was quite correct in suspecting that Captain Lamouche’s 
aloofness was a result of his personal sympathy for the Bulgarian side; La-
mouche was later appointed “honorary consul” of Bulgaria because of his 
conduct during the Macedonian conflict, and he later wrote a book that nar-
rated the events in Macedonia from a pro-Bulgarian viewpoint.94 It seems 
that the captain, adding insult to injury, not only displayed a blatant indif-
ference toward the July 14 celebration of this Greek school but made a 
point of paying special attention to the Bulgarian schools in the area. Greek 
protests against Captain Lamouche were not limited to this newspaper ar-
ticle. Minister Theodoros Deliyannis’s office expressed the discontent of the 
Greek side through higher diplomatic means, such as notes to Paris. Accord-
ing to anonymous reports, Lamouche was not happy when Greek teachers 
paid him a visit and told him that they spoke Greek at home and at school in 
those parts. Nor did he express any interest when the teachers explained to 
him that Romanian and Vlach were different languages and that the Vlachs 
declared themselves to be, and therefore were, Greeks. Finally, during a 
visit to a Greek school, he greeted the students in the “Bulgar manner,” 
and even though his salutation was reciprocated in Greek, he continued to 
speak in Bulgarian. He insistently asked what language was spoken “within 
families,” and without waiting for a response, he continued to talk to the 
students in Bulgarian. The teacher told him that the students were Greek but 
they also spoke Bulgarian. “So they are Bulgarians,” he commented, and 
the teacher said, no, “they are not schismatic Bulgars, they call themselves 
Greeks, go to Greek Church and follow the Patriarchate.” The captain’s 
response, apparently, was “an ironic smile.”95
Lamouche’s own recollection of these events was naturally quite different: 
“The Greeks in Serres as in all of Macedonia, were extremely fanatical and 
intolerant,” he wrote in his book. “From the time we arrived, they claimed 
monopoly over our relations and were offended by the slightest interest that 
we might offer to anyone other than themselves. Even though I always tried 
hard to maintain the impartiality that my position required, I could not sac-
rifice the causes that years of study had already had proven just to me, for 
the friendship of Greeks.”96
The French captain’s conduct, which made no secret of his sympathy for 
the Bulgarian side, was not atypical of the foreign officers sent to Mace-
donia, who were viewed by the local population as representatives of the 
94. Lamouche, Quinze Ans d’Histoire Balkanique.
95. MAE, vol. 416, Confidential Note, November 9, 1904.
96. Lamouche, Quinze Ans d’Histoire Balkanique, 56.
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Great Powers sent to save them from their misery. They were also seen as 
the potential arbiters of an ultimate resolution of the “Macedonian prob-
lem,” which made it important to appeal to their personal opinions. As the 
case of Captain Lamouche demonstrates, such opinions were often formed 
before the officers’ arrival at their posts and were a result of the ways that 
Europeans conceived of peoples of the Ottoman Empire since the “discov-
ery” of Eastern Europe.97 Winning the fight required not only numerical 
superiority but also, and arguably more important, the establishment of 
a morally superior position that would win foreign public opinion. The 
assertion of cultural superiority, therefore, was not a supplementary but a 
fundamental component of this competition. In a pamphlet intended for 
a francophone audience, Ioanna Stephanopoli asked, “Is it to this rebellious, 
factional, barbarian minority [i.e., Bulgarians] that we are to sacrifice a race 
that is counted among the greatest contributors of European civilization?”98 
The question was meant to convey the message that not only were the Bul-
garians a numerical minority but that they were also qualitatively dwarfed 
compared to the great civilization they were up against.
The distance covered by Bulgarian academic institutions in the second 
half of the nineteenth century was impressive. The new schools directly con-
tributed to the emergence of a political movement demanding the indepen-
dence of Macedonia from the Ottomans by training the leadership cadres of 
IMRO, an outcome not necessarily foreseen by the Bulgarian upper classes 
who pioneered the scholastic leap forward. IMRO would become one of 
the principal political forces leading the insurgency against the Ottoman Em-
pire and would maintain its influence (and retain its violent tactics) during 
the interwar years. Nearly all the founders of IMRO—Damian Gruev, Andon 
Dimitrov, Ivan Hadzi Nikolov, Hristo Batandzhiev, and Petûr Poparsov—
were schoolteachers, trained either in Bulgaria or Macedonia. Duncan Perry, 
in his work on the early years of the Macedonian liberation organizations, 
argues that the sociological base for the revolutionary movement evolved 
because as “schools flourished, graduates multiplied and became teachers, 
little changed on the socio-economic front, and thus restlessness and dis-
satisfaction with the status quo ultimately fed a steady stream of students, 
graduates and teachers into revolutionary circles and later into guerrilla 
bands.”99 Although the IMRO ideological direction and strategic planning 
did come from its educated leadership, the movement also blended the well-
established haidut (bandit) tradition into its organization, enlisting the aid 
of several “social bandits” in the region.
97. By his own account in 1928, Colonel Lamouche had been interested in “the life of 
the Bulgarian nation” for forty years. He had been a student of Louis Léger, the Slavist, and 
had taken his Russian class at L’Ecole des Langues Orientales. Later his interest became more 
focused on Bulgaria and Bulgarians; ibid., 7–8.
98. Ioanna Z. Stephanopoli, Macédoine et Macédoniens (Athens, 1903), 7.
99. Perry, Politics of Terror, 30.
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Maps are too important to be left to cartographers alone.
—J. Brian Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” 1992
Roumeli is not to be found on maps of present-day Greece,” wrote Patrick Leigh Fermor at the start of his eponymous account of travels in northern Greece, published in 1966, 
which has since become a classic and required reading for students of an-
thropology. Fremor explained that he was “perhaps seduced by the strange-
ness and the beauty of the name.”1 The meaning of Roumeli is of course 
more obvious to those familiar with the history of the Byzantine and Otto-
man empires, yet it is not one that can easily be attributed to a fixed entity. 
The simplest definition of Roumeli (Rumeli in its Turkish spelling) is the 
land of the Rum, or Romans. It does not, however, include Asia Minor or the 
Peloponnese or Thessaly. The term Fermor picked to describe what was es-
sentially northern Greece was the name Ottomans gave to the province that 
was formed by their first major conquests in the Balkan Peninsula, which 
they also referred to as Rumeli. As the Ottoman territories expanded, so did 
the area of the province, including not only northern Greece but also parts of 
present-day Bulgaria and Macedonia.2 As a geographical term, Rumeli did 
not have clearly demarcated boundaries. The elasticity and nostalgic ring 
of the term were precisely why Fremor found it so fitting for his “random 
journeys.” It was also proper for a book that described peoples and ways of 
life that sit uneasily within the strict confines of a nation-state, such as the 
transhumant Sarakatsani and the fiercely localist Cretans. In one passage a 
Sarakatsan lamented about the times when they could pasture their flocks 
1. Patrick Leigh Fermor, Roumeli: Travels in Northern Greece (New York, 2006).
2. The province of Rumeli was divided into smaller provinces after the Tanzimat reforms 
and became practically a geographical name after the vilayet law of 1864. After the conclusion 
of the 1877–1878 Russo-Ottoman war and the Berlin Treaty, an autonomous province of 
Şarkî Rumeli (Eastern Rumelia) was established in part of the territory that had earlier been 
promised to Bulgaria under the San Stefano Treaty. Şarkî Rumeli united with the principality 
of Bulgaria in 1885, which was nominally under Ottoman suzerainty until 1908. In 1902, the 
Inspectorate of Rumeli was founded, which functioned as a special administrative unit directly 
under the Grand Vezirate.
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as far as Bithynia and the “caiques sailing past in the Sea of Marmara could 
hear my bells.”3 Now that the national boundaries had been drawn, those 
pasture lands were out of reach.
Empires, of course, do not have boundaries but frontiers. Frontiers are 
elastic and porous; they are zones of transition, not demarcation lines. Peo-
ple, animals, and commodities move more or less freely (if clandestinely) 
within and across frontiers, whereas boundaries contain, regulate, and re-
strict all such motion. Frontiers are defined primarily in military terms; they 
are zones where sovereignty is not stable and are always subject to change 
with the movement of armies.4 They cannot, however, be defined exclusively 
as zones of perpetual conflict; frontiers are also places of synthesis and syn-
cretism, of heterogeneity and mingling, in contrast to boundaries, which 
exist precisely to correct or prevent such uncertainty. Rumeli was such a 
frontier zone for the early Ottomans; they were extending their realms in 
Europe through military conquest, often in coalition with the locals who 
were subsequently coopted into the ranks of the Ottoman “frontier lords.”5 
Physical reminders of that period are scattered across the Balkans, despite 
generations of benign neglect and deliberate eradication, in the vast inven-
tory of architectural monuments (or remains thereof) endowed during the 
first centuries of Ottoman rule in the area by people, many of whom were re-
cent, not to say nominal, converts to Islam.6 Rumeli, then, became the center 
of gravity of the empire as it continued its expansion west. After 1453, the 
capital of the Ottoman state moved east from Edirne to Constantinople, but 
the governor of the province of Rumeli preserved his prestigious position 
in the military/administrative hierarchy of the empire. As the commander 
of the forces of Rumeli, he was part of the imperial council directly below 
the Grand Vezir, and sometimes the governor of Rumeli and the Grand 
Vezir were one and the same person. Anadolu was Rumeli’s counterpart on 
the Asian side of the Bosphorus, and these two provinces, with Istanbul in 
3. Fermor, Roumeli, 18.
4. The terms meaning “frontier” and “boundary” in Turkish are serhad and hudud, 
respectively, with further distinction for those regions at the very edge of the zone of military 
venture, uc, which literally means “edge” and fell from use after the first wave of Ottoman 
expansion into Europe. By the twentieth century, hudud and serhad had largely been fused; the 
former was used more often in describing state boundaries, but serhad still better carried the 
meaning of “military frontier.” For the historical evolution of the term frontière, see Lucien 
Febvre, “Frontière: The Word and the Concept,” in A New Kind of History from the Writings 
of Febvre, edited by Peter Burke, translated by K. Folca (London, 1973), 208–17.
5. On early Ottomans and their frontier society see Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: 
The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley, 1995). Heath Lowry portrays these frontier 
lords as a “coalition of marauders”; The Nature of the Early Ottoman State (Albany, 2003).
6. The vast number of public edifices endowed by Gazi Evrenos, almost certainly a 
Christian convert and the conqueror of almost the entire region of northern Greece for the 
Ottomans, is a good case in point; Heath Lowry, The Shaping of the Ottoman Balkans, 1350–
1550 (Istanbul, 2008).
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the center, formed the heartland of the empire until Rumeli was lost by the 
Ottomans after the Balkan Wars in 1912–1913.
As Fremor’s account reveals, Rumeli was not a household name among the 
western audience in the twentieth century. Nor was it ever the term of choice 
in describing the Balkan Peninsula among the learned in Europe. European 
cartographic imagery of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century maps and 
atlases depicted the Ottoman Empire as a whole, under various iterations 
of the name Turkish Empire, although the Ottomans themselves never used 
either term in reference to their territories until the nineteenth century when 
the Ottoman diplomatic service started using the terms “Turquie” to refer to 
the Ottoman empire and “sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan” in reference to the 
sultan. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, European cartogra-
phers had started to divide the Ottoman realms into “estates,” and the term 
Turkey in Europe, which took hold then and stayed the norm until the early 
twentieth century, covered the area the Ottomans called Rumeli. The inven-
tion of Turkey in Europe was partly an outcome of the Ottomans’ declining 
military might in the eyes of Europeans, but more important, it was directly 
related to the post-Enlightenment idea of Europe, which defined itself in 
civilizational opposition to the Oriental/Turkish Other.7
Most, if not all, maps of the Ottoman Empire drawn by European cartog-
raphers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries denoted classical names 
for regions such as Macedonia but did not ascribe boundaries to these 
regions, and the way the inscriptions were printed implied an overlap among 
these designations. In Pierre du Val’s “Carte de l’Empire des Turcs et de les 
Contins,” dated 1664, for instance, “Grèce” and “Macédoine” overlapped, 
as did “Turcomanie” and “Arménie.”8 By contrast, Nicolas Sanson, whose 
1692 “Les Estats de l’Empire des Turques en Europe [et en Asie]” was an 
early harbinger of the practice of representing the Ottoman Empire in sepa-
rate sheets for Europe and Asia and Africa, also drew boundaries within the 
“Beylerbeglic de Roumelie,” demarcating “Bulgarie,” “Romanie,” “Macé-
doine,” “Albanie,” “Thessalie,” “Epire,” and “Achaia.” Needless to say, 
none of these designations corresponded to Ottoman administrative divi-
sions, which were not, in any case, conceptualized through cartographic 
imagery at the time. Interestingly enough, the only inscription mentioning 
“Grèce” on Sanson’s map denoted the “Mer Ionienne ou Mer de Grèce.”
Ascribing boundaries to a specific region would turn into an extremely im-
portant and ideologically fraught practice in the nineteenth century as those 
regions became increasingly considered the exclusive domain of a  certain 
7. Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the 
Enlightenment (Stanford, 1994), 144–94.
8. Pierre du Val, “Carte de l’Empire des Turcs et de les Contins,” in Le Monde, ou la 
Geographie Universelle Contenent les Descriptions, les Cartes & le Blazon de Principaux Pays 
du Monde (Paris, 1664), in Ian Manners, European Cartographers and the Ottoman World, 
1500–1750 (Chicago, 2007), 42.
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“racial” group, or as they became territorialized. For the seventeenth-century 
cartographer, however, boundaries simply served as approximations, devices 
meant to divide up an unknown entity into chunks that would more easily 
evoke some sort of geographical order in European minds that were familiar 
with Ottoman lands only through the classics and a limited number of trav-
elers’ accounts. This state of affairs changed dramatically in the nineteenth 
century when the domain of the “Grand Turc” became more accessible and 
developments in the disciplines of geography and ethnography introduced 
novel methods of map-making, classification, and cartographic representa-
tion. In the late nineteenth century, when the enduring presence of the Otto-
man Empire in Europe was increasingly seen by liberal Europeans and local 
irredentists as an anomaly that needed immediate rectification, the maps 
of Turkey in Europe acquired an even more pronounced political weight. 
After 1878, that map was at the center of diplomatic debates concerning the 
Eastern Question, or how the corpse of the “Sick Man of Europe” would 
be disposed of when the time came. Rumeli was now prize territory for the 
small Balkan nation-states desperate to expand their borders and a zone of 
influence to be partitioned among the Great Powers. Macedonia happened 
to be at the center of this territory.
The school of geopolitics founded in the early twentieth century by 
 Friedrich Ratzel, German political scientist and geographer of Leipzig Uni-
versity, and his followers described the relation among political power, ge-
ography, and territory in Darwinian terms, as a struggle for survival.9 Even 
though Ratzel himself did not place states at the center of his analysis, fo-
cused as he was on the role of the environment, similar ideas about geopoli-
tics defined the way western European geographers and politicians discussed 
the future of Rumeli, which was also adopted by the Balkan national elites. 
The idea of Macedonia as a distinct geographical region and as a potentially 
independent country came into being in this context of Darwinian geopoli-
tics. Neither of these projects survived the struggle that ensued (until they 
were revived in the post–World War II period); the dream of “Macedonia 
for Macedonians” was shattered, but the attempts to define Macedonia and 
its inhabitants had a lasting effect on the way the nation-states that claimed 
it as their own conceptualized their territory and on the relationship of the 
land to the people that inhabited it. This was a process that was largely 
carried out through the medium of maps, and as such, it was a product of 
the epistemological shifts in the discipline of geography and its principal vi-
sual technique, cartography. These shifts reflected current notions concern-
ing the supremacy of science; the expanding boundaries of knowledge; and 
9. Jeremy Black, Maps and History (New Haven, 1997), 83. For an early critique of 
Ratzel and other geographical determinists, see Lucien Febvre, A Geographical Introduction to 
History, translated by E. G. Mountford and J. H. Paxton (New York, 1925).
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the possibility of knowing, indexing, calculating, and mapping not only the 
physical world but also the “moral” attributes of people.
My starting point for this chapter was a collection of ethnographic maps 
of “Turkey in Europe” published from the mid-nineteenth to the early twen-
tieth century. I did not quite understand what these maps were trying to 
say when I first came across them as I was browsing the stacks at the Gen-
nadion Library in Athens, but I soon realized that they were not merely 
images to “illustrate the Macedonian Question” to (dis)interested parties. 
They represented, instead, their authors’ visions of what the landscape, both 
physical and human, should look like; they were projections of the reality 
they claimed to represent. They were, in other words, political statements. 
They could not be read without our first understanding the context of their 
production and dissemination. This chapter therefore builds that context to 
show that these maps were essentially a grid imposed on the populations 
that inhabited the depicted terrain and were an essential tool in projecting 
the territoriality of a nation and its discontents. This is not to say that their 
power was hegemonic. J. B. Harley saw maps as “preeminently a language 
of power, not of protest.”10 The same language of power, however, also gen-
erated resistance, effectively allowing a language of protest to use the same 
medium of the map.
The contextualization of ethnographic maps (or any cartographic repre-
sentation for that matter) requires that we first recognize that maps are more 
“than the territory they represent,” to paraphrase Alfred Korzybski.11 The 
notion of an objective map, especially one that claims to represent ethnic 
groups in situ, is pure fiction even today after the invention of sophisticated 
imaging techniques and access to detailed census reports; in the early twen-
tieth century, it was fantasy dressed up as “science.” The maps we discuss 
here are, first and foremost, depictions and, by implication, assertions of 
territoriality. Territoriality, according to David Sack, signifies something far 
more complicated than spatial relationships drawn on a plane. It is, above 
all, “the key geographical component in understanding how society and 
space are interconnected.” A given delimited area is not “territory” in and 
of itself; it becomes so “only when its boundaries are used to affect behavior 
by controlling access.”12
The primary apparatus of territoriality is cartography, and when applied to 
the principle of national determination, it created nothing less than the spa-
tial definition of a nation—not necessarily its current shape but the territory 
10. J. Brian Harley, “Maps, Knowledge, and Power,” in The Iconography of Landscape: 
Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design and Use of Past Environments,” edited by 
Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels (Cambridge, 1988), 300–301.
11. Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems 
and General Semantics (Englewood, 1994).
12. Robert David Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge, 
1986), 3–11.
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it should occupy. In Siam Mapped, Tongchai Winichakul persuasively argues 
that maps do not follow the social reality of a nation dispersed across delim-
ited domains; they are not depictions of something that already exists but 
predictions of it. He presents this process as resulting from a confrontation 
between indigenous definitions of the realm and its modern geographical 
interpretations, and he calls the resulting novel concept of the territoriality 
of a nation its “geo-body,” which he argues, “is merely an effect of modern 
geographical discourse whose prime technology is a map.”13
Much of the discussion in this chapter takes its cue from Tongchai’s con-
ception of the emergence of nationhood and the field of critical geography, 
represented in the writings of J. B. Harley, Denis Cosgrove, Jeremy Black, 
Denis Wood, and Robert David Sack, among others. It does not, however, 
single out any one method favored by these authors and apply it to the 
maps of Turkey in Europe. What it borrows from this field is the notion 
that cartography is not, and never was, a disinterested scientific discipline 
but a technique of power and a perfect tool in the service of Darwinian geo-
politics. The dizzying colors on maps of Turkey in Europe makes sense only 
when read against this background.
Geographical Knowledge and Governmentality
In eighteenth-century Europe, as the definition of geographical subjects 
of inquiry sharpened, detailed topographical surveys uprooted astronomic 
observation and traveler reports as the gold standard of cartography. A 
novel technique called geodetic survey was introduced—a technique still 
used today with different measuring implements. The principal method of 
geodetic surveys was triangulation, which can roughly be described as the 
application of trigonometric principles to the measurement of distance to 
“triangulate,” or fine-tune, the contours of Earth as they were depicted on a 
map and to increase the resolution of a map to the greatest possible extent.14 
French geographers were the leaders in the practice of geodetic surveys in 
the eighteenth century. The survey of France carried out between 1744 and 
1789 by the Cassinis, a family of astronomers, and financed by the king, 
resulted in the 182-sheet Carte de France, which depicted the entire country 
in a uniform manner. The Carte de France became a model to be emulated 
as other European countries followed suit.15
13. Winichakul Tongchai, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation 
(Honolulu, 1994), 17.
14. Matthew H. Edney, Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British 
India, 1765–1843 (Chicago, 1997), 106.
15. Matthew H. Edney, “Mapping Parts of the World,” in Maps: Finding our Place in the 
World, edited by James R. Akerman and Robert W. Karrow Jr. (Chicago, 2007), 151.
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It is not an exaggeration to say that the Cassinis’ project was a turning 
point in the history of geography. The Carte de France was not only ground-
breaking in its implementation of a complex survey technique over a vast 
territory, but it also signified a new application of geographical knowledge 
in the service of “governmentality,” providing the state and its expanding 
edifice of bureaucracy a novel technique of calculation, of control over ter-
ritory. Not surprisingly, this type of survey was also perfectly suited for 
the purposes of the colonialist enterprise, and it was put into use in Egypt 
by the French and in Ireland and India by the British, to mention a few 
prominent examples.16 That the bar for scientific precision had been set too 
high by geodetic surveys did not prevent the popularization of the idea that 
all maps had to rely on the latest instruments and techniques. As a result, 
even those maps that did not rely on surveys boasted the method in their 
titles, and graticules (the grid formed by parallels and meridians) on a map 
became the minimum requirement for a claim to mapping precision and 
 authority—never mind the fact that the graticules were often added to maps 
post-production in a completely haphazard manner.
It is important to take note of this new-found confidence in the superiority 
of cutting-edge scientific methods, as faulty and fraudulent as they might be, 
because this transformation took place during the period when European 
geographers had also set their eyes on the task of mapping the “lost lands” 
of Europe, which meant Eastern Europe.17 The Russians seemed amenable 
to reform by “enlightened” Europeans, and created their own cartographic 
office in collaboration with the French as early as 1719,18 but the project 
of redeeming the lost lands through cartographic knowledge met a serious 
roadblock at the western frontier of the Ottoman realms. The Ottomans’ re-
luctance to aid (and possibly their sheer neglect) of European cartographers 
in their quest to survey their territory became the source of much resentment 
and frustration among scholarly circles in Europe. Here is an excerpt from 
the Atlas Universel of 1757:
If in the detail of the different parts of Europe that one has traveled through 
to the present, we have had satisfaction of receiving aid from the savants who 
have worked on their countries, we can not say that we have enjoyed such an 
advantage in the description that we have to make of the states submitted to 
16. This should not, however, lead us to the conclusion that trigonometric surveys became 
a common tool at the hands of an omnipotent state or colonial power. To start with, they 
were simply too expensive and laborious to be implemented widely. Furthermore, even in the 
presence of the resources and the political will to undertake such detailed surveys, they were 
quite limited and riddled with inaccuracies; Edney, Mapping an Empire, esp. 325–31.
17. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, 144, Wolff’s reference to “lost lands” was taken 
from Voltaire’s Charles XII.
18. This is not to say that the Russians had been incapable of, or did not care to, represent 
their domains through cartography; Valerie A. Kivelson, Cartographies of Tsardom: The Land 
and Its Meanings in Seventeenth-Century Russia (Ithaca, 2006).
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Ottoman domination. We would have wished to be able to conclude (terminer) 
European geography with more success; but the approach to these states is dif-
ficult for enlightened people (gens éclairés), and does not permit on ever to 
hope for sufficient lights (lumières) to give something satisfying in geography; 
for the relations that voyagers give us are not of sufficient help to confirm the 
topographical detail of the lands that they have traveled through. It would be 
necessary for these voyagers to be instructed in mathematics.19
This excerpt is an early reminder of a specific rhetoric that was better 
articulated and more pervasive among scholarly circles in the second half 
of the nineteenth century in their discussions about the deplorable state 
of sciences such as geography and ethnography in the Ottoman Empire. 
The contrast between light and darkness, symbolizing the contrast between 
reason and superstition, between science and ignorance and calling for the 
illumination of the dark corners of “states submitted to Ottoman domina-
tion” for the scientific gaze of the Europeans were common elements of this 
rhetoric. What distinguishes it from later expressions of similar sentiments 
is the tone that hinted at the notion that “Turks” did not belong in Europe, 
and it was precisely their presence there that made the “terminus” of the 
continent so dark. For the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century geographers, 
the presence of Ottomans in the eastern Mediterranean was not an anomaly 
that needed explanation.20 In the nineteenth century, this rather subtle dis-
course was replaced by explicit calls to chase the Turks out of Europe once 
and for all. It is important to note that the sudden interest in surveying the 
lands at the edge of Europe was taking place in the context of Habsburg-
Ottoman rivalry in Eastern Europe and of the Russian expansion to the 
south at the expense of Ottoman territory. In the words of Larry Wolff, 
“the lands that the Habsburg and Russian statesmen coveted were precisely 
those that geographers sought to study; the two ambitions were inevitably 
related and arguably interdependent.”21 The inextricable link between geo-
graphical knowledge and imperial ambition became even more pronounced 
in the nineteenth century as European colonial projects not only charted 
and measured their overseas acquisitions but also created and named entire 
regions according to their interests.22
It is important to bear in mind that geography is a culturally constructed 
realm and geographical knowledge reflects the particular intellectual milieu 
in which it is produced. The eighteenth-century developments outlined here 
19. Robert de Vaugondy, Atlas Universel (Paris, 1757), Vol. 1: 22, cited in Wolff, 
Inventing Eastern Europe, 148–49.
20. Manners, European Cartographers and the Ottoman World, 36–37.
21. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, 169.
22. On the invention of India, for instance, see Edney, Mapping an Empire. The power of 
naming through geographical exploration was so persuasive that a colonial invention could later 
be embraced by anti-colonial nationalist elites as the definition of a homeland they would liberate.
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all had a role in determining the shape of cartographic representations of the 
Ottoman Empire and its inhabitants, and the lengthy notes that accompanied 
them. A final element we should mention in this regard is the Enlightenment 
establishment of ancient Greece as the source of “Western Civilization.” The 
centrality of ancient Greece in Enlightenment thought directly and indirectly 
influenced the production of knowledge about the European “lost lands” 
in the nineteenth century. For one thing, ancient Greece, as Enlightenment 
philosophers reconstructed it, was a largely sterilized and stylized version, 
completely stripped off its elements of African and Asian origin.23 Although 
we might disagree with Martin Bernal’s assertion that the “Aryan” model 
of ancient Greece later dominated the field of classics, it is indisputable 
that the Enlightenment, by defining “Civilization” as the product of an ex-
clusive Greco-Roman lineage, not only branded the peoples that fell outside 
the confines of that intellectual heritage as inferior but also created a foil 
for the submission of the same peoples to European colonial power.24 Turks 
were definitely on the other side of this civilization divide, but Eastern Euro-
peans were not entirely part of the inner circle either, stranded as they were 
between the darkness of the Orient and the light of the Occident. This no-
tion is clearly noticeable in the writings of European travelers in the region 
and in the way that “scientific” works of ethnography recorded, classified, 
and ranked the same people.
Moreover, the notion of ancient Greece as the source of Western Civiliza-
tion fueled an interest in Classical Geography, which became a curricular 
requirement for the educated classes. In the mid-nineteenth century, “maps 
of the classical world dominated other atlases,” notes Jeremy Black.25 The 
increased demand for these atlases meant that more research was needed to 
bring the classical world to homes and classrooms. The same quest for the 
ancient world for their own eyes motivated travelers, who started to explore 
these as yet uncharted lands in increasing numbers in the nineteenth century.
The Marriage of Cartography to Statistics and 
the Rise of Ethnography
The emergence of a dominant discourse among the European literati and 
illuminati that established the peoples beyond the ambiguous European 
23. Martin Bernal, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization (New 
Brunswick, 1991).
24. This notion still resurfaces in European establishments of high culture, despite all 
pretenses about its eradication. We need only visit the Musée du Quai Branly in Paris, which 
opened in 2006 but has curatorial choices and an exhibition style that would not have been 
out of place in 1906. In fact, most the artifacts in the museum were transferred from the old 
museum of ethnography.
25. Black, Maps and History, 30.
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 borders in the east and the north as fundamentally different and inferior to 
the white Europeans was rooted in post-Enlightenment notions of scientific 
knowledge and civilization.26 The same discourse reached its peak through 
the course of the nineteenth century as it penetrated not only elite institutes 
of knowledge production but popular conceptions of the Orient in the grow-
ing domain of European public opinion. As far as cartography of Turkey in 
Europe is concerned, one of the crucial developments that took place in the 
nineteenth century was the combination of geography with statistics and the 
appearance of statistical tables on maps. All forms of basic data graphics 
that we readily recognize today, such as bar and pie charts, histograms, and 
line graphs, were invented during the first half of the nineteenth century.27 
Familiar as they may seem to the modern eye, this technique was quite un-
heard of at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Combined with the 
heightened interest in the “distribution of races” across the globe, especially 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, the marriage of cartography 
to statistics gave birth to the ethnographic maps that we are familiar with.
Ethnographic maps essentially constitute a subgroup of “thematic maps,” 
or maps that “[display] the occurrence, spatial pattern, or variation of one 
or a small number of phenomena in the physical, biological, social, or eco-
nomic world, such as climate, natural resources, population characteristics 
and commerce.”28 Even though their origins can be traced back to the sev-
enteenth century, it was only in the nineteenth century—after the introduc-
tion of new graphical representation methods and the transformation of 
geography as a discipline into a branch of natural sciences that covered 
physical elements of Earth in its entirety, including its atmosphere, climate, 
flora, fauna, and geological layers—that thematic maps became widely used 
tools of cartographic representation. Carl Ritter and Alexander von Hum-
boldt, the pioneers of this transformation, introduced the cartography of 
physical phenomena into the discipline. Von Humboldt was also extremely 
influential in popularizing the use of new graphic methods among geog-
raphers; among his disciples was Heinrich Berghaus, whose Physicalischer 
Atlas was widely copied and plagiarized.29 Superficially, the new techniques 
were indeed the accomplishment of “pure” science, untainted by any sort 
of measuring error or bias because they represented physical phenomena as 
accurately as possible and served the purpose of expanding humankind’s 
knowledge of the globe it inhabited. The mapmaker’s curatorial authority 
and choices, however, were never a simple exercise of a “purely scientific” 
26. For European ambiguity about the eastern borders of the continent, see Wolff, 
Inventing Eastern Europe.
27. Michael Friendly and Gilles Palsky, “Visualizing Nature and Society,” in Maps: 




Territoriality and Its Discontents  89
method but a reflection of the dominant weltanschauung. Consider, for in-
stance, the folio in Berghaus’s Atlas depicting the “Geographical Distribu-
tion of the Human Races”: a Mercatorial projection of the globe occupies 
the center, while the margins are packed full of information with the aid of 
graphical charts and an inset map showing how population density corre-
lates with dietary patterns.30 The most striking illustrations are scattered on 
the top and sides of the map; they are portraits representing the different hu-
man races—some rendered grotesquely ugly—and the corresponding skull 
shapes.31 The distinctions based on physiognomy (which looks even uglier 
than it sounds) lent the author’s racial classification the aura of scientific 
knowledge; it asserted the notion (accepted as fact at the time) that race was 
something that could positively be identified, although the criteria used for 
determining race still oscillated between definitions based on physical traits 
(such as the color of skin) and what we would consider cultural elements 
today (such as costumes). In any case, the purely physiognomic conception 
of race was not entirely dominant, and race was mostly used as a term that 
might correspond to ethnicity today, with the notable distinction that it was 
understood to be essentially fixed.
Berghaus’s map was an early example of cartographic representations 
of ethnographic knowledge, and it made use of tables and illustrations 
external to the map to explicate its subject matter. It certainly had a sig-
nificant visual impact, but another technique, known as “choropleths” 
was an even more potent medium for communicating knowledge about 
the distribution of “measurable” phenomena in space. The earliest known 
example of the choropleth technique is “Figurative Map of Popular Educa-
tion in France” (“Carte figurative de l’instruction populaire de la France”) 
by Baron Charles Dupin, published in 1826. Dupin’s stated purpose for 
his map was to illustrate the effects of public education on prosperity in 
France.32 He shaded the map such that the coloring became darker as 
the number of pupils in school in a given department decreased. A bet-
ter proxy for representing “enlightenment” could not be found, and in 
fact, the map became a reference for dividing France into “obscure” and 
“eclairé” regions. Choropleths became a widely used tool in the depiction 
of social problems, such as crime and disease, and their correlation with 
schooling, region, and social class.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the toolbox was complete for 
those who wanted to undertake the ambitious project of writing up the 
30. Geographische Verbreitung der Menschen-Ranssen (Gotha, 1848).
31. For a critical commentary on this map and Berghaus’s intellectual connection to von 
Humboldt, see Denis Cosgrove, “Tropic and Tropicality,” in Tropical Visions in an Age of 
Empire, edited by Felix Driver and Luciana Martins (Chicago, 2005), 197–216.
32. Charles Dupin, Effets de l’enseignement populaire de la lecture, de l’écriture et de 
l’arithmétique, de la géométrie et de la mécanique appliquées aux arts, sur les prospérités de 
la France (Paris, 1826), quoted in Friendly and Palsky, “Visualizing Nature and Society,” 240.
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 cartography of the human race. The rise of ethnography as a scientific dis-
cipline during the same period contributed to the proliferation of maps of 
European Turkey and its “races.” The discipline of ethnography (which 
many academic institutions housed in the same general department of ge-
ography), despite its claim to objective and empiricist foundations, was at 
the time dominated by theories that classified humans and cultures along 
a sliding scale that placed white Europeans at the top. The superiority of 
Europeans was not just an extreme position implicitly present in the sister 
disciplines of geography and ethnography; it was one of the premises of 
their methodology. The other premise was the teleology of the European 
model of nations. These two premises were in place well into the twentieth 
century, and combining forces with the concept of “natural frontiers” (an-
other nineteenth-century invention), they helped shape geopolitics around 
the globe. Consider, for instance, the definition of ethnology and ethnogra-
phy in the 1910 edition of Encyclopædia Britannica: “sciences which in their 
narrowest sense deal respectively with man as a racial unit (mankind), i.e. 
his development through the family and tribal stages into national life, and 
with the distribution over the earth of the races and nations thus formed. 
Though the etymology of the word permits in theory of this line of division 
between ethnology and ethnography, in practice they form and indivisible 
study of man’s progress from the point at which anthropology leaves him.”33 
The assumption that human races go through an evolutionary process, the 
ultimate result of which is organization into nations, is the central idea of 
this definition. We should also note that anthropology, ethnology, and eth-
nography constituted a continuum under the general rubric of “natural his-
tory” and that the study of the different races was determined according to 
their location on that continuum: anthropology for the “savages,” ethnol-
ogy and  ethnography for the more familiar and literate “other,” and finally 
national history for those who had reached the culmination point.34 It is 
interesting to note that the Balkan national elites, whose ethnic kin was the 
subject matter of European ethnographers, imported and internalized simi-
lar assumptions about the relative qualities of different ethnic groups and 
their potential for “civilization,” as we will see later. This was not a bizarre 
form of self-regard but a carefully strategized method used to substantiate 
one ethnic group’s claim to territory over another’s because the European 
Powers understood the principles of popular sovereignty and national self-
determination in terms of natural frontiers and “national maturity.”
33. “Ethnology and Ethnography,” Encyclopæaedia Britannica (New York, 1910), 
vol. 9: 849.
34. Bernard Cohn calls the ethnography of this period “the description of ‘primitives,’ ” 
which entailed “a theory of history which is based on the idea of a chronological ordering 
of types of societies interpretable as a sequence of cultural or biological evolution.” Bernard 
Cohn, “History and Anthropology: The State of Play,” in An Anthropologist among the 
Historians and Other Essays (Delhi and Oxford, 1987), 24.
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Mapping Macedonia and Its Races
The reinvention of the term Macedonia owed much to the early travel-
ers in the area, who came in search of ruins and, following cartographic 
custom, referred to these little-known parts of the Ottoman Empire by their 
ancient names, as if they were visiting Roman provinces.35 The most signifi-
cant among the earlier explorers was E. M. Cousinéry, whose topographical 
descriptions are still used as a reference by archaeologists.36 The explorers 
were writing not only about geography and the ruins, of course, but also 
about the inhabitants of those lands or the “human geography,” influenced 
by assumptions about their ancestors and their geographical origins based 
on the classics and the earlier deliberations of historical atlases. The author 
of the first significant work on the ethnography of the region was Amie 
Boué, who published the results of his research in 1840, a decade after Cui-
sinéry’s Voyage dans la Macédoine. An ethnographic map that indicated a 
large presence of “Bulgarians” in the area accompanied his work. The map 
introduced, for the first time, the notion that Bulgarians constituted the 
largest “racial” group in Macedonia.37 Ethnographic research on European 
Turkey became more popular during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and even the nonspecialist visitors made sure to note ethnographi-
cal peculiarities in their travel accounts as they saw fit.
Maps based on the findings of these researches also started to appear in the 
middle of the nineteenth century. Some of these were published as separate 
works, and some were included in prestigious annals and journals of geogra-
phy such as Berghaus’s Atlas or Petermann’s Mittheilungen. Henry R. Wilkin-
son, in his 1951 book on maps of Macedonia, which is still considered a 
classic reference source, notes that the map published in 1842 by Pavel Scha-
farik, pan-Slavist scholar and an Austro-Hungarian subject of Czech descent, 
35. The reinvention of Macedonia by nineteenth-century travelers and geographers was 
not something identified by deconstructionist historians in the late twentieth century. For 
instance, in 1920 Jordan Ivanoff, professor and member of the Bulgarian academy of sciences, 
wrote, “The passionate desire of those from the Balkans [les Balkaniques] to resuscitate the 
name Macedonia is stimulated by the publications of Europeans about the Balkan peninsula, 
especially since the beginning of the 19th century. We shall cite only the names that are 
most frequently seen: Félis de Beaujour, Couisinéry, Pouqueville, Urquhart, Viquesnel, Boué, 
Grisebach, Grigorovitch, etc. In their research on the Balkans, they consider Macedonia as a 
geographic unity.” La Question Macédonienne au Point de Vue Historique, Ethnographique 
et Statistique (Paris, 1920), 5.
36. Cousinéry had served as consul general for France in Salonika; Couisinéry, Voyage 
dans la Macédoine. Pouqueville is cited among the earlier travelers, but according to a later 
explorer, he did not actually go to Macedonia; see Charles Édouard Guys, Le Guide de la 
Macédoine (Paris, 1857), vi.
37. Amie Boué, La Turquie d’Europe, ou Observations sur la Géographie, la Géologie, 
l’Histoire Naturelle, la Statistique, les Moeurs, les Coutumes, l’Archéologie, l’Agriculture, 
l’Industrie, le Commerce, les Gouvernements divers, le Clergé, l’Histoire, et l’état Politique de 
cet Empire (Paris, 1840): see also Amie Boué, Receuil d’Itinéraires dans la Turquie d’Europe, 
Détails Géographiques, Topographiques, et Statistiques cur cet Empire (Vienne, 1854).
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“virtually revolutionized the prevailing ideas on the distribution and charac-
ter of the peoples of south-eastern Europe” and “set the fashion for nearly 
all ethnographic maps of this area.”38 As thorough as Wilkinson was, we 
take this assertion with a grain of salt because Jovan Cvijić, Serbian scholar 
and another contributor to the ethnographic geography of southeastern Eu-
rope, remarked that, having been published in Czech, Schafarik’s Slovansky 
Národopis “remained unknown to other cultured nations.”39 Nevertheless, 
Cvijić also noted that the map was ground-breaking in its classification and 
labeling of six major groups currently inhabiting the Balkan Peninsula: Alba-
nians, Turks, Serbo-Croats, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Romanians. The more 
likely person to be credited with familiarizing the “cultured nations” of Eu-
rope with the racial riches of European Turkey for the first time was Amie 
Boué, who published an ethnographic map in Berghaus’s Atlas in 1847, seven 
years after the appearance of La Turquie d’Europe. Boué attributed an even 
larger territory to the Bulgarians than Schafarik had and denoted Turks only 
in a few major cities. When read in the context of his other writings about 
the Ottoman Empire, however, this should not necessarily lead us to conclude 
that he was making a visual statement, questioning the legitimacy of Otto-
man rule in the Balkans, as the majority of European geographers did. His 
writings suggest that Boué was more interested in presenting policies to bring 
the Ottomans on par with other European states than in supporting an eth-
nic basis for challenging their presence in Europe.40 His suggestions did not 
involve the replacement of an imperial source of authority with a national 
one defined by language but, instead, called for the reform of the existing 
structure. Boué had unfaltering confidence in the potential of modernity to 
change everything within the reach of railroads.
Yet Boué’s map made such a good case for the Bulgarians as the dominant 
element in Macedonia that it was reproduced during the first decades of 
the twentieth century several times in other ethnographic works and atlases 
used as propaganda material by the Bulgarians; the scholar’s reputation no 
doubt provided the stamp of scientific objectivity to these publications.41 In 
1861, another map that would later become a frequent reference work for 
the Bulgarian propagandists was published in Petermann’s Mittheilungen, 
38. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics.
39. Jovan Cvijić, Remarks on the Ethnography of the Macedonian Slavs (London, 1906), 
19. This article was originally published in French and was also translated into Serbian and 
Russian. It immediately drew a reaction from Anastas Ishirkov, who argued that this was a 
transparent attempt to prove that the Bulgarians of the Morova valley and Macedonia were in 
fact Serbs; Études Ethnographiques sur les Slaves de Macédoine (Paris, 1908).
40. Boué considered the Ottoman Empire a European state rather than an aberration in 
the continent, in contrast to, for instance, Bianconi. It is worth noting that he mostly compared 
it to Spain, sometimes to England and France, and occasionally did so in a favorable manner. 
See, for instance, Boué, Turquie d’Europe, Vol. 2: 158.
41. According to Cvijić, Vasil Kûnchov’s Makedonia: Ethnographia i Statistika (Sofia, 
1900) was one such example; Cvijić, Remarks, 30–31.
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a map by Guillaume Marie Lejean, a former consul of France in the Otto-
man Empire.42 The map was based on data that Lejean had collected during 
two trips made in 1857 and 1858. Lejean noted in the introduction to his 
work that the “ethnographic study of the Ottoman Empire” was no longer 
an “object of purely scientific curiosity.” He separated himself from earlier 
ethnogeographers with his position that language could not be used as a 
criterion to determine nationality in “Turkey” since “religious hatred and 
political inequality” had caused people to adopt languages that did not cor-
respond to their races.43 Instead, he argued, the criterion of history should 
be used to determine nationality. Despite the change in the criterion for 
measuring nationality, the coloring of the map still favored the Bulgarians 
in Macedonia. The most striking feature of his map, in contrast with earlier 
examples, was a great block of Turkish settlement in northeastern Bulgaria, 
covering regions that were more usually attributed to the Romanians.
James F. Clarke argues in his book The Pen and the Sword, one of the 
formative texts of Bulgarian history in the English language, that “the per-
sistence of classical cartographic conventions—the dead hand of  Ptolemy—
together with the terra incognita nature of the Turkish Balkans which 
prevailed up to the second half of the nineteenth century” contributed to 
the “cartographical misfortune” of Bulgarians, who, “in addition to re- 
educating themselves . . . had the task of educating Europe.”44 European 
cartographic material from 1842 to 1877, however, tells an entirely different 
story. Far from suffering from a “cartographic misfortune,” Bulgarians were 
represented abundantly in these maps. In 1869, August Heinrich Petermann, 
the esteemed editor of Petermann’s Geographische Mittheilungen, published 
a map titled Die Ausdehnung der Slaven in der Türkei und der angrenzenden 
Gebieten. The work claimed to represent the epitome of the previous three 
decades of work on the ethnogeography of Turkey-in Europe.45 The map 
showed uniform Bulgarian dominance over the entire Balkan Peninsula with 
the exception of the coastal regions, where the Greeks were indicated, and 
towns, which were marked Turkish (or Muslim.)
After 1877, as ethnographic maps of European Turkey proliferated, the 
coloring style of the maps, the criteria used to determine nationality, and 
the nationality of the authors of the maps began to diversify. Even the “Bul-
garianness” of Macedonian Slavs, which had been accepted as more or less 
self-evident, came to be questioned by new works. Although maps favoring 
42. It was later appended, for instance, to A. Ofeicoff, La Macédoine au Point de 
Vue Ethnographique, Historique, et Philologique (Constantinople, 1887). Ofeicoff was a 
pseudonym used by A. Shopov, the Bulgarian commercial agent in Salonika and a frequent 
contributor to polemics about the ethnographic composition of Macedonia.
43. Guillaume Lejean, “Ethnographie de la Turquie d’Europe” in Peterman’s Geographische 
Mittheilungen (Gotha, 1861), 1–2.
44. Clarke, Pen and the Sword, 34.
45. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, 55.
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one particular group continued to be the norm, a few exceptions appeared 
that questioned the homogeneity of choropleths and used hybrid color com-
binations to account for ethnic variety.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the name Heinrich Kiepert 
came to the fore as one of the best-known cartographers of the time. A 
prolific professor of geography at the University of Berlin, Kiepert counted 
among his many talents expertise in the geography of European and Asian 
Turkey, and Bismarck among his many admirers.46 Kiepert published his 
Ethnographische Übersicht des Europäischen Orients in 1876. In this map, 
Thrace was colored as half Turkish and half Greek, and further north, a 
more or less similar proportion was observed between Turks and Bulgarians. 
This map had had such a good reception in Europe that it was used as a ref-
erence at the Congress of Berlin—presumably a testament to its objectivity.47
It was not long before this apparent status quo was challenged by maps 
that favored Greek claims over Macedonia. Two significant examples pub-
lished in 1877 were the Stanford Map and a map drafted by F. Bianconi, 
French engineer and geographer.48 The same year, A. Synvet, a French phil-
hellene and a teacher of geography at Galatasaray Lisesi (also known as 
Lycée de Galatasaray, a prestigious public school in Istanbul that produced 
a large proportion of the Ottoman bureaucratic and literary elite) published 
another map that was considered pro-Greek and received considerable 
publicity in Europe. Synvet’s map was relatively modest in its claims about 
Greek territory; it did not directly negate the earlier maps showing sizable 
Bulgarian populations, but by stressing the existence of dense “Turkish” set-
tlements all over the Balkan Peninsula, it showed that the Greek population 
of the Ottoman Empire had been grossly underestimated.49 His figures were 
largely based on the results of a two-year-old survey commissioned by the 
Patriarchate to determine the number of Greek Orthodox households that 
would be liable for a tithe for the support of bishoprics. A year later, Synvet 
46. V. Colocotronis, La Macédoine et l’Hellenisme, Étude Historique et Ethnologique 
(Paris, 1919), 484; Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, 67.
47. Wilkinson notes Bismarck’s high regard for Kiepert and mentions that his map was 
used at the Congress of Berlin and “was regarded as part of Bismarck’s ‘honest brokerage.’ ” 
Maps and Politics, 67–68. It must be noted however, that Kiepert’s maps that were used at 
the Congress of Berlin had been prepared under Russian sponsorship; Karpat, Ottoman 
Population, 26. They were first published in Russian, and according to Paparrigopoulos, had 
been translated into French on Bismarck’s orders to be used at the Congress; Paparrigopoulos’s 
correspondence with P. Argiropoulo, in K. Th. Dimara, Kōnstantinos Paparrēgopoulos, ē 
epochē tou, ē Zōē tou, to ergo tou (Athens, 1986), 348.
48. F. Bianconi, Ethnographie et Statistique de la Turquie d’Europe et de la Grèce 
(Paris, 1877).
49. A. Synvet, La Carte Ethnographique de la Turquie d’Europe et Denombrement de 
l’Empire Ottoman (Paris, 1877). He adjusted the numbers produced by community registers 
by referring to the records of syllogues. Kemal Karpat notes that the figures he calculated 
proved to be exaggerated “when the Ottoman census of 1881/82–1893 gave the first truly 
comprehensive account of the Greek population.” Ottoman Population, 49.
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published Les Grecs de L’Empire Ottoman, where he supplemented these 
figures using those provided by membership registers of syllogues (Greek 
cultural organizations), which, he argued, gave a more accurate picture. 
Using this method, the Greek population of Macedonia, which he had es-
timated at 474,000 the year before, was now reported as 587,860.50 It is 
important to note that as the fight over Macedonia shifted into one carried 
out using guns rather than maps, the Greek side still recognized the weight 
of ethnography to be as significant as the guerrillas wielding weapons. So, 
when a crowd gathered in Piraeus to protest the events in Macedonia in 
August 1903 and present a memorandum to the government and the diplo-
matic delegations in Athens, one of the six resolutions of the memorandum 
was against the “false statistics published by Slavists to mislead European 
public opinion to the detriment of the Hellenic nationality.”51
In 1878, two new maps covering Macedonia appeared: one by Carl Sax 
and a new map by Heinrich Kiepert. Compared to other ethnographic maps 
of the era, which usually displayed different ethnic groups by clearly delin-
eated blocks of color on the map because of their reliance on the graphic 
principle that favored a “preponderance” of a given “race,” Sax’s map 
looked like a painting by his fellow countryman, Oskar Kokoschka. Jovan 
Cvijić later remarked that, although there was some merit to Sax’s work, 
“the well-known, peculiarly Austrian, bureaucratic methods made him tear 
nations into atoms.”52 Perhaps we should concede that Cvijić did have a 
point, for Sax cited no fewer than twenty-one groups in his classification 
and his concern with justifying Austrian intervention in the region did not go 
unnoticed. We might even go as far as to suggest that this was the first pro-
Austrian map of the Balkans. On the other hand, Sax’s “peculiar” method 
was the first to question the raciolinguistic criteria that had hitherto been 
the norm. He pointed out that the importance of religion had been neglected 
and that what he called a sense of “group consciousness,” or the sum of ele-
ments that keep a community together, had not been taken into account.53 
It is very likely that Sax’s method was an application of the theories of Karl 
von Czörnig and his pupil, Adolf Ficker, who “were opposed both to the 
language criterion constituting the sole marker of nationality, as well as to 
the principle of enquiry into the nationality of individuals. They argued that 
any enquiry into nationality should be directed at discovering the national 
identity of communities, rather than the language used by individuals. They 
in addition regarded history, geography, anthropology and ethnography as 
the essential correctives of the language criterion.”54
50. A. Synvet, Les Grecs de L’Empire Ottoman: Étude Statistique (Constantinople, 1878).
51. Quoted in Paillarès, Imbroglio Macédonien, 22.
52. Cvijić, Remarks, 24.
53. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, 77.
54. Z. A. B. Zeman “Four Austrian Censuses and Their Political Consequences,” in The 
Last Years of Austria-Hungary, edited by Mark Cornwall (Exeter, 1990), 32.
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What seems to be a curious absence during this period, considering the 
Russian interest in the region, and the “protection” it offered to its Slav 
brethren, are ethnographic maps prepared by Russian geographers. It is dif-
ficult to attribute this to a lack of know-how or sufficient resources because 
the St. Petersburg–based Imperial Russian Geographical Society had been 
active since 1845, when it was established under the tutelage of German 
geographers, most notably Karl Baer, who passed the mantle on to such 
Russian colleagues as the influential K. I. Arsenyev [Arsenieff] (1789–1865) 
and P. P. Semënov [Semenoff] (1827–1914).55 In fact, during the tense period 
preceding the Constantinople Conference in December 1876, which con-
cluded yet another Balkan crisis between the Ottoman Empire and Serbia—
and by implication Russia—the Russian Embassy in London, according to a 
report by Ioannis Gennadius, displayed an ethnographic map of the Balkan 
Peninsula drawn not by one of its own but by the famous G. M. Lejean.56
According to Jovan Cvijić, there were only three Russian maps that had 
any influence among the Slavs (even though they were not noted by European 
intellectuals), all published by the Slav Union based in St. Petersburg. The first, 
published in 1887, by Marković and Rittich, was almost entirely a copy of 
Lejean’s map, with certain notable exceptions, such as the island of Thasos im-
probably marked as containing an “oasis of Bulgarians.”57 The second, pub-
lished by N. C. Zarjanko and V. V. Komarov in 1890, was based on Kiepert’s 
map and marked as dominated by “Bulgarians” an area found to be “exagger-
ated even by the Bulgarians themselves.”58 The same year, Komarov published 
another map that used a neutral color for Macedonian Slavs, marking them as 
neither Serb nor Bulgarian.59 This shift is not hard to explain: having assumed 
the patronage of all Slavs, Russia had to strike a delicate balance in appeasing 
the Serbs and the Bulgarians, whose southern Slavic fraternity reached its lim-
its somewhere between Niš and Skoplje and fell short of preventing the war 
in 1885. The earlier work of Serbian scholars, such as Stefan Verković, on the 
ethnography of Macedonian Slavs apparently did not have any reservations 
about attributing the term Bulgarian to their language, yet toward the end 
of the nineteenth century this attitude had made a  complete turn in the other 
55. Semënov (also known as Tian-Shanskiy, in tribute to his expedition of Tien Shan) 
was also involved in the preparation of the first Russian census of 1897; David J. M. Hosoon, 
“The Development of Geography in Pre-Soviet Russia,” Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 58 (1968), 259.
56. S. Karavas, “Oi Ethnografikes Peripeteies tou Ellēnismou, “Ta Istorika 19 (2002), 34.
57. Jovan Cvijić, “Remarques sur l’Ethnographie de la Macédoine,” Annales de 
Géographie 15, no. 81 (1906), 256.
58. Ibid. As noted previously, Cvijić was referring to Kûnchov’s work when he referred to 
“Bulgarians” finding Zarjanko and Komarov’s work exaggerated.
59. Another Russian map worth mentioning is T. D. Florinski’s Etnografska Karta na 
Slavyanstvovo v Europa, published in 1908, which counted Macedonian Slavs as “Bulgarians”; 
Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, 153.
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direction.60 The reaction against the “Greater Bulgaria” of St. Stefano seems 
to have had a sobering effect not only on Serbian authors but on their Russian 
counterparts, who became more circumspect about using the term Bulgarian 
in reference to Macedonian Slavs.61
Russian geographers’ relative lack of interest in the Macedonian Slavs also 
had to do with their more pressing projects at the time. The outreaches of 
the Russian Empire were still in the process of “discovery” by strongly mo-
tivated Russian explorers, watched closely with approval by European geog-
raphers. When the Russian Geographical Society published a  compendium 
summarizing the work it had done between 1845 and 1895 in celebration 
of its fiftieth anniversary, the highly condensed accounts of its explorations 
filled up some 1,378 pages in three volumes.62 The surveys stretched from 
the Kirghiz steppes to the Siberian tundra, from the Black Sea shores to the 
slopes of the Urals, and passed borders into territories within the confines of 
neighboring states. Russians were by no means indifferent to the geographi-
cal distribution of their Slavic brethren in Macedonia, but their geographers 
had bigger fish to fry elsewhere, and they were stretched thin over a vast 
territory that needed to be properly measured, counted, and recorded to be 
fully incorporated into the empire.
Spiridon Gopčević published the first significant study by a Serbian scholar 
to make a claim about Macedonian Slavs in 1889. This was an impressive 
volume of ethnographic work, illustrated with fine drawings and photo-
graphs and accompanied by an ethnographic map.63 Nevertheless, it was 
largely viewed as a “propaganda piece.”64 Strictly speaking, Gopčević was 
60. Anastas Ishirkov, Le Nom de Bulgare: Eclaircissement d’Histoire et d’Ethnographie 
(Lausanne, 1918), 3–4. Verković was the author of Narodne Pesme Makedonski Bugara [Folk 
Songs of Macedonian Bulgars] (Belgrade, 1860).
61. Compare the work, for instance, of Victor Grigorović on the ethnography of Turkey 
in Europe, first published in 1848 and frequently cited by Bulgarian authors (such as Ishirkov, 
Nom de Bulgare, 35) as proof that the Macedonian Slavs were recognized as “Bulgarians” 
by scholars writing well before the establishment of the Exarchate. See also the writings of 
Iastrebov, published in 1886, which considered Macedonian Slavs to be “Serbs”; Cvijić, 
“Remarques,” 257, n. 1.
62. P. P. Semenoff, History of a Half Century of Activity of the Russian Geographical 
Society, 1845–1895, with the collaboration of A.A. Dostoiyevsky (St. Petersburg, 1896) [in 
Russian], cited in Peter Kropotkin, “The Fifty Years’ History of the Russian Geographical 
Society,” Geographical Journal 10 (July 1897): 53–56. The compendium included “a map 
showing the process of geographical exploration of the Russian Empire, and the neighbouring 
countries within the last fifty years” (53). For activities of the society during this period, see 
also “Recent Russian Geographical Literature,” Geographical Journal 6 (December 1895): 
554–58; E. Delmar Morgan, “Russian Geographical Work in 1886 from Russian Sources,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography 9 (July 
1887): 423–37.
63. Spiridon Gopčević, Makedonien und Alt-Serbien (Vienna, 1889).
64. Wilkinson notes that “it is a firm axiom of the propagandist . . . that an initial failure 
may be turned into an ultimate success by the simple process of reiteration,” and that Gopčević 
“provided the Serbs with their initial failure.” Maps and Politics, 103. To be fair to Gopčević, 
the volume that the map accompanied was a remarkably crafted book, full of interesting 
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not the first cartographer to place Serbians in the region, his most impor-
tant predecessors being M. S. Miloyevitch (1873), Colonel Dragashevitch 
(1885), and M. Veselinovitch (1886), but it seems that he earned this repu-
tation because his work became widely available to European scholars after 
its publication in Petermann’s Mittheilungen.65 This map was also the first 
one among those mentioned so far to use the term Macedonia in its title. Ten 
years later, C. Nicolaides, the Greek scholar, published another ethnographic 
and linguistic map of Macedonia, and maps dedicated to Macedonia, as op-
posed to Turkey in Europe, started to appear as the political rivalry became 
more concentrated in this region. The Serbians had now firmly entered the 
cartographic contest. An anonymously prepared “Serbian University Map” 
was published in 1891.
Other maps of the period worth mentioning were those of Gustave 
Weigand (1895); Richard von Mach (1899), who based his ethnographic 
representation on the distribution of Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek schools; 
a map published anonymously in Sofia in 1901;66 another anonymous map 
showing Christian schools in Macedonia (1905); and Brancoff’s maps show-
ing the Christian population and Christian schools of Macedonia (1905). 
Another significant example of maps prepared with school data is the anon-
ymous “Carte des Écoles Chrétiennes de la Macédoine,” published in Paris 
in 1905.67 Brancoff’s map of Christian schools, in rebuttal, claimed that 
Greek schools were protected by the Ottoman government and that, in con-
trast, Bulgarians could not get even a permit to open up a school in areas 
where the population had joined the Exarchate but given sufficient time, 
Bulgarian schools would prevail because they offered better education.68
This new trend of ethnographic maps based on school data was largely the 
invention of Greek nationalists, who were despairing at the notion, which 
was gaining firmer ground in western Europe, that Macedonia was largely 
inhabited by a Slav population. Needless to say, the sizable Muslim popula-
tion (Turkish, Albanian, and Slavic speakers) of the region was entirely ne-
glected owing to the perception that these people were “aliens” who did not 
belong there in the first place.69 As we have noted, this is a notion that can 
ethnographic information, including the author’s research on folklore, and definitely warrants 
more than a dismissive label.
65. Cvijić, Remarks, 29.
66. According to Cvijić, there was “no doubt that this edition belongs to the Bulgarian 
Ministry of War.” Ibid., 31.
67. Cvijić notes, “there is nothing which represents better than this chart the gigantic 
efforts of the Greeks to Hellenise these two vilayets.” Ibid., 32. School statistics in favor of the 
Greeks were initially published in the form of statistical tables, but the visual impact of a map 
was certainly stronger. For the statistics see, Population of Macedonia; Ioanna Z. Stephanopoli, 
Grecs et Bulgares en Macédoine (Athens, 1903).
68. Brancoff [Mishev], La Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne, 77–79.
69. Even in a mainstream source of general information such as Encyclopædia Britannica 
(11th ed.), the population of Macedonia was described as follows: “The greater part of 
Macedonia is inhabited by a Slavonic population, mainly Bulgarian in its characteristics; the 
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be traced back as far as the eighteenth century, when post-Enlightenment 
philosophers were in the process of “inventing Eastern Europe,” a transition 
zone within the vaguely defined borders of Europe with dangerously close 
proximity to the anomaly of Turkey in Europe. Lacking a proper vocabulary 
to describe the exotic inhabitants of these “lost lands,” scholars borrowed 
familiar names from ancient history; Scythians served as a generic name 
for these people in the eighteenth century, until, as Larry Wolff observes, 
“Herder appropriated another identification from among the barbarians of 
ancient history, and gave Eastern Europe its modern identity as the domain 
of the Slavs.”70 The first generation of ethnographic maps claiming Mace-
donia as Greek, however painstakingly prepared, failed to undo this per-
ception. The school criterion was introduced as a new basis for identifying 
ethnic groups because it provided the mapmakers with numbers that they 
could compile with relative ease and that had a reliability that was harder 
to challenge. These figures also happened to favor Greek schools, which, 
despite the relatively recent rivalry of Bulgarian and, to a lesser extent, Ser-
bian schools benefited from the authority of the Patriarchate as well as the 
material and personnel support of the Greek state and the Greek bourgeoi-
sie. More important, this criterion combined consciousness and culture as 
the main determinants of national identity rather than racial or linguistic 
factors, thereby emphasizing the element of free will and invoking the cha-
risma for liberal European public opinion of Greek culture and its classical 
heritage.
Three ethnographic maps published during the first decades of the twen-
tieth century were distinguished by the influence they had over their au-
diences. The first was a book of population statistics compiled by Vasil 
Kûnchov, a former inspector of Bulgarian elementary schools in Macedonia. 
Kûnchov’s book, published in 1900, also contained maps based on his fig-
ures and instantly became a respected reference source not only in Bulgaria 
but also in France. The book was not translated into French or English, but 
its statistical tables were used by the popular press and geography journals.71 
The second, Karl Peucker’s Karte von Makedonien, Altserbien und Albanien, 
published in 1903 was, as its subtitle notes, drawn to illustrate the Macedo-
nian Question, but it did not used choropleths. In fact, compared to the base 
maps of the other examples mentioned so far, Peucker’s map was the most 
sophisticated. Instead of choropleths, the map addressed questions of his-
tory, language, religion, and culture with two insets that included summary 
coast-line and the southern districts west of the Gulf of Salonica by Greeks, while Turkish, 
Vlach and Albanian settlements exist sporadically, or in groups, in many parts of the country.” 
“Macedonia,” 216.
70. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, 11.
71. Vasil Kûnchov, Makedonia: Ethnographia i Statistika (Sofia, 1900). Kûnchov’s 
statistics were considered among the best and were reproduced in European-language 
publications. See, for instance, Routier, Macédoine et les Puissances, 267.
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statistical tables and a color key to indicate “language zones.” It was topo-
graphically and toponymically extremely detailed. The map did not indicate 
a source for the topographic survey it was based on (the cultural groups 
were reportedly listed according to Cvijić’s classification), but it was likely 
the work of Austrian engineers. The Ottoman map office had also obtained 
a copy of this map.72
Peucker’s reference to Jovan Cvijić is a testament to the respect the Ser-
bian geographer had garnered during this period. If Kiepert had been the 
pop geographer of Europe in the 1870s, that title belonged to Cvijić during 
the first two decades of the twentieth century.73 His demographic research 
and ethnographic maps were considered a benchmark for other works on 
the populations of the Balkans, much to the chagrin of Bulgarian scholars 
and activists. Until the 1880s, the assumption that the Macedonian Slavs 
were Bulgarian had not really been questioned because this was more or 
less the position of the European geographical establishment. As we have 
seen, worries about the revival of St. Stefano Bulgaria fueled the initial reac-
tion against this status quo, and the Bulgarian side was quick to take note 
and answer in kind.74 Cvijić’s intervention, on the other hand, was a game 
changer. He put forth the notion that Bulgarian was not a term that denoted 
nationality among the Macedonian Slavs, who in any case lacked any such 
consciousness until well after the formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate.75 
He challenged the work of early European scholars and travelers, including 
François C. H. L. Pouqueville, Cousinéry, Boué, August Heinrich Rudolf 
Griesebach, Lejean, Georgina Mary Muir Mackenzie and Adeline Paulina 
Irby, and even Kiepert, who all, he pointed out, lacked the necessary lin-
guistic skills to write authoritatively about the ethnography of the Mace-
donian Slavs and who therefore relied on the interpretation of their Greek 
and Turkish guides and ended up repeating the same errors. He held Joseph 
Müller, who had worked as a physician for the Ottoman army, to be the only 
exception and considered his book to be the most reliable among the earlier 
works. Müller, not surprisingly, had classified the Macedonian Slavs in the 
regions he traveled as “Serbs.”76
72. BOA, HRT 251.
73. It helped that Cvijić wrote in an academic, seemingly objective style; published his 
prolific output in several European languages, including English; and was good at marketing 
his work. I could not but notice that all the reprints of his articles held at the Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France were gifts of the author.
74. See, for instance, Ofeicoff [Shopov]’s polemic Macédoine au Point de Vue 
Ethnographique, in which he argues, using current political events, toponyms, historical 
figures, and grammar (while conceding the distinctiveness of the Macedonian dialect and its 
common traits with Serbian), that the Macedonian Slavs are Bulgarian.
75. Jovan Cvijić, Questions Balkaniques (Neuchâtel, 1916).
76. Joseph Müller, Albanien, Rumelien und die österreichisch-montenegrische Grenze. 
Nebst einer Karte von Albanien. Mit einer Vorrede von Dr. P. J. Šafaŕik (Prague, 1844), 103, 
cited in Cvijić “Remarques,” 251. The region that Müller wrote about did not include “Aegean 
Macedonia” but was limited to the province of Monastir, parts of Albania, and Old Serbia.
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Even more egregious, as far as the Bulgarian intellectuals were concerned, 
was Cvijić’s insistence that the adjective Bulgar was widely used in the Bal-
kans simply with the meaning “country bumpkin [rustaud ]” and “before 
the establishment of the Exarchate and the establishment of present-day 
Bulgaria, the word Bulgar did not signify anything other than this pejorative 
sense [used by] the Greek people and Turkish functionaries.”77 Therefore, 
the travelers in the Balkans saw Bulgarians everywhere because this was 
what their Greek and Turkish guides called the peasant populations of the 
Balkans. What worried the Bulgarian establishment more than Cvijić’s pub-
lications was his target audience (European scholars) and how they evalu-
ated his writings (with respect). This anxiety was palpable in a pamphlet 
written by Anastas Ishirkov as a response to Cvijić: “Had Mr. Cvijić pub-
lished his study on Balkan questions in no language other than Serbian, I 
certainly would not spend my time on the question of the name Bulgar [la 
question du nom de Bulgare], since, for the Serbs, this question is not a sci-
entific question, but a question of nationalist politics.” This, alas, was not 
the case; Mr. Cvijić had targeted “the educated people of the whole world” 
by writing in French, and “since the readers of this new book on Balkan 
questions are not familiar with the literature on the Balkans,” they might 
be misled by the author, especially because he was “well known in scholarly 
circles as a geographer and a geologist.”78
Ishirkov’s worries were not baseless. The manuscript map of Cvijić’s La 
Peninsule Balkanique on the geographical distribution of “races” in the Bal-
kan Peninsula, published in 1918, turned out to be arguably the most influ-
ential of the time, demonstrated by the fact that it served as a blueprint for 
marking national boundaries during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, 
much as Kiepert’s map had been used at the Berlin Congress.79 Cvijić’s rise 
to such prominence among geographers of the Balkan Peninsula represented 
a clear shift within three decades in western perceptions about the ethnic 
make-up of the region and underscored a major defeat for the Bulgarian side 
in the fight for supremacy in Macedonia.80
77. Cvijić, Questions Balkaniques, 22, cited in Ishirkov, Nom de Bulgare, 47.
78. Ishirkov, Nom de Bulgare, 5.
79. A critical analysis of the way the map served the U.S. delegation at the conference 
can be found in Jeremy Crampton, “The Cartographic Calculation of Space: Race Mapping 
and the Balkans at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919,” Social & Cultural Geography 7, 
no. 5 (October 2006): 731–52.
80. The attempts to distance Bulgaria from Germany in the hopes of influencing U.S. 
public opinion in favor of Bulgaria at the end of World War I did not really pay off. Pamphlets 
published in English emphasized the role played by U.S. missionaries in the liberation struggle 
of the Bulgarian people, the commitment of Bulgarian people to democracy, and, predictably, 
the majority of Bulgarians in regions claimed by Bulgaria. See, for instance, Dimitur Mishew 
[Dimitar Mishev], America and Bulgaria and Their Moral Bonds (Bern, 1918); Radoslav Andrea 
Tsanoff [Tsanov], “Bulgaria’s Case,” Journal of Race Development 8, no. 3 (1918): 296–317.
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Ottoman Maps, or Their Conspicuous Absence
What was the Ottoman response to this cartographic activity? Did they 
answer back with their own ethnographic maps? The answer is an emphatic 
no, but before concluding that the Ottomans were woefully behind in the 
game of ethnographic cartography (which is true), it is useful to consider, in 
broad strokes, the developments that Ottoman cartography and Ottoman 
imagery of their world went through after the eighteenth century. Benja-
min Fortna, in The Imperial Classroom, his book on public education in 
the Hamidian era (1877–1908), argues that the translation of European 
works of cartography by military officials for use in schools in the nine-
teenth century represented a continuity with earlier Ottoman traditions of 
state patronage of cartography and “of incorporating the cartographic de-
velopments of other lands.”81 This, I think, is a position that needs to be 
qualified. Fortna samples school maps and atlases used in the 1890s, which 
were typically organized by continents and did not have political boundaries 
or topographical detail except for the area in focus (e.g., Asia, Europe). He 
argues that this practice was, again, due to the influence of European map-
makers, for whom “the continental approach ma[de] more sense,” as op-
posed to a more global outlook. According to Fortna, the explanation had 
three parts: “geographical, political, and philosophical.” Geographically, it 
served the “[artificial] claim [of Europe] to be a continent,” and politically it 
was influenced by the interests of the colonial powers in overseas territories. 
Finally, “the rational, positivist mode of thinking so prominent in Europe in 
the nineteenth century . . . was bent on dividing up the things of the world, 
the better to analyze them.”82 While Fortna is right in all three counts, none 
of this actually implies that there was a general trend in Europe in the nine-
teenth century that favored the production and export of continental maps. 
In fact, cartographic production in Europe was prolific and covered a wide 
range and scale of representation in the late nineteenth century.83 Maps of 
the globe were certainly represented among these in significant numbers, 
and it was precisely this Eurocentrism, the desire to project the power of 
Europe, and the belief in the superiority of rational knowledge that made 
“Great Globes” a popular item. This was the intended effect of the global 
(usually Mercatorial) maps in historical atlases and of the public display 
of outsized globes.84 Elisée Reclus, anarchist and arguably the most anti-
establishment of the French geographical establishment of the late nineteenth 
81. Benjamin Fortna, The Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the 
Late Ottoman Empire (Oxford, 2002), 173.
82. Ibid., 182–83.
83. Cf. Black, Maps and History, esp. 51–101.
84. For a critical approach to images of the globe from the Renaissance to the recent past, 
see Denis Cosgrove, “Contested Global Visions: One-World, Whole Earth, and the Apollo 
Space Photographs,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84, no. 2: 270–94.
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century, “proposed that an enormous terrestrial globe be displayed at the 
Paris Exposition Universelle in 1900.”85
A more likely explanation for “truncated” images of Ottoman domains 
was that these maps were not inspired by but were exclusively based on 
translations of maps produced in Europe, where representing the Otto-
man Empire in separate sheets and continents had been the norm since 
the eighteenth century, as we have already seen. While it is true that there 
was some continuity in the European influence on Ottoman cartography 
since the early modern era, a distinct divergence occurred in the eighteenth 
century. The exchange of comparable technical knowledge was no longer 
the case after this time, and the Ottoman world gradually became bereft 
of advanced cartographic techniques. It is difficult to explain the origins 
of this divergence in the eighteenth century, but by the nineteenth century, 
as the Ottomans endeavored to adopt these techniques, they were already in 
the position of “translating” rather than incorporating, or even imitating. 
One possible reason for this has to do with the way “governmentality” was 
the impetus behind technical innovation in Europe, espousing ever more 
sophisticated methods of knowing the land to strengthen the control of the 
central state over territory and human and physical resources in the eigh-
teenth century, exactly when the Ottoman state was delegating more con-
trol over administrative practice to its provincial lords. For the Ottomans, 
incorporating geographical knowledge into local administration became a 
concern and a possibility only in the late nineteenth century.86 Even then, 
the main motivation for expanding cartographic knowledge continued 
to be the military, rather than provincial administration.87 In fact, Otto-
man cartographers were trained exclusively by the military, by the Fifth 
Department of Science of the General Staff (Erkân-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye 
Dairesi Beşinci Fen Şubesi), to be precise.
The Fifth Department decided to start a geodetic survey of the Protected 
Imperial Domains in 1896.88 Two French engineers, M. M. Defarges and 
Barisain, were commissioned with the task and accorded military rank as 
85. Morag Bell, Robin Butlin, and Michael Heffernan, eds. Geography and Imperialism, 
1820–1940 (Manchester, 1995), 5, cited in Black, Maps and History, 63.
86. Ensuring the accuracy of the changing and newly established borders with Bulgaria, 
Russia, and Greece and their protection seems to have been the primary motive in the quest 
for detailed topographic knowledge; BOA, BEO 1011/75822, September 9, 1897; BEO 
1164/87254, July 25, 1898; BEO 1501/112536, June 12, 1900.
87. This is not to suggest that the Ottomans did not appreciate the usefulness of graphic 
or cartographic representations of statistical data at the service of imperial administration. 
The first significant example of these novel methods of visual representation applied to 
statistical data by an Ottoman official was the 1895 Ottoman Social Survey compiled by 
Mehmet Behiç; for more details about this survey see Fatma Müge Göçek and Şükrü Hanioğlu, 
“Western Knowledge, Imperial Control and the Use of Statistics in the Ottoman Empire,” 
CRSO Working Paper no. 500, Ann Arbor, 1993.
88. BOA, BEO 783/58682, May 20, 1896.
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colonel and lieutenant colonel, respectively.89 The survey started in Anato-
lia, in Eskişehir, but it was plagued with financial difficulties from the start. 
The salaries of the French engineers and other commission members were in 
arrears, and the 200,000 guruş estimated to cover the first stage of opera-
tions turned out to be an impossible amount to raise.90 When the Finance 
Ministry refused to foot the bill, the officials sought to obtain the funds from 
the military budget, which also failed. Finally, the military suggested that the 
sum be taken from the Salonika provincial budget.91 We do not know the 
response of the officials in Salonika, but in all likelihood, the money failed 
to materialize because the project was all but abandoned by 1899. When the 
Royal Geographic Society of London requested a copy of the resulting map, 
they were told that it was “incomplete” at the moment.92 There is no indica-
tion that it ever existed. The general staff published a map of Rumeli that 
year, which seems to have been drawn on the basis of another topographic 
map. The title did not mention an author, but it indicated that it had been 
“edited and drawn” by the Fifth Department (of Science). The prime merid-
ian of the map was noted as Paris, which strongly suggests French origins.93
In 1909, a separate map commission was established under the general 
staff’s Fourth Department, which was presumably to take on the task of 
surveying the empire. An army colonel was sent to Paris to purchase the nec-
essary equipment. It is hard to tell how far this project went, but even after 
the Balkan Wars, the maps used by the Ottoman military were translations 
of European maps—ironically, it is not clear how reliable these maps could 
be, given the Ottomans’ determination to prevent foreigners from carrying 
out topographic surveys in the empire or around its borders.94
Throughout the late nineteenth century, Ottoman officials continued to 
subscribe to European geographical publications, import and translate maps 
produced by European geographers (including Kiepert), and use them in 
classrooms of public schools as well as the army college.95 What they lacked 
in technique, the Hamidian bureaucracy tried to make up with practical 
ingenuity. Benjamin Fortna demonstrates that Ottoman officials, growing 
89. Their exact names may be different; my guess is based on the Ottoman spelling as 
“Döfarj” and “Barazin,” and I was not able to locate these two individuals in French sources. 
The timely payment of their monthly salaries seems to have been a continuous source of trouble; 
BOA, BEO 997/74754, August 24, 1897; BEO 1139/85420, June 10, 1898. M. Barisain was 
also later promoted to the rank of colonel; BOA, I.TAL 151/1316, October 10, 1898.
90. BOA, BEO 993/74404, August 8, 1897; BEO, 1011/75822, September 22, 1897.
91. BOA, BEO 1232/92377, November 27, 1898.
92. BOA, BEO 1348/101064, July 31, 1899; BEO 1355/101582, August 30, 1899.
93. Rumeli-i Şâhâne Haritası, 1899, scale 1: 310,000 km (from the personal collection of 
Heath Lowry; many thanks to Prof. Lowry for sharing this map with me).
94. See, for instance, the reaction to the discovery that some Russian cartographers 
were in the process of taking geodetic measurements around the Euphrates River; BOA, I.DH 
881/70280, April 11, 1883.
95. BOA, BEO 9/606, May 24, 1892; BEO 1662/124647, May 5, 1901; BEO 1710/
128181, August 27, 1901.
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sensitive about the pedagogical limitations of maps displaying the Otto-
man realms in series of separate sheets, commissioned different maps that 
displayed the entire territories of the empire on one unbroken sheet. He 
notes that this was the “most striking change to be observed in Hamid-
ian cartography.”96 Not surprisingly, these maps colored regions that had 
ceased to be “Ottoman,” or were only nominally so, with the same colors 
assigned to the Ottoman Empire.97 Commissioning maps from Europe that 
would supposedly project Ottoman grandeur and educate young Ottoman 
minds could lead to certain unforeseen “accidents,” such as the case when 
the global maps ordered for use in public schools turned out to carry the 
legend “Armenia” in eastern Anatolia, causing embarrassment for the Edu-
cation Department, which was forced to pull the maps out of circulation.98 
Even as late as 1914, a private publishing house in Istanbul used Peucker’s 
1903 map as the base map for one showing “the Borders of the Balkans af-
ter the Balkan War.” In the direct translation of place names into Ottoman 
Turkish, the map introduced a term that would never have been used by the 
Ottomans to refer to Rumeli: “Avrupa-i Osmani,” or “Ottoman Europe,” 
which was actually an inversion of “European Turkey.” Ironically, at this 
instance, “Avrupa-i Osmani” was limited to eastern Thrace, only a tiny por-
tion of what Rumeli had been.99
As for ethnographic maps, they were not part of the vocabulary of Otto-
man statecraft. The Ottomans did count and classify the population accord-
ing to state-defined criteria, which had the unintended result of reinforcing 
ethnic differences (see chapter 4), but they were not interested in picturing 
those numbers on maps as a countermeasure to the ones circulating in Europe 
and the Balkans. They did not make a case for territoriality through ethnic 
graphics because ethnic unity had never defined the boundaries of the Ot-
toman realm; on the contrary, just like any other imperial structure, the Ot-
tomans had a lot to fear from an organization of their territory according to 
administrative divisions favoring ethnic homogeneity. Interestingly enough, 
the Hamidian bureaucracy, which attentively watched all publishing activity 
in Europe for the handiwork of “evil-doers” and did its best to prevent the 
circulation of “harmful” material, was surprisingly reticent when it came to 
ethnographic maps. The bureaucracy was, however, much more sensitive 
to another kind of map: maps that distorted the boundaries of the well-
protected domains or inscribed “inappropriate” terms such as “Armenia” 
96. Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 187.
97. Ibid., 190. Note that the Ottomans were not the only ones suffering from delusional 
cartography; we only need to look at French maps that annex Alsace-Loraine when it was 
definitely not part of France; Black, Maps and History, 57.
98. BOA, BEO 397/ 29760, May 3, 1894.
99. BOA, HRT 159, 1914.
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over parts of them.100 These were to be kept from view, or better yet, eradi-
cated. After all, Abdülhamid II did not have any desire to transform the 
empire into a nation-state; that would be the agenda of the Young Turks.
The Logic of Geography and Natural Borders
Before we move on to a discussion of the various criteria in determin-
ing “race” among the inhabitants of the Balkans, it is instructive to first 
consider the issue of geographical boundaries because it was often evoked 
to substantiate the link between the land and the people, an important ele-
ment of territoriality. The discipline of geography had already established in 
the eighteenth century that the surface of Earth could be observed to have 
certain zones, regions, and subregions based on a variety of physical criteria 
such as climate, latitude, and topographical characteristics and the corre-
lation of these criteria, which then could also be linked with the cultural 
practices or physical traits of the populations indigenous to these regions. 
There was an obvious logic to this kind of geographical organization; in 
other words, geography had a purpose. Some geographers argued, however, 
that such logic was entirely lacking in Ottoman Europe, whose geography 
seemed to be conspiring against logic and order. Élisée Reclus, the French 
anarchist geographer, had strong opinions on this issue:
Their [travelers and geographers] task was by no means an easy one, for the 
mountain masses and mountain chains of the peninsula [Haemus or Balkan] 
do not constitute a regular, well-defined system. There is no central range, with 
spurs running out on both sides, and gradually decreasing in height as they ap-
proach the plains. Nor is the center of the peninsula its most elevated portion, 
for the culminating summits are dispersed over the country apparently without 
order. The mountain ranges run in all directions of the compass, and we can only 
say, in a general way, that those of Western Turkey run parallel with the Adriatic 
and Ionian coasts, whilst those in the east meet the coasts of the Black Sea and 
the Aegean at right angles. The relief of the soil and the water-sheds make it 
appear almost as if Turkey turned her back upon continental Europe. Its high-
est mountains, its most extensive table-lands, and its most inaccessible forests 
lie towards the west and the north-west, as if they were intended to cut it off 
from the shores of the Adriatic and the plains of Hungary, whilst all its rivers, 
whether they run to the north, east, or south, finally find their way into the Black 
Sea or the Aegean, whose shores face those of Asia.101
100. These maps were confiscated at customs and post offices; BOA, BEO 397/ 29760, 
May 6, 1894; BEO 430/32238, July 4, 1894; BEO 471/35273, September 19, 1899.
101. Elisée Reclus, The Earth and Its Inhabitants, Vol. 1, Greece, Turkey in Europe, 
Rumania, Servia, Montenegro, Italy, Spain and Portugal, edited by Ernst G. Ravenstein (New 
York, 1882), 89. (Emphasis added.)
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The Balkan Peninsula, as Reclus saw it, was an impossibly complex, un-
friendly terrain that lacked normal contours that might give it some order. 
More interestingly, the geography of (European) Turkey was so strange that 
one might even wonder if it was in Europe at all: Turkey had physically 
“turned its back” on Europe, while the Adriatic and Hungary had embraced 
it with their pleasant shores and wide open plains. But there was more, the 
chaotic geography accompanied (or fostered, we are invited to think) chaos 
of a different order, one that had yet to be sorted out:
This irregularity in the distribution of the mountains has its analogue in the 
distribution of the various races which inhabit the peninsula. The invaders or 
peaceful colonists, whether they came across the straits from Asia Minor, or 
along the valley of the Danube from Scythia, soon found themselves scattered in 
numerous valleys, or stopped by amphitheatres having no outlet. They failed to 
find their way in this labyrinth of mountains, and members of the most diverse 
races settled down in proximity to each other, and frequently came into conflict. 
The most numerous, the most warlike, or the most industrious races gradually 
extended their power at the expense of their neighbours; and the latter, defeated 
in the struggle for existence, have been scattered into innumerable fragments, 
between which there is no longer any cohesion. Hungary has a homogenous 
population, if we compare it with that of Turkey; for in the latter country there 
are districts where eight or ten different nationalities live side by side within a 
radius of a few miles.102
Clearly, the anomalous geography was instrumental in creating yet an-
other anomaly with regard to the distribution of the inhabitants. Reclus 
showed his readers, on the one hand, how physical elements of geography 
could determine the moral character of the people tied to the land, and on 
the other, he warned about the difficult consequences that might arise when 
geography was simply not a cooperative partner. In this case, it had helped 
the warlike peoples to dominate the land, leaving the others to occupy small 
scattered pockets. Hungary was, again, the contrasting example. Compared 
to Turkey, it emerged as a country with a homogenous population that had 
not blocked itself from the continent of Europe and presumably its civiliz-
ing influence; Turkey was a harder (if not impossible) case for redemption.
It is interesting to note that Reclus’s characterization of Turkey as a place 
that was not really European, even though it was in Europe, and his use 
of Hungary as a contrasting example are highly reminiscent of the process 
Larry Wolff so eloquently describes in The Invention of Eastern Europe. 
This is a process that took place in the eighteenth century, when the eastern 
borders of Europe were still not fixed and there was room for ambiguity, 
intellectual and geographical, in these vaguely defined lands that did not 
102.  Ibid.
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quite belong to Asia but were certainly not within Europe either. The need 
to define what we might call a zone of transition between the Orient and 
the Occident inspired an intellectual project that invented the idea of East-
ern Europe while defining Europe itself. Wolff notes that the “paradox of 
‘Turqie d’Europe,’ in Europe yet of the Orient, was essential to the emerg-
ing idea of Eastern Europe.”103 As the philosophes were articulating this 
process, Hungary went from being classified as Asiatic and associated with 
Bulgaria and Wallachia to being that liminal area between the Orient and 
the Occident. Reclus’s remarks are an encapsulation of this process, which 
was complete by the end of the eighteenth century. As Sir Charles Eliot 
summed up the general feeling about Turkish presence in Europe at the end 
of the nineteenth century, “The Turks are an Asiatic people who have settled 
but not taken root in our continent, and their presence there is a question 
which may be treated by itself and quite independently of their existence in 
Anatolia and elsewhere.”104 The Englishman had not a hint of irony in call-
ing Europe “our continent.”
Even more than identifying continental borders, identifying borders of a 
different kind preoccupied the geographers as well as laypeople touring the 
Balkans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and frustrated 
them with their absence—namely, “natural borders” that should replace the 
current irrational ones. At the time, natural borders were almost exclusively 
associated with national territory and were mentioned often in notes accom-
panying ethnographic maps of Macedonia. The Carte Ethnocratique des Pays 
Hellèniques, Slaves, Albanais, et Roumains, dated 1878 and attributed to 
Kiepert, for instance, came with a note that claimed that it used a new method, 
which separated “South-Eastern Europe according to divisions or groups of 
race, and, to the possible extent, natural frontiers, historical requirements, 
traditional affinities, and to assign to each division or group a single color. 
This color would not claim rigidly that the constituent parts of each section 
are occupied exclusively by a single race, it would only indicate the race that 
would be preponderant.”105 (This happened to be the Greeks in this case.)
Even though there was nothing natural about the way the population of 
a certain area was identified, measured, and captured in color on a map 
depending on the “scientific criteria” applied by the author, the assumption 
was that natural boundaries did exist. This basic assumption was not chal-
lenged by the fact that the social reality rarely fit within the confines of those 
natural boundaries. The real challenge was turning those natural boundaries 
into actual political ones. It was only “natural” that a map be drawn for 
better communicating those demarcation lines.
103. Wolff, Invention of Eastern Europe, 165.
104. Sir Charles Eliot, Turkey in Europe (New York, 1907), 1–2.
105. Henri Kiepert, Notice Explicative sur la Carte Ethnogratique des pays Helleniques, 
Slaves, Albanais et Roumains (Berlin, 1878), 5. (Emphasis added.)
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Consider this description by H. N. Brailsford, British journalist and mem-
ber of the Relief Mission that arrived to assist the survivors of the 1903 
Uprising: “Macedonia lies confounded within three vilayets (i.e., provinces), 
which correspond to no natural division either racial or geographical. . . . 
The result is that no race attains a predominance, and no province acquires 
a national character. The natural arrangement would have been to place 
Greeks, Servians, and Albanians in compartments of their own, leaving 
the Bulgarians to occupy the center and the East.”106 How could we de-
termine “natural” divisions and restore order given the current situation 
of unnatural mixing? Obviously, an intervention by an expert was needed, 
and in fact, in the obligatory ethnographic map that Brailsford appended to 
his book, Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future, he performed this neces-
sary task. What he called “Bulgarians” occupied the center and east of the 
peninsula, whereas Chalkidiki was marked as Greek territory. Other ethnic 
groups recognized by the author were assigned symbols rather than colors. 
Not counting the random disturbances on the map, it more or less con-
formed to what Brailsford argued was the “natural” arrangement of races.
Natural frontiers or, more precisely, the lack thereof, in Ottoman Mace-
donia was an important theme in an earlier publication written in response 
to the British Blue Book of 1889. Its anonymous author criticized the British 
consul in Salonika in his failure to acknowledge their existence:
Mr. Blunt [the consul] ought to have admitted that the administrative division of 
Turkey is not scientific, that is to say, that is has not as a basis natural boundar-
ies, nor is it stable, and at the same time to have recorded one at least of the many 
arbitrary changes in the boundaries, such as that of the department of Velisso, 
which eight years ago did not belong to the Vilayet of Salonica, and was annexed 
to it later on upon the demand of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, in 
order to fictitiously strengthen the Bulgarian element in the vilayet of Salonica, 
which would in consequence thus acquire different geographical boundaries and 
another ethnological character.
The author then presented an alternative, more “scientific” approach to the 
boundary problem:
I confine myself to the following remarks 1) that it is both just and practicable 
to give to these three Macedonian vilayets such geographical boundaries as to 
be separated from each other by lines, parallel to the Macedonian coast on the 
Aegean 2) that the delimitation of the geographical boundaries of the vilayet of 
Salonica on such a scientific basis would include about as much Christian popu-
lation as Mr. Blunt records in treating of the present vilayet of Macedonia 3) 
106. Brailsford, Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future, 7. (Emphasis added.)
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that the principal and most heroic method for the attainment of tranquility in 
Macedonia, in which Mr. Blunt is interested, and, moreover, for the removal of 
the intricacies of the Macedonian question, for which Lord Salisbury is justly 
concerned, would be the scientific administrative division of Macedonia upon 
the basis of its natural boundaries.107
It is difficult to imagine how and why “parallel lines” would be any more 
“natural” than the existing boundaries of the Macedonian provinces.108 
A glance at a topographic map of Macedonia makes us realize that there 
are no unyielding mountain chains, unsurpassable rivers, and impossibly 
isolated plains in the geography. Assuming geographical formations would 
determine the demarcation lines, or natural boundaries, it is extremely dif-
ficult to argue in favor of one division as opposed to the other. But topog-
raphy was not even the issue here; these natural boundaries amounted in 
effect to what we might today call “ethnic gerrymandering.” It was a way of 
imagining the geo-body of a nation on paper, sterilized and not obfuscated 
by blurry visions of ethnic ambiguity.
As unconvincing as it may seem, this was a project worth pursuing by 
the interested parties, as hindsight tells us—and not because they would 
finally settle on a unanimously agreed “natural” division. Obviously, the 
conflicting contours of natural boundaries created by European observers 
of the geographical and ethnic chaos that was Ottoman Macedonia was 
not the simple outcome of the extreme difficulty of the puzzle they were 
trying to solve or of the lack of reliable demographic data. The conflict was 
in the very premises that these projections of boundaries were built on. We 
have already noted the importance of the underlying ideological framework 
that essentially saw the construct of “Turkey in Europe” as a freakish geo-
graphical accident and proposed to replace it with a more rational spatial 
arrangement. We have also noted the primacy of the notion that nation-
states were the only legitimate and meaningful form of human political or-
ganization. It is not a surprise that the logical conclusion emerging from the 
fusion of these two theses would be the projection of a new geographical 
order based on national boundaries, also conceived as one and the same as 
natural boundaries.
There were, however, two immense and interrelated problems with this 
position. The first and obvious one is the disagreement about who belonged 
in the nation, and by implication in its territory. The second is the less visible 
but no less significant issue of who was to define the shape and contents of 
the natural boundaries and how. We should not ignore the fact that what 
107. The English Blue Book Regarding Macedonia, Comments by A.K. (Athens 1891), 7. 
(Blue Book No. 3 1889, Turkey, Official Correspondence on Eastern Affairs.)
108. It is interesting to note that the boundaries of counties (nomoi) in contemporary 
Greek Macedonia are informed by the boundaries of Ottoman-era sancaks.
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constituted natural borders was hardly something that the entire political 
and intellectual establishment of Europe could agree on, as the two world 
wars have made painfully clear. Natural borders, or the assumption that the 
territorial divisions between states are justified based on their conforming 
to certain geophysical markers such as rivers or mountains, was current 
in the nineteenth century.109 This was an idea that can be traced back to 
the “natural frontiers” doctrine of seventeenth-century France, which was 
formulated by Richelieu and remained a staple of French history textbooks 
until quite recently.110
An important intervention to this notion came from Friedrich Ratzel in 
the late nineteenth century.111 In Ratzel’s treatment, the “natural” element 
of the relationship between states and territory was not to be found in the 
contours of rivers or mountains. Instead, he argued, it was the nation, an 
organic entity, that determined the boundaries of the state and not the other 
way around.112 He also introduced the concept of Lebensraum, which was 
based on the same idea, that the nation, the state, and the land were organi-
cally connected and that the borders of the state would change depending 
on the physical needs of the growing state. Geographical constraints and 
the need to overcome them were also determinants of culture: “A state, for 
example, was simply the result of a particular people’s adaptation to an 
environment. The form that a state or an entire culture took was therefore 
shaped by the relationship to Lebensraum and the struggle for it.”113 Ratzel 
understood the struggle for Lebensraum to be driven by Darwinian princi-
ples. It is well known how these specific elements of his work were embraced 
first by German conservatives and later by the Nazis as the justification for 
territorial expansion. There was also something quite appealing in his the-
ory for those who saw the nation as a linguistically homogeneous entity—a 
109. The assumption that natural borders do indeed exist continues to inform research in 
social science, popular culture, and journalistic approaches to border conflicts. For a critique 
of this pervasive myth, see, Juliet J. Fall, “Artificial States? On the Enduring Myth of Natural 
Borders,” Political Geography 29, no. 3 (2010): 140–47.
110. Daniel Nordman argues that the conceptualization of a national border emerged 
in France even earlier than Richelieu’s time and that we need to distinguish between the 
fluctuation of actual geographical borders and the concept of borders as clear and precise 
demarcation lines; “From the Boundaries of the State to National Borders,” in Rethinking 
France: Les Lieux de Mémoire, Vol. 1, The State, edited by Pierre Nora, translated by Mary 
Trouille (Chicago, 2001), 105–32. Cf. Peter Sahlins, “Natural Frontiers Revisited: France’s 
Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century,” American Historical Review 95, no. 5 (1990): 
1423–51. The meanings of the terms frontière and limites overlapped in the nineteenth century; 
see Febvre, “Frontière,” 213.
111. For a critique of Ratzel and the idea of natural borders, see Febvre, Geographical 
Introduction to History, 296–315. Gaston Zeller was an even more vocal critique of the notion; 
Sahlins, “Natural Frontiers Revisited.”
112. Robert Kaiser, “Geography,” in The Encyclopedia of Nationalism, edited by 
Alexander Motyl, 315–33 (San Diego, 2000).
113. Woodruff D. Smith, “Friedrich Ratzel and the Origins of Lebensraum,” German 
Studies Review 3, no. 1 (1980), 53.
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dominant notion in the early part of the nineteenth century—as opposed 
to one determined by common culture, interests, and goals. This distinc-
tion also roughly corresponded to the changing conceptions of nationhood 
and territory in France and Germany; the French had largely abandoned 
the principle of linguistic unity, whereas it was still paramount for the Ger-
mans.114 The shifting criteria for what constituted the nation and its natural 
borders obviously correlated with the political interests of those making the 
observation, which was also true for the ethnographers trying to establish 
those boundaries in the Balkans. It is important to note that the double stan-
dards of their methods, as well as the idea that territorial expansion could be 
necessary (and justified) to ensure the coherence of the national and spatial 
units, informed the way Balkan national elites drew their own versions of 
natural borders on map.
How to Diagnose Different Races
Today there is more or less a consensus that nationalities are social con-
structs, with much of the academic debate and disagreement centering on 
the how and when of that construction process; in the nineteenth century the 
self-evident issue was that nationalities were objectively identifiable catego-
ries, with the academic differences stemming from alternative methodologies 
of “diagnosis.” Would it be language? Religion? Historical consciousness? 
All these elements and more figured in the ways European ethnographers 
defined the criteria for sorting out the population of Macedonia into “ra-
cial” groups. Some candidly noted that what worked in civilized parts of the 
continent was sadly irrelevant in these lands, which had essentially been cut 
off from their enlightened distant neighbors and forced to sustain an anoma-
lous intermingling of races. It is interesting to note that while this degree of 
intermingling reportedly made the ethnographer’s task impossible, everyone 
except for the inhabitants of Macedonia seemed to be able to assign a race/
nationality to each community—some even assigned nationalities to dogs.115 
Although the terms race and nationality were often confounded, race as we 
have already noted, was akin to what we might call ethnicity today, and it 
was the term more commonly used to refer to the population of Macedonia; 
however, nationality also appeared in various texts, especially after the turn 
of the twentieth century.
The beliefs in the intrinsic character of national identity and in the na-
tion as the ultimate evolutionary stage of social organization were perva-
sive in late-nineteenth-century Europe. Nationality was conceived as a code 
inscribed on every human community, and whether they were “evolved” 
114. Nordman, “From the Boundaries of the State,” 127.
115. Mary Adelaide Walker, Through Macedonia to the Albanian Lakes (London, 1864).
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enough to be conscious of it or not, it could be identified and decoded 
through the authoritative knowledge at the disposal of the trained observer. 
This also implied that it was possible, at least in principle, to access and 
restore the original code no matter what had been written over it through ac-
culturation, submission, or corruption.116 Thus, communities could be “re-
stored” and the original code “retrieved.” For instance, M. E. Picot, in Les 
Roumains de la Macédoine, in which he traced back a common genealogy 
for the Koutzo-Vlachs or Tzinzars of Macedonia and the Roumanians of the 
Carpathian Mountains, lamented that a good part of the Koutzo-Vlachs had 
been Hellenized but pointed out that it was not clear in “what proportion” 
they were Hellenized and whether this “Hellenization was final,”117 thus 
invoking a whole world of opportunities for the redemption of “Hellenized 
Vlach” peasants as “Roumanians.” In similar vein, a note accompanying 
the Tableau Ethnocratique could foresee a time when the layers obstruct-
ing the inner and intact consciousness of the “Musulmans” would be lifted 
to reveal the shining core of their original nationality because they were 
not racially Turks; they were renegades: “When Christian rule prevails in 
the Orient, when there are no longer masters and slaves[,] . . . the Muslim 
renegades no longer having an interest in separating themselves from their 
own stock [congénères],118 the feeling of race will take over among them its 
natural force.”119
Ethnographers and geographers working in European Turkey might have 
different criteria for determining nationality, but they were united in their 
attachment to the ideas that nations were the only legitimate and viable form 
of collective identity and that the nation-state was the manifest destiny of 
any meaningful communal organization. In addition, they were not immune 
to the idea, dominant in the tomes of the period’s natural history, that ra-
cial groups were marked by innate characteristics that not only made them 
distinct from each other but also allowed for their ranking in a hierarchy. 
Consider, for instance, the observations of Auguste Viquesnel, companion 
to the famous explorer and geographer Amie Boué during his travels in 
European Turkey. Viquesnel’s main thesis in his 1868 book was that the 
borders of Europe ended at Dnieper based on racial categorization. In his 
introduction to the book, Henry Martin asserted that Viquesnel had  studied 
“these people” with the “same scientific independence and the same in-
vestigation procedures that he used for the study of geological layers or of 
116. This principle also informed policies in Europe much later in the twentieth century, 
such as the “re-Slovakization” of self-identifying Magyars in Slovakia after World War II, the 
assimilation of Macedonians into Bulgarians, the attempt to “restore” Turks in Bulgaria to 
their Bulgarian origins, and the redefinition of Kurds as “mountain Turks” in Turkey in 1980s.
117. M. E. Picot, Les Roumaines de la Macédoine (Paris, 1875), 41.
118. Congénères: “of the same genus.”
119. K. Paparrigopoulos, note in Heinrich Kiepert, Tableau Ethnocratique des pays du 
sud-est de l’Europe (Berlin, 1878).
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 hydrographical basins.” He summarized the findings of the scientist’s “long 
and rigorous research”:
the Aryan and the Touranian families tend to express their respective spirits in 
two completely different types of societies. The principle of individuality and 
moral and political liberty dominates in the Aryan race. . . . In the Touranians, 
by contrast . . . people do not have but a weak sentiment of personal liberty. . . . 
These people [Touranians] who do not have a feeling of personal liberty have 
an instinct for liberty of movement which results in a taste for nomadic life. 
They only attach themselves to the land despite themselves and leave whenever 
they can. The Aryan, by contrast, loves the land and [is] wedded to it, so to say. 
It is the agricultural race par excellence and the spirit of ownership allies itself 
closely with the spirit of liberty with them whereas the spirit of community and 
that of patriarchal authority, easily degenerating into autocracy, dominates the 
Touranians.120
Extreme as it may seem, ethnographic studies on the distinct qualities of 
the Touranian and Aryan races, demonstrating the superiority of the lat-
ter, were quite common and had been received as well-respected works of 
science since the eighteenth century, and they were inextricably linked to 
the post-Enlightenment definition of Europe through the denigration of the 
Oriental. The analytical categories used to rank different races were not 
exclusively based on those relating to political organization such as the ca-
pacity for settled life, complex political organization, and love of liberty. 
They also included costume, language, religious practices, and superstitious 
beliefs. Nevertheless, even these categories could then be checked to deter-
mine a given race’s potential for evolution, culminating in the nation form. 
The inferiority of the “Touranian” race, which included Turks, Tartars, 
Mongolians, Huns, and Bulgars, had not prevented them from penetrating 
into Europe during darker times, which made their expulsion from where 
they did not belong all the more urgent. Historical atlases published in the 
mid-nineteenth century tinted the “tribes of particular races” with differ-
ent colors to demonstrate their movements “from their former localities to 
their present possessions.”121 This practical graphic tool also had the effect 
of giving visual emphasis to the alienness of certain races in Europe. In his 
Encyclopédie article on the Tartars, Louis de Jaucourt wrote, “Goths, who 
conquered the Roman Empire brought monarchy and liberty, the Tartars, 
wherever they conquered, brought only servitude and despotism [It was] 
120. Henry Martin, introduction to Auguste Viquesnel, Voyage dans la Turquie d’Europe 
(Paris, 1868), xix–xx.
121. Edward Gover, Historic Geographical Atlas of the Middle and Modern Ages 
(London, 1853), cited in Black, Maps and History, 79.
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humiliating for human nature that these barbaric peoples should have sub-
jugated almost all of our hemisphere.”122
The consensus on the inferiority of the Touranian race was not some-
thing that served only to justify the necessity of throwing the Turks out of 
Europe.123 Despite the good press they received in Europe from liberal poli-
ticians, journalists, and, apparently, ethnographers, the Bulgarians found 
themselves in a disadvantaged “racial” position because of their ancestry. 
In addition to all the positive stereotypes depicting Bulgarians as a peace-
ful, agrarian, hard-working folk, there were a few other, less flattering ones 
painting them as slow (both mentally and physically), uncouth, and unin-
spired. Among those peddling the latter stereotypes was G. F. Abbot, Cam-
bridge ethnographer, and author of several works on Macedonian folklore 
published by the same university.124 The following is a typical excerpt from 
his books; here he is recording a participant-observation in Petritch (village 
in the province of Serres) of the villagers dancing at the festival of the pan-
ageia (festival commemorating the Dormition of the Mother of God):
Notwithstanding this weight of wool and metal, they danced with great persever-
ance and an air of truly Christian resignation. Bagpipes—the favorite instrument 
of the Bulgarian—supplied the local equivalent for music. Round this squealing 
band a wide circle footed it slowly and exceedingly stupidly. . . . The dance con-
sisted of a one step forward, one backward, and one to the side, without any 
variation whatsoever. A melancholy refrain Sospita Yanno, Sospita Yanno [sic], 
drawled out in sleepy and sleep-begetting tones, accompanied the sad measure.125
Not surprisingly, the non-Aryan roots of the Bulgars were a favorite topic 
of authors who wanted to give credence to Greek claims in the Balkan Penin-
sula. Eduard Driault, journalist, wrote effusively of the Greeks at the dawn 
of the Balkan Wars, “The Greeks know that they have formidable enemies, 
that the Turk is still strong, that the Slavs are more numerous in Macedonia. 
But Hellenism is not a simple question of races; it is an idea, an intellectual 
and moral force, made by the rational support of free men to principles that 
established the grandeur of ancient Greece and that are the essential sources 
122. Louis de Jaucourt, “Tartares,” in Encyclopédie: Ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des 
sciences, des arts et des métiers, nouvelle impression en facsimilé de la première edition de 
1751–1780 (Stuttgart, 1967), Vol. 15: 921–23, cited in Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, 192.
123. The title of an article that Leon Dominian published just as the Turks had finally 
been removed from Europe sums up the general sentiment about the presence of this “race” 
in Europe: “The Turk, Casual of Geography,” Journal of Geography 18, no. 1 (1919): 3–13. 
Dominian’s concluding remarks were written not without a certain degree of relief: “The 
history of this great race of conquerors is drawing to a dishonored close before the gaze of the 
whole civilized world. The casual of Asiatic geography has become the outcast of Europe” (13).
124. George F. Abbott, Macedonian Folklore (Cambridge, 1903). He was also the author 
of Songs of Modern Greece (Cambridge, 1900).
125. Abbot, Tale of a Tour, 174.
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of European civilization.”126 A few pages later, as he was writing about 
Bulgarians, he remarked that they were “not pure Slavs, they seem to be 
Slavicized Tartars.”127 Slavs, who used to be considered only slightly above 
the Tartars in the racial hierarchy, were now counted among the “Caucasian 
and Greco-Roman” types.128 Too bad for Bulgarians that they had to keep 
proving their Slavic credentials, most notably through references to saints 
Cyrill and Methodios.
In another example of attempts to rectify the racial stock of Bulgarians, 
Henry F. Tozer used every single physiognomic proof and detailed the vari-
ous “infusions of blood” they received to dispel the notion that contempo-
rary Bulgarians might in any way be related to the barbarian “Bulgars.” This 
was by no means possible because:
The Bulgarians, who form the largest element in the Christian population from 
Salonica to the confines of Albania, are a very interesting people, and are highly 
spoken of for industry and honesty. They are the most numerous of all the na-
tionalities inhabiting European Turkey, and are estimated between five and six 
millions. There can be no doubt that the original Bulgarians were of Turanian 
descent, and near relations, if not actual descendants, of Attila’s Huns; but after 
they became so intermingled with the Slavonian inhabitants of that country that 
they adopted their language. A large number of them seem to have emigrated 
into Western Macedonia before the ninth century, and there, in all probability, 
received a further infusion of Slavonic blood. The traces of this are very evident 
in the present appearance of the people; for the Tartar type of face, which gener-
ally is remarkable for its permanence, has here for the most part disappeared. 
Notwithstanding this, you will not often find a people with such well-marked 
characteristics. They have straight noses, high cheekbones, flat cheeks, and very 
commonly light eyes; their complexions are frequently almost swarthy from 
exposure to the sun, but the children are generally fair.129
The possible non-Aryan roots of the Bulgarians continued to pose a prob-
lem for advocates of the Slav side in the Struggle for Macedonia well into 
the turn of the century. H. N. Brailsford, for instance, the well-known cham-
pion of Macedonian Slavs, had to come up with the following apologetic 
126. Edouard Driault, La Question d’Orient depuis ses Origines jusqu’a nos Jours (Paris, 
1912), 282.
127. Ibid., 286.
128. This notion inevitably affected general perceptions about the different ethnic groups 
of Ottoman Europe and consequently their entitlement to political sovereignty. Ravenstein, for 
instance, argued in a paper presented to the Statistical Society in London in June 1877 that the 
critical difference that legitimized the Russian Empire and disqualified that of the “Turks” was 
the fact that Russians were “intellectually superior to the races they govern, while the opposite 
is true of the Turkish Empire.” E. G. (Ernest George) Ravenstein, “The Population of Russia 
and Turkey,” Journal of the Statistical Society 40 (September, 1877), 438).
129. Tozer, Researches in the Highlands of Turkey, 176.
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 explanation about their racial purity, distinguishing them, quite unusually, 
from the Bulgarians in this instance:
They [Macedonian Slavs] are not Serbs, for their blood can hardly be purely 
Slavonic. There must be in it some admixture of Bulgarian and other non-Aryan 
stock. . . . On the other hand, they can hardly be Bulgarians, for quite clearly the 
Servian immigrations and conquests must have left much Servian blood in their 
veins, and the admixture of non-Aryan blood can scarcely be so considerable as 
it is in Bulgaria. They are probably very much what they were before either a 
Bulgarian and or a Servian Empire existed—a Slav people derived from rather 
various stocks, who invaded the peninsula at different periods.130
It was not long until the Balkan national elites internalized this discourse 
of racial inferiority and civilizational capacity, and started to produce their 
own versions of natural boundaries based on the same premises. Pamphlets 
and propaganda material were the obvious outlets for this rivalry, but some 
intellectuals went so far as to usurp the very same scientific authority of 
the European cartographers to support their case. The Balkan elites were 
late arrivals in the game of geopolitics through ethnographic maps, but they 
proved to be a quick study. They mastered the principles, the rules, and, 
more important, the shortcomings of this technique of power to project 
their own agendas of ethnic superiority. Even the association of Bulgarians 
with an Asiatic tribe of questionable provenance could be given a positive 
spin at the hands of a talented propagandist. Note, for instance, how An-
astas Ishirkov, after naming this tribe the “Prebulgars,” not to be confused 
with “Bulgars,” embraced their contribution to the early Bulgarian political 
formation: “The nomadic prebulgars, who had cleared a path, sword in 
hand, from central Asia to the Balkans, distinguished themselves with their 
bellicose spirit, their robust discipline and their talent for organization, char-
acteristic traits of all the nomadic peoples of the steppes.” These nomadic 
peoples had important redeeming qualities after all, but the way they were 
absorbed by the Slavs they had come to conquer would leave no doubt that 
their union had actually resulted in a synergy that bolstered the Bulgarian 
state and national character:
They [the Prebulgars] placed under their rule, either through these traits or 
through force, the Slavs, [who were] agriculturalists more numerous and more 
civilized, but less organized. During the creation of the Bulgarian state the two 
peoples, different with respect to their way of life and their organization mutu-
ally completed each other in a happy manner. The prebulgars, less numerous, 
became the ruling class thanks to their military organization in the Slavic state, 
130. Brailsford, Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future, 101.
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but in return lost their language and adopted Slavic, which became the official 
language of the state and the national church.131
In other words, the Prebulgars served their genealogical mission as the 
neutral nucleus of the Bulgarian nation that took its essential racial char-
acteristics from the Slavs. The Prebulgars had injected qualities of political 
and military organization into, but had not changed, the true Slavic stock 
that the Bulgarians were made out of; they were Slavs, only better. Lest the 
point was not clear enough, Ishirkov also emphasized the role of the early 
Bulgarian state in establishing a national church for the Slavs and in giving 
them the language in which they still worshipped.132
Questioning Cartographic Authority 
and Projections of Nation Space
Ethnographic maps were primarily tools of territorial hegemony, a point 
not lost on the Balkan national elites. Let us now return to two maps men-
tioned at the beginning of the chapter—the Stanford Map and Kieper’s 
Tableau Ethnocratique—and take a closer look at the circumstances sur-
rounding their production to expose the ideological currents that found an 
ideal environment in the medium of ethnographic maps.
The map known as the Stanford Map was published in 1877. Even though 
luminaries such as Carl Sax and Heinrich Kiepert dismissed the map as ut-
ter nonsense, it did acquire a certain degree of attention in Britain, having 
been published by a respectable institution. It was translated into various 
languages and circulated among European geographical institutions.133 The 
map was often incorrectly attributed to Stanford himself, but the author 
was anonymous and was listed as such even in Henry Wilkinson’s widely 
referred 1951 book.134 There were rumors, however, that the real author 
was a member of the Greek intellectual elite. As a matter of fact, the anony-
mous author was none other than Ioannis Gennadius, who at the time of 
131. Ishirkov, Nom de Bulgare, 14–15.
132. Ibid., 15.
133. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, 75. Carl Sax’s verdict on this map was that “it cannot 
even be mentioned seriously,” whereas Kiepert said that it “extended Greek pretensions to the 
utmost limits possible to man.” Cvijić, Remarks, 23.
134. It seems that even Kiepert was not able to figure out the identity of the author; 
the only answer to his inquiries about this was the information that the author was Greek. 
See Letter from Kiepert to Paparrigopoulos, published in K. Svolopoulos, “O Kōnstantinos 
Paparrēgopoulos kai ē Chartografēsē tēn Chersonēsou tou Aimou apo ton Heinrich Kiepert,” 
in Afi erōma eis ton Kōnstantinon Vavouskon (Thessaloniki, 1992), 366. In 1906, Cvijić did 
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the publication of the map held the post of Greek chargé d’affairs in London 
and who later served as the minister to London and to The Hague.135
In the pamphlet that accompanied the map, Gennadius argued that “the 
different nations and races inhabiting European Turkey and the western 
portion of Asia Minor . . . are all more or less marked by a confusing diver-
sity of origin, language, national character, political condition, social status, 
intellectual development and religious persuasion.” Because these categories 
could not be matched to religious or linguistic principles either, it was, in his 
words “an abortive, not to say an impossible, undertaking to establish in a 
graphic representation the distribution and intermixture of race, language, 
and creed in Turkey.” Instead, Gennadius suggested that “a practically use-
ful ethnological map” would “explain and represent the actual relations in 
which those nations stand toward one another.”136 These relations were 
revealed in Gennadius’s work through a method that employed a hybrid of 
historical and cultural claims, religious influence, and occasional references 
to statistical data. He insisted that the area north of the Balkans was charac-
terized by long-time Bulgarian settlement, whereas the south had remained 
purely Greek and that even the “Bulgarians” of northern Macedonia and 
Thrace were Greek. In his own words:
During a period of darkness, internal convulsions and administrative prostra-
tion, the mixed Greek and Bulgarian populations of those regions were gradu-
ally merged into a new and common body, neither purely Bulgarian, nor purely 
Greek, but appertaining to both races. This mixed people may be appropri-
ately designated as “Bulgarophone Greeks,” for it is easily proved that Greek 
is the prevalent element in its constitution. The outward features of this race 
differ considerably from those of the Bulgarians north of the Balkans; the latter 
are clearly of the Mongolian type, whereas South of the Balkans we find the 
Caucasian, and very frequently the purely Greek type. Their dress is identical 
with that of the Greeks whereas a Bulgarian is always distinguished by the un-
avoidable pootoor—breeches large and full to the knee and tight around the leg 
to the ankle—and the characteristic cylindrical-shaped cap, or calpak of black 
sheep skin. Their language is not only more smooth and much softer than that 
of the Northern Bulgarians, but it contains an immense admixture of Greek 
words, wholly incomprehensible to a pure Bulgarian. . . . In their churches, their 
schools, and their correspondence they always use the Greek language, which 
they understand and study.137
135. Today Gennadius is remembered more as a bibliophile than a diplomat. He donated 
his impressive collection of books and manuscripts to the American School of Classical Studies 
in Athens, which keeps the collection in a separate library building that carries his name.
136. [Ioannis Gennadius], Ethnological Map of European Turkey and Greece with 
Introductory Remarks on the Distribution of Races in the Illyrian Peninsula and Statistical 
Tables of Population (London, 1877), 2.
137. Ibid., 13.
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Gennadius, posing as an anonymous British scholar, managed to cover 
all the important elements an ethnographer should employ to establish a 
racial ranking: the difference in costume, the Bulgarians favoring a decid-
edly more “alien” or folkloric kind that required a detailed description and 
the definition of a foreign word; the difference in language, the Bulgarians 
speaking a rough-sounding language; the propensity to use Greek, which 
helped to identify one as a member of the bourgeois (or more refined) classes 
in the Balkans; and finally, the M-word—the identification of Bulgarians 
as a member of the larger Mongol family, those hordes whose descent on 
Eastern Europe was considered an aberration of history and geography.138 
The references to costume as a distinguishing feature of the Bulgarian “race” 
was not at all strange because language, customs, habits, and religious be-
liefs were often counted among the “mental” factors that distinguished one 
racial group from another at the time.139
Even assuming that the Stanford Map was not taken very seriously by 
educated circles in Europe, the pamphlet that accompanied it was quite sig-
nificant in the sense that it demonstrated a mechanism through which the 
European rhetoric about superior and inferior qualities of races could find 
their way back into the discourses of self-perception generated by the subject 
cultures. The map may have been a flop in Europe, but that was only one 
part of Gennadius’s intended audience. The other, more important part was 
the Greek elite, and the example Gennadius set showed the Greek elite how 
to fight against the claims of romantic Slavophiles: by wielding the weapon 
of cultural and racial superiority, by invoking the powers of ancient Greece 
over the European elites, who considered its legacy their own source of 
civilization. Most of the output following this line of attack was published 
in Greece, suggesting it was Greek propaganda aimed at Greeks, but short 
pamphlets making the same point in different iterations also appeared in 
English and French at the beginning of the twentieth century. In one such 
pamphlet on the populations of Macedonia, Ioanna Stephanopoli, one of 
the most vocal supporters of the Greek cause in Macedonia, who also had 
the distinction of being the first female student of Athens University School 
138. More specifically, he described them as “a mixed people formed by the fusion of 
Mongolian and Hunnish tribes, with much Tartaric blood in their veins. . . . It is true that 
owing to a close contact with Slav races the Bulgarians, during their descent upon the Balkan 
peninsula, absorbed into a widely different dialect a large proportion of Slavonic words. But 
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Territoriality and Its Discontents  121
of Philosophy, wrote, “Bulgarians are not Macedonians, and Macedonians 
are not Bulgarians,” and continued, “if they are proud of belonging to the 
Family of Aristotle, of Alexander, of the Diadochoi, they [the inhabitants of 
Macedonia] would find it demeaning in their own eyes to be confused with 
the ‘peoples without glory’ who have not added even the smallest stone to 
the edifice of civilization that humanity has been erecting for centuries.”140
It is interesting to note that the rhetoric of racial and cultural superiority 
was not in the exclusive purview of the educated Greek national elite by the 
beginning of the twentieth century. The same sense of civilizational distinc-
tion could be detected in the discourse of Greek Orthodox notables in Mace-
donia when they pleaded with Ottoman authorities for protection against 
Bulgarian encroachments on their community. For instance, when the Greek 
notables and bishop of Salonika petitioned the Ottoman governor in March 
1904 demanding that Bulgarian insurgents be punished more severely, they 
made extensive allusions to the superiority of Rumlar (Greeks), who “have 
acquired an exalted place in international opinion as well that of the Otto-
man state thanks to their accomplishments in civilization and learning from 
time immemorial” and to the inferiority of the Bulgarians, who were “a ‘na-
tion’ that has not benefited from the grace of civilization and learning.”141 
Complaints about Bulgarian bands’ transgressions emphasized the attacks 
on teachers and schools, underscoring the point that precisely this progress 
in education and civilization was targeted.
The second map is the bizarrely titled 1878 map attributed to the famous 
Kiepert, Tableau Ethnocratique des pays du sud-est de l’Europe. This map 
and the conditions surrounding its publication constitute a truly impres-
sive example of how a clever member of the Greek national elite could em-
ploy ethnographic cartography to assert Greek territoriality while turning 
the authority wielded by those same maps on its head. The title, Tableau 
Ethnocratique, is the first and obvious clue that this map was not claiming 
any false pretense of representing a scientifically based (and objective, by 
implication) ethnographic picture of southeastern Europe. The intermediate 
step was completely done away with—the author of this map was not inter-
ested in displaying natural boundaries between ethnic groups as determined 
by population count and geographical distribution; instead, he directly ad-
dressed what other ethnographic maps only alluded to, natural boundaries 
between ethnic groups as determined by their relative “fitness to rule.”
If we place this map right next to Kiepert’s well-known Ethnographsiche 
Übersichtskarte, published only two years earlier, it becomes clear that they 
140. Stephanopoli, Macédoine et Macédoniens, 7.
141. The Ottoman word for “nation” used here was kavm (from Arabic qaum), which 
may mean both “nation” and “race”; BOA, TFR.I.SL 33/3228, Greek Community of Salonika 
to the Inspectorate, March 6, 1904.
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are the complete opposite of each other.142 Had the famous cartographer 
had a change of heart? Was he trying to shake up the establishment by es-
pousing a controversial new method of determining the graphic distribution 
of races based on “preponderance” as the accompanying note suggested? 
Was it publicity he was after? The professor’s lengthy correspondence with 
a certain gentleman named Konstantinos Paparrigopulos reveals that his 
motivations were entirely different and casts a shadow over the famous ge-
ographer’s professional integrity.143
Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos (1815–1891) may not be instantly recog-
nizable among a non-Greek audience, but he is in fact one of the greatest 
names of Greek national historiography, whose magnum opus, History of 
the Greek Nation, has been called “the most important intellectual achieve-
ment of nineteenth-century Greece.”144 At the time of his correspondence 
with Kiepert, he was among the members of Society for the Dissemination of 
Greek Letters (Syllogos), which took an active interest in ethnographic maps 
of European Turkey.145 Feeling the need to counter the alarming prestige 
Bulgarians seemed to have with ethnographic cartographers—confirmed 
by the recent recruitment of Kiepert, the best of Europe, to their side—
Paparrigopoulos took it upon himself to persuade Kiepert to draw a new 
and remarkably different map sponsored by the Syllogos.146 The historian 
left for Berlin in July 1877 with this goal.
During his stay in Berlin, Paparrigopoulos apparently convinced Kiepert 
to draw a new map of the region comprising roughly the Peloponnese, Thes-
saly, Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, and Eastern Rumelia. At this first meeting, 
Paparrigopoulos provided certain specifications about the borders of the 
map and how it would be “colored.” During the year that passed between 
this meeting and the publication of the final version of the map, Kiepert and 
Paparrigopoulos maintained a correspondence, over the course of which 
the German cartographer changed his earlier depiction of the region almost 
entirely, in line with Greek claims, despite his initial reservations concerning 
142. Heinrich Kiepert, Ethnographische Übersichtskarte des Europäischen Orients 
(Berlin, 1876); Kiepert, Tableau Ethnocratique.
143. The correspondence is in MAE, A.A.E.; C.P, Grèce, 106: Tissot (Athènes) à 
Waddington, March 6, 1878; March 25, 1878, Annexe à la Dépêche Politique d’Athènes, 
No. 35 March 25, 1878, cited in Svolopoulos, “Kōnstantinos Paparrēgopoulos,” 361–70.
144. Paschalis Kitromilides, “On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: 
Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea,” in Byzantium and the Modern Greek 
Identity, edited by David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (Hampshire, 1998), 28, In this article, 
Kitromilides provides a brief yet instructive analysis of the historiographical significance of the 
work (25–34). See also, Antonis Liakos, “The Construction of National Time: The Making 
of the Modern Greek Historical Imagination,” Mediterranean Historical Review 16 (2001), 
27–42, esp. 33.
145. Dimara, Kōnstantinos Paparrēgopoulos, 336; Svolopoulos, “Kōnstantinos Papar-
rēgopoulos,” 358.
146. Dimara, Kōnstantinos Paparrēgopoulos, 343 (based on Alexander Rizos Rangavis’s 
memoirs).
Territoriality and Its Discontents  123
the coloring of certain regions and the name(s) to be printed on the map. 
The first disagreement regarded two “transition zones,” the first one around 
Karaca Dağ and Orta Dağ (Meson Oros or Strednagora), and the second the 
upper valleys of the Strymon and Vardar (Struma/Strimonas and Axios). 
Kiepert was in favor of drawing the line demarcating the Greek “ethnoc-
racy” from that of the Bulgarians a little further south than Paparrigopou-
los wanted it. The first region was, Kiepert asserted, “exclusively inhabited 
by Bulgarians,” and as for the second region: “I made it extend in a way 
that may seem exaggerated to you, though it is justified by the fact that we 
don’t find any Greeks there (except for merchants and teachers at schools 
established here and there in some towns) and finally because Bulgarians 
constitute the large majority also in the southern part of Macedonia, which 
is indicated as Greek territory.”147
Kiepert asked to be informed if any alterations were made to the borders 
he had proposed, in which case, he further demanded, Paparrigopoulos’s 
or another committee member’s name should be cited as the “coloring au-
thor.” A later correspondence of Kiepert from Naples on October 9, 1877, 
reveals that the modifications he proposed had been rejected. Kiepert was 
surprisingly accommodating in his response; he stated that he “perfectly ap-
preciated the reasons and the facts” presented by Paparrigopoulos to prove 
that the southern part of Macedonia was more than half Greek. Concerning 
a revised version of the map, he pointed out it was impossible to draw an 
exact line from memory and suggested that Paparrigopoulos send a “sample 
of the entire map” colored in correspondence with his corrections.
But when he found out the title that Paparrigopoulos had picked for the 
map, “Chart of Greek Lands,” Kiepert’s patience apparently ran out and he 
made it known that he drew the proverbial line right there. Finally putting 
his foot down, the professor wrote to Paparrigopoulos, “I have nothing to 
object to Pinax tōn Ellēnikōn Chōrōn [Chart of Greek Lands], except for the 
fact that at least half of the area represented on the map includes lands that 
were never either Hellenic or Hellenized, like Serbia, Wallachia, Danubian 
Bulgaria, Montenegro, Northern Albania.”148
Paparrigopoulos’s letter to Kiepert, dated February 16, 1878, from Ath-
ens, reveals that the letter and the latest color proof of the map sent by the 
cartographer had not settled the differences concerning the limits of Greek 
dominance in the regions of Thrace, Macedonia, and Epirus. Paparrigop-
oulos was also upset about Kiepert’s objection to the title of the map and 
pointed out that it was enough to take a look at Kiepert’s own proof to see 
that “these lands [Hellenic or Hellenized] fill up more than three quarters 
147. Svolopoulos, “Kōnstantinos Paparrēgopoulos,” 365.
148. Ibid., 366.
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of the whole map.”149 Moreover, the cartographer had repeated his demand 
that someone else’s name be published on the map as the “coloring author.” 
Finally, despite their previous conversations, the Kingdom of Greece had 
been given “a color different than other Hellenic lands.” This last “mistake” 
was the straw that broke the camel’s back. This time Paparrigopoulos was 
indignant:
As you see, Professor, your last work is far from corresponding to the first 
arrangements, to which you had kindly given your complete consent. It goes 
without saying that it is impossible to accept these modifications. We cannot but 
attribute them to a simple misunderstanding; we also have the firm hope that af-
ter the considerations we hereby present to you, you will kindly give M. Reimer 
the necessary instructions to place the different colors conforming to the basis 
established by you, and that we hastened to accept. We have sent a telegram to 
M. Reimer in order to stop all further work on the map, until an agreement can 
be reached between us.150
It is not clear what the “considerations hereby presented” were, but Pap-
arrigopoulos’s bluff evidently had the desired effect because Kiepert’s final 
letter, dated February 25, 1878, from Berlin, was almost apologetic in its 
acceptance of the terms suggested by Paparrigopoulos:
I did not, in any manner want to anticipate by this temporary sketch (which, 
as M. Reimer told me should not represent anything other than a sample of the 
style of coloring) the definitive decision about the frontier lines to adopt. I had 
thought instead with M. Reimer that the printing of the map (the corrections 
of which are at the moment on lithography stones) should be deferred for a 
short term, from what it seems, when it will be possible to present in it the new 
frontiers of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro established by the peace [Treaty 
of San Stefano]. . . . However, if you absolutely want to be in possession of a 
certain number of samples of the map, intended for the needs of the moment, 
we can print and color them, according to the instructions and corrections that 
you would like to send.151
In the same letter Kiepert implored, yet again, that another name along 
with his be published as the coloring author, afraid that he would be found 
accountable by critics who would not know, in his words, to “distinguish 
between the very different trends of this map, and the ethnographic maps” 
that he had published earlier.
149. Ibid., 368. The title of the final and published version of the map suggests that this 
was the only compromise Kiepert could obtain from Paparrigopoulos.
150. Ibid., 369.
151. Ibid., 370.
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In the end, it was Paparrigopoulos who prevailed, even though it seems to 
have taken another three to four months for him to persuade the geographer 
with his persistence and what no doubt must have been compelling 
(dis)incentives—unfortunately not documented. We do learn from a letter 
by Paparrigopoulos to his protégé Argiropoulos that the final agreement 
was reached around June. In the same letter, it is hard to miss a certain ele-
ment of sarcasm in Paparrigopoulos’s style when he uses of the title “the 
eminent geographer” [o epiphanēs geographos] repeatedly when referring to 
Kiepert: “The eminent geographer (who nowadays is busy with the transla-
tion of his Russian maps of Asian borders into French for the conference 
[of Berlin] on Bismarck’s commission), the eminent, well, geographer, was 
persuaded to color our chart the way we wanted it to be from the beginning; 
and even better, under his name.”152
These letters clearly show Paparrigopoulos’s determination to get a ge-
ographer who had been named the best of Europe by none other than Bis-
marck to publish a map supporting Greek claims. It was not good enough 
to obtain a map simply drawn by Kiepert; the map also had to have his seal 
of  authority—and so the key issues that surfaced many times in the cor-
respondence were “coloring” and “authorship,” which brought the project 
to a standstill at least twice because of Kiepert’s understandable reluctance 
to paint a huge chunk of southeastern Europe in Greek colors. But Papar-
rigopoulos’s persuasion tactics, covering the range from flattery to bribery, 
from criticism to outright threats, ultimately resolved the disagreements.
Paparrigopoulos’s talent in manipulating ethnographic maps surpassed 
that of Gennadius because he did not just deploy that map as an apparatus 
of power, a visual tool with which the rights of the Greek nation over an 
expanse of territory were asserted. He also highlighted the holes in the pre-
sumably scientific premises of the whole process and questioned the author-
ity of ethnographic maps in principle. The literal issue of authorship was the 
most important symbolic element of the map, communicating to the public 
the scientifi c authority embodied in the geographer’s name. Gennadius had 
claimed that authority by remaining anonymous and giving the impres-
sion that the map had been prepared by a British author.153 By contrast, 
 Paparrigopoulos usurped the already existing and unquestionable authority 
of Kiepert by making sure that Kiepert’s name was the only one printed on 
the map and on the text that accompanied it (written, however, by Papar-
rigopoulos himself), deliberately misleading the reader. The result was so 
convincing that even the otherwise meticulous and thorough  Wilkinson did 
152. Paparrigopoulos’s letter to Argiropoulo, in Dimara, Kōnstantinos Paparrēgopoulos, 
348. (Emphasis added.) Colocotronis also made a sarcastic remark about the geographer’s 
willingness to publish a map negating his previous work: “Certainly M. Kiepert did not want 
to disappoint anyone.” Colocotronis, Macédoine et l’Hellenisme, 484.
153. The confusion created was enough that Dimara, as recently as 1986, cited “the famous 
English Edward Stanford” as the author of the map. Kōnstantinos Paparrēgopoulos, 343.
126  Chapter 3
not doubt its authenticity when he wrote in his 1951 book, “In the expla-
nation accompanying the map Kiepert outlined the difficulties inherent in 
the production of an ethnographic map and he maintained that the use of 
such maps for drawing up political boundaries was a malpractice which no 
geographer ought to countenance.”154
It is difficult to gauge the exact magnitude of the impact that the Kiepert-
Paparrigopoulos map had in western Europe. It is likely that it remained 
somewhat obscure in comparison to Kiepert’s previous work,155 but Papar-
rigopoulos’s persistent efforts had helped him kill two birds with one stone. 
Paradoxical as it may sound, the first of these goals was demonstrating that 
ethnography was not an exact science. He did this by making his correspon-
dence with Kiepert public and disclosing it to representatives of European 
Powers in Athens months before he had guaranteed the publication of the 
map under his terms.156 To the letters he attached a memo in which he ar-
gued that, although no one would dispute the merits of Kiepert’s geographi-
cal work, the same certainty could not be sustained for its ethnographic 
component because Kiepert himself was “far from believing in the absolute 
value of the data we have on the population of the diverse races of the 
Orient.”157 Questioning the criteria whereby the ethnographic component 
of a map was determined meant that one could introduce alternative meth-
ods that would result in different outcomes. This did not detract from the 
power of such maps, however. To the contrary, it underscored their impor-
tance in visualizing a political objective without naming it as such and mak-
ing it available in its simplest form to the observers, which was the second, 
and more conventional, goal of Paparrigopoulos’s map. The map thus con-
ceived was not intended for the audience of the geographers of Europe, for 
whom it was probably too crude, but for classrooms in Macedonian schools 
that the Syllogos provided with textbooks, teachers, and, apparently, maps. 
“At the level of mass culture, lies and propaganda are submerged in a sea of 
cultural expectations and beliefs,” observes Matthew Edney; “propaganda 
maps are not so much arguments as cultural and social reaffirmations.”158 
Likewise, Paparrigopoulos’s “Chart of Greek Lands” gave the Greek public 
a means to transform the faith they had in their stake in Macedonia and 
the much needed assurance that, if maps were to be drawn to “display the 
races of the Orient,” the heritage of Greek civilization was a more justifiable 
principle than mere numbers in determining their colors.159
154. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, 75.
155. Cvijić does not mention the original map, but he does refer to Nicolaides’s rendering 
of it (1899) and notes that he was “astonished to see Kiepert’s name on this map.” Remarks, 32.
156. This is why we do not know how exactly he convinced Kiepert to publish the map 
under his name; Svolopoulos, “Kōnstantinos Paparrēgopoulos,” 360.
157. Ibid., 361.
158. Edney, Mapping an Empire, 338.
159. As N. Kasasis, president of the University of Athens and the society Hellenisme, 
wrote, “But it is not through numerical significance that Greeks maintain their incontestable 
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Maps as Fiction
In an article published in the Bulletin of the American Geographical Soci-
ety in 1913, W. L. G. Joerg compared the recent political map of the Balkans, 
following the conclusion of the second Balkan War, with Jovan Cvijić’s eth-
nographic map, which was considered the gold standard for ethnographic 
maps at the time. According to Joerg, “despite minor discrepancies,” this 
comparison showed that “at last the guiding principle of European history 
since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the establishment of coinci-
dent racial and political boundaries, has made itself felt in Balkan affairs.” 
The celebratory tone of the article and hopeful words for the future of the 
Balkan peoples rang hollow, and nowhere more poignantly than in the con-
cluding remarks: “the reapportionment of Balkan territory on broad lines 
does satisfy the requirements of the principle of nationalities. In this lies the 
significance of the recent conflicts; in this, too, lies the hope of the future. 
Given the opportunity to work out their own destinies, the Balkan peoples, 
we may hope, will enter upon a new era of progress and development.”160
Joerg, if he lived long enough, would learn differently. Only five years af-
ter the publication of this article, boundaries were being redrawn in the Bal-
kans, and they would be revised several more times throughout the century, 
at an immensely tragic human cost. Jovan Cvijić, whose expertise on the 
ethnic groups of the Balkans and their geographic distribution had by now 
acquired near-cult status, was once again influential; his work was adopted 
as a reference by a group known as the Inquiry, convened by Woodrow 
Wilson in September 1917 “to collect data, compare competing claims to 
territory and to map out possible future political boundaries.”161 Thanks to 
Jeremy Crampton’s work, we now know how the members of the Inquiry 
used a combination of maps and statistical data from a variety of sources 
to draw the map they would support and how these maps were also used 
by President Wilson as he was drafting the Fourteen Points. A report they 
prepared made the following recommendations: “i) Make a racial map of 
Europe, Asiatic Turkey, etc., showing boundaries and mixed and doubtful 
zones. ii) On basis of i) draw racial boundary lines where possible, i.e. when 
authorities agree; when they disagree select those we had best follow; when 
these disagree map the zone of their disagreement; study density and distri-
bution of peoples in these zones.”162
This excerpt summarizes in one concise paragraph all the main themes 
of Denis Wood’s monograph, The Power of Maps, which has chapter titles 
superiority over other races; it is also through the influence of their intellectual culture, their 
commercial and economic activity, briefly, through the triple privilege of seniority [l’ancienneté], 
intelligence and money.” Néoclès Kasasis, L’Hellenisme et la Macédoine (Paris, 1903), 63–64.
160. W. L. G. Joerg, “The New Boundaries of the Balkan States and Their Significance,” 
Bulletin of the American Geographical Society 45 (1913), 829–30.
161. Crampton, “Cartographic Calculation of Space,” 731.
162. Quoted in ibid., 739.
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such as “Maps Are Embedded in a History They Help Construct,” “Every 
Map Shows This . . . but Not That,” and “The Interest the Map Serves Is 
Masked,” ending with “The Interest the Map Serves Can Be Yours.”163 
Incredible as it may seem, this was how boundaries were drawn in 1917, 
and still are to a large extent. What is even more disturbing than the hardly 
disguised motive of self-interest is the conviction that it was in fact possible, 
with the aid of comparative statistics and geographical knowledge, and the 
guidance from experts with a “conscientious and scientific attitude” such 
as Jovan Cvijić, to separate propaganda from legitimate claims and draw a 
map that would reflect the “real” ethnic boundaries.164 Once this task was 
complete, attaining a fair peace agreement would be just a matter of drawing 
lines that best conformed to those boundaries—and too bad if some outliers 
could not be accommodated.
This, in brief, is the fiction that conflict will be permanently resolved once 
the demarcation lines between groups of people coincide with their respec-
tive political entities, and it is not a thing of the distant past, when naïve 
politicians collaborated with ethnographers to “determine racial boundar-
ies.” In fact, this fiction is held in high esteem to this day and surfaces 
time and again in commentaries on conflicts in those strangely heteroge-
neous zones of the world, such as contemporary Macedonia. During the 
late 1990s, when the (western) world observed the mounting tension in the 
Republic with anxiety, the two authors of an op-ed piece in the New York 
Times, “Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing,” argued that violence was “in-
evitable” given the reluctance of the Slavs to work with the Albanians. They 
proposed a plebiscite that would determine whether the Albanians wanted 
to stay or leave, and then would “partition” the Republic of Macedonia.165 
We do not know if the authors were (pleasantly, we hope) surprised that 
the apocalyptic violence they foresaw has not materialized despite the lack 
of partition. Redrawing maps and partitioning territory, far from prevent-
ing violence, usher it in. Population “exchanges,” the oppression of newly 
created minorities, killings, the uprooting of countless lives, and, at the very 
least, assimilation follow partitions, not peaceful exchanges of land. The 
lines drawn on a map are hardly just an academic exercise; they are constitu-
tive of the reality they purportedly represent and tear through human lives 
in the process.
I am not arguing that the ethnographic map is a “fiction” because of my 
distrust in the data collected by ethnographers such as Cvijić. Nor am I 
163. Denis Wood, The Power of Maps (New York, 1992).
164. Not surprisingly, the Bulgarian side would beg to differ with the general opinion 
concerning Cvijić’s “scientific attitude.” Radoslav Tsanov, a Bulgarian émigré who acquired 
recognition as a professor of philosophy in the United States, called the geographer “shameless.” 
Tsanoff, Bulgaria’s Case, 305.
165. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, “Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing,” 
New York Times, April 19, 1999.
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suggesting that ethnographers and cartographers were all motivated by ne-
farious motives of territorial domination. H. R. Wilkinson’s 1951 book on 
ethnographic maps of Macedonia, for example, presents them in sequence, 
standardized to the same scale and fully demonstrating their inconsistencies 
in representation, which makes it a great work of reference half a century 
after its publication.166 Nevertheless, it seems as though Wilkinson also sub-
scribed to the assumption common to all these maps and their creators—the 
assumption that there is a better way to draw an ethnographic map, that 
ethnicity can be objectively identified, enumerated, and depicted in two di-
mensions. The wishful assumption seems to be: if only we had a miraculous 
ethno-meter that could measure and record a standardized national alle-
giance index for each person, and chart his or her exact location with satel-
lite imagery, then we would have the perfect ethnographic map. And until 
then, we should keep trying.
To believe in the possibility—even theoretical—of the perfect ethno-
graphic map is to ignore how people live, think, and act. “Maps collapse 
both space and time”; that is, the information that has been measured is 
captured and remains fixed on the map.167 Ethnographic maps and the sta-
tistical data they are based on “flatten and enclose” people.168 This is hardly 
the ideal medium to capture the essence of a concept as fluid, as contingent, 
and as changing as ethnicity—especially ethnicity in Ottoman Macedonia 
at the turn of the twentieth century. The static depictions of essentialized 
ethnicities on the unsophisticated base maps of southeastern Europe did not 
simply suffer from shoddy scholarship; they entirely masked the complexity 
of human experience.
Maps are practical cognitive tools that help us organize complex spatial 
relations in a readable format. It is precisely this feature of the map medium, 
translating complexity into two dimensions, that lends it so easily to ideo-
logical manipulation, and nowhere is this manipulation more consequen-
tial than in ethnographic maps. Ethnographic maps, through the dictum 
that national will is the ultimate principle of political legitimacy, reflect the 
nation-space, its reach and its boundaries, which may or may not coincide 
with actual political boundaries. The important point here is that these maps 
are drawn not only to reflect but to will that space into existence.169 They 
are, above all, iconographic representations of territoriality.
166. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics.
167. Christine Boyer, The City of Collective Memory (Cambridge, 1994), 209.
168. Arjun Appadurai, “Number in the Colonial Imagination,” in Orientalism and the 
Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia, edited by Carol A. Breckenridge and 
Peter van der Veer (Philadelphia, 1993), 329.
169. A telling example of how these maps can be used to popularize the idea of border 
changes is the depiction of conflict zones, such as Kosovo or, now more recently, Iraq and Syria 
in widely read magazines such as The Atlantic Monthly and Vanity Fair, which have published 
alternatives to the current map of Iraq with no self-conscious examination of the inextricable 
links to colonialism of this kind of exercise.
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The power of the map medium to create, predict, and enforce the ter-
ritoriality of a nation is one of the most important political expressions 
of cartography. We should, finally, note the flip side of that expression—
namely, its social consequences. Cartography helps to disinvest the process 
of  nation-state formation of moral concerns by presenting map-making as 
an entirely scientific, benign exercise. The mapmaker drawing lines on a 
map, no matter how much “research” s/he puts into their drawing, cannot 
foresee the human cost of new boundaries. The importance of the choices 
available to the mapmaker and of the decisions that he or she makes is un-
derscored by the fact that the product of these decisions does not represent 
merely a topographical image but a very potent suggestion as to how the 
territory that Harley called “a socially empty space” is to be filled: “The 
abstract quality of the map, embodied as much in the lines of a fifteenth-
century Ptolemaic projection as in the contemporary images of computer 
cartography, lessens the burden of conscience about people in the landscape. 
Decisions about the exercise of power are removed from the realm of im-
mediate face-to-face contacts.”170
Colorful blocks on an ethnographic map do not only demonstrate how 
different ethnic groups “stand with respect to one another,” as Gennadius 
suggested, but also make a powerful statement about the discontents of 
those clearly demarcated territories, namely the people who did not “fit the 
scale.” This statement is not as loud and clear as that voiced by the guer-
rillas. It is not, at least at first instance, physically violent. It does, however, 
serve the same process thorough which homogeneity as an ideal becomes 
homogeneity in practice within the (imagined) boundaries of a nation.
170. Harley, “Maps, Knowledge, and Power,” 303.
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I certainly should never expect Turkey to survive unless she consented to 
become statistical like the rest of Europe.
—William Farr, address to the Statistical Society in London, 1877
When he made this declaration, Dr. William Farr, later called the “Father-in-Law of the British Census,” was voicing an opinion prevalent among western European 
geographers.1 That is, the Ottomans were different than the rest of Eu-
rope in yet another matter: they refused to procure and publish detailed 
statistics that were considered to be among the very basic tools of effective 
 administration, such as population figures, import and export values, and 
distribution of natural resources. This was a deficiency that was both an in-
dication and the cause of their backwardness. It certainly did not bode well 
for the future of “Turkey, the lowest and apparently the most irreclaimable 
of European countries.”2
The lack of useful statistics was only one side of the serious demographic 
problem of the Ottoman Empire; there was also the issue of population de-
cline. Notwithstanding the apparent lack of statistics on the imperial popu-
lation, it was commonly assumed by statisticians in Europe that the number 
of Turks, the dominant element of the Ottoman Empire, was in steep decline 
due to such practices as widespread abortion, moral vice, overindulgence of 
children, and bad hygiene. Although not as indulgent of their children as the 
Turks, Jews were threatened by the same calamity because of their squalid 
living quarters. The Christian population, by contrast, was believed to be 
on the rise.3 Alas, the implicit hope that Turks (and Ottoman Jews) might 
become extinct, disappearing from Europe by an auspicious kind of attri-
tion, was not based on any substantial empirical study; rather, it was based 
1. Athelstane Baines, “The Census of the Empire, 1911,” Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society 77 (1914), 381.
2. James E. Thorold, “Opening Address of the President of Section F (Economic Science 
and Statistics) of the British Association for the Advancement of Science,” Journal of the Sta-
tistical Society, v. 29, no. 4 (December 1866), 502.
3. Hyde Clarke, “On the Supposed Extinction of the Turks and Increase of the Christians 
in Turkey,” Journal of the Statistical Society 28, no. 2 (1865): 261–93.
chapter four
Fear of Small Margins
4
132  Chapter 4
on the observations of foreign travelers, most notably those of Pouqueville, 
who, in his three-volume travel account published in 1805, wrote that the 
fertility rate was much lower among the Muslim women than among Chris-
tians. He claimed that the scourges afflicting the Muslim population of the 
Peloponnese and decimating their numbers were abortion and polygamy, 
both of which were not practiced by the Christians.4
The bulk of population statistics of the Ottoman Empire published in 
European journals of statistics and geography were based on a similar 
method. Despite the proclaimed difficulties of compiling any sort of data 
from Turkey, the observations of travelers, occasionally adjusted by figures 
obtained from European consuls, were deemed good enough to provide an 
educated guess, which would then be published and join the tomes of knowl-
edge about the globe. These writings repeatedly complained that there was 
not even a single census of the Ottoman Empire they could consult. As 
E. G. Ravenstein, a noted geographer of the times, put it, “Some statistical 
information on the populations of that part of Eastern Europe which is now 
devastated by the Turkish hordes will prove acceptable at the present time. 
It is scarcely necessary to state that no regular census of the population has 
ever been taken.”5
Ravenstein, in a more dispassionate paper read before the Statistical Soci-
ety of London on June 19, 1877, acknowledged that the Ottoman authori-
ties did collect data and published them periodically. They did not, however, 
meet the geographer’s exacting standards: “The data collected by the local 
authorities and occasionally published in the Salmanes [sic], or official alma-
nacs of the vilayets, are not deserving of much confidence, and there exists 
no properly organized statistical office to check the returns.”6 These short-
comings did not prevent Ravenstein from compiling his own figures. He 
explained that he had consulted the work of authorities such as Carl Sax and 
Major Zur Helle, who had “devoted special attention to Turkish population 
statistics.” He added that he had availed himself of “wherever additional 
information was procurable, from consular reports or otherwise.”7
4. F. C. H. L. Pouqueville, Voyage en Morée, à Constantinople, en Albanie, et dans Plus-
ieurs Parties de l’Empire Ottoman, pendant les Années 1798, 1799, 1800 et 1801 (Paris, 1805). 
There may have been some degree of truth to the difference in fertility rates among Christians 
and Muslims. Kemal Karpat also argues that the rate was higher among the Christians until 
the mid-nineteenth century, but he attributes this to the Muslim males’ spending their peak 
reproductive years in the army; Ottoman Population, 11.
5. E. G. Ravenstein, “Distribution of the Population in the Part of Europe Overrun by 
Turks,” Geographical Magazine 3 (October, 1876): 259–61. Ravenstein was a prolific scholar 
better known for his research on Africa, more particularly on demographic issues concerning 
the colonization of the continent by Europeans. He was the author of many articles on the sub-
ject, such as E. G. Ravenstein, “Lands of the Globe Still Available for European Settlement,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Geographic Society and Monthly Record of Geography 13, no. 1 
(January 1891): 27–35.
6. Ravenstein “Population of Russia and Turkey,” 433.
7. Ibid, 434.
Fear of Small Margins  133
“Consular reports or otherwise” indicates a conveniently vague range of 
sources for Ravenstein’s statistical tables. Just like maps, the reliability of 
statistics rested on the compiler’s reputation as much as anything else. The 
unreliability or complete lack of Turkish statistics was a predictable, for-
mulaic preamble to works that presented alternative figures that claimed 
to represent the latest and most accurate knowledge about the population 
of the Ottoman Empire. Even though the Ottoman Empire had possessed 
a flawed but serviceable census system since the 1830s, the insistence on 
its inaccuracy, if not complete absence, served as a perfect foil against the 
scientific authority of the compiler. In fact, certain “authoritative” sources 
on Ottoman population were simply fabricated by copying a previous work 
and declaring it as the most “reliable” one without providing any tangible 
proof of the superiority of these figures over any others. After a source had 
been quoted once and, in turn, quoted by another author, a third party could 
comfortably declare the numbers “reliable,” apparently without bothering 
to trace the chain of transmission. For instance, Bianconi’s figures relied 
largely on those provided by the Stanford Map, supplemented by a few Brit-
ish consular reports and the author’s own observations from the time when 
he worked in the region as an engineer for the French railroad company 
that built the Jonction Salonique-Constantinople.8 And the Stanford tables 
(which, as we have seen in the last chapter, were actually published by I. 
Gennadius) were again “estimates,” but the author was comfortable in pub-
lishing them because they were attributed to the most reliable “authority” 
on the issue. This reliable and objective source that Gennadius quoted for his 
own work was Henri Mathieu’s La Turquie et ses Différents Peuples. Nor 
surprisingly, Mathieu himself stated that, although he had made every effort 
to approach the “truth,” he still did not pretend to be giving exact figures.9
We have seen in the last chapter how, as the notion of popular sovereignty 
based on national will gained hold in Europe and among the Balkan na-
tional elites, ethnographic map-making turned into an open contest about 
projecting territoriality. Population statistics were an inextricable part of 
this practice because they endowed the choropleth maps with a numerical 
basis. Most of these maps, and the accompanying plans for territorial he-
gemony, obviously privileged homogeneity rather than complexity, making 
demographic rivalry among different groups a high-stakes game of numbers. 
8. Bianconi, Ethnographie et statistique, 22–26; Stanford [Gennadius], Ethnological 
Map, 16.
9. Henri Mathieu, La Turquie et ses Différents Peuples (Paris, ca. 1857), 44. It is interest-
ing to note that Salahaddin Bey, an Ottoman official apparently followed the same method 
for the statistical tables he presented at the Exposition Universelle of 1867. Ernest Dottain 
claimed that his figures were taken from Viquesnel’s Voyage dans la Turquie d’Europe, which, 
in turn, were taken from the Ubicini statistics; Dottain, “La Turquie d’Asie d’après la Traité 
de Berlin,” Revue de Géographie, no. 3 (1878), 209, cited in Karpat, Ottoman Population, 25 
n. 32. Remember that Ubicini’s numbers were presumably based on Ottoman official statistics.
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Gaining the upper hand in a certain region required the establishment of 
population statistics that clearly favored the preponderance of one group. 
After the implementation of the Mürzsteg Reform Program, which called for 
a future reorganization of the Macedonian provinces according to “racial” 
criteria, the urgency of producing proof of demographic superiority became 
even more acute among the leaders of the various nationalist movements 
that sought the same territory for expansion.
In this chapter, I view population statistics and census practices from the 
perspective of the participants in the process, both the counters and the 
counted. I first review the methods of enumeration and comparison avail-
able to the parties fighting for demographic supremacy in Macedonia. There 
were obviously enormous political stakes involved in the production of these 
statistics, which makes them quite suspect, but my purpose here is to under-
score how statistical knowledge came to be understood as the basis for for-
mulating a legitimate territorial claim rather than to evaluate the soundness 
of these figures. Then I shift the focus to an actual census survey as it was 
experienced on the ground. This is the Ottoman “Census of 1903,” which 
acted as a force of mobilization in making people aware of a radically new 
understanding of their collective identity.10
When the Ottoman government decided to proceed with its own plans of 
enumeration in the middle of an already tense situation, the rivalry among 
the different camps was no longer limited to duels on the pages of books, 
propaganda material, or respected geography journals; it had spread to the 
countryside. The body count of the census now included the bodies of those 
who were killed in this fight for demographic superiority. The census be-
came yet another step in the hardening of communal boundaries. It was not 
a snapshot of the population divided into different confessional groups; it 
was a mechanism through which those very same categories that it presum-
ably enumerated were, in fact, created. It directly involved (nearly) every 
member of a largely illiterate and rural population in a process that it oth-
erwise would have stayed indifferent to—the process of nationalization. For 
the same reason, looking at the implementation of the census in the coun-
tryside gives us a glimpse into the meaning of nationalist movements, not 
as defined by the elite who spearheaded them but by the people who were 
swept into the movement by the trickle-down effects of nationalist ideology.
10. Perhaps a more appropriate title would be the “Census of 1903–1907” because, al-
though the regulations concerning a new population count were issued in 1903, the count was 
not completed until 1907. The choice of the word census itself deserves an explanation here. 
Justin McCarthy has argued that the term is inappropriate because the count was not a survey 
taken on a given day throughout the empire and therefore not a census in the strictly modern 
sense;, Population History of the Middle East and the Balkans (Istanbul, 2002), 118, 136. 
Nevertheless, I have chosen to follow the more established practice of calling the Ottoman pop-
ulation counts of 1831, 1881/82–1893, and 1903–1907 censuses not only for the sake of con-
venience but also to distinguish them from earlier attempts and routine upgrades of registers.
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Methods of Counting
How could the Ottomans “know” their population if they were so igno-
rant of methods that would allow them to “read” it? Thanks to the work 
of social and economic historians, we know that the Ottomans were actu-
ally not as hapless as these European geographers would have us believe 
when it came to gathering information about the population of the empire.11 
Sources of demographic data for the fifteenth through nineteenth centuries 
range from information revealed by tahrir registers and salnâmes (Ottoman 
state almanacs) to the results of more targeted surveys such as the popula-
tion counts of the empire after the 1830s, which have been deemed fairly 
reliable, if imperfect, estimates of Ottoman population.12 Figures such as 
the value of exports and imports from major ports, the population of cities, 
and the population density of the empire by region were provided by the 
salnâmes and were also republished in consular reports and in various com-
pilations by European scholars.13 The first detailed population count of the 
empire was taken in 1831–1838 and repeated in 1844.14 Another  European 
11. The attempts by the Ottoman state to gather and record information about its popu-
lation have attracted a considerable amount of scholarly attention from social and economic 
historians of the Ottoman Empire. Ömer Lütfi Barkan pioneered the field of demographic 
studies in Ottoman historiography; his works include “Türkiye’de İmparatorluk devirlerinin 
büyük nüfus ve arazi tahrirleri,” I
.
ktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 1–2 (1940): 1–40; “Tarihi de-
mografi araştırmaları ve Osmanlı tarihi, Türkiyat Mecmuası 10 (1953): 1–26; “Essai sur les 
Données Statistiques des Registres de Recensement dans l’Empire Ottoman aux XVème et 
XVIème Siècles,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 1 (1957): 9–36. For 
a detailed bibliography of Ottoman population studies, refer to Daniel Panzac, La Population 
de l’Empire Ottoman (Aix-en-Provence, 1993).
12. Tahrir registers were kept for fiscal purposes and not as population registers; more 
specifically, they listed taxable revenue sources assigned to timar (prebend) holders, and their 
reliability as a source for demographical information should not be overestimated; Heath 
Lowry, “The Ottoman Tahrir Defterleri as a Source for Social and Economic History: Pitfalls 
and Limitations,” in Studies in Defterology (Istanbul, 1992), 3–18. For the nineteenth-century 
surveys, see Karpat, Ottoman Population; Kemal Karpat, “Ottoman Population Records and 
the Census of 1881/1882–1893,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 9 (1978): 237–
74; Stanford Shaw, “The Ottoman Census System and Population 1831–1914,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 9 (1978): 325–38; McCarthy, Population History; Justin Mc-
Carthy, Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the 
Empire (New York, 1983).
13. For a detailed list of contemporary European sources see Karpat, Ottoman Popula-
tion. Ottoman sources were routinely disregarded by most European scholars, who claimed 
they were not reliable. Ravenstein provided his own population statistics of the Ottoman Em-
pire, Ravenstein “Population of Russia and Turkey.”
14. Justin McCarthy claims that there is no record of the 1844 count, but the well-
known Ubicini statistics published in 1851 have later been attributed to this count; “Fac-
tors in the Analysis of the Population of Anatolia, 1800–1878” in McCarthy, Population 
History, 87. Enver Ziya Karal called the 1831 count the “first census” of the empire. Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu’nda ilk Nüfus Sayımı (Ankara, 1943). The Ubicini statistics were published in 
A. Ubicini, Lettres sur la Turquie (Paris, 1853). Göçek and Hanioğlu mention another count 
that was carried out in 1866–1873, but little is known about its results; Göçek and Hanioğlu, 
“Western Knowledge.”
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scholar who apparently had access to these figures was Eugene Boré, French 
Orientalist, who published them in Almanach de l’Empire Ottoman pour 
l’Année 1849/1850.15 In 1866, a detailed census of the Tuna Vilayeti, the 
model province for administrative reforms, was taken. In 1877–1878, 
the Ottoman government published, for the first time, the population es-
timate for the entire empire (as opposed to the tax and conscription base, 
i.e., number of male adults) in the imperial salnâme. These numbers, how-
ever, were not based on an actual count but on figures provided in the 
provincial salnâmes, supplemented by information gathered by provincial 
 administrators.16
Abdülhamid II was interested in census surveys as a tool of government 
policy, and the first comprehensive survey, which required census clerks to 
cover all regions of the empire and to indicate when they used estimates 
rather than an actual count (such as areas with a nomadic population), was 
taken during his reign, between 1881/1882 and 1893.17 This survey antici-
pated the census of 1903 in an important way: compliance with registration 
was enforced through the introduction of nüfus cüzdanları (identity cards) 
issued according to the information in the census register. Lacking an iden-
tity card, which was now required for the completion of any official trans-
action, was an offence punishable by jail time. Those who avoided registry 
to escape from the military draft would “be immediately conscripted.”18 
Kemal Karpat notes that the results of this survey, presented to the sultan 
by the Grand Vezir Cevat Paşa in 1893 “represent the most complete and 
reliable Ottoman population figures complied in the nineteenth century.”19 
In fact, these results also served as the main reference for the 1903 census, 
as we will see shortly.
Between these population counts, census clerks tracked demographic 
changes, such as the number of males who were liable for draft and pay-
ing taxes, through entries made into separate registers called yoklama 
and vukuat defterleri.20 In 1905–1907, the 1903 census, which classified 
the population according to sectarian affiliation, was carried out. The fi-
nal population count of the empire took place in 1914, after the immense 
15. Eugene Boré, Almanach de l’Empire Ottoman pour l’Année 1849/1850 (Constanti-
nople, 1849/50), cited in Karpat, Ottoman Population, 23.
16. Karpat, Ottoman Population, 25.
17. The tenth U.S. census of 1880 served as an important model for Abdülhamid II. 
Samuel Sullivan Cox, who was appointed as the U.S. representative to the Ottoman court in 
1885 had chaired the Census Commission of the House of Representatives. The sultan was 
very impressed with the summaries of the U.S. census results presented by Cox and remarked 
that “with such data for administrative policies, [the United States] could not be other than 
prosperous.” Samuel S. Cox, Diversions of a Diplomat in Turkey (New York, 1893), 43, cited 
in Göçek and Hanioğlu, “Western Knowledge,” 2.
18. Karpat, Ottoman Population, 32.
19. He also notes that it is difficult to determine the ending date for this census process, “if 
it ended at all,” but that the results were presented to Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1893. Ibid., 33.
20. McCarthy, Population History, 86.
Fear of Small Margins  137
 demographic changes brought about by the Balkan Wars.21 This last count 
classified the population into twenty-two categories but did not distinguish 
the numbers of men and women, nor did it provide any information about 
age. These population counts were taken not for the benefit of European 
geographers but to meet specific administrative needs of the state, and they 
therefore were not widely published.22 As for their reliability, Daniel Panzac 
points out that, precisely because they were collected for internal use, there 
is no reason to assume that the Ottomans would want to commit any errors 
in their aggregation.23
The reliability of sheer aggregates, however, was not the only the concern 
of nineteenth-century critiques of Ottoman census practices. As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, what the statisticians in London, Berlin, and 
Paris wanted to capture, enumerate, and map were the different “races” of 
the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman statistical sources, even if they had been 
widely available, would not have assisted with this quest because they did 
not classify the population into “racial” or “national” groups. The Otto-
man imperial government felt no pressing need for such a classification; the 
information was gathered mainly for the purposes of estimating potential 
tax revenue and the number of soldiers to be recruited, for which wealth 
and religion—and not ethnicity—were the only two relevant categories.24 
There was, however, a significant change with the 1903 census, which clas-
sified the population not only with regard to simple religious distinction but 
also divided the Christian population according to sectarian and “national” 
affiliation. But this principle was not applied uniformly; the entire Muslim 
21. This population count should not be considered a census because no survey was actu-
ally taken. The numbers were based on the results of the 1903 census, adjusted according to the 
registered births and deaths; Karpat, Ottoman Population, 189. Panzac, even though he uses 
the term recensement for the published population statistics of 1914, notes that this was more 
“a count rather than census.” D. Panzac, “L’Enjeu du Nombre: La Population de la Turquie 
de 1914 à 1927,” Revue de l’Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée 50, no. 4 (1988), 48.
22. One of the most important internal uses of these statistics was as a basis for calcu-
lating the proportions by which non-Muslim communities would be represented in the bu-
reaucracy and other official capacities. Fuat Dündar notes that these numbers also helped to 
determine the number of non-Muslims in provincial administrative councils and the number of 
parliamentary representatives during the short-lived experience of representative government, 
pointing out that the state logic of representation was not based on individuals but communi-
ties; Fuat Dündar, Modern Türkiye’nin Şifresi: İttihad ve Terakki’nin Etnisite Mühendisliği, 
1913–1918 (Istanbul, 2008), 85–107.
23. Panzac, “L’Enjeu du Nombre,” 48. Justin McCarthy has also been extremely vocal in 
emphasizing the reliability of Ottoman population statistics and argues that their shortcomings 
were comparable to those of modern censuses in the developing world; Population History. 
Fuat Dündar, on the other hand, thinks that these statistics may not be as reliable as Karpat, 
McCarthy, and Panzac suggest, but he also discredits the claims that Ottoman statistics were 
entirely baseless as being purely political, Dündar, Modern Türkiye’nin Şifresi, 107.
24. For statistical data on the Macedonian population, see Daniel Panzac, “La Popula-
tion de la Macédoine au XIXe Siècle,” La Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée 
66 (1992): 113–29; Cem Behar, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun ve Türkiye’nin Nüfusu, 1500–
1927 (Ankara, 1996).
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population was counted under one category, with the exception of the kıpti 
(Roma), as was the usual practice. On the other hand, the Vlachs consti-
tuted an exceptional case in that they were assigned a separate category even 
though they did not have an autonomous, national church.
In 1905, the statistical data available to the Ottoman administration were 
derived largely from the results of the 1881/1882 census, which were peri-
odically updated by the census authorities, but the numbers were largely 
underestimations. Muslim and non-Muslim alike, the population had ample 
incentive to hide away from the census clerks, such as evading the tax col-
lector and dodging the army.25 According to a report of the French consul in 
Salonika in March 1904, the rural population could not easily avoid registry 
because these small communities were easier to monitor and it was in the 
interest of Muslims that everyone was conscripted. The situation differed 
in larger centers, however, where muhtars (communal leaders) managed to 
hide some of the (Christian) population in exchange for a share from the 
spoils rescued from the tax collector.26 Although the consul’s remark that 
the Muslim population did not have an incentive to avoid registry is off the 
mark in the sense that the military tax was not the only personal liability 
of the population, it is true that the salnâme of 1903 that he referred to, 
like other compilations of Ottoman official population statistics, was in all 
likelihood an underestimation; this was a general problem that the state was 
trying to overcome through the implementation of new measures.
Reliable or not, the statistics complied by the Ottomans did not serve 
the purposes of propaganda groups nervous about their co-nationals’ num-
bers in disputed regions coveted by multiple parties (how they determined 
who the “co-nationals” were was an entirely different matter, as we will 
see shortly). For one thing, Ottoman statistics did count Muslims, a signifi-
cantly large group scattered across the land just like the other confessional 
groups but also the dominant element in certain areas. This was not neces-
sarily useful information for the propaganda groups, whose statistics usually 
did not even mention the Muslim population, as if they did not exist. And 
for the purposes of propagandists, they just might as well not exist because 
25. The categories for the 1881/1882–1893 census were Muslims, Greeks, Armenians, 
Bulgarians, Catholics, Jews, Protestants, Latins, Monophysites (Syriacs), non-Muslim Gyp-
sies, and Foreigners. In 1906/1907, to these categories were added Cossacks, Wallachians, 
Greek Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Maronites, Chaldeans, Jaconites, Samaritans, Yezidis, 
and Gypsies (without religious distinction); See Karpat, Ottoman Population, tables I.8.A 
(132–33) through I.16.A (166–67). According to the 1905 census, the total population of the 
three provinces of Monastir, Salonika, and Kosovo was 2,417,840, of which 1,127,775 were 
recorded as Muslim, 628,253 as Bulgarian, 564,067 as Greek, 59,552 as Jewish, and 26,042 as 
Vlach. According to the same figures, in Monastir Muslims constituted 40 percent of the total 
population, Greeks 35 percent, and Bulgarians 24 percent. In Salonika, these percentages were 
45.5, 28.6, and 17.2; and in Kosova, 56.5, 2, and 40, respectively (calculations based on the 
data published by Karpat, Ottoman Population.
26. MAE, vol. 40, report “Population du Vilayet du Salonique,” Salonika, March 1904.
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it was understood that the Muslim population’s “self-consciousness” would 
not factor into the calculations that would partition the area into distinct 
nation-states when the imminent death of the Ottoman Empire occurred.27 
In a memo to the French Foreign Ministry, dated October 15, 1901, a mem-
ber of the French diplomatic corps made the following observation: “The 
inhabitants [of Macedonia] belong to four different races: the Greek race, 
the Serbian race, the Bulgarian race, the Roumanian race.” Nevertheless, he 
conceded, a couple of paragraphs after this, the presence of “a population 
entirely different than the four others mentioned, namely the Albanians.” 
This alien population, he further noted, “if they are Muslims, exercise a kind 
of dominance which truly is oppression, thanks to the Sultan.” The “differ-
ence” of the Albanians from the others and, more important, the Muslim 
contingent of this large ethnic group, apparently disqualified them from 
membership among the indigenous inhabitants of Macedonia. Nowhere in 
this memo was there a mention of the presence of other Muslim groups.28
According to another observer, H. N. Brailsford, British journalist, the 
important issue to be addressed in Macedonia to ensure peace and pros-
perity was determining the proportions of various Christian groups with 
respect to one another. Brailsford’s recommendations for meaningful reform 
in Macedonia did not explicitly call for an expulsion of Muslims, but it 
was understood that national homogeneity should be the goal and that, 
when it came to the “future of Macedonia’s races,” the Muslims, whatever 
their numbers might be, would either be absorbed into the nation-state they 
found themselves in or, as it was implicitly assumed, follow their Ottoman 
overlords into Asia. Brailsford’s plan had it all worked out:
It would obviate much injustice, and help to disentangle the present confusion 
of races, if a Land Commission were instituted to facilitate exchanges. All the 
Balkan races, save the Bulgarians, have the migratory habit. Albanians dissatis-
fied with the new régime might prefer to return to Albania. Slavs left stranded 
in an unreformed Albania would certainly wish to emigrate to Macedonia. 
Within Macedonia itself, and even within the Bulgarian principality, there are, 
27. It would become clear after World War I that the right to self-determination was a 
principle applied selectively and did not necessarily include the Muslims’ rights to express any 
such political will; nor did it reflect a politically sound consensus for those who presumably 
exercised this right. Commenting on this principle as it was applied at the Paris Conference, the 
Paul Ignotus, journalist, remarked cynically, “Self-determination . . . meant that a few gentle-
men in and around Paris told the peoples concerned what to ‘determine’ about their future.” 
P. Ignotus, “Czechs, Magyars, Slovaks,” Political Quarterly 40, no. 2 (1969), 188.
28. MAE, vol. 26 Série B, Carton 77, Dossier 1, October 15, 1901. According to 
A. d’Anvil, the diplomat who wrote the memo, these four races were not “scattered and mixed 
higgedly-piggedly all over Macedonia: whatever they say, each have their own territory.” He 
appended an ethnographic map illustrating this point. The Bulgarians covered a large area of 
the center of the map, with smaller areas of Greeks along the Aegean coast, Serbians and Alba-
nians in the periphery, and even smaller islands of Vlachs and Turks.
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 doubtless, Greeks who would like to leave a Slav district and settle in an area 
where they could speak their own tongue and be governed by men of their own 
race. The more such exchanges were encouraged the less risk would there be of 
racial friction. There is certain to be a stampede of the worse type of Turks from 
a reformed Macedonia. It is important to save them from selling out at an unjust 
price, and at the same time fill their places with immigrants whose case will be 
bettered by transference.
Brailsford was so confident of his plan that he cheerily recommended its 
application in “the whole of European Turkey, and—for that matter, [in] the 
more advanced regions of Asia Minor as well, more particularly the prov-
inces where Armenians are numerous.”29 His recommendations would not 
sound so chilling if we did not know that these “exchanges” were indeed 
put in practice, with horrible consequences for the people Brailsford had 
relocated on the map with strikes of his pen.30
Racial fiction was the apparent antidote to racial friction, and Ottoman 
sources of statistics did not provide suitable material for such plans. They 
had been produced by Ottoman officials, for Ottoman officials—and cer-
tainly not to validate the wished-for demographic superiority of any one 
group in a certain region. No wonder they were consulted only when they 
happened to support a claim and were discounted otherwise.
School Enrollment: A Better Way of Counting?
As we have seen in the last chapter, the prevalent public opinion in Eu-
rope viewed southeastern Europe, including Macedonia, as a place where 
Slavic peoples constituted the original and dominant racial group. Natu-
rally, this was a cause of concern for the national elites of the Hellenic 
Kingdom, who believed they had legitimate claims to the same region. They 
were joined by the Greek Orthodox of the Ottoman Empire in their wor-
ries that Macedonian Greeks might be absorbed into a hostile Slavic mass. 
By 1884, long before the demographic struggle took a physically violent 
turn, it was common knowledge and an immense concern also among the 
Ottoman Greek elites that statistics favoring the Slavs were being published 
and circulated in Europe. The Greek Orthodox community of Salonika 
voiced its  discontent in December 1884 in a letter to the French consul in 
29. Brailsford, Macedonia, 333.
30. Not to mention that, despite his predictions of people “self deporting,” people pre-
ferred to stay in the lands they knew as home despite all the hardships brought on them by this 
choice. For instance, the Greek communities in Bulgaria that had escaped from the violence 
anti-Greek movement of 1906 to safety in Greece clamored to return as soon as the dust 
settled; Dragostinova, Between Two Motherlands, 57–61.
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 Salonika signed by Archbishop Constantinos, protesting the circulation of 
these  statistics.31
As the battle of numbers started with a clear advantage on the Slav side, 
the Greek defense against these claims came out of the same elites’ deep-
seated belief in the superiority of Greek culture and civilization—and what 
could represent that culture better than schools?32 Therefore the idea of 
publishing statistics based on school enrollment numbers was born. The 
Greek educational establishment indeed had a longer history and larger en-
rollment numbers in Macedonia than their Bulgarian counterparts. It did 
not take long, however, for Bulgarian pundits to answer with scholastic 
statistics of their own, statistics that emphasized quality” over quantity. The 
widespread notion that population statistics, whether based on Ottoman 
officials’ or European consuls’ and travelers’ reports, were not to be trusted 
lent support to the popularity of school enrollment numbers as a more ac-
curate source of data that could be verified with relative ease.33 Moreover, 
school statistics presumably offered a less tangible but politically not in-
significant advantage: they were in harmony with a liberal conception of 
nationhood that favored choice over racial predeterminism. The anonymous 
(Greek) author of a critical commentary on the 1889 British Blue Book 
on Macedonia argued that ethnology should take into account four funda-
mental elements in defining national affiliation: “consciousness, language, 
religion, and shared aspirations.” There was, however, an equally important 
but often overlooked “fifth ethnological feature”—“school enrollment.” He 
admonished Consul John Elijah Blunt, who had contributed the report on 
populations statistics to the Blue Book for not giving this important feature 
due consideration.34 Another anonymous (again Greek) author wrote, “In 
Turkey the father of a Christian family in sending his children to a particu-
lar school declares, not only the language which he wishes them to learn, 
but also the nation with which he is connected, and of which he shares the 
memories and hopes. In short he declares which is his mother country.”35
Unfortunately for the Greek national elites, making school enrollment 
numbers a valid measure of national consciousness was largely wishful think-
ing on their part, at least as far as the European audience that these statistics 
were aimed at was concerned. As we have seen, when it came to categorizing 
the people of Macedonia, most European observers trusted their own judg-
ment, which favored a more “organic” understanding of nationality, based 
on mother tongue or historical anthropology, rather than self-declared 
31. MAE, vol. 7, January 9, 1885. (The date of the petition was December 28, 1884.)
32. See, for instance, Kasasis, Hellénisme et la Macédoine.
33. Population of Macedonia; Stephanopoli, Grecs et Bulgares en Macédoine.
34. English Blue Book, 14.
35. Population of Macedonia, 10. The pamphlet was also published in French under the 
title Les Écoles Chrétiennes de Macédoine (Paris, 1905).
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 affiliation, no matter how vehemently defended.36 Furthermore, there were 
serious problems with the school statistics presented as beyond reproach by 
both sides. First, the numbers did not quite rise to the task, and second, and 
more important, even assuming that every schoolchild in Ottoman Mace-
donia had been properly counted and classified according to the community 
that provided his or her education, the act of choosing a school by the par-
ents was by no means an autonomous, individual expression of preference 
for a certain national culture.
Regarding the published figures and their inconsistencies, it is instructive 
to take a look at some of the widely available statistics on school enrollment 
at the time. In 1903, according to Ottoman official records, of the total of 
706 schools run by the Greek Orthodox and Bulgarian communities within 
the province of Salonika, 400 belonged to the Greek community and the 
rest to the Bulgarians. The overwhelming majority of the 306 schools run by 
the Bulgarian community was under the control of the Exarchate, but 12 of 
them were in the Catholic rite. Greek schools employed 766 teachers and en-
rolled 34,044 students, whereas the Bulgarian schools employed 452 teach-
ers an enrolled 15,339 students.37 These figures are not at extreme variance 
with another set of statistics that originated from a publication of the Greek 
Patriarchate in 1902, subsequently published by the Syllogue Macédonien of 
Athens in fall 1903 and by the Bulletin d’Orient in November 1904, making 
them available to a wider audience.38
Although this set of statistics circulated in consular reports as well as pub-
lications in Europe as the main frame of reference, it is likely that the number 
36. Colonel Vérand wrote in a report to the French Embassy in Constantinople, “It is 
fairly difficult to determine exactly which race the inhabitants belong to. Only the spoken 
language might be a reliable [sérieuse] indicator, which, however, cannot be considered ab-
solutely accurate.” MAE, Constantinople, Série E, Colonel Vérand to Amabassador, Serres, 
July 10, 1904.
37. Numbers for the other communities were Muslim, 988 schools, 1,305 teachers, and 
36, 843 students; Serbian, 17 schools, 60 teachers, and 798 students; and Vlach, 13 schools, 
30 teachers, and 606 students. The totals are for male and female teachers and pupils; BOA, 
TFR.I.SL 14/1345–1, July 6, 1903. The seemingly high number of schools for Muslim children 
should not lead us to the assume that the Muslim educational establishment was the best 
organized and funded in the region. During the Hamidian period (1878–1908), there was 
indeed a visible commitment to public education for the (Muslim) masses, and the number of 
primary and secondary schools increased proportionately with this policy; Somel, Moderniza-
tion of Public Education; Fortna, Imperial Classroom. At the same time, however, inspectors 
often complained about the deplorable state of Muslim schools, especially compared to the 
schools of other communities; see, for instance, BOA, TFR.I.AS 54/5355, Report prepared by 
Erkân-ı Harb Binbaşısı Ahmed Nuri for the Inspector General, December 12, 1907; TFR.I.SL 
1/59–2, Maarif Encümeni (Education Council) official Mehmed Tahir to the Inspectorate, 
December 1902.
38. The Patriarchate’s publication, entitled Tableau Comparatif des Écoles Helléniques 
et Bulgares dans les Vilayets de Monastir, de Salonique et d’Adrianople, also included, as the 
title suggests, the province of Edirne; La Macédoine et les Reformes, Mémoire du Syllogue 
Macédonien (Athènes, 1903).
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of Bulgarian schools were indeed higher than these statistics suggested.39 
The Ottoman statistical attribution of an even smaller number to Bulgar-
ian schools does not really corroborate these figures, given the Ottoman 
authorities’ alignment with the Patriarchate on any issue concerning Bulgar-
ians, and more important, of the presence of Bulgarian schools that operated 
without license from the government. Moreover, at least according to the 
claims of the acting British consul in Salonika, these figures included only 
the Bulgarian students who had passed their examinations, rather than the 
original enrollment at the start of the school year, thereby giving the Greek 
statistics an unfair edge.40 Even this point, however, was a cause for dispute.: 
The French, who were hardly proponents of the Greek cause, reported the 
same numbers with the caveat that the numbers referred to students who 
were “present at the time of exams,” obviously duplicating the note in the 
Syllogue publication that the total number of students attending Bulgarian 
schools also included 19,348 who “reported" only during exams.41 It ap-
pears that the Bulgarian schoolchildren’s drop-out rates were put to different 
uses with contradictory implications. For instance, the anonymous author 
of The Population of Macedonia asserted that most students of Bulgarian 
schools quit before the end of the semester to demonstrate the failure of 
these schools to keep their students committed.42 But the claim also lent cre-
dence to the British acting consul’s argument that there were actually more 
students who enrolled in Bulgarian schools than the statistics suggested.
It is hard not to notice that the number of Greek schools, although 
based on the same source, had a mysterious way of creeping up in each 
reproduction. By the count of the Syllogue, published in 1903, there were 
968 Greek schools attended by 57,681 students. In Kasasis’s book, pub-
lished in the same year, the figures were 989 and 59,043 respectively. Only 
a year later, when the Bulletin d’Orient came out in November, the numbers 
had climbed up to 998 and 59,640. Other sources kept the number of stu-
dents the same, but estimated the number of schools at 1,041.43 Douglas 
Dakin noted the most phenomenal increase in his 1966 book; according to 
his source, “in or about 1902 there were just over 1,000 Greek schools in 
Macedonia with close to 70,000 pupils.” His source was a Greek pamphlet 
published in 1904 that was based on the Bulletin d’Orient statistics, which, 
39. MAE, Turquie, Correspondence Politique et Commerciale, vol. 410, November 17, 
1904. The British acting consul general in Salonika, in referring to the same set of figures, 
noted problems with the Greek statistics; PRO, FO 195/2183, Du Vallon to Embassy, Salonika, 
December 2, 1904. In addition to British and French diplomatic sources, other works repro-
ducing the statistics of the Syllogue Macédonien include Kasasis, Hellénisme et la Macédoine; 
Population of Macedonia; Frédéric Boissonnas, La Macédoine Occidentale (Genève, 1921).
40. PRO, FO 195/2183, Du Vallon to the Embassy, Salonika, December 2, 1904.
41. MAE, Turquie, vol. 410, Correspondence Politique et Commerciale, November 17, 
1904; Macédoine et les Reformes, 16.
42. Population of Macedonia, 11.
43. Belia, “Ē Ekpaideutikē Politikē tou Ellinikou Kratous,” 33.
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in turn were, derived from the Patriarchate’s figures.44 Despite claims of 
verifiable soundness, school statistics were no different than general popula-
tion statistics in the way they were deployed for the demographic war effort.
Not surprisingly, the figures for Bulgarian schools also fluctuated enor-
mously depending on the source. For instance, the number of Bulgarian 
schools in the sancak of Serres, according to the Bulletin d’Orient statistics, 
was 129. According to the same source, 3,783 students were enrolled in 
these schools. According to Mishev’s figures however, which were based on 
the records of the Exarchate and dated 1902, in this same sancak there were 
184 Bulgarian schools with 7,718 students.45 Strangely enough, the most 
generous figures concerning Bulgarian schools were reported in April 1894 
by the British Vice Consul in Serres, a Greek Orthodox. Vice Consul Con-
stantine Capety reported that the number of Bulgarian schools had steadily 
been increasing. The data he provided placed the number of schools at 172 
and the number of students at 9,426. Capety’s seemingly strange generosity 
with the numbers of Bulgarian schools in Serres is more easily explained in 
the broader context and the timing of the report he was penning. He was tak-
ing issue with those who claimed that the Ottoman government was  partial 
to the Greek side; as the school numbers made clear, the imperial govern-
ment did not “impede Bulgarian instruction.” At this instance, demographic 
one-upmanship was not the real issue, which may explain the vice-consul’s 
unusual viewpoint.46 Capety’s report was corroborated by the French Con-
sul in Salonika, who reported that despite their complaints against local 
authorities, the Bulgarians had opened up a large number of schools in the 
area within the past few years. The number of schools just in the “sancaks of 
Selânik and Serres” (presumably including the merkez, or center of Salonika, 
and all the kazas, or subdivisions of Serres) was estimated to be “more than 
300, with approximately 17,000 students of both genders.”47
A final point to consider about the Bulgarian school statistics is the Otto-
man authorities’ attitude toward these institutions, which went from suspi-
cion to hostility after the Ilinden Uprising of 1903. After the involvement of 
Bulgarian schoolteachers in the Macedonian revolutionary movement became 
undeniably clear, the Ottoman authorities started to view the schools as breed-
ing grounds for potential “brigands.” As a result many of them were closed 
down, their teachers were incarcerated and the schools left functioning were 
placed under the close (but hardly infallible) scrutiny of the government.48
44. Dakin, Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 19. His reference was A. T Spiliotopoulos, La 
Macédoine et l’Hellénisme (Athens, 1904).
45. Brancoff [Mishev], La Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne.
46. PRO, FO 195/1849, Serres, Vice Consul Capety to Consul Blunt, April 24, 1894.
47. MAE, vol. 9, Consulate General of France in Salonika to Casimir Perier, president of 
the council, May 9, 1894.
48. MAE vol. 36, Annexed to the political dispatch dated August 16, 1903 (report by the 
Bulgarian commercial agent).
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More important than the reliability of school enrollment numbers, the 
way they were counted, or the underestimated size of the “subversive” com-
munity schools was the way in which schoolchildren were essentially turned 
into numbers on statistical tables. Contrary to the assertion of the anony-
mous author of Schools of Macedonia, the school where parents sent their 
children was not necessarily a statement about nationality. For one thing, 
as we have seen, even the nationalist elites had widely different opinions on 
what schooling should involve to mold young minds into national unity. 
Moreover, the final decision to choose a particular school was determined 
by factors that were not indicative of national identity, whether defined 
linguistically, religiously, or as a matter of individual preference borne out 
of a composite consciousness of history, customs, class, and aspirations. 
National affiliation was not simply a matter of choice in Ottoman Macedo-
nia at the turn of the century, and school choice did not follow that choice 
in logical sequence. Nor was national affiliation a relic of “innate racial 
qualities.” The school and population statistics that presumably quantified 
nation-ness were, in fact, reflections of its contingent and contested nature.
What Censuses Count
Studies on Ottoman census practices have so far concentrated more on 
the numbers recorded in the registers after these population counts, on their 
accuracy and comparative advantages over contemporaneous European 
sources on Ottoman demography.49 Census registers have mostly been val-
ued as a source for Ottoman social history only to the extent that they help 
shed light on the structural composition of society, be it vocational, ethnic, 
or religious. In other words, the assumption that censuses reflect a social 
reality has remained current, and not much attention has been paid to the 
role that the census could potentially play in the construction of the reality 
that it purportedly represents. This is partly because of a general tendency in 
the field to take at face value the thesis that the nation-states that emerged 
out of the Ottoman Empire consisted of peoples previously caught in a time 
warp as millets, immobilized but otherwise untouched and pure until their 
“national awakening” in the nineteenth century. Another reason for this 
tendency is that the reification of collective identities through what seems 
like a routine statistical exercise of the bureaucracy is a concept more readily 
demonstrated in contemporary population counts, and it is only (relatively) 
recently that we have come to realize the significance of this phenomenon 
for identity construction.
49. See, for instance, Halil İnalcık’s “Review of Kemal H. Karpat ‘Ottoman Population: 
Demographic and Social Characteristics.’ ” International Journal of Middle East Studies 21, 
no. 3 (1989), 424.
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The census is the ultimate tool used by the modern state to classify and 
enumerate, or simply to know, its population. In other words, the census 
brings meaning and order into what is an amorphous, indistinguishable 
mass, rendering it, in James Scott’s words, “legible” to the state.50 Con-
versely, the census is an opportunity for the people being counted to define 
themselves and make that definition count. The origin of the census, how-
ever, is not necessarily located in the tradition of liberal politics and citi-
zenship rights. Many scholars have theorized on the emergence of census 
practices from the colonial versus subject viewpoint, and as a result much 
of the theoretical literature on the census tends to coalesce in two groups: 
studies of contemporary population counts and of colonial census practices 
in the past.
Bernard Cohn’s classic work on British colonial administration in India 
and its classificatory practices inspired many scholars to further analyze 
these practices and their role in redefining caste differences as the principal 
reference for social differentiation and in the reification of collective identi-
ties and their subsequent relationship to one another.51 Benedict Anderson, 
for instance, draws a distinction between earlier attributions of group iden-
tity and the practice, after the 1850s, of not only actively constructing these 
identities but enumerating them according to “a maze of grids which had no 
immediate financial and military purpose.”52 Arjun Appadurai, writing on 
British colonial practices in India, diagnoses a similar distinction for what 
he names the “colonial body count.”53 Anderson’s and Appadurai’s conclu-
sions embody a general consensus in the scholarship that colonial popula-
tion counts represented a clear break from earlier surveys, which were never 
concerned with the entire population, only with those who mattered for 
fiscal or military purposes. The preexistence of locally formulated identity 
categories did not mitigate this break because they did not inform the new 
taxonomies as much as the colonizers’ imagination did. Moreover, the very 
introduction of those taxonomies and, more important, their quantification, 
undermined the relevance of preexisting norms.
David Kertzer and Dominique Arel underline the disjuncture between 
the categories imposed on a local population by colonial administrators 
and the locals’ self-perceptions. In fact, they consider this to be the distin-
guishing mark of the colonial census: “the formulation of categories in the 
colonies was unilaterally done by the ruling officials, while European catego-
ries of cultural nationality and language were already being negotiated, to 
some extent, with social groups.”54 The distinction may seem too clear-cut; 
50. James Scott, Seeing like a State (New Haven, 1998), 2–3.
51. Bernard Cohn, “The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia,” in 
An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays, 224–54 (Delhi and Oxford, 1987).
52. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 169.
53. Appadurai, “Number in the Colonial Imagination,” 329.
54. David Kertzer and Dominique Arel, “Censuses, Identity Formation, and the Struggle 
for Political Power,” in Census and Identity, edited by David Kertzer and Dominique Arel 
(Cambridge, 2002), 10.
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however, and it is not without its detractors. Norbert Peabody and Sumit 
Guha, among others, have critiqued this view of the colonial census as an 
isolated and pure exercise of colonial power and have documented different 
aspects of the negotiation that went on in colonial contexts, especially during 
earlier stages of census design, including the mediation of the locals or their at-
tempts to make the population more intelligible to colonial administrators.55
The distinction expressed by Kertzer and Arel is still a point that needs 
consideration, however, not only because of its sheer importance as a widely 
held opinion but also because colonial census categories were increasingly 
designed with more attention to ethnographical data. The growing prestige 
of ethnography brought about an increasing reliance on “racial” categories 
(however defined by Western ethnographers) as opposed to the earlier prin-
ciples that took into account, at least theoretically, preexisting markers such 
as religion.56 After this point, the authority, determined by the “objective” 
rules of ethnography, was in the hands of colonial administrators, which 
significantly reduced the space for negotiation and more clearly separated 
the ruler from the ruled.
To what extent can we analyze the census experience of a dynastic empire 
that ceased to exist at the end of the First World War against the background 
of colonial population counts? It is tempting to argue that the Ottoman cen-
sus of 1903 in Macedonia can be seen as an incident of (re)colonization, the 
imperial center taking stock of its subjects. After all, recent exceptions not-
withstanding, the bulk of extant historiography on the “rise of nationalism 
in the Balkans views the Ottoman period as one of alien rule and a rupture, 
much like the rupture of colonialism, which makes parallels between the 
Ottoman and British census practices apropos. According to this view, the 
census was a population count carried out by alien bureaucrats according to 
criteria the population did not have much agency in generating—which was 
true to a certain extent, but due to reasons completely different than what 
the national-lineage histories would have us believe. Even more relevant 
is the recent turn in Ottoman historiography, especially of the Arab prov-
inces, that reframes the administrative reforms of the nineteenth century 
as internal colonialism and their language as “Ottoman Orientalism.” The 
principal theme that such works converge on is the mission civilisatrice im-
plicit in the discourse of the Ottoman bureaucracy in their description of the 
“natives,” and their role in bringing them into the civilized imperial fold.57 
55. The literature on the role of colonial censuses in reifying the caste structure in India 
has generally accepted the assumption that this process was defined solely by colonial admin-
istrators and their (mis)perceptions of the system. For a literature review and critique of this 
approach, see Norbert Peabody, “Cents, Sense, Census: Human Inventories in Late Precolonial 
and Early Colonial India,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 43 (2001): 819–50; 
Sumit Guha, “The Politics of Identity and Enumeration in India c. 1600–1990,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 45 (2003): 148–67.
56. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 164.
57. Although I do not entirely agree with the premises and conclusions of this scholarship, 
especially with regard to the early period of reforms, I do find it to be an analytically richer 
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According to Selim Deringil, who makes the most convincing case for an 
Ottoman mission civilisatrice, the Ottoman elite’s view of the imperial pe-
riphery as a “colonial setting” was, much like that of late imperial Russia, 
a “borrowed colonialism.”58 As accurate a term as Ottoman colonialism 
may be in describing a certain segment of the Ottoman elite’s internaliza-
tion of notions of a hierarchy of civilizations propagated by colonial pow-
ers to legitimize their continued exploitation of a large part of the world’s 
physical and human resources, it still is one that needs to be qualified, not 
least because the epistemological foundations that supported the European 
colonial project were almost entirely absent in the Ottoman case. Moreover, 
the production of knowledge for governing peripheral and less-known areas 
and peoples differed widely in the Ottoman from the European colonial con-
text, and even from imperial Russia. I think that a more proper rationale for 
drawing comparisons between colonial census categories and the Ottoman 
experience is not located so much in the source and nature of power but the 
impetus for quantification, which in both cases was ushered in by moder-
nity—and by this I do not mean a modernity that was sourced from Europe 
by definition but a modernity defined by indigenous exigencies.
Common Hazards of the Census
On the evening of August 20, 1905, a shepherd was grazing his sheep on 
a hill outside Negorçe/Negortzi (Negorci), when he was approached by four 
men he did not recognize. The men, all of whom were armed, ran away after 
one of them handed the shepherd a letter written in Bulgarian addressed to 
the inhabitants of Negorçe. A day later, the police had reported the incident 
to the prefecture, which had the letter translated and sent to the General 
 Inspectorate of Rumeli. The letter, written by a certain Vlad Vasil, appar-
ently one of the local guerrilla leaders, read as follows:
I greet you all. The census clerks who will be coming to your village will give 
you new identification cards (nüfus tezkereleri), and ask you which denomina-
tion you belong to. Tell them “we are not Rum, we are Bulgars” and that you 
are of Bulgar denomination because you speak Bulgarian. And don’t be afraid of 
framework for understanding the Tanzimat than the one provided by the tired modernization 
paradigm. See, for instance, Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” American Historical 
Review 107, no. 3 (2002): 768–96; Ussama Makdisi, “Rethinking Ottoman Imperialism: Mo-
dernity, Violence, and the Cultural Logic of Ottoman Reform,” in Empire in the City: Arab 
Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire, edited by Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philippe and 
Stefan Weber (Wörzburg, 2002), 29–48; Jens Hanssen, Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an 
Ottoman Provincial Capital (Oxford, 2005).
58. Selim Deringil, “They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery: The Late Ottoman 
Empire and the Post Colonial Debate,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 45, no. 2 
(2003): 318.
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anyone. You will answer, “we want Bulgar identification cards.”’ Villagers, look, 
open up your beautiful eyes. Don’t have yourselves registered Rum, because 
then no good will come to your children, your goods and your animals, you will 
[have to] go up the mountains. Until today we somehow forgave your mistakes, 
but you could lose your well-being. Know that it is thanks to me that you have 
stayed alive. . . . Don’t imagine that you will stay in Negortzi, escape to Gevgili 
and be saved. There was a man like you in Cuma-i Bâlâ, a Rum, he escaped to 
America; we also have men over there; they killed him, keep that in mind.59
Although some of the subtleties may have been lost in the awkward trans-
lation into Turkish (and further into English), the message of the letter was 
clear enough: declare yourselves Bulgarians or die. The threat, a typical inci-
dent for the region at the time, also makes it clear that as far as the inhabit-
ants of Macedonia were concerned this census was no ordinary population 
count. Establishing demographic supremacy—through whatever means 
necessary—had become part of the struggle for Macedonia, and the com-
petition would have a horrible impact on the people claimed by both sides.
When the central administration dispatched census clerks to the Mace-
donian countryside in spring 1905, the struggle for Macedonia had already 
entered its most violent phase. Like its predecessor from 1881/1882–1893, 
the new census questionnaire was to register the population according to 
membership in a given religious denomination, such as Exarchist or Pa-
triarchist (i.e., followers of the Exarchate or the Ecumenical Patriarchate). 
Unfortunately, this seemingly straightforward principle proved to be a recipe 
for disaster. In November 1905, the British consul in Salonika reported to 
his superior, “the Italian adjoint, Colonel Albera told me that it was his 
belief that the acuteness of the struggle between Greeks and Bulgarians was 
largely due to the senseless manner in which the census operations were 
being conducted. Nothing could have been more untimely than the attempt 
to revise the ethnological statistics of Macedonia during the present crisis, 
as both parties were anxious to establish the preponderance of their own 
element, and equally unscrupulous as to the means they employed to that 
end.”60 What the consul failed to explain was how the local population had 
come to understand the census as “ethnological statistics” and why the re-
action was so strong. The violent propaganda tactics of the guerrilla bands 
were surely effective in this regard, but if the census itself was the trigger for 
the tensions, why had the earlier census not caused similar problems? The 
key issue here was the popularization of the idea that collective conscious-
ness, once identified and quantified, could serve as the legitimizing principle 
for territorial claims. Given the active role the European Powers played in 
59. BOA, TFR.I.SL, 81/8053, Prefecture of Gevgili to the Inspectorate, August 21, 1905.
60. PRO, FO 195/2208, Graves to O’Connor, November 18, 1905.
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reaffirming this principle, it is difficult to understand the incredulousness of 
the consuls at the way the census polarized the population.
The point was not lost on Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, who countered the criti-
cisms by pointing out that the decision for a general census had been made 
long before the Mürzsteg Reform Program came into existence. The Reform 
Program carried a clause stipulating the reorganization of the region accord-
ing to ethnic lines in the future, and according to Hilmi Pasha, it was this 
clause, and not the census itself, that had exacerbated the situation in the 
provinces. In a communiqué to the Grand Vezirate, he protested, “[the deci-
sion for a general census was made] during a time when the provision of the 
Mürzsteg Program that the region shall be reorganized according to ethnic 
lines in time of peace did not exit, and the bands formed with the encourage-
ment and support of great powers and certain small states and especially the 
Bulgarian evil-doers did not attempt or dare to menace the population in 
order to force them to change their denomination [mezheb].”61
Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha was not alone in protesting the “third provision” 
of the Mürzsteg Program calling for the regularization of ethnic groups; the 
French consul also criticized it in a report to the embassy, where he dismissed 
it as an already abandoned plan. Whatever the relevance of the clause may 
have been, propaganda-related violence did escalate in the region in antici-
pation of the census. In the meantime, confusion concerning the “national 
affiliations” of the population continued to occupy all sides, including the 
representatives of European Powers, who could not decide which figures to 
believe and what terms to use, and the Ottoman administration, which could 
not fix a uniform census questionnaire. Although the operation was already 
in full swing, the British consul was not even aware of the categories in the 
census questionnaire. In the same letter where he complained about the inop-
portune timing of the census, he was also relieved to report that “the attempt 
to register the Christian population as Bulgarians, Greeks, Vlachs, Serbs, 
etc.” had been “abandoned, and [that] orders [had been] issued to the Cen-
sus Commissions to confine themselves for the present to the broad lines of 
Mussulman [sic], Christian and Jew.”62 Graves was clearly unaware that the 
category “Serb” had never been recognized as a separate entry and that other 
denominations, rather than the three general categories, were being reported.
While the census survey continued, the pressure exerted by propaganda 
groups was not the only grievance of the local population. Certain Ottoman 
officials, who viewed the third provision and the European presence in the 
region as the first steps toward annexation into a Greater Bulgaria, took it 
upon themselves to protect the interests of the Patriarchate. Complaints of 
abuses inflicted by Ottoman soldiers in Exarchist villages were frequently 
 reported to Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha and to the military and civil representatives 
61. BOA, TFR.I.A. 24/2387, June 3, 1905.
62. PRO, FO 195/2208, Graves to O’Connor, November 18, 1905.
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of European Powers. One such letter of complaint, written by a certain 
Ivan Madjaroff to Colonel Vérand, the commander of the French gendar-
merie stationed in Serres, reached the desk of the French chargé d’affairs in 
Istanbul. The letter suggested that abuses took place with the full awareness 
of high-ranking provincial officials. According to Madjaroff, one of the cen-
sus commissions headed by a certain “Silamsiz Ali Pasha” was demonstrat-
ing “a lot of zeal” in registering the villages they were assigned as Rum. The 
commission had told villagers they would be chased out of their farms, and 
it threatened one of the communal leaders that his farm would be burnt 
down unless the village all registered as Rum. Costandine Tantcheff, who 
apparently was encouraging the villagers to take up Exarchist identity cards 
(nüfus tezkeresi), had been taken by gendarmes to the subgovernor of Serres, 
who “after expressing his dissatisfaction, told him: you know that Bulgar-
ians are malicious people, and yet you teach the villagers to call themselves 
‘Bulgarians.’ ” Tantcheff was then informed that he would have to go live 
in another village if he insisted on calling himself a Bulgarian. The villagers, 
terrorized and threatened as they were, still refused to take up identity cards 
as Rum, defying the government decree at the cost of being deprived of these 
documents. The same Ali Pasha had also told the inhabitants of Kakaraska 
(Agia Eleni) that “the government assigns the tezkere it desires.”
The letter continued to recount similar incidents, such as one that took 
place in the small village of Melnikich (Melenikitsi), where the inhabit-
ants were told by the owner of the çiftlik, a “Greek by the name of Mikail 
Pasha,” that people “who declared themselves Bulgarians would have to 
leave the village.” On June 22, a different census commission went to Prose-
nik (Skotoussa) and started registering the population as Greek without ask-
ing their opinion. Ninety among the villagers refused to take their tezkeres 
in protest. The last case reported was Elsan (Karperi), which was visited by 
the same census commission on June 28. The commission, the letter claimed, 
“did everything to register all the villagers as Greeks, but could not do it ex-
cept for four Vlach households, all the rest of the village refused to take the 
Greek nüfus.” The census commissions, he continued, always had a Greek 
member, but never a Bulgarian one, and they had soldiers assigned to their 
service, who beat up villagers if they refused to register as Greek.63
According to the allegations of another letter, submitted anonymously 
to an ambassador in Constantinople, some census commission members 
even resorted to outright torture. The letter reported an incident in Zihna 
(Palia Zichni), where every head of a family was summoned by Lieutenant 
(Mülâzım) Hüseyin Efendi, rounded up into a pigsty, and forced to “crawl 
on bare knees on stones for three hours.”64 Village notables were tortured 
further by soldiers who “sat on their heads and clubbed them.” They were 
63. MAE, Constantinople, vol. 147, Série E Macédoine, July 27, 1905.
64. The same report mentions that Mülazim Hüseyin had committed similar acts in Eğri 
Dere and Gorentzi.
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then forced to take oaths that they would register as Rum because, they were 
told, they would “otherwise be killed.” The next morning, the Mülâzım 
“brought them in front of the head of the census commission, where the 
unfortunates had the courage to declare ‘given that the census is done by 
blows of sticks, we can register not only as Rums, but gypsies as well, if that 
will please the commission.’ ” The angry official reportedly registered them 
as neither.65
It is no coincidence that all the mentioned villages in these two reports 
were cited in the statistical tables of Mishev’s pro-Bulgarian study,  published 
in 1905, as “Hellenizing Bulgarian Patriarchist, where the important 
adjective, naturally, was “Bulgarian.”66 Mishev’s figures should not be 
taken at face value, especially because he, among other things, could cite 
the same “Bulgarian” village twice and disregarded the Muslim popula tion 
altogether—which was estimated to constitute at least half the  population of 
Macedonia even by pro-Russian and pro-Greek sources, not to mention 
Ottoman population statistics.67 The figures do, however, support the hy-
pothesis that all these problem cases were locations inhabited mostly by 
Slavic-speaking followers of the Patriarchate, whose loyalties could go 
either way. Even though allegations about a systematic policy directed 
from the Imperial center aiming to register all Christians as Rum is impos-
sible to document (and similar allegations were made by the Greek side as 
well), there is ample evidence that a significant number of Ottoman provin-
cial administrators were at least in tacit collaboration with the Patriarchate 
to bring the unruly Christian subjects back into the grip of an established 
imperial institution.68 In addition, there is enough extant evidence to sug-
gest that Hüseyin Pasha had a pro-Patriarchist bias.69 For instance, a 
 communiqué sent by the Inspectorate to the prefecture of Vodine [Edessa] 
on September 28, 1904, reveals that months before the commencement of 
the census process, provincial administrators were called on to be on the de-
fense against the “Bulgarian evil-doers,” who, it was understood, “had the 
idea of bringing Bulgarians to the majority in the latest census.”70 Months 
later, an encrypted message from the Inspectorate to the Sublime Porte stated 
65. MAE, Constantinople, vol. 147, Série E Macédoine, September 7, 1905.
66. Brancoff [Mishev], La Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne, 198–201.
67. MAE. vol. 40, report “Population du Vilayet du Salonique,” Salonika, March 1904.
68. After stating that Colonel Vérand would ask for the resignation of the mentioned 
Mülâzım who was harassing the villagers, the report continues, “but this resignation would 
serve nothing, since it is Constantinople where the orders to transform the Bulgars into Greeks 
by all means possible come from.” MAE, vol. 147, Série E Macédoine, September 7, 1905.
69. It was a common notion among the French mission that Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha was 
partial to the Patriarchists and would do anything within his power to increase their numbers. 
On the other hand, the Greek Consulate was disturbed by what it perceived to be a “Bulgarian 
bias” among most of the French gendarmerie; MAE, Turquie, Gendarmerie Internationale, vol. 
415, August 4, 1904.
70. BOA, TFR.I.SL 53/5221, September 28, 1904.
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the necessity of minimizing the problems related to the census and urged 
explicitly that officials should prevent “the registry of the Christian popu-
lation’s majority that have long been members of the Patriarchate among 
Bulgarians.”71 It may be difficult to comprehend the Ottoman establishment 
support of the Patriarchate if we look through the lens of nationalist teleol-
ogy, but at the time, this was a rational choice for both parties involved—
the Patriarchate constituted “the lesser of two evils,” and the Sublime 
Porte wished to reestablish the authority of an imperial institution. This 
attitude gradually started to change as the activities of “action-minded” 
priests in the Patriarchate drowned out the dissenting voices of their more 
moderate colleagues and as diverging tendencies within Greece and the Pa-
triarchate coalesced and then clashed with their Young Turk counterparts 
in Macedonia.
The Greek side was far from content about the timing and implementation 
of the census. The Syllogue Macédonien of Athens, the semi-official advo-
cate of the Greek cause in Macedonia, delivered a memorandum to the rep-
resentatives of the Great Powers on June 26, 1905, about the “ethnographic 
census,” protesting its rationale and the way it was being carried out. The 
memo alleged that the census was being taken in preparation for the imple-
mentation of the Mürzsteg Reform Program’s third article. The picture that 
the Syllogue Macédonien informants drew was one that was in complete 
contrast with the reports and complaints already mentioned. According to 
them, far from forcing the population to refuse Bulgarian identity cards, the 
census agents, “often under occult influences,” did quite the opposite. They 
“[distorted] the will of the local populations by all means to extort declara-
tions from them contrary to the national faith they profess with conviction.” 
It was not the Bulgarians who were undercounted by the census clerks, the 
Syllogue informants averred: “despite their formal declarations claiming the 
right to be registered in the lists of the Greek community, there were a good 
number of Macedonians [listed] among the Bulgarians and others.” The res-
olution demanded by the Syllogue Macédonien was nothing less than a halt 
to the census process, which it recommended be postponed until “a more 
favorable time when the work conducted under conditions of tranquility, 
trust and individual liberty could result in the production of a picture faith-
ful to the Macedonian populations and to the national sentiment that domi-
nates in this or that part of the region within the reach of the project of 
reforms.”72 There is no reason to doubt the veracity of Hüseyin Hilmi Pa-
71. BOA, TFR.I.SL 24/2387, Inspectorate to the Sadâret and Başkitâbet, June 3, 1905. 
Another common complaint about the partiality of Ottoman officials was that they always 
visited villages accompanied by Rums but never Bulgars; MAE, Constantinople, vol. 147, Série 
E Macédoine, July 27, 1905.
72. MAE, Constantinople, Correspondance Générale, M. d’Ormesson, Ministère de 
France à Athènes to M. Rouvier, Prèsident du Conseil, June 30, 1905.
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sha’s statement that the decision to conduct a general census had nothing to 
do with the Mürzsteg Reform Program. The record confirms his statement, 
and the claim that the Ottomans were carrying out a census to confirm to an 
ill-defined clause of a Reform Program that they considered an affront to Ot-
toman sovereignty, and detested by all accounts, does not make much sense. 
Moreover, the parties fighting over the timing of the census were so focused 
on the demographic fight over Macedonia that they completely ignored that 
this exercise was meant to be a population count of the empire as a whole, 
including Macedonia, which, despite all efforts to the contrary, was still part 
of the Ottoman Empire. As the reforms continued, and the disappointment 
of the Greek side with the actions of the representatives of the European 
Powers in the region grew, so did their protests, not to mention the armed 
activity supported by the Hellenic Kingdom. The head of the French mis-
sion, Colonel Vérand, noted what was becoming more obvious in a report 
written on July 2, 1907: “They [Greeks] completely forget that Macedonia 
is TURKISH, they assume that Europe will treat Turkey as a negligible entity 
and will dispossess it for their advantage. The example of Crete gives them 
confirmation of this idea.”73 The Greek side was not the only one drawing 
lessons from Eastern Rumelia, the Bulgarian Principality, and Crete; the 
writing was clear for the other Balkan nation-states desperately trying to 
extend their boundaries. More important, Colonel Vérand’s admonishment 
of the Greeks ignored the fact that it was European Powers, and not Greek 
politicians, that had been supporting the notion that Turkey in Europe was 
an anomaly that had outlived its historical relevance. Obviously there was 
not a chance that a demographic picture of the European provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire would make any of the interested parties happy, no matter 
how and when it was carried out, and the real burden of the census fell not 
on the protesting elites but on the people being counted.
Taking the Nation out of Denomination
Fights over who would be called what on the census register had be-
gun before the census itself. It seems that the Ottoman administration had 
 entertained the idea of dropping the denomination or millet question alto-
gether in favor of proceeding with the three benignly general categories of 
Muslim, Jewish, and Christian.74 This idea was abandoned after Hüseyin 
Hilmi Pasha pointed out that, because the military exemption tax (bedel-i 
askeriye) was paid separately by each millet, based on the total number of 
men eligible for military service, it could not be collected effectively under 
73. MAE, Politique Intérieure, Turquie, Colonel Vérand’s report, July 2, 1907.
74. PRO, FO 195/2208, Graves to O’Connor, November 18, 1905.
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such a classification.75 It is not clear, however, whether this was really the 
reason for the inspector’s insistence on registering denominational affilia-
tions. The 1881/1882–1893 census (henceforth, 1893 census) included de-
nominational affiliations, but the principal register (esas defter) of 1893 
contained only one entry for the Greek Orthodox population, which, al-
though more specific than a general religious category such as “Christian,” 
was not as specific as denominational affiliation. That distinction (for tax 
purposes) was made in separate registers called Bulgar and Rum defterleri, 
where the Greek Orthodox population was recorded as Exarchist or Pa-
triarchist. It seems that in the 1903 census the desire of the central state to 
obtain an accurate count of its population, vertically ordered, and to pre-
serve a common census policy across the empire, overrode concerns about 
the potential problems that might arise from this distinction in a politically 
volatile area. The government attempted a compromise solution whereby 
denominational affiliation would be recorded in the main census register 
but the identity cards handed to individuals would display only religious 
affiliation. But this too was ineffective in quelling attacks by propaganda 
groups, who knew all too well that it was the denominational aggregates 
that mattered in the end.76
Perhaps more problematic were continuously confused administration 
 efforts at “rectifying” terminology, which neither confirmed traditional 
markers of identity nor devised new ones that would comfortably accom-
modate the sensibilities of the population. After the official recognition of 
the Vlachs as a millet that would be acknowledged in the census register in 
1905, the term millet no longer corresponded strictly to denominational 
affiliation. This raised questions about the naming of other ethnically dif-
ferentiated members of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.77 For instance, when 
some villagers petitioned the Inspectorate to be registered as belonging 
to the Serbian denomination (Sırb mezhebi), the administrator of their 
 subprefecture felt the need to elaborate, in his response to the Inspector-
ate inquiry, that “Serbness is not a denomination but a nationality (Sırblık 
bir mezheb olmayub milliyet bulunduğuna).” Therefore, he argued, any de-
mands to change census records on this basis should be rejected.78 Milliyet 
(“nationality”)—confusingly, derived from the word millet—was an entirely 
75. BOA, TFR.I.A 24/2392, June 10, 1905; Stanford J. Shaw, “The Nineteenth-Century 
Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, 
no. 4 (1975), 456.
76. PRO, FO 195/2232, Monahan to O’Connor, January 5, 1906; Karpat, Ottoman 
Population, 162–63.
77. The Vlachs spoke a Romance language and constituted a separate sociolinguis-
tic group but were followers of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. During this period, Romania 
emerged as their patron state, claiming kinship based on language and with an eye toward 
establishing a base in an area that would soon be partitioned among Balkan nation-states.
78. BOA, TFR.I.SL 80/7938, Doyran Prefecture to the Inspectorate, August 10, 1905.
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new term, recognized but not completely understood by the Ottoman bu-
reaucracy. Even though this particular administrator noted the distinction 
between mezheb and milliyet and recognized only the relevance of the for-
mer for census categories, there were many cases in which local officials 
were faced with even more perplexing choices, especially concerning the 
registry of people who identified themselves as Albanian, Serb, or Greek, 
categories that did not necessarily correspond to one specific denomination. 
Another concept, cinsiyet (which more or less corresponded to “race” in its 
nonbiological, turn-of-the-century meaning or to “national affiliation” in 
this context), was thrown into the mix to differentiate such people.79
This perpetually shifting terminology reflected the problems of a new or-
der that was short of words to express the nuances of preexisting norms 
of social organization and local differences. The problem, it is important 
to note, should be attributed to a lack of expertise or fluency in the new 
categories of collective identity. It is true that the census clerks’ apparent 
lack of training made worse an already dire situation. There is no reason 
to expect, however, that better training based on expert knowledge would 
have produced indisputable results. The issue was not that the criteria (or 
lack thereof) by which the state measured and classified the population or 
its faulty transmission to the people who implemented the census but, in-
stead, that the very act of taking a census that would tie people into a single 
category of identification, which, uneducated as they were, the peasants 
understood to have important and tangible ramifications for their lives.
About a decade earlier, during the all-Russian census of 1897, the Rus-
sian officials had had a similar experience when trying to register and clas-
sify the population of the empire according to their “nationalities.” Unlike 
the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire had more extensive resources, 
know-how, and, more important, newly colonized territories that should be 
rendered “legible” to the state. The Russian Imperial Geographical Society 
had a special Ethnography Division whose research directly informed how 
the subjects of the empire would be registered and classified.80 Yet even the 
expert members of the division had no clear consensus on how narodnost 
or nationalnost, two terms for “nationality” that were used interchangeably 
at the time, would be established.81 In the end, a compromise was found 
that considered “native language as the ‘primary category’ of narodnost.” 
Even though the census questionnaire did not include a direct question on 
nationality, the information gathered on religion and confessional  affiliation 
was later used to compose a list of the narodnosti of the empire.82 The 
79. In modern Turkish, millet and milliyet still refer to concepts akin to their turn-of-the-
century meanings, but cinsiyet has changed meaning to denote gender.
80. Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the 
Soviet Union (Ithaca, 2005), 35–51.
81. Ibid., 39.
82. Ibid., 38.
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implementation of this compromise, however, was quite uneven across 
the vast territories of the Russian Empire, and especially in regions where the 
questions of religion and language were considered politically sensitive, the 
“self-declaration” principle was largely ignored.83 Moreover, nationality, in 
its conception as either narodnost or nationalnost, did not make much head-
way among the populations of the rural periphery of the Russian Empire. 
Even decades later, when the first all-union census of the Soviets was taken 
in 1924, despite the highly centralized and organized structure of the census 
and the number of analytical tools at the disposal of the census takers, local 
and religious identities in Europe and Asia, respectively, continued to be the 
dominant references for self-identification among the peasants.84
Nevertheless, imposing a certain degree of control on the chaos that pre-
vailed over the census categories was an urgent necessity in the Macedonian 
countryside, and in the absence of a similar panel of experts on ethnography, 
the task fell to Inspector General Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, who issued some 
general guidelines that would be followed in the registration of the Christian 
population. He first of all decreed that August 1903, that is, the date of the 
Ilinden Uprising, be legally instituted as a cut-off date for official recogni-
tion of conversions to and from the Patriarchate. Conversions after this date 
would be declared void to minimize the incentives the bands might have in 
coercing the population during the census. The census clerks were instructed 
to follow four general principles with regard to disputable cases:
• Those who were followers of the Exarchate or the Patriarchate before 
August 1903 should be registered according to their old church affiliation.
• Those who claim to be Rum or Serb now, even though they have been fol-
lowers of the Exarchate for a long time, should be registered as “Orthodox, 
member of the Exarchate” until their nationalities (cinsiyetleri) are deter-
mined after the disturbances are over.
• Those Christians who have long been followers of the Patriarchate and who 
clearly will insist on having their nationalities as well as their denominations 
spelled out [mezhebleriyle beraber cinsiyetlerinin dahi tasrihini mussirren 
iddia edecekleri derkâr olan] such as Serbs, Vlachs, and Albanians who 
reside in vilâyets (provinces) of Monastir and Kosovo should be registered 
as “Serb, Vlach or Albanian, member of the Patriarchate.”
• Those who are followers of the Patriarchate and claim to be Serb, Vlach, 
Albanian, and Bulgarian although their nationalities are  disputable [mes’ele-yi 
83. David W. Darrow, “Census as a Technology of Empire,” Ab Imperio 4 (2002): 
145–76.
84. It took another two decades of Soviet social engineering to consolidate those peasants 
into nations inhabiting geographically delimited territories. For a concise account see Francine 
Hirsch, “The Soviet Union as Work-in-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality 
in the 1926, 1937 and 1939 Censuses,” Slavic Review 56 (1997): 251–78.
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 cinsiyetleri taht-ı itirâz ve ihtilâfda kalacaklar] should be registered, as in the 
second clause, “Orthodox, member of the Patriarchate.”85
These guidelines did little in practice to solve the problems. In fact, they 
aggravated them by adding more variables and jargon to an already mud-
dled system of classification. One of the direct effects was to increase the 
already high volume of correspondence generated by lower-level provin-
cial officials, who sought the approval of their superiors regarding their 
decisions in situations that might constitute exceptions or failed to fit any 
category. It was only a couple of days after the Inspectorate had communi-
cated these regulations to all the departments that the subgovernor of Serres 
asked for approval from the inspector general to register “Bulgarians who 
are attached to the Patriarchate as ‘Bulgarian, member of the Patriarchate’ 
(Rum Patrikhanesine mensub Bulgar),” given that “according to the general 
orders, Albanians, Bosnians etc. attached to the Greek Patriarchate will be 
registered as ‘Albanian or Bosnian, member of the Greek Patriarchate.’ ”86
The subgovernor’s inquiry is interesting for two reasons. First, it high-
lights the careful omission of the Inspectorate of the word Bulgar from the 
final registers in favor of the more ambiguous “Orthodox member of the 
Exarchate,” reinforcing the perception that the Patriarchists enjoyed a privi-
leged position vis-à-vis their Exarchist brethren, especially given that the 
subgovernor’s request to acknowledge the Bulgar cinsiyeti (albeit with a 
qualifier) in the register seems not to have been granted. Second, it illustrates 
a common problem faced by local administrators in following regulations 
sent from the center. Their decisions, as in the case of the subgovernor of 
Serres, were often at odds with their superiors mostly because of the contra-
dictory imperatives to take the initiative in settling a dispute and to ensure 
that the decision would comply with the vague guidelines of the central 
administration. Another example in this regard is the kaymakam (prefect) 
of Doyran (Kilkis and Nov Dojran), who did not find it appropriate to 
follow the entries in the 1893 register for three villages under his jurisdic-
tion but still forwarded the matter to the Inspectorate, seeking approval 
for his course of action.87 The first of the villages was Valandova (Valan-
dovo), which consisted of twenty households that had been “claiming to be 
Bulgarians for the last five years,” even though the 1893 register cited them 
as Rum. “In order to prevent the complaints and hardships that will prob-
ably emerge,” the prefect found it appropriate to register them as Exarchists. 
The other two cases concerned Fourka (Furka) and Vladya (Akritas). Ap-
parently, the residents of Fourka had somehow been registered in the Bulgar 
85. BOA, TFR.I.A. 24/2387, June 3, 1905.
86. BOA, TFR.I.SL 74/7367, Siroz (Serres) Mutasarrıfı (Subgovernorate) to the Inspec-
torate, June 8, 1905.
87. BOA, TFR.I.SL 74/7301, Doyran Prefecture to the Inspectorate, 21 Mayıs 1321 [June 3, 
1905].
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defteri during the past census even though they had been attached to the 
Patriarchate for a long time, a mistake they had petitioned to have corrected 
on March 28, 1901. On August 30, 1904, they petitioned again, but this 
time to change their denomination to the Exarchate. They also demanded 
a Bulgarian teacher on the grounds that their children did not speak Greek. 
This final petition, however, was not accepted. The prefect expected that 
they would complain and try to be registered as “Bulgars” again, but his 
decision, pending approval, was to refuse their request because, he noted, 
they had been “Rum by origin and for generations.” The case of Vladya, on 
the other hand, was the complete opposite. The residents of this village had 
been registered in the Rum defteri, but because a majority of them had been 
“Bulgarians for the last ten years and their church and school belonged to 
the Bulgarians” the prefect’s counsel was to register them among “Bulgars” 
without regard to the old register.
The criterion used by the prefect to justify his decisions, namely that of 
“church and school belonging to one community and not the other,” un-
derscores another complication with the census process. In fact, the propri-
etorship of churches and schools was itself an often disputed issue among 
communities. Therefore the use of the church and school building by a com-
munity was subject to the same problems as the original question. In other 
words, the prefect’s logic, however well-intentioned, confused the basis of 
the problem with its solution and did not address the fundamental problem 
of recording the villagers’ “true identity,” which, according to the Inspector-
ate, was to be found in the 1893 register—at least until further notice. The 
process seemed completely to exclude the wishes of the counted. It did not 
mean, however, they were incapable of finding ways to resist.
Resisting the Count
In 1903, the Ottoman government (re)issued a law requiring that a nüfus 
tezkeresi (personal identity card) be produced for the completion of any 
official transaction. This was one of the major instruments of the state for 
coaxing or coercing the peasants to participate in the count.88 Identity cards 
were to be handed to every individual in conjunction with the census survey. 
The requirement was a novel concept in state surveillance but remained 
ineffective against a sizable segment of the population.89 Even though the 
88. Cem Behar, “Qui Compte? ‘Recensement’ et Statistiques Démographiques dans 
L’Empire Ottoman, du XVIe au XXe Siècle,” Histoire et Mesure 13, no. 1–2 (1998), 142–43. 
This requirement was introduced with the 1881/82 count.
89. The mürur tezkeresi was another document that contained similar information, but it 
was required only for travel; in other words, it was an internal passport.
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government was adamant about completing the census, many villagers 
slowed the process down by simply refusing to obtain their tezkeres.90
In Negovan (Xiloupoli), for instance, the peasants were called in for an 
interview by the authorities to settle the dispute about their denomination. 
They did not respond to the summons, however, and as a result no tezkeres 
were assigned. According to the correspondence between the prefecture of 
Langaza (Lagadas) and its administrative superior, the province of Salonika, 
the inhabitants of Negovan had converted twice: they were originally Rum, 
then they had converted to the Exarchate “under threats from the brigands,” 
and finally they had converted back to the Patriarchate. According to the tax 
and census bureaus, they were still listed in the Bulgarian register, and the 
province demanded that this be corrected.91 This order was evidently carried 
out, and the village was transferred to the Rum register. The issue, however, 
was not resolved here. The Exarchist archbishop of Salonika sent a petition 
requesting the transfer of their records back to the Bulgarian register. The 
general census administrator took the petition seriously enough to advise the 
census bureau of Langaza to carry out an inquiry. The commission was to 
inspect military tax-exemption records and find out whether the community 
had employed Bulgarian priests and teachers and so determine the “proper” 
denomination of Negovan residents.92 The village notables, the community 
leader, and the priest had presumably been called in to settle this last issue, 
but they had not presented themselves even two weeks after they had been 
called in. As a result, the matter remained unresolved.93
It is not clear from the correspondence of the local Ottoman authorities 
why the village elders failed to attend the interview. The exchange, back 
and forth, of conflicting petitions suggests a certain hesitation among the 
inhabitants to register one way or the other. This incident is also remarkable 
in that it was the Exarchist archbishop of Salonika who requested a transfer 
of records, not the villagers themselves, as was the normal procedure. The 
villagers’ unwillingness to come forth under these circumstances strongly 
implies that they had been threatened by one or both of the parties of pro-
pagandists in the area, who employed equally brutal methods to enforce 
their rules.
Another case that testifies to the kind of objections the peasants raised 
against the census process occurred in Kavaklı (Leukonas]) a village located 
right outside of Serres.94 The inhabitants complained to the Inspectorate in 
90. PRO, FO, Monahan to O’Connor, January 5, 1906; MAE, Constantinople, vol. 147, 
Série E, October 7, 1905, and July 27, 1905.
91. BOA, TFR.I.M 11/1088–1, Governor of Salonika to Prefecture February 22, 1906.
92. BOA, TFR.I.M. 11/1088–1, Nüfus Nâzırı to Langaza Nüfus Müdürlüğü, Febru-
ary 25, 1906.
93. BOA, TFR.I.M 11/1088–1, Governorship of Salonika to Prefecture, March 11, 1906.
94. The entire correspondence concerning this village is located in BOA, TFR.I.SL 
74/7395.
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a telegram dated May 31, 1905, that despite their objections they had been 
registered as Exarchists, and they returned their tezkeres. This telegram, 
coupled with the Greek Consul Lambros Koromilas’s personal intervention, 
apparently precipitated a full investigation of the church and ethnic affilia-
tion of the village, which, it seems, could not simply be determined by asking 
the villagers which church they attended. Even the telegram itself reveals 
why Kavaklı was a controversial case; most of the names signed at the end 
of the petition stating they had been “Rum since old times” and that would 
“remain so until eternity” were Slavic rather than Greek versions of popu-
lar Orthodox Christian names—Yovan Yorgi, Mitye Renya, Simyo Yuvan 
[sic].95 It is also interesting to note that this village had been cited in two 
ethnographic maps published by Bulgarians in 1901 and 1905 as Exarchist 
and Patriarchist, respectively, whereas Mishev listed it as a “Hellenizing 
Bulgarian Patriarchist” village with a population of 328.96 Kavaklı, it seems, 
preserved its “confessional ambiguity” even in the eyes of the propagandists.
It is instructive to recall the 1897 census experience in Russia as a com-
parison here. The nexus of the problems there, as in the Ottoman case, lay 
with the emerging notion that demographic superiority could be translated 
into political gain and with the dissemination of this notion among a popu-
lation precisely through the statistical exercise that was designed to measure 
it. Naturally, regions with a highly “mixed” population, such as Macedonia 
and Galicia, were particularly prone to manipulation, if not violence, as 
population statistics turned into a political battleground. For both the Ot-
tomans and the Russians, the question amounted to one of political legiti-
macy, albeit for slightly different reasons. The Ottomans were in a bind not 
because of the number of Muslims in the region, which, even by the accounts 
of propagandists, made up about half the total population. These lands had 
been part of the Ottoman Empire since medieval times. Nevertheless, the 
Ottomans were aware of the precariousness of their hold on sovereignty in a 
region where they were considered an anomaly not only by the neighboring 
Balkan states yearning to redeem their brethren along with the territories 
they inhabited but also by European statesmen, liberal and conservative 
alike, who viewed the sincerity of the Ottoman reforms with suspicion if 
not cynicism. The various political purposes the results of the census could 
serve, and the consequences of establishing one non-Muslim group as the 
dominant demographic element among the others were clear. The Russian 
anxieties, on the other hand, were more acute in areas whose Russian pedi-
gree was questionable because they were relatively more recent additions to 
the imperial territories and where the number of Russians was not securely 
95. BOA, TFR.I.SL 74/7395, Kavaklı residents to the Inspectorate, May 31, 1905.
96. Cartes Ethnographiques des Vilayets Salonique, Cossovo, Monastir (Sofia, 1901); 
Carte des Ecoles Chrétiennes; Brancoff [Mishev], La Macédoine et sa Population Chré-
tienne, 198.
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high to serve as an indisputable basis for political legitimacy, such as acquisi-
tions from the partition of Poland and Austrian Galicia.
Unlike their Ottoman counterparts, the Russian census clerks had been 
given clear instructions to fill out the census questionnaire based on “self-
identification.” In practice, however, these instructions were overridden 
by orders from provincial governors. The enumeration of the population 
of Galicia, with its large Uniate population, turned out to be particularly 
problematic. David W. Darrow notes that “petitions from Uniate families 
and—in most cases—from entire villages” poured in, asking to be registered 
as Uniate; “to emphasize that their complaint was not based on any fickle-
ness of faith connected to the census, many villages emphasized the fact that 
they had been practicing Roman Catholics for nearly thirty years,” not un-
like their counterparts in Ottoman Macedonia who had produced records 
to prove the longevity, and hence the sincerity, of their sectarian affiliation. 
In the Russian case, that the petitions supposedly coming from “Russian” 
peasants were written “in Polish” did not help their case, and the category 
“Uniate” simply disappeared from the final tally of the census, even though 
it was present in the “initial drafts of proposed tables on the population’s 
religious composition.”97
Only a few years before Uniate peasants were trying to convince the 
Russian census authorities not to register them as “Orthodox,” another 
government official in the Ottoman Empire had registered the inhabitants 
of the village of Kavaklı (mentioned previously) as “Exarchist,” not because 
they had declared themselves so but because—at least according to the lo-
cal governor—they had been heard speaking Bulgarian.98 As it turns out, 
Kavaklı residents had never petitioned to join the Exarchate between 1893 
and 1905; instead, the census commission had simply copied the previous 
register of 1893, repeating the mistake of the earlier commission. The gov-
ernor had an all-too-bureaucratic explanation for why the registry could 
not be amended: “[in 1893] according to the orders of the Ministry of the 
Interior, part of them [Kavaklı residents] had been given Bulgarian, and 
later ‘Christian and Orthodox’ tezkeres. Besides, since the principle register 
does not contain millet affiliation, and the inhabitants obviously spoke in 
Bulgarian, they were written down in the register called Bulgar sicili, [and 
later] they were registered as Bulgars in compliance with the order that for-
mer records would not be changed.”99
There is no doubt that the inhabitants of Kavaklı were Slavic-speaking. 
Even Greek Consul Koromilas, in his letter to Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, did not 
dispute this. What he disputed was whether the language spoken could be 
considered enough indication of the ethnic affiliation of a village. Obviously 
97. Darrow, “Census as a Technology of Empire,” 168–70.
98. BOA, TFR.I.SL 74/7395, Governorship of Salonika to the Inspectorate, June 1, 1905.
99. BOA, TFR.I.SL 74/7395, Governorship of Salonika to the Inspectorate, June 3, 1905.
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the consul’s sentiments were not based on an attachment to the liberal prin-
ciple of self-determination. In fact, Koromilas would hardly have advo-
cated the distribution of tezkeres based solely on the choices of peasants in 
Macedonia. His point of view was encapsulated in his words: “As for the 
language spoken [in the village], I am amazed that the commission has the 
right to state it without the inhabitants’ consent. I admit that this census is 
complicated since we must not conform to the statements of the inhabitants 
except up to a certain extent.”100
We can draw a number of conclusions from the case of Kavaklı. First of all, 
it demonstrates once again the ambivalence that those in the region possessed 
toward ethnic affiliation, not only the villagers themselves but also the Otto-
man local administrators and the Greek consul. Second, as the consul’s words 
revealed, the people’s own perceptions of their identity, even when explicitly 
stated, were often considered irrelevant. This was not specific to Kavaklı, or 
even to Ottoman Macedonia, because state officials and bureaucrats had a 
bias against rural populations, inhabitants of regions deemed “backward,” 
or with lifestyles that did not conform to the rules of civilized society. Under-
counting and top-down reporting should be attributed to this bias. In the case 
of Kavaklı, the consul and the local administrators, even though they were 
well aware of the dubious definitions in the census questionnaire, were less 
interested in questioning the usefulness, under such conditions, of such a cen-
sus than they were in neutralizing those very same conditions to obtain what 
they considered to be the “appropriate” results. The governor, in seeking the 
inspector general’s approval, argued that the principle of preserving the old 
records had to be applied consistently to all cases for the sake of preventing 
other villagers from demanding changes in the census records for similar 
reasons—and therefore Kavaklı residents should tolerate Bulgar tezkeres for 
the time being, even if they were justified in their claims.101 Hüseyin Hilmi 
Pasha, in contrast, advised that the village be registered as “Patriarchist” 
despite apparent concerns about “inconsistency.”
Finally, it is revealing that the peasants, who had apparently been pay-
ing their military tax as Exarchists, had not objected to their status until 
1905, when they were to receive their new tezkeres. This could be either 
because they were not aware of the previous situation or, if they were, be-
cause they did not care to object. Both possibilities underscore the sheer 
novelty of the issue for the party it affected most. And, finally, the fact that 
the Kavaklı inhabitants—who claimed that they were Rum and would “re-
main so for eternity”—actually conversed with one another in a Slavic idiom 
demonstrates the complexity and resilience of traditional and, in this case, 
religious loyalties.
100. BOA, TFR.I.SL 74/7395, Greek Consul General Koromilas to Inspector General 
Hilmi Pasha, June 1, 1905. (Emphasis added.)
101. BOA, TFR.I.SL 74/7395, Governorship of Salonika to the Inspectorate, June 4, 
1905.
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Counting from the Bottom Up
In October 1905, census authorities dispatched an inquiry commission 
to the small village of Zervi (Zervi), to establish under which denomination 
the villagers should be registered. They suspected that the residents of Zervi 
were Exarchists even though they were registered as Patriarchists in the 
1893 register. When the commission members reached their destination and 
started to question the villagers, the response they received was not what 
they expected. “We are neither Rum nor Bulgarian,” insisted the villagers, 
“we are Christians.”102 The term Rum, which had denoted a religious af-
filiation in the past, namely (Greek) Orthodox Christian, no longer meant 
the same thing. Nevertheless, some obviously still held on to that religious 
identity.
The response of the peasants of Zervi to the Ottoman census commission 
should not come as a surprise. When modernizing states came into contact 
with rural communities and attempted to integrate them into new sociopo-
litical structures, they often found out that these communities did not give up 
their long-established references for social differentiation on demand. Reli-
gious identity was one of the strongest such anchors. To say that peasants had 
a propensity to identify as members of a religious group is not to privilege 
religion as a “pure” marker of identity as opposed to an “alien ethnic grid” 
imposed on the population. We must keep in mind that religion was also 
used to inform the “racial” enumeration categories and, more important, 
that religion itself was a marker produced socially and deployed in dynamic 
forms. Nor am I suggesting that peasant communities inhabited a magically 
peaceful world of undifferentiated and coherent units before they were na-
tionalized. Just as caste was “not a figment of the British political imagina-
tion,” religious and linguistic differences in Macedonia were not invented 
by the Ottoman administration or the European patron states.103 But their 
politicization was. To see the ways in which those differences were socially 
articulated before and after the onset of the process of nationalization, we 
first need to divest that process of its assumed teleology. From this perspec-
tive, it is useful to remember that the two conflicting communities described 
here had, until recently, been living side by side, baptizing their children in 
the same churches, sending their children to the same schools, and bury-
ing their dead in the same cemeteries. Even the church schism did not erase 
these practices overnight; the two denominations often took turns using a 
102. BOA, TFR.I.SL 87/8623, Vodine Prefecture to the Inspectorate, October 26, 1905.
103. Appadurai, “Number in the Colonial Imagination,” 319. It is also important to 
remember how British experts on race and caste, such as H. H. Risley, the commissioner for 
the 1891 census, and the director of ethnography for India, relied on “Brahmanical measures, 
and opinions, concerning caste rank.” Nicholas Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the 
Making of Modern India (Princeton, 2001), 213.
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church building or held mass together.104 Boundaries and divisions occu-
pied a much smaller place in the collective memory of these communities 
until normalization and enumeration linked those same divisions with the 
politics of representation. In other words, the sectarian division within the 
Orthodox Church, which had been a very narrowly defined difference, was 
transformed into a general principle on which the society was divided and 
represented—not just locally but in the eyes of an international audience.
The unyielding, rigid classificatory practices of the modern state, such as 
the census, were a galvanizing force in creating national identity in the impe-
rial and colonial contexts I have mentioned here (and ironically facilitated 
their own destruction). Nevertheless, there are limits to the parallels we can 
draw between these contexts. The most obvious limit is that many of the 
peculiarities of the colonial census can be gleaned not from what it counted 
in the colonies but from how that count contrasted with its metropolitan 
counterpart. One important feature that distinguishes the dynastic empires 
in this regard is the singular relationship the state had already established 
and kept in place with its subjects through its bureaucracy. Even though 
there were variations in local practices, these were not of the same nature 
as those that separated colonial and metropolitan administration principles. 
The distance that separated the census clerk from the people he was count-
ing was much smaller than the distance between the British surveyors and 
the colonial subjects they were classifying and counting.
When we look at the implementation of the 1903 census, for instance, we 
clearly see that the census takers did not start with a tabula rasa on which 
they sketched a system of classification that they had conjured up based on 
an ethnographic study of local customs. Instead, they had to work within 
an organic system that preceded the modern notions and categories of col-
lective identity—a “system” that included gendarmes torturing villagers to 
make them accept their identity cards, local administrators relentlessly re-
porting protests to their superiors (some of whom did not know if “Serb” 
was a religious or national category), and peasants who kept insisting that 
they were simply Christians. The census takers, as unwelcome and alien as 
they may have been in the villages they visited, represented an authority 
with which the population was accustomed to communicating. This culture 
of negotiation was especially significant because it allowed the voices of the 
peasants to be heard. Their position was expressed through protests, peti-
tions, and, failing that, outright refusal to participate, suggesting that the 
census was not simply an operation executed in a top-down manner and 
that the population itself significantly affected the way it was implemented.
Another element that distinguishes the Ottoman census of 1903 from co-
lonial body counts, as well as from previous methods of enumeration, was 
104. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606. See also Brailsford, Macedonia, Its Races and Their 
Future, 72.
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the tension generated by the inherent contradiction between a new practice, 
which presumably relied on information at the level of the individual, and the 
preexisting relationship between the peasants and the state, which defined 
the peasants solely in terms of their communities. Even though the peasants 
were given individual identity cards, the choices they made in accepting those 
cards were not individual ones. It is remarkable that most petitions were 
signed by representatives of an entire village and processed by the administra-
tion under the name of the village, not of the individuals. We should also re-
call that disputes concerning allegiance to the Patriarchate and the Exarchate 
required lengthy investigations into the community church attendance by the 
census commission instead of a simple question addressed to the individuals 
during the census. The inhabitants’ own statements were not to be taken at 
face value, and this was a point on which the Greek consul and Ottoman 
administrators agreed, albeit for different reasons.
Beshara Doumani’s analysis of a population count in Nablus in the mid-
nineteenth century helps us see the census functioning as a domain staked 
out between the center and the periphery. The negotiations that went on 
between the state and the local notables in Palestine may seem reminiscent 
of the negotiations we saw in early-twentieth-century Macedonia, but in 
fact there was a significant difference, which Doumani hints at in his final 
remark: “By the end of that [nineteenth] century all individuals regardless 
of sex and age would become the basic unit of counting, further facilitating 
the integration of the local population into new administrative, cultural, and 
legal categories aimed at undermining local affiliation and creating loyal Ot-
toman ‘citizens.’ ”105 The difference, in other words, concerned the politics 
of counting, which was no longer concentrated within an elite domain but 
diffused across a much wider segment of society.
The degree of the success of the state in carrying out its ideological 
objective of creating “loyal Ottoman citizens” through modern population 
counts is another matter. According to Cem Behar, the vocabulary of the last 
two censuses of the Ottoman Empire went even further than erasing local 
affiliations; it sought to substitute national identity with an Ottoman one.106 
The way in which the classificatory logic of the census was imposed on the 
population in Macedonia suggests that there was indeed a concern with 
placing people in categories designated by the state, but the same agenda, as 
we have seen, did not always trickle down to the lower echelons of provin-
cial administration. In any case, under the circumstances that prevailed in 
Macedonia—and in other regions of the empire—the executors of the 1903 
census had neither the means nor the will to inject a sense of “Ottomanness” 
105. Beshara Doumani, “The Political Economy of Population Counts in Ottoman Pal-
estine: Nablus, circa 1850,”International Journal of Middle East Studies 26, no. 1 (1994), 14.
106. Behar, “Qui Compte?” 143.
Fear of Small Margins  167
in the society. On the contrary, it was more effective in the “minoritization” 
of the confessional categories in the empire than in their Ottomanization.107
It is obvious that, when there are political incentives involved, a census 
can never be a purely statistical exercise. A less obvious fact, but equally im-
portant, is that no census is without a political motive. But the assumption 
remains that it is possible to separate those incentives from the census pro-
cess by introducing categories that can be “objectively” determined—and 
this assumption was a widely accepted principle among European ethnogra-
phers and geographers at the turn of the twentieth century. In practice, how-
ever, these “objective” categories engendered a different set of problems. 
Take, for instance, the censuses of the Habsburg Empire between 1880 and 
1910, whose scientific sophistication and efficient implementation, unlike 
the condemned efforts of the Ottoman Empire, were not disputed by any self-
respecting statistician in Europe. Because of a question concerning language, 
nationality became an issue in the census questionnaire of the Habsburg 
Empire.108 Language was understood simply as the medium of daily com-
munication in the Austrian half of the empire, whereas the Hungarian half 
defined it as “mother tongue,” apparently with no clear consensus on what 
“mother tongue” meant, and, despite officials’ vehement assertions to the 
contrary, inextricably linked the language question with nationality, at least 
in the minds of the national elites.109 Any bilingual person can testify that 
language is an ideologically charged subject, and there were thousands of 
bilingual people in the Habsburg Empire.110 The Austrian census commis-
sion did not consider bilingualism as an available option, despite the fact 
that including it might have resolved a good deal of controversy over the 
question. This is not surprising, given that not more than one language, one 
religion, or any other marker—however defined—can be associated with an 
individual if a register is to serve the classificatory purpose it is designed for: 
the translation of complex social relations into raw data that can be orga-
nized in columns and aggregates. In other words, fluidity of and overlap in 
social identity have no place in census registers (nor in maps based on those 
registers, as we have seen, which complete the job of “flattening” and “en-
closing”), despite the testimonials of resistance to rigid classification such 
as were buried among the lengthy notes and explanations scribbled on the 
margins of endless bureaucratic exchanges.
107. I use the term minoritization here to underline the contradiction and tension inher-
ent in the state’s modernizing efforts to classify the population. An action that is presumably 
meant to assimilate a group essentially creates a minority out of a confessional community by 
objectivizing the membership and compounding the sense of distinctiveness and subjugation.
108. It must be noted that Adolf Ficker, who was in charge of the surveys, did not agree 
that nationality could be equated with language alone, or even that it had a place in the census 
questionnaire at all; Zeman, “Four Austrian Censuses,” 31.
109. King, Budweisers into Chechs and Germans.
110. Pieter Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Im-
perial Austria (Cambridge, 2006).
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Kertzer and Arel emphasize an extremely important function of the census, 
namely, that it “does much more than simply reflect social reality; rather, it 
plays a key role in the construction of that reality.”111 In the examples cited 
in this chapter, it is easy to see that a one-to-one correspondence between 
census categories and the social reality of the groups they purportedly rep-
resented is difficult to achieve. What is not equally self-evident, and what 
Kertzer and Arel mean when they speak of the “construction of that real-
ity,” is that the introduction of those categories is a mechanism through 
which are created the social groups and their collective identities that fill in 
those columns. Their social reality does not precede the entries in the census 
registry. To the contrary, those very categories name, and thereby bring into 
existence, what we perceive as social reality; the two mutually shape and 
reinforce one another. We must note, however, that the experience of the 
Ottoman census of 1903 in Macedonia demonstrates that this mechanism 
worked through more than the power of naming. The census, by deepen-
ing and reifying vertical divisions within the population, contributed to a 
general consciousness of being one thing and not the other, and the violence 
that accompanied that consciousness turned a piece of paper—the identity 
card—into the difference between life and death.
111. Kertzer and Arel, “Censuses, Identity Formation,” 2.
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The stupidest peasant sighed for a life of quiet and the departure of the 
Turks. But the means, the courage, the instinct of mutual help had first to 
be trained. The leaders had to inspire the peasants with the same courage 
and faith which the schools of the Exarchate had already created in the 
minds of the educated class. They had to weld the isolated Macedonian 
villages, which regard the district beyond their own valley as a foreign 
land, into a conscious nation.
—Henry N. Brailsford, Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future, 1906
Until recently, the historiography of the Balkans viewed the relationship between religion and nationalism as straight-forward and even self-evident, and mostly treated it as such. 
The millet system and the endurance of the Orthodox Church were seen as 
the saving grace of Balkan nations, which kept them “free for their national 
awakening, in which Orthodox affiliations, linked up with the medieval 
background, played a very conspicuous part.”1 Likewise, textbook expla-
nations attributed the emergence of the national churches in the nineteenth 
century simply to the resuscitation of their forbears, which “were histori-
cally national churches and symbols of a nation’s sovereignty.”2 Although 
there was certainly a connection between the forging of national identities 
and religion, this connection was historically determined as the result of 
a process too complicated to be reduced merely to an equation of church 
membership or declared church affiliation with national identity.3 More 
1. George Arnakis, “The Role of Religion in the Development of Balkan Nationalism,” 
in The Balkans in Transition, edited by Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich (Berkeley, 1963), 
133. See also Nikolaos J. Pantazopoulos, Church and Law in the Balkan Peninsula during 
the Ottoman Rule (Thessaloniki, 1967); Zina Markova, “Bulgarian Exarchate 1870–1879,” 
Bulgarian Historical Review 16, no. 4 (1988):, 39–55.
2. Peter F. Sugar, Nationalism and Religion in the Balkans since the 19th Century 
(Seattle, 1996), 9. See also, Peter F. Sugar, “External and Domestic Roots of Eastern European 
Nationalism,” in Nationalism in Eastern Europe, edited by Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer 
(Seattle, 1969), 28–33.
3. Paschalis Kitromilides asserts that “religion came last in the struggle to forge new 
national identities and did not become a functional element in national definition until the 
nation-states had nationalized their churches.” Kitromilides, “’Imagined Communities,’ ” 59. 
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recent interpretations of this link have cautioned against accepting a binary 
opposition between “religious and secular values” and call particular atten-
tion to the cross-hybridization of religious and post-Enlightenment secular 
notions of collective belonging.4 In this chapter, I look at the link between 
religion as a marker of national identity and an enabler of nationhood from 
a different perspective, which suggests that the most important element that 
consolidated this connection in popular conception, specifically among the 
rural populations, was the politicization of religion and religious identity 
after they became inextricably linked with violence.
In the previous chapter, we saw that religion still played a major role as a 
reference for people’s conceptions of collective identity and that, for many of 
them, this was something that differentiated them not from other Orthodox 
Christians in their vicinity but from Muslims. When H. N. Brailsford took a 
few local boys from a village near Ohrid to the “ruins of the Bulgarian Tsar’s 
castle,” the boys, proving right every prejudice the journalist entertained 
about them, failed to give the correct answer to the question, “Who built 
this castle?” Despite repeated prodding and hints by Brailsford, including 
the words “Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks,” the boys’ final answer was: “They 
weren’t Turks, they were Christians.”5 Brailsford, not quite as frustrated as 
the Ottoman census clerk who had to register people who insisted on be-
ing “Christian” as one of the official categories, nevertheless attributed the 
boys’ (and, more generally, the Bulgarians’) lack of historical and national 
consciousness to the fact that “[t]heir ecclesiastical autonomy was more 
completely suppressed” than that of the Greeks.6 In other words, Brailsford 
saw national identity (as some still do) as a concept that simply could lay 
dormant for centuries, safely entombed within different church traditions, 
only to be woken up when the time was right. Religion, therefore, was im-
portant, but only insofar as it preserved the core identity of a nation, not in 
and of itself.
It is interesting to contrast this view of religion as an incubator (and re-
ligious difference as derivative of national difference), which follows logi-
cally from primordialist understandings of national identity, with that of 
Benedict Anderson, who sees religion as “the basis of very old, very stable 
imagined communities not in the least aligned with the secular [colonial] 
state’s authoritarian grid-map.” The stabilizing influence of religion on local 
communities could not easily be dismissed by colonial authorities, who in 
the end had to contend with it through regulation and subordination, rather 
In contrast, Skopetea attributes a stronger role to religion in the creation of Greek nationhood 
in post-revolutionary Greece; Ellē Skopetea, To “Protypo Vaseileio” kai ē Megalē Idea, Opseis 
tou ethnikou provlēmatos stēn Ellada, 1830–1880 (Athens, 1988), 119–34.
4. Gazi, “Revisiting Religion and Nationalism,” 95–106.
5. Brailsford, Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future, 99.
6. According to Brailsford, even the Serbs were luckier in this respect for various reasons, 
but “[Bulgarians] were within easy striking distance of the capital.” Ibid., 99–100.
A Leap of Faith: Disputes over Sacred Space  171
than complete eradication. Sacred spaces such as temples, mosques, and 
schools fell outside the topographic order of the colonial state, an anomaly 
that facilitated the transformation of these spaces into “zones of freedom 
and—in time—fortresses from which religious, later nationalist, anticolo-
nials could go forth to battle.”7 That religion was easily transformed into a 
basis for anticolonial liberation struggles because of the spatial and spiritual 
autonomy it provided to the colonized is a hypothesis that seems to stand 
in close conceptual proximity to primordialist accounts of the role of the 
Orthodox Church as the vault where the core of national identity was kept 
and, later, as a base from which the fight for national independence was 
launched. By contrasting the categories introduced and imposed by the colo-
nial rulers with an already existing and “stable” marker of identity, namely, 
religion, Anderson accords religion a privileged position in the resistance 
against colonial regimes.
Sumit Guha has justifiably criticized Anderson’s stance with regard to 
the role of religion as an innately suitable anchor for anticolonial struggles. 
Most significantly, Guha contends that “Anderson does not consider how 
religious identities were socially reproduced and propagated—as they must 
have been to survive”8 Before throwing out the baby with the bathwater, 
however, we must take note of the conclusion to Anderson’s argument, which 
is that the resilience of religious markers compelled “frequent endeavours to 
force a better alignment of census with religious communities by—so far as 
possible—politically and juridically ethnicizing the latter.”9 More than the 
myriad possible premodern, precolonial, and prenational identity markers 
generated by a complex web of social and political networks that, according 
to Guha, were neglected by Anderson in favor of religion, the key notion 
that is relevant here is the “ethnicizing” of religious identity—a process that 
is not derivative of preexisting categories of collective identity but, rather, 
imbues those preexisting categories with new meaning. This process also 
explains the dramatic changes with respect to the meaning of religious dif-
ference in Ottoman Macedonia at the turn of the twentieth century.
Singling out religion as the primary marker of collective identity is not 
to replace one form of primordialism with another. Nor do I privilege reli-
gious identity as the authentic collective identity of the Balkan peasant that 
existed from time immemorial as opposed to an alien social construct. It is 
clear that religion is a highly contested territory, no matter the context, and 
as Guha notes, religious identity itself is “socially reproduced and propa-
gated.” These specific social processes, however, were part of how and why 
religion and nationality came to define one another in Macedonia—in other 
words, how Orthodoxy became ethnicized. The ethnicization of Orthodoxy 
7. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 169–70.
8. Guha, “Politics of Identity,” 149.
9. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 170. (Emphasis added.)
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was a process that involved the transformation of preexisting social value 
systems into a depository of national consciousness and, more important, a 
reference for immutable differences. For the purposes of the national elites, 
“who had to weld the isolated Macedonian villages . . . into a conscious na-
tion,” church affiliation served as a readily available blueprint for their am-
bitious project.10 The religiously observant peasant masses, who regarded 
religion as the center of their social as well as spiritual worlds, would be 
drafted into this same project of nation-building through the gate of church 
affiliation. The readily available and universally accepted principle of reli-
gious observance required yet another element to be ultimately enforceable, 
namely coercion, whose means became increasingly violent as the project 
grew more contested. Ultimately, it was not merely the introduction of an 
alternative church and its rivalry with the preexisting one that molded and 
fixed the national identities of Christian Macedonian peasants but the vio-
lence that accompanied it. Ideology did not induce a mass mobilization of 
the peasantry until it was activated through violence.
In this chapter, I question the presumed causal link between religious dif-
ference and conflict by tracing the experience of the Exarchist-Patriarchist 
schism “on the ground.” Taking a closer look at how the Exarchists and 
Patriarchists came to be two separate and antagonistic communities shows 
that the link is more complicated than the clear formula of “one church, 
one language, one nation.” First, religious differences did not necessarily 
correspond to linguistic ones, and second, they were not the result of the 
need to reconcile national consciousness with religion. Finally, these two 
communities had been entirely capable of working out their differences, if 
grudgingly, without resorting to violence, prior to the activities of insurgent 
bands in the region.
Religion was important in forging national identities because it superseded 
any ideological alternatives in terms of its potential for unifying or dividing 
the rural Christian population. Yet its role was not one of logically following 
a preceding national division. Religion as dogma was not nearly as impor-
tant as the daily practice of religion in this context. The symbolic nature of 
many of the conflicts centering around sacred spaces and the clergy was not 
simply coincidence but a deliberate motion aimed at exploiting the rules, 
customs, and practices through which people made sense of this world and 
the next. Acts such as defrocking a priest, confiscation of liturgical books, 
denial of sacraments, and the theft of a ceremonial robe were important not 
in and of themselves but because they struck a chord by directly usurping 
the system of symbols that the peasants had been using as a bridge between 
spirituality and everyday existence. Targeting a church during mass was not 
a random act of violence but one designed for maximum impact, spiritually 
10. Brailsford, Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future, 116.
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and physically, and for replacing communal coexistence with communal 
boundaries, enforced by guns if necessary.
Religion and Religious Authority
In the eyes of western Europeans, Catholic or Protestant, clergy or lay, 
Christians of the Eastern rite, although deserving the support and sympathy 
of their co-religionists, practiced a strange, if not pagan, version of Chris-
tianity that bore little resemblance to the faith practiced in more civilized 
parts of the world, save for the cross that symbolized it. Members of the 
Orthodox clergy were viewed with suspicion and amusement, attached as 
they were to their bizarre rituals bordering on the occult, performed in lan-
guages they themselves were not able to understand, let alone convey the 
message to their flock.
Ruggiero Giuseppe Boscovich, a Jesuit priest accompanying the party of 
James Porter, the English ambassador to the Sublime Porte, on his return 
journey in 1762, was an early observer of Orthodox priests’ woeful igno-
rance.11 Thanks to his Slavic roots, he was able to communicate with a (pre-
sumably) Bulgarian priest whom the party met on their journey, in a village 
(most likely) in Thrace. The impressions he gathered from this exchange 
of the young, married priest were quite unflattering: “His ignorance, and 
that of all these poor people, is incredible. They do not know anything of 
their religion except for the fasts and holidays, the sign of the cross, the cult 
of some image, of which one encounters now and then among them some 
quite horrid and ugly ones, and the name of a Christian. To the extent that 
I could discover that evening, speaking my language, and also having in-
quiries made in Turkish, which is commonly understood among them, they 
know neither the Pater Noster, nor the Credo, nor the essential mysteries of 
the religion.”12
More than a century later, H. N. Brailsford (a Methodist) was equally 
condescending, if slightly more sympathetic, to the village priests:
To go for ethical guidance to the average village priest would indeed be too 
ridiculous. The married priests outside the larger towns are for the most part al-
most totally uneducated, and lead the life of peasants. . . . They can read enough 
to mumble through the ritual, and write sufficiently well to keep the parish 
11. Boscovich was born in Ragusa in 1711. In addition to being a Jesuit a priest, he 
was also “a Copernican astronomer and Newtonian physicist of international reputation, and 
furthermore an eminent scientific geographer.” He had a Serbian father and Italian mother, 
but his education and early socialization were decidedly Italian; Wolff, Inventing Eastern 
Europe, 172.
12. Ruggiero Guiseppe Boscovich, Giornale di un Viaggio da Constantinopoli in Polonia 
dell’abate Ruggiero Guiseppe Boscovich (Milan, 1966), 35, quoted in ibid., 175.
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registers; but there the superiority to the peasant ends. Preaching is practically 
unknown. Their function is not that of the pastor or the teacher. They are simply 
petty officials who perform the rites appropriate to the crossing of the frontier 
between this world and the next.13
Unlike Boscovich, Brailsford placed the blame for the deplorable state of the 
priests and higher clergy primarily on “Turkish rule” that “crushed every 
form of intellectual life” and partly on the church hierarchy itself. “There is 
no heresy in the Eastern Church,” he wrote, “because there is no real interest 
in religion.”14 Even though a few Greek bishops had benefitted from educa-
tion in Oxford and Leipzig, the “incorrigibly Byzantine habits of thought” 
rendered this exposure useless and their ignorance more offensive. Many 
members of the Bulgarian clergy had been trained in seminaries in Russia, 
where “modern and Western ideas [were] very jealously excluded.”15 Given 
the sad state of affairs with regard to the clergy, it was no wonder that their 
flock fared even worse in the recollections of Europeans with regard to their 
religiosity. Travelers noted, usually with surprise and often with condescen-
sion, how time was anchored to the procession of what seemed to be an 
infinite number of saints’ days; how people seemed to fast for almost the 
entire year; and worse, how the observance of so many religious holidays 
bred “laziness.”16
Needless to say, pious observance of religious rules among the peasantry 
was not unique to the Christian Orthodox of the Ottoman Empire. It was 
the norm in such communities all over Europe. Rather than a pure matter 
of conscience, religion was a set of guidelines and rituals according to which 
the rhythm of daily life was set. The rites and rituals not only fulfilled in-
dispensable social functions but also evolved with them. Certain practices, 
such as fasting, were as much the result of exigency as of piety. If the descrip-
tions in the travel literature reflect the actual situation with any degree of 
certitude, the diet of Ottoman peasants in Rumeli was comparable to that of 
other rural populations in eastern and most of western Europe, which meant 
that animal products were considered a luxury and reserved for festive oc-
casions. Saints’ days ensured temporal continuity, marked the changing of 
seasons, and normalized time—it was no coincidence, for instance, that the 
Ilinden Uprising took place on the day that it did—not simply August 2, but 
the day of Saint Elijah.
Brailsford predicted that the theocratic hold of the church over the peas-
antry would be lifted along with the disappearance of Turkish authority. 
He obviously viewed the insurgency in Macedonia as a western-leaning, if 
13. Brailsford, Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future, 69.
14. Ibid., 66.
15. Ibid., 62–65.
16. See, for instance, Baker, Turkey in Europe, 102.
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not entirely secular, movement. The armed revolutionaries were pioneers of 
democratic freedom in a land of religious tyranny of both the Muslim and 
the Christian sort. “Already the Bulgarian Committee [IMRO] represents 
a movement of democratic revolt against these princes of the Church,” he 
noted, disregarding the fact that the Church was instrumental in propa-
gating a distinct Bulgarian national consciousness among the youths who 
were educated at its schools—a point he himself made later in the same 
book.17 More important, the “democratic” revolutionaries relied heavily on 
the Church for several of their logistical and other organizational needs, not 
to mention that the Church itself was directly involved in the revolutionary 
movement through its radicalized priests and schoolteachers. It is true that 
the relationship between the higher ranks of the Exarchate in Constanti-
nople and the revolutionaries was often strained because of the former’s 
preference for a more prudent policy for the national cause and disapproval 
of the insurgents’ provocative methods. Yet the insurgents knew they could 
not carry out their agenda without the assistance of the Church—not least 
because that was the most direct way of reaching out to the peasants.
The insurgents’ reliance on Church officials to provide cover for their 
operations could occasionally end up in completely unforeseen blunders, 
such as the case of the Exarchist assistant bishop of Tikveş/Kafadar [Ka-
vadarci]. Assistant Bishop Methodii disappeared from his seat without 
anyone’s knowledge on April 18, 1905, apparently leaving town on foot. 
The authorities later found out that he had managed to catch a train to 
Salonika and had sent a letter to a confidant (who evidently was not as trust-
worthy as he had assumed), asking for his personal belongings to be shipped 
to Salonika. Rumor had it that the assistant bishop had fled in haste because 
he was afraid that the “Committee” was about to find out that he had been 
embezzling funds the church had collected on its behalf. The prefect found 
it unlikely that Bishop Methodii had indeed been embezzling money. But, 
anticipating the uproar that was probably brewing among the people who 
had apparently been swindled, he decided to err on the side of caution and 
requested the dispatch of a 150-strong detachment in addition to the troops 
already in the provincial center, lest there be an uprising.18 Although the as-
sistant bishop’s behavior lends some credence to Brailsford’s opinions about 
the Orthodox clergy’s rapaciousness, I must note that this example is more 
illustrative as an exception rather than as the rule. Although there certainly 
must have been several corrupt individuals among the clergy, as well as 
laypeople, collecting “taxes” on behalf of the Committee, it is not possible 
to conclude there was endemic corruption among Church members, of the 
Exarchate or the Patriarchate, based on occasional examples. Moreover, 
17. Brailsford, Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future, 66; cf. Macedonia, Documents 
and Material, 116.
18. BOA, TFR.I.SL Tikveş. Prefecture to the Inspectorate, April 20, 1905.
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failing to follow the rules of the committee resulted in serious punishments, 
including death, which acted as an effective deterrent against such slip ups; 
the bishop actually had good reason to be afraid.
Bishop Methodii’s misadventure with the Committee money notwith-
standing, clergy belonging both to the Exarchist and the Patriarchist sides 
carried immense moral authority over the peasants. In fact, that is what 
made his transgression all the more egregious. Brailsford, for all his conde-
scension toward the clergy as “petty officials,” was accurate in highlighting 
their role in performing “the rites appropriate to the crossing of the fron-
tier between this world and the next.” What he failed to fully comprehend 
was the importance of that role among people who truly believed that they 
needed the comfort of faith, and the priests who affirmed that faith, when 
“the frontier between this world and next” was so narrow.
Worship in Contested Churches
During the last decade of the nineteenth century, the “church contest” 
had become a palpable source of tension in Macedonia, one that involved 
not only disputes at the level of the clergy but also struggles centered on 
the physical church buildings and the worshippers within. The relations 
between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Sublime Porte had been 
quite tense since the establishment of the Exarchate, but it was not only 
the recognition of a separate church directly challenging the Patriarchate’s 
authority among the faithful that caused the tension. A paradox of the post-
Tanzimat organization of autonomous religious communities—or millets, 
in the true sense of the term, with internal constitutions and an official rep-
resentative, the milletbaşı—also unleashed a process that gradually eroded 
the authority of the Patriarchate over the Greek Orthodox community.19 
The reforms accorded lay members of the community more control over the 
Holy Synod through the “mixed national council” (karma milli meclis or 
mikto ethniko symvoulio).20 As Greek Orthodox members of the Ottoman 
administration joined the council, the control of the Ottoman bureaucracy 
over the Patriarchate increased, although indirectly. In 1883, the growing 
concerns of the Patriarchate about Ottoman government involvement in 
the communal affairs of the millets, considered to be a set of “privileges” 
accorded to the Ecumenical Patriarchate since earlier times, resulted in a 
crisis. The immediate reasons involved the increased secularization of the 
19. On the establishment myths of the Ottoman millet system, see Benjamin Braude, 
“Foundation Myths of the Millet System,” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: 
the Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol. 1, The Central Lands, edited by Benjamin Braude and 
Bernard Lewis (New York, 1982), 69–88.
20. For more on this development, see Stamatopoulos, Metarrythmisē kai Ekkosmikeusē.
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judiciary and government control over schools, which had been the purview 
of the Patriarchate.21 These interventions curtailed the legal authority of 
the Patriarchate over its own members; it made clergy members subject to 
civil laws in criminal cases, and the curricula and teachers of Greek schools 
subject to bureaucratic scrutiny. Finally, Patriarch Ioachim III cited restric-
tions imposed on the construction and repairs of churches in his protest to 
the Sublime Porte, and resigned. Greek Orthodox churches remained closed 
over Christmas that year.22 An imperial decree was issued in 1884 affirming 
the rights of the Patriarchate, but another crisis broke out in 1890, this time 
over the declared intention of the Sublime Porte to regulate the appoint-
ment of teachers and trustees of Greek schools. Adding insult to injury, the 
government had also issued berats for Exarchist bishoprics in Skopje and 
Ohrid. Patriarch Dionysios V resigned, declaring that he would not “renew 
his permission to his priests to perform divine service in their churches this 
year.”23 The Greek Orthodox churches in Constantinople followed suit by 
suspending their services, an action also followed by the Metropolitans in the 
Macedonian provinces. In Serres, for instance, all district churches remained 
closed in December 1890, until the community reached a compromise with 
the Metropolitan of Menlik (Melnik) that restored access to the churches 
also in Cuma-i Bâlâ (Blagoevgrad), Petriç (Petrich), and Demirhisar/Valov-
ishta (Sidirokastro).24 The decision, celebrated by congregations anxious to 
reclaim their venues of worship, owed much to the resourcefulness of the 
kaymakam (prefect) of Menlik, who apparently persuaded the Metropolitan 
by promising him that he would not let the Bulgarians invoke the name of 
the Exarch in liturgy.25 The rest of the province was not as lucky, and their 
churches remained closed.
As communities remained without access to their churches, the fact that 
the clerical strike occurred during a time of heightened religious sentiment, 
when most people were fasting and Christmas celebrations were around 
the corner, exacerbated the overall restlessness. On December 18, the day 
of St. Nicholas (Julian calendar), the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of Serres 
pleaded with the Metropolitan and submitted a petition to the sultan to have 
their churches reopened. As we will see shortly, it was not a coincidence 
that such tensions happened to mount right around the major holidays 
of the Orthodox calendar. For the most part, it was the clear symbolic power 
of these dates and the increased sensitivity of the population that accounted 
21. Kofos, “Patriarch Joachim,” 114.
22. For a summary of these events see Vangelis Kechriotis, “The Modernization of the 
Empire and the Community ‘Privileges’: Greek Orthodox Responses to Young Turk Policies,” 
in The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran, edited 
by Touraj Atabeki (London, 2007), 53–70.
23. PRO, FO 195/1692, Vice Consul Capety to Consul Blunt, November 5, 1890.
24. PRO, FO 195/1692, Vice Consul Capety to Consul Blunt, December 6, 1890.
25. PRO, FO 195/1962, Vice Consul Capety to Consul Blunt, Serres, December 20, 1890.
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for this phenomenon, but there was also the simple fact that these were the 
times when access to churches was in highest demand.26
Archival records of sectarian conflict reveal that incidents of church 
 access–related violence, especially in the countryside, started to escalate 
gradually, beginning with the first years of the twentieth century. After 1903, 
reports of such incidents appeared on an almost daily basis in consular as 
well as Ottoman state documents. When the contested churches and chapels 
became a nuisance for the Ottoman authorities, they started closing them 
down as a temporary measure, not allowing access to either community. 
Even Easter, the most important holiday of the year—normally a festive 
occasion for celebrating not only the resurrection of Christ but also the ar-
rival of spring—fell victim to the poisoned atmosphere. Attending Easter 
service, one of the basic tenets of religious observance for all Orthodox 
faithful, turned into a risky undertaking for most, and was impossible for 
some, because of the number of contested and therefore closed churches. 
One such church, in Visoçen (Xiropotamos), had been closed for three years 
when the Metropolitan petitioned the Inspectorate requesting permission to 
open the church for Easter service in April 1903; the response was negative. 
The Inspector pointed out that the church had been closed in 1900 because 
the conflict among the Greeks and Bulgarians had escalated to the point 
where the two parties were inflicting physical harm (“darb ve cerh”) on 
each other. Until a general decree was issued about the matter, all similar 
local conflicts would be dealt with in the same manner (i.e., the Inspectorate 
would not issue exceptions for special circumstances).27
Meanwhile, the Greek Orthodox community, wanting to keep the issue 
current and maintain proprietorship of the contested churches until such 
time when they reopened, became more vocal in their protests. Unlike a 
decade earlier, however, when the government treated the Exarchate and 
the Patriarchate as equals (at least in the eyes of the Patriarchists), the Ot-
toman officials were now—after the incursions of Bulgarian bands into 
Macedonia became an immediate threat—more likely to bestow favors on 
the Patriarchate at the expense of the Exarchate. Even the smallest village 
chapel could become a rallying point against the rival community by the 
other community claiming ownership of or simply access to it. Take, for 
instance, the small village of Koula (Palaiokastro), a çiftlik (estate or farm) 
of not more than twenty-four households, probably entirely owned by one 
26. When Capety, the vice consul himself, was attacked at the Serres Metropolitan church 
a year later, after writing the reports above (notes 23–25), he was there for the celebration of 
his name day, May 21, which corresponds to the day of saints Konstantinos and Eleni, two 
most common Greek Orthodox names; this suggests that the church must have been packed. 
PRO, FO 195/1768, Serres, June 3, 1891.
27. BOA, TFR.I.SL 9/804, Bishop of Drama [Drama Metropolidi] to the Inspectorate, 
April 16, 1903; Inspectorate to the Subgovernorate of Drama, April 17, 1903.
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proprietor.28 The village had a small convent that was traditionally visited 
by people from neighboring villages on September 14/27, for the observa-
tion of the “Exaltation of the Holy Cross [Ypsōsē tou Timiou Staurou].” 
In 1904, however, local authorities canceled the celebration to prevent any 
disturbance that might arise because the residents of Koula had just signed 
a petition to join the Exarchate. In the words of the British Vice Consul 
J. M. Theodorides, who was in fact a Greek Orthodox local, the villagers 
had expressed their desire to be considered “among the Schismatic Bulgar-
ians” while the neighboring villages were all “Orthodox.”29
It appears that the Greek Orthodox community of Serres took the matter 
of this small village very seriously, and a large crowd estimated at 5,000 peo-
ple gathered in town. They first went to the acting Greek Metropolitan and 
then, accompanied by him and the representative committees of the town, 
made for the mutasarrıf ’s (subgovernor, or district governor’s) office. The 
subgovernor, Theodorides reported, had to give in to the pressing demands 
of the crowd and permitted the people to go to the convent for celebrations, 
adding that he would take all measures, including sending a military escort, 
to make sure that order would be preserved. Content with the assurances 
of the subgovernor, everyone left in good order.30 Even though Theodorides 
does not mention how the inhabitants of Koula celebrated the festival, it 
is questionable whether they dared to go to the little convent given the pres-
ence of a large Greek Orthodox crowd, which had contested the right to 
celebrate and won. It is also significant that a practice that, until recently, 
had been a routine observance turned into a political issue requiring the 
involvement of civilian and military authorities.
The demonstration of the Greek Orthodox community in Serres was not 
the first of its kind that year. Similar demonstrations asking for support 
from the Ottoman authorities sprang up across the region. The community 
in Salonika organized an impressive gathering on March 6, 1904. Report-
edly, the community had informed the government officials a day earlier 
that it would meet at the Church of Aghios Nikolaos in the Eski Cuma 
neighborhood to observe the “Aya Nikola Palamas” [sic] holiday and then 
march to the governor’s mansion (hükümet) to present a petition about the 
“atrocities and aggression” of the Bulgarians.31 Having been advised by the 
28. Cartes Ethnographiques. G. F. Abbott, who passed through the village in 1900, 
did not provide any information on the language spoken by the peasants or their religious 
affiliation, but he noted that his party had to leave in haste because they were warned that an 
armed band was in the area; the band did, in fact, come to the chiftlik to pick up provisions 
shortly after Abbot’s party had left; Abbott, Tale of a Tour, 112–13.
29. PRO, FO 195/2183, Vice Consul Theodorides to Gérant du Vallon Serres, September 
26, 1904. Consular staff employed by the European Powers in the Ottoman Empire were often 
recruited from among the local Christians.
30. Ibid.
31. The clerk drafting the letter is wrong about the holiday in question; probably he 
confused the name of the church where the ceremony would be held with the saint’s name. 
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governor that marching en masse from the church to the governor’s mansion 
would be “inappropriate,” the Metropolitan Alexander pledged to pres-
ent the petition himself. Indeed, a large crowd that seemed to include “the 
entire Greek Orthodox community of Salonika” filled the church and lis-
tened to the service that went from noon until 5 p.m. The Metropolitan was 
politically savvy enough to pray for the sultan as the congregation cheered 
with cries of “Zito! [Long live!].” Instead of dispersing after the service, the 
crowd started to march on the Hamidiye Avenue (one of the main paved 
arteries of the city), passing by the consulates and ending up in front of the 
imperial barracks, where the marchers “showed their respect” with more 
cries of “Zito!” Their final destination was the Metropolitan Cathedral, 
where Archbishop Alexander repeated his speech at the church and further 
cries of “Zito” were heard before the crowd dispersed peacefully.32 This 
was a carefully choreographed event that pushed all the right buttons to 
garner sympathy for the Greek side in the ecclesiastical struggle. Timing 
the gathering with an important local holiday, following official guidelines 
to the letter, vocal expressions of gratitude to the sultan and respect to the 
military, making the crowd visible by marching across the city, and passing 
monuments and the foreign consulates (which were carefully left out of the 
official petition) were all elements of a cleverly designed show of power 
that managed not to transgress any norms of propriety. The petition itself, 
which praised the sultan and reaffirmed the loyalty of his Greek Orthodox 
subjects, contrasting their exalted and long-established place in Ottoman 
society with the rebellious and uncouth “Bulgarian evil-doers,” was another 
document of political sophistication.33
The Bulgarian Exarchist community was perhaps not as talented in so-
liciting protection from the Ottoman officials, but it did not necessarily lag 
behind its rivals in resourcefulness in the fight over the churches. On June 
11, 1905, the Inspectorate sent an inquiry to the kaymakamlık (prefecture) 
of Yenice (Giannitsa) demanding information about the inhabitants of the 
villages of Pirolik (Pentaplatano), Kruşar/Krusari (Ampelies), Hisarbey 
(Drosero), Vardiçe/Vadrishta (Palios Milotopos), Vehdi Pazar (Palaio Gi-
annitson), and Dalyan. According to information delivered by the Bulgarian 
commercial agent in Salonika to the Inspectorate, all churches in these vil-
lages had been closed down and, when the villagers put up fences to create 
some makeshift open-air churches, the gendarmes had demolished them. 
The villagers had also been forced to sign papers stating that they would 
There is no Saint Nikolaos Palamas, but given the date, he is almost certainly referring to 
Agios Grigorios Palamas of Thessaloniki, and the church in question could be Agios Nikolas 
Orfanos.
32. BOA, TFR.I.SL 32/3190, Governorship of Salonika to the Inspectorate, March 6, 
1904.
33. BOA, TFR.I.SL 33/3228, Greek Community of Salonika to the Inspectorate, March 6, 
1904.
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not try again to erect these enclosures made of tree branches and rugs, and 
would no longer assemble for prayer.
The prefect’s response was that the villages of Pirolik, Kruşar, Hisarbey, 
Eskice (also part of Palaio Giannitson), and Sukutlu (Palatades) had peti-
tioned to join the Exarchate following threats from the “brigands” even 
though they had been loyal to the Patriarchate until 1904. The standing 
order was that such petitions would not be accepted until the security threats 
in the region were driven away, and it was also applied in this case. How-
ever, the villagers had persisted in performing services in “Bulgarian” with 
“Bulgarian” priests. For this reason, the prefect explained, their churches 
had been closed down and their keys temporarily confiscated by the state. 
Following this, the villagers built fences of wood and tree branches around 
the churches, and Bulgarian priests continued to officiate in these enclosed 
areas. Not only was it “inappropriate for Bulgarian priests to perform di-
vine liturgy,” continued the prefect, given that the churches belonged to the 
Patriarchate, but the fences also posed a fire hazard. Therefore, the villagers 
were told not to build such fences, but it was not true, he averred, that they 
had been forced to sign papers.34
Considering the general attitude of the Ottoman gendarmerie toward 
Exarchist villagers, the prefect’s assertion that nobody had forced them to 
sign papers is highly suspect. It is also highly unlikely that this “worship al 
fresco” was a spontaneous and improvised solution to the hardship posed 
by the locked churches because the same particular (and somewhat peculiar) 
pattern had sprung up simultaneously in five villages. The main motiva-
tion for the attempts by each community to defy the ban on using closed 
churches was the principle of squatters’ rights. There was no guarantee 
that either of the communities could successfully claim proprietorship of 
the churches when the disputes were finally resolved, not only because there 
was no sign of an attempt to issue uniform and coherent guidelines on the 
part of the Ottoman government but also because it was not clear whether 
the Ottoman state would be the ultimate arbiter resolving the issue. Given 
the overall uncertainty, it was safe to assume that a community that had 
managed to somehow “occupy” the church when it was shut down would 
have a better shot at claiming it in the future.
Interruptions of religious rites were common occurrences, but sometimes 
they were carried out in the most unexpected manner, such as the strategi-
cally executed theft of a ceremonial robe. On January 17, 1905, for in-
stance, his congregants noticed that Bishop “Yerasim Efendi” was missing 
from church during the observance of the rite of the New Year (probably 
Bulgarian Christmas, Boujik; the bishop in question was a representative 
34. BOA, TFR.I.SL 75/7481, A. Schopoff, Bulgarian Commercial Agent to Hüseyin Hilmi 
Pasha, May 24, 1905; Inspectorate to the Prefecture of Yenice, June 11, 1905; Yenice Prefect 
to the Inspectorate, June 20, 1905.
182  Chapter 5
of the Exarchate). His absence being rather conspicuous, the Inspectorate 
requested an inquiry from the prefecture of Usturumca/Strumnitza (Stru-
mica) concerning the bishop’s whereabouts. It was soon understood that 
the bishop had been unable to officiate because two individuals had broken 
into the church the night before and stolen his ceremonial robe from the 
caretaker. Further inquiry revealed that the perpetrators were from the band 
of the famous Chernopeyef (an IMRO affiliate) and that they had been sent 
there because the bishop had refused to pay the (quite hefty) sum of 200 liras 
demanded earlier.35 Interestingly enough, the robe was returned the day af-
ter, leaving us to wonder whether the komitajis, certainly aware of the sym-
bolic value of this article of clothing, also had enough faith in its spiritual 
value that they felt pressed to return it, risking capture by the authorities. 
The moral value of clerical ornaments, liturgical objects and books, and, 
most important, icons, which served as a direct link to the spiritual world, 
was so exalted in the eyes of the locals that even Ottoman authorities were 
occasionally forced to acknowledge the direness of an assault on these ven-
erated objects. The commander of the troops searching for weapons in the 
church of an Exarchist village in the district of Avrethisar (Ginaikokastro) 
found this out the hard way when he was immediately arrested on the vil-
lagers’ complaints that soldiers under his command “broke the icons and 
toppled the sacraments.”36
The priest’s robe, not only the elaborate pieces worn for special occa-
sions such as Easter or Theofania but also the simple everyday article, was 
a symbol that distinguished him from his flock and made him instantly rec-
ognizable. The Greek Orthodox Church did not harbor much sympathy for 
members who defected to the Bulgarian Exarchate and obviously did not see 
them as worthy of the robes they wore, as the “defrocking” of Papa Iovan 
Iconoff of Karlikovo (Mikropoli) of the kaza of Zihna (Palia Zichni) testi-
fies. Karlikovo was a mid-size, Slavic-speaking Patriarchist village, possibly 
with Greek- and Vlach-speaking minorities.37 In other words, Karlikovo 
was one of those villages whose allegiance was up for grabs by either party, 
and at the beginning of 1905, its inhabitants had (partially) petitioned to 
join the Exarchate.38 Ottoman officials alleged that the village had been 
attached to the Patriarchate “since old times” and that the desire to join the 
35. BOA, TFR.I.SL 61/6121, Inspectorate to the Prefecture of Usturumca, January 17, 
1905.
36. The incident took place in Tchigontzi (Tchougountzi) on January 20, 1905. MAE, 
Constantinople Serie E 147, Consul General’s report to the Embassy in Constantinople, 
Salonika, January 28, 1905.
37. According to the pro-Bulgarian Cartes Ethnographiques, Karlikovo was a mixed 
village of 380 households. Mishev cites it as a village of 1,500 souls, 1,440 of whom were 
Patriarchist Bulgarians and 60 of whom were Vlachs.
38. PRO, FO 195/2232, Consul Graves to the Ambassador, February 6, 1906. Even 
though the British consul’s and Ottoman officials’ initial reports give the impression that the 
entire village had petitioned to join the Exarchate (see BOA, TFR.I.SL 100/9992, Inspectorate 
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Exarchate was motivated by the threats of the “Bulgarian brigands.” In any 
case, because their petition was presented after August 1903 (the date that 
had been declared final by the Inspectorate for official recognition of con-
versions to and from the Bulgarian Exarchate) the village would officially 
continue to be counted as Patriarchist.39
This may have been the official status of Karlikovo, but because their 
priest, formerly a representative of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, had 
also converted with the villagers (or more likely, had persuaded them to 
convert), the higher Greek Orthodox clergy of Drama found the situation 
extremely disturbing and took measures accordingly.40 In the words of Con-
sul Graves:
It appears that the [Greek Orthodox] Metropolitan requested the Mutasarrif to 
have the priest of Karlikovo brought to Drama to answer a charge of uncanoni-
cal conduct. This request was transmitted by the Mutasarrif to the kaymakam 
of Zihna, by whose orders, after reference to the Mutasarrif of Serres, two gen-
darmes took charge of the priest on the 20th of January and conveyed him to the 
frontier of the Drama Sandjak where he was handed over to the Drama patrol 
by whom he was conducted to the Government House at Drama. Thence he was 
taken by a policeman to the residence of the Greek Metropolitan, where he was 
kept a prisoner until nearly midnight. The Metropolitan’s Cavass, accompanied 
by a deacon and two other men, then entered the room, and while the Cavass 
held a revolver pointed at the head of this old man of eighty-four years of age, 
his hair and beard were cut off with a clipping-machine, his priest’s hat and 
robes were removed, and he was dressed in peasant’s clothes, and a fes placed 
upon his head.41
The details of the literal “defrocking” of the priest, such as the acts of 
shaving his hair and beard, and replacing his robe with a peasant’s outfit 
complete with a fez, signified more than a simple lesson taught through 
humiliation. The habits of the Exarchist clergy had long been a sore spot 
for the Patriarchate, which had made various unsuccessful attempts to deny 
them, from the very beginning, the right to wear the distinctive attire of 
the Orthodox Church.42 The issue had become even more inflammatory 
after the Exarchate started acquiring bishoprics, such as Nevrekop (Gotse 
Delchev) and Veles/Köprülü (Veles) in 1894, in areas that were considered 
outside the accepted “Bulgarian” sphere of influence. The appointment of 
to the Grand Vezirate, February 16, 1906), it is clear from subsequent correspondence that part 
of the village had remained attached to the Patriarchate (BOA, TFR.I.SL 129/128580).
39. BOA, TFR.I.SL 100/9992, Inspectorate to the Grand Vezirate, February 16, 1906.
40. Karlikovo was administratively under the jurisdiction of the kaza of Zihna but 
ecclesiastically under that of Drama.
41. PRO, FO 195/2232, Consul Graves to the Ambassador, February 6, 1906.
42. Kofos, “Attempts at Mending,” 353.
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an Exarchist bishop in Nevrekop, for instance, caused protests in Menlik, 
Demirhisar, Zihna, and Drama by the Muslim as well as the Greek Ortho-
dox population.43 One of the issues that the Greek Orthodox emphasized in 
their petition to the governor was the garb of the Exarchist clergy in these 
areas. In the words of the French consul in Salonika:
In their petitions, the protesters assert that there is but one Orthodox church, and 
therefore, there should not be two distinct ecclesiastical authorities; in case that 
there would be schism, they demand, at least, that the exarchist priests should 
no longer be authorized to carry the costume of Greek priests; the form and the 
color of the cap present, in their eyes, a real importance. . . . The orthodox fear, 
justifiably, that the same peasants will rally around the Exarchate the day the 
priests and bishops, speaking the same language as them and not having dis-
cernible differences with other priests either in their costumes or their rites are 
officially permitted to oversee the administration of civil and religious affairs.44
In the eyes of the Greek Orthodox, the Exarchist clergy was cheating by not 
giving up the garb and the distinctive cap (kalymauchi) of the Orthodox 
Church because this visual continuity failed to signal to the peasants that the 
Church they now attended was not the Church that they had belonged to for 
generations. And when they seized the opportunity, higher members of the 
Patriarchate did not refrain from removing these symbols of the “genuine” 
Orthodox Church from the person of Exarchist priests. In 1894, almost a 
decade before the defrocking of the priest of Karlikovo, when the outrage 
against the assignment of new bishoprics to the Exarchate was at its height, 
the priest of a small village named Klepousna (Agriani) suffered a similar 
humiliation. He was defrocked four years after 90 of the 140 households of 
the village signed a petition expressing their desire to attach themselves to 
the Exarchate. Before he was taken into the room where the district man-
ager and the Metropolitan were waiting for him to hear his defense, the 
Metropolitan’s deacon seized the priest’s cap, saying, as it was reported by 
the British consul, “we made you a priest, and we depose you.” The priest 
had to “enter the room bareheaded which was regarded as a great disgrace 
to him.”45
The removal of the priest’s cap and the “defrocking” of the priest of Kar-
likovo followed a formula meant to deliver a message not only to the priests 
who had thus been stripped of their ecclesiastical authority but also to the 
Exarchate. In the case of Karlikovo, further correspondence reveals that the 
Metropolitan, who was single-handedly responsible for the priest’s public 
43. PRO, FO 195/1849, Vice Consul Capety to Consul Blunt, Serres, May 14, 1894.
44. MAE, vol. 9, Consul to Casimir Perier, Selanik, May 9, 1894.
45. PRO, FO 195/1849, Report of the Consul [in Salonika], Samokov, December 11, 
1894.
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humiliation, defended his conduct on the grounds that he was “acting under 
the orders of the Patriarchate and strictly within his rights” in punishing a 
rebellious priest of the Church. After the matter was brought to the attention 
of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, however, the prefect of Zihna and his deputy were 
removed from their posts, a measure much appreciated by representatives 
of the European Powers in the region—with the exception of the British vice 
consul at Drama, Mr. Gregoriades, who, no doubt owing to his own affilia-
tion with the Greek Orthodox Church, found the conduct of the Metropoli-
tan “quite justifiable” and “accused the Turkish authorities of interfering 
in a purely ecclesiastical matter in which they were not concerned.”46 The 
conflict soon spread from the domain of the church officials to their parish-
ioners. The Exarchists of Karlikovo, who obviously did not appreciate the 
way their priest had been treated by the Greek Metropolitan and the Otto-
man authorities, turned their resentment against their Patriarchist neighbors 
and attacked them.47
Giving someone a haircut and shave may not strike modern sensibilities as 
an exceptionally offensive act, but in this specific context it was nothing less 
than a violation of the priest’s ecclesiastical identity, a violent intervention 
to directly decommission the priest and nullify his social capital. The first 
sentence of a petition presented by Karlikovo’s communal representatives to 
the Inspectorate substantiates the exact nature of the violation involved in 
the shaving of an Orthodox priest’s hair and beard; the letter starts with an 
expression of gratitude for permission to continue observing divine liturgy 
officiated “by a newly appointed priest” who would serve them “until the 
beard of our priest Papa Yovan Ikonov grows back.”48 A priest was no lon-
ger a priest without his beard.
It appears that temporarily losing their priest was not the last indignity 
these villagers had suffered. On February 16, a man by the name of Atanas 
Girkof had passed away. The priests Tanasis, Yovan, and Dimitri, who were 
responsible for Papa Yovan Ikonov’s suffering, were now determined to pre-
vent the new priest from performing the last rites for the dead man and bury-
ing him in the village cemetery. The Exarchists needed a separate lot for a 
cemetery, the petitioners reasoned, so that “the occurrence and repetition of 
such inappropriate situations would not be allowed.” “Inappropriate” is an 
understatement for the situation: it is difficult to say for how long the burial 
was delayed, but the Inspectorate’s response, written on March 22, mention-
ing that the body had been “left in the open [açıkta kaldığı],” is disturbing 
enough. The recommendation of the Inspectorate was to establish whether 
it was possible to divide the existing cemetery between the two  communities 
46. PRO, FO 195/2232, Consul Graves to the Ambassador, February 6, 1906.
47. MAE, vol. 51, December 28, 1906. There were no injuries or death reported, but the 
attacks seem to have been repeated.
48. BOA, TFR.I.SL 100/9927, March 18, 1905.
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and, if that seemed unworkable, to issue permission to the Bulgarian com-
munity for a separate cemetery in an appropriate location.49 Note that the 
Greek Orthodox clergy chose to reassert their authority at a time and oc-
casion when the Exarchist community was extremely vulnerable. It is even 
more noteworthy that the Exarchists chose to hold on to a rotting corpse 
rather than have a Greek Orthodox priest say the last rites for the deceased 
man.50 No sacrament, it seems, was too sacred for these clergy members, 
who were in the fight until the bitter end. Perhaps less extreme than the 
denial of last rites, but still cruel, were the denial of the first rite (baptism) 
and the most important one in between (the bestowal of wedding wreaths). 
All these were rituals of life that not only marked the transition from one 
stage to the next but were also required of the faithful. These were the most 
precious instances in which Orthodox clergy could interfere between God 
and those who had strayed, and interfere they did.51
Priests were at the forefront of the struggle for the churches, sometimes 
as unwitting bystanders and often as active participants, but as this case 
suggests, their struggle was not seen as a religious matter by any of the 
concerned authorities, including that of the office of the Ottoman General 
Inspector, even though their congregations considered them the gatekeepers 
of eternal salvation. The peasants venerated the clergy not for their temporal 
but for their spiritual power, and they feared them for the same reason. It is 
not surprising that the clergy members were not shy about using this power 
to further their political agendas, as in the case of the Bulgarian bishop (re’is-
i ruhânî)52 of Nevrekop, who apparently banned his flock from engaging in 
any sort of commercial activity with the Greek (Orthodox) and from attend-
ing their churches.53 One of the punishments that the noncompliant risked 
was monetary—a fine of 1 Ottoman lira (a very large sum for the peasants) 
presumably to be paid to the coffers of the Bulgarian church of Nevrekop. 
49. BOA, TFR.I.SL 100/9927, The Inspectorate to the Salonika Province, March 22, 1905.
50. Refusal to bury the dead was a resistance method employed not only in protesting 
the Greek Orthodox clergy but also Ottoman officials when appropriate, as happened after 
the massacre in Mravintza çiftlik in January 1905. Ten men were killed by Greek komitadjis 
dressed like Ottoman soldiers. The wives of the dead refused to bury their husbands despite 
the prefect’s offer to pay 2 mecidiye each as an incentive. The women wanted to take their 
protest to Salonika and presumably demand autopsies. MAE, Constantinople E 147, Verbal 
Deposition of Risto Costandi, Mitre Gochi and Risto Lazo recorded at the French Consulate, 
January 22, 1905.
51. The Metropolitan of Vodine, having secured the assistance of government authorities 
to expel Bulgarian-speaking priests and teachers from Patriarchist villages, would not allow 
residents of the same villages to travel to another village to be married or have their children 
baptized by an Exarchist priest. Even the Ottoman official writing about the issue did not hide 
his shock at the Metropolitan’s conduct; BOA, TFR.I.SL 60/5920, Vodine Prefecture to the 
Inspectorate, December 24, 1904.
52. It seems that in the language of Ottoman bureaucracy, reis-i ruhânî (lit. “spiritual 
leader”) was generally used for bishops of the Exarchate, whereas the term metropolit was 
reserved for their Greek Orthodox counterparts.
53. BOA, TFR.I.SL 9/838, Subgovernorate of Serres to the Inspectorate, April 17, 1903.
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The fee was only part of the deterrence factor, however; the transgressors 
also faced excommunication for the dire offense of buying so much as a head 
of lettuce from a Greek Orthodox shopkeeper.54 In addition to all the hor-
rible consequences of excommunication we may imagine for the faithful, we 
must also note fears that would be considered “superstitious” in our times. 
In the Balkan folk tradition, excommunication was associated, among other 
things, with vampires. In his travelogue Tozer noted, “The principal causes 
which change persons into vrykolakas [vampires] after death are excommu-
nication, heinous sins, the curse of parents, and tampering with magic arts. 
The first of these is the most common and most important and dates from 
very early times.”55
It is remarkable that the bishop’s announcement to his flock through the 
intermediary of priests coincided with the Megali Evdomada, the week be-
fore Easter Sunday, when the fast is most austere, religious sentiments run 
high, and, perhaps most important, the markets are busiest because of all 
the shopping going on in preparation for the holiday. Oddly enough, ac-
cording to the report of the prefecture of Nevrekop, during the Paskalya 
Pazarı, or Easter Market, that was set up on Friday, no Bulgarians were 
seen shopping from Greek Orthodox vendors. When questioned about 
this peculiar phenomenon, the bishop’s response was that it was possible 
they had found what they desired being sold by Bulgarian vendors and 
not the Greek Orthodox or perhaps that the latter were selling at more ex-
pensive rates. Anyway, he added, they would be buying from them again in a 
couple of weeks. When asked why they would start buying from them in a 
couple of weeks if they did not yesterday, the bishop was quiet.56
The bishop’s ban was clearly aimed at reducing or completely eliminating 
whatever daily contact remained between the Exarchist and Patriarchist com-
munities that protected the threadbare social fabric from disappearing en-
tirely.57 The marketplace in Nevrekop was one place where people interacted 
with one another despite their sectarian, linguistic or national differences 
very similar to the way these markets still function in Macedonia.58 In other 
54. BOA, TFR.I.SL 9/838, Prefecture of Nevrekop to the Subgovernorate of Serres, April 
15, 1903; Governorship of Salonika to the Inspectorate, April 18, 1903.
55. Tozer, Researches in the Highlands of Turkey, Vol. 2: 86.
56. BOA, TFR.I.SL 9/838, Prefecture of Nevrekop to the of Serres; Subgovernorate of 
Serres to the Inspectorate, April 21, 1903.
57. Declarations by both parties banning all transactions would become commonplace 
within a few years. For instance, a Greek Orthodox who, despite threats from the “Greek 
party,” negotiated the sale of a house that he owned to the Bulgarian commercial agent in 
Serres, was killed by a Turk allegedly working for the Greeks; MAE, vol. 147, Colonel Vérand 
to the Ambassador, Serres, January 31 and February 15, 1905. In the same town, a notable 
Greek lady, who had been renting a building to Bulgarian tenants, was threatened by the Greek 
committee; PRO, FO 195/2263, British Vice Consul Bosanquet to Consul Graves, Serres, May 
30, 1907. The ban would later be transformed into an extensive boycott in most parts of the 
province in Salonika, FO 195/2263, Salonika, Consul Graves to O’Connor, June 18, 1907.
58. See Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood, esp. 74–76.
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words, the bishop was using his ecclesiastical authority to intervene in an 
entirely secular space of interaction to divide it along sectarian lines. What 
is even more striking than the order to boycott the businesses of the other 
community was the ban on attending its church. It reveals, yet again, that 
church segregation was not as rigidly practiced as we might expect, even as 
late as 1903, three decades after the sectarian split.
Compromise and Coexistence—Church Rotation, 
a Viable Alternative?
In many villages with mixed populations of Greek Orthodox and Bulgar-
ian Exarchists, “church rotation,” a compromise whereby the two commu-
nities took turns holding services in a single church, seems to have prevented 
serious conflicts for many years. The practice was widespread enough in 
the early 1900s to be noted by astonished European visitors, such as H. N. 
Brailsford, who wrote: “the absurdity of this use of spiritual weapons in 
carnal warfare is so patent that ‘Greeks’ and ‘Schismatics’ frequently share 
the same church, and say Mass on alternate Sundays in Greek and Slavonic 
from the same altar.”59
As the propaganda activities in Macedonia intensified, however, it be-
came increasingly difficult to maintain this compromise. The only church 
of Spatovo (Kimisi), a medium-size village in the district of Demirhisar, was 
one such building that had been used in rotation by the villagers, who were 
all Slavic-speaking.60 The village church was first brought to the attention 
of Ottoman authorities in March 1904 when the Bulgarian Exarchist com-
munity sent a petition to Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha demanding the restoration of 
the practice of church rotation.61
According to the petitioners, the entire village had converted to the 
Exarchate fifteen years earlier (in 1889), after which date they started to 
perform their rites in the village church in “Slavic [Islavca, i.e., Church Sla-
vonic]” and the children of the village were also instructed in “Slavic.”62 
The petitioners alleged that twenty-five households had reverted back to the 
Patriarchate in 1898 because of pressures from the Greeks. The villagers, 
to prevent a conflict, had consented to take turns using the church with the 
Patriarchists. According to the arrangement that they had worked out, the 
Patriarchists would have use of the church every third Sunday because they 
59. Brailsford, Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future, 72.
60. According to the Cartes Ethnographiques, the village consisted of 201 Bulgarian 
households. Mishev cites a total population of 2,000, 1,280 of whom were Exarchist and the 
rest Patriarchist Bulgarians.
61. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, petition to Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, March 31, 1904.
62. Note that the petitioners did not call the language of instruction “Bulgarian,” which 
was often used in reference to both the local dialects and Church Slavonic.
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were in the minority and did not contribute to the expenses of the church. 
Through a similar arrangement, one of the smaller rooms of the school 
building was also allocated for the children of the Patriarchists. The commu-
nity had two muhtars (leaders, chiefs), one for each group, and two mühürs 
(official seals).
According to the letter, the remainder of the village had also attached it-
self back to the Patriarchate in summer 1903 because of the threats of “the 
ill-omened Greek Orthodox [Rum meş’umları]” and out of fear of persecu-
tion by the authorities, especially after the “disturbances” in May and June 
1903. Even though the villagers had remained “loyal to the state” during 
these acts of “murder and brigandage,” six of them had been arrested and 
placed in custody in Serres, and many of them had been detained several 
times in Demirhisar. The official seal of the Exarchist community had also 
been removed. After the arrival of the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of 
Menlik in July 1903 in Spatovo to conduct services, the keys to the church 
had been handed over to the Greek Orthodox trustees and the icons of Cy-
rill and Methodios had been confiscated along with twenty-six volumes of 
religious books in Slavonic.
In February 1904, after the area had calmed down and become relatively 
secure, 133 households applied to the prefecture of Demirhisar with the in-
tention of rejoining the Exarchate. The prefecture gave them verbal affirma-
tion of the approval of their petition. Despite this, the Kaymakam muavini 
(deputy prefect), a Greek Orthodox man, prevented the restoration of their 
rights over the church and the school. Neither their icons nor their liturgical 
books were returned because of this man’s interference. Actually, this was 
not the first recorded grievance against this particular deputy prefect, who, 
according to the allegations of the Bulgarian Exarch in November 1903, 
had publicly announced to the Bulgarians that those who “recognized the 
Patriarchate would indefinitely be safe from all persecution and repression, 
and even the Bulgarians who were incarcerated would be pardoned if they 
acquiesced to the same offer.”63 Spatovo was obviously one of the villages 
where the locals had not heeded his advice. The long petition by the villagers 
ended with a restatement of their wish to reinstitute the practice of using the 
church in rotation, to restore the school building to their community, and to 
have their confiscated icons, books, and the official seal of the community 
returned.
The Inspectorate ordered the prefecture of Demirhisar to carry out a pre-
liminary investigation and ascertain whether the claims of the Exarchist 
villagers were correct.64 According to the prefect’s report, the village 
consisted of 190 households, which had been adherents of the Patriarchate 
63. MAE, vol. 39, Petition of the Bulgarian Exarch to the Grand Vezir, November 
21, 1903.
64. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, Inspectorate to the Prefecture, April 2, 1904.
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“since old times,” but 160 of them had attached themselves to the Exarchate 
in 1896–1897. For four years following this, the Exarchist majority had 
shared the church with the Patriarchist minority, and the two communities 
had attended church together. In 1900–1901, after a dispute among them, 
they had started the practice of rotation instead of sharing the church simul-
taneously. In August 1903, they had returned to the Patriarchate, and seven 
months later, in February 1904, they reverted back to the Exarchate. At this 
point, the prefect noted that the Bulgarians apparently could not stick to one 
sect (“bir mezhebde sebât etmemeleri”); they did not consent to the method 
of rotation; and that the church had originally been constructed under the 
name of the Greek Orthodox community. He had asked for counsel from 
his superior on how to proceed with the matter given these facts, but he 
had not received an answer. Regarding the liturgical objects, the prefect 
implied that they had not been seized by force; the villagers themselves had 
handed them over to the Metropolitan Ioachim Efendi.65
A few days later, another petition from a representative of the Exarchist 
community of Spatovo was on the desk of the Inspector General, explain-
ing why the prefect’s interpretation of the events was partial to the Greek 
side.66 According to the petitioner, Avram Konstantin, the Greek Orthodox 
deputy prefect had convinced the prefect through “tricks and lies [hiyel ve 
desâis]” to summon the members of the Exarchist community of Spatovo to 
his office and tell them that they could have their liturgical books and other 
objects back, but that the practice of rotation would no longer be allowed. 
He also told them that they were not to go near the church when the Greek 
Orthodox were there, that they would have to give up their official seal, and 
that they would be officially represented by the Greek Orthodox muhtar. 
It was no doubt a safer bet for Avram Konstantin to place the blame en-
tirely on the Greek Orthodox deputy and absolve the Muslim official of 
any wrongdoing than to complain about the conduct of both. Two days 
later, the Exarchist community sent yet another telegram, informing the au-
thorities that they could not get into their church even though it was Easter 
Sunday and that the village consisted mostly of Exarchists.67
The Exarchist villagers of Spatovo apparently found a more sympa-
thetic ear with the Inspectorate than the local authorities. A telegram sent 
on April 11, 1904, from the Inspectorate to the governorship of Salonika 
ordered that the requests of the Exarchist community be granted.68 Each 
community would enjoy use of the church every other week according to 
65. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, Prefect Ramiz to the Inspectorate, April 4, 1904.
66. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, Avram Konstantin of Spatovo to the Inspector General, 
April 6, 1904.
67. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, Vangel Atanas and his 39 companions of Spatovo to the 
Inspectorate, April 8, 1904.
68. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, Inspectorate to the Governorship of Salonika, April 11, 
1904.
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the new  arrangement. Not two weeks had passed after this order was issued, 
however, than the Metropolitan of Menlik sent an angry protest telegram 
to the Inspector General. According to the Metropolitan, the Inspector had 
been deceived by a group of evil-doers consisting of five or six people (“beş 
altı neferden ibâret fi tne-engiz takımı’ ”).69
According to the Metropolitan, the dispute in Spatovo was not an is-
sue of religion, or one of “Orthodoxy and Schismatism,” as he put it, but 
was all about the endowment of the church, which was estimated at 100 
Ottoman liras. The “evil-doers” had duped the villagers into signing the 
petition by saying that it was for the appointment of a kocabaşı (Chris-
tian village elder). These evil-doers, he continued, incited the population 
to achieve their “atrocious and malevolent” ideas under the pretext and 
defense of “Bulgarianness” (“vicdansız ve su’i-mekâsıd efkârlarına na’il ve 
muvaffak olabilmek içün Bulgarlığı siper ve vâsıta isti’mâl ile ahaliyi teşvîş 
ederler”). He claimed that the village consisted of 230 households, about 
15 or 20 of which had been misled to take sides with the evil-doers. The 
total number of “Schismatic” households, according to the Metropolitan, 
was not more than 30 (consistent with the prefect’s report), an insignificant 
minority in comparison to the more than 200 Greek Orthodox households. 
He maintained that it could be easily verified that this was not a “national 
or a spiritual” matter if the “Schismatics” were granted permission to build 
another church or to convert a building into one. They would not accept 
such a solution, the Metropolitan contended, because their purpose was not 
to found a new church, but to seize the present one’s endowment (“bunların 
efkâr ve mekâsıdı kilise temellük etmek olmayub vâridâtını almakdır”). He 
would even have allowed them to use Slavic in the church had he been con-
vinced that the issue could be resolved in this manner, but their purposes 
were entirely at odds with religion and motivated purely by the desire to 
harm the Greek Orthodox. Therefore, he was asking that the order allowing 
the Exarchists to use the church every other week be reversed.
It is clear from the correspondence between the Inspectorate and the 
mutasarrıfl ık (subgovernorate or district governorate) of Serres that the 
Metropolitan’s argument was not found to be convincing by Hüseyin Hilmi 
Pasha’s staff, who sent persistent telegrams to the provincial authorities in-
quiring about the status of the liturgical books and the church in Spatovo.70 
The same correspondence also reveals that the local authorities dragged 
their feet in carrying out the urgent orders of the Inspectorate. As a response 
to the repeated demands, the prefecture of Demirhisar assured the subgov-
ernorate that the Exarchist community would be allowed to have liturgy at 
69. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of Menlik to the Inspector 
General, April 21, 1904.
70. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, Inspectorate to the Subgovernorate, April 22, 1904; 
Subgovernor of Serres to the Inspector General, April 23, 1904.
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the village church the following Sunday (April 24) and that one room of the 
school had been transferred to the Exarchists for instruction in Slavic. But 
the Exarchists would have to give up whatever hope they may have had of 
retrieving their books and icons for reasons bordering on the absurd: the 
subgovernor claimed that the Greek Metropolitan’s predecessor had handed 
the liturgical objects over to the Demirhisar Rum mütevellisi (Greek Ortho-
dox council member) for “safe keeping” in his shop, which, unfortunately, 
had burned down.71 The Greek consul in Serres subsequently attempted a 
final effort terminate service rotation at the church in Spatovo by contact-
ing the Inspectorate and claiming that the practice was causing conflict, but 
an investigation revealed that there was no such conflict between the two 
communities.72
We would hope that all this brokering, scheduling, and monitoring and 
the compromise that was finally accomplished ensured that these two com-
munities managed to exist side by side as they had done “since old times.” 
This indeed seems to have been the case at least for another eight months 
after the completion of the correspondence related here. Whatever disputes 
and tensions the peasants of Spatovo may have had during this time, they 
were not serious enough to leave an archival record, which is significant, 
given their previous propensity to drop a few lines to the Inspector General 
describing their grievances.73 In December, however, the name of the village 
was back on Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha’s agenda, and this time the issue centered 
on the church school. The children of the Exarchists had been thrown out 
of their classroom, along with their school materials, on December 2 by the 
usual suspects: the Metropolitan of Menlik, accompanied by two gendarmes 
assigned for his service by the prefect of Demirhisar.74
Communal Schools as Boundary Markers
At the local level, it is impossible to distinguish the school disputes from 
the broader sectarian rift. They were two sides of the same coin, and school 
disputes in small rural communities such as Spatovo usually paralleled the 
development and aggravation of disputes over use of a church building by 
the communities. They served as a wedge between the two communities, 
71. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, Attachment to the telegram from the Subgovernor of Serres 
to the Inspector General, April 23, 1904.
72. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, Subgovernor of Serres to the Inspector General, April 
29, 1904.
73. All the correspondence concerning Spatovo was placed in one file at the Rumeli 
Müfettis
˙
liği archives, which makes it quite unlikely that there were any missing petitions or 
telegrams between the two clusters of documents.
74. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, petition from the Exarchists of Spatovo to the Inspector 
General, December 16, 1904.
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and another tangible marker of the boundaries dividing them, rendering 
coexistence more difficult, if not impossible. In this regard, it was not what 
the schools taught but what they stood for that made them an instrument of 
nation-making among the peasantry. As we have seen in chapter 2, educa-
tion in the service of nationalization in Macedonia was a two-tiered process 
that involved the network of parish schools in the countryside and more so-
phisticated institutions such as gymnasia in larger centers that had different 
but complementary agendas. The leadership and influence of the national 
elites were considerably more pronounced in the top tier of this process, that 
is, the high schools.
Despite the rudimentary conditions in which they operated, the village 
schools, overall, were successful centers for recruitment to the national cause. 
It is remarkable that even small villages with fifty or seventy households had 
at least one primary school—and sometimes more.75 Nevertheless, we can 
hardly argue that it was ultimately a successful educational campaign that 
created Greeks and Bulgarians out of the children of Christian peasants in 
Macedonia. It is true that the schools in urban centers played an immensely 
important role in the making of national leaders, some of whom, as we have 
seen, took their mission to villages across Macedonia as schoolteachers. As 
influential as they were, these teachers were still the minority among those 
educating the rural parishioners’ children, many of whom could not attend 
school regularly due to their families’ reliance on them as extra labor. The 
dearth of teachers and the unwillingness of some communities to accept 
teachers who did not speak their language meant that not all schools were 
open all the time. The committees also interfered with the functioning of 
schools if they could not fully collaborate with the overseeing eparchy. Most 
important, the educational projects of Greek and Bulgarian national elites 
lacked the means and the ideological unity that could be guaranteed only 
through the resources of a central state, even as the Greek and Bulgarian 
states coordinated their efforts with the local religious authorities. The con-
tribution of rural schools to nationalization therefore should be attributed 
more to their role in further delineating and politicizing communal differ-
ences than to large-scale indoctrination.
The dispute over the church building in Spatovo, which eventually spilled 
over into a dispute about the school building, encapsulates the process 
through which communal boundaries were hardened. Even after the labori-
ous efforts of several authorities to mediate the conflict in Spatovo, which 
seemed to have been successfully resolved, the question of fair access to 
the school reanimated the dispute between Exarchists and Patriarchists. As 
the negotiations for the church building were finalized, both parties had 
consented to an arrangement whereby the extra room of the village school 
75. Carte des Écoles Chrétiennes; Brancoff [Mishev], La Macédoine et sa Population 
Chrétienne.
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would be assigned to the children of the Exarchists because they outnum-
bered the Patriarchists by five to one. Unfortunately, this arrangement lasted 
only until the arrival of the Greek Metropolitan at the village months later. 
The Metropolitan demanded that the extra room assigned to the Exarchists 
now be divided into two sections, one of which would be allocated to the 
Patriarchists. When the Exarchists refused to give up half of the room, 
the Metropolitan had the Exarchists’ children removed from the room and 
gave it to the Greeks (“Rum”). The incident was reported by the Bulgar-
ian bishop and corroborated by the Greek Metropolitan. The local au-
thorities then advised the leaders of the two communities and the Greek 
Metropolitan to manage the situation according to the old arrangement, 
which previously had worked without any complaints from either side. The 
Greek community, however, now refused to accept any arrangement other 
than the Metropolitan’s, and the Exarchist community, further emboldened 
by the Metropolitan’s interference, refused to give up half of the room, argu-
ing that it was not big enough to accommodate their children, who consti-
tuted the majority.76
Determining the exact number of rooms in the village school, their dimen-
sions, and the manner in which they were used by the two communities in 
the last years occupied the officials of the Inspectorate for several months, 
and the Austro-Hungarian consul in Salonika also got involved in the mat-
ter.77 It appears that they were able to convince the Exarchists to share one 
of the smaller rooms with the Patriarchists, but the fragile status quo was 
disturbed yet again in March, this time by the Exarchists, who allegedly 
confiscated one of the rooms. According to the Greek Metropolitan, the Ex-
archists had called on the children, who normally would have been tending 
the cows in the fields, to convince the local authorities that they constituted 
the majority (“ekseriyeti kazanmak içün sığırlarını güden çocukları mektebe 
idhal ve mahallî hükümet memurlarını bu suretle iknâ edebilerek.”). As a re-
sult, he continued, not only had the Exarchists almost managed to transform 
the Greek community school into a Bulgarian one but they had also forced 
the Greek teachers to instruct all children, boys and girls, in the same room, 
which surely was unacceptable to the sultan and the General Inspector.78
A report prepared by a police officer from Serres, and approved by the 
representatives of the two communities of Spatovo, finally clarified the con-
fusing matter of the number, division, and use of the rooms of the school. 
The room that the Exarchists had started using in December 1904 had not 
been seized from the Greek community; it had been created by dividing in 
76. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, report [copy] to the Prefecture of Demirhisar, December 20, 
1904; Governorship of Salonika to the Inspectorate, December 25, 1904.
77. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, Inspectorate to Governorship of Salonika, December 31, 
1904 and January 2, 1905; petition from the Exarchists of Spatovo to the Consul of Austria-
Hungary, January 6, 1905.
78. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, petition from the Metropolitan of Menlik and Demirhisar 
to the Inspector, March 6, 1905.
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two the large room on the first floor of the school building that they had 
already been using. The Greek Metropolitan had come in, removed the chil-
dren from the small room on the second floor, and locked it up in January. A 
police officer and a gendarme had been sent to open up the room and return 
it to the Exarchists’ use in February. According to the report, there was no 
conflict arising from the division of the school in this manner, and female 
and male teachers (“daskal ve daskaliçeleri”) also stated that they got along 
well.79 The recommendation of the vilâyet to the Inspectorate based on this 
report was not to intervene in light of the fact that the previous arrangement 
had been restored and no conflict seemed to have arisen from it.80
Did the statements of the teachers to the Ottoman authorities that they 
were getting along reflect the actual situation? Perhaps, but it is hard to 
imagine the Slavic-speaking teachers reconciling with their Greek colleagues, 
whose religious leader had thrown the Exarchists’ children out of the school 
building with the complicity of local officials. Nor would the Greek teach-
ers accept with joy the dwindling number of their student body and their 
relegation to a minority status in what they considered to be a building and 
institution that belonged to their community. In other words, there is not 
much reason to expect that relations between these two communities were 
as amicable as they appeared in the police officer’s report, even though the 
names of representatives of both sides were signed on it.
On the other hand, the correspondence over the church and school build-
ing of Spatovo over the course of a year also reveals that this village was a 
location where Exarchist and Patriarchist communities had worked out an 
arrangement between themselves that allowed a sustainable, if not harmo-
nious, form of coexistence. Paradoxically, in Spatovo and countless other 
mixed villages, the church and the school, the two institutions around which 
the life of a community revolved and the early socialization of its members 
occurred, not only constituted the main source of conflict but were also the 
domain where the factions had to continue to be together. The trajectory of 
the conflict that followed the division of the Orthodox faith into two differ-
ent camps in Macedonia was not a straight line tracing a fracture that would 
inevitably end in violence. It was violence and coercion that made dead-ends 
out of the various bypasses that existed and might have been taken.
Violence and Religion
Villages with Slavic-speaking populations that had remained loyal to the Pa-
triarchate were the terrain on which the struggle for Macedonia—ecclesiastical, 
79. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, Report of the police officer Mahmud bin Mustafa, March 
20, 1905.
80. BOA, TFR.I.SL 67/6606, Governorship of Salonika to the Inspectorate, March 27, 
1905.
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scholastic, demographic, and military—was carried out. Valandova (Va-
landovo) of the prefecture of Doyran (Macedonian portion: Nov Dojran; 
Greek portion: Kilkis) was one such village, first brought to the attention of 
authorities by the Greek Metropolitan of Usturumca/Strumnitza on January 
12, 1905, in a letter complaining about the occupation of the community 
church and school by Exarchists and requesting the restoration of both to 
the Greek Orthodox community.81 The Inspectorate demanded an immedi-
ate investigation from the prefecture in response. The investigating com-
mittee dispatched to the village consisted of Kemal Efendi, a police chief; 
Atanas, a member of the town’s administrative council (who, it seems, was 
a Slavophone Patriarchist); Hristo Nano of the municipal council, and Es-
men Ağa.82
The Greek Orthodox villagers told the investigators that they had never 
abandoned their religion. According to their version of the events, a couple 
of months earlier their teachers had left the village and returned to their 
hometowns, scared away by the killings of a female teacher and a few lo-
cals in Garçişte (Grchiste) by a Bulgarian komite. Naturally, the school had 
closed down, but the villagers temporarily sent their children to the “Bulgar-
ian school that remained open, instead of leaving them ignorant and without 
instruction, given that they spoke Bulgarian anyway [bi’t-tabi’ mekteb ta’til 
olunduğu ve bu cihetle etfâlin bilâ-tedâris cahilâne bulunmaktan ise zâten 
öteden beri Bulgar lisânıyla tekellüm etmelerinden nâşi açık bulunan Bulgar 
mektebine suret-i muvakkatede berây-ı tedris gönderildiklerini].” It was also 
true that a Bulgarian priest had come into their church, although their own 
priest was present, and that he had conducted services during a holiday, 
taking turns with the other priest and conducting the service in Bulgarian. 
It was not true, however, that any coercion was involved, and because this 
had happened only once, and all the villagers were familiar with Bulgarian 
(“cümlesi Bulgar lisânına âşinâ olmalarından dolayı”), they had not refused 
him. They asserted that they had never severed their ties with the Patriarch-
ate, and they were not subject to any hidden or explicit threats.
The prefect of Doyran, who related the report of the investigating com-
mittee to the Inspectorate, noted that it was quite likely that the villagers 
were not revealing the complete story. The fact of the matter, he contin-
ued, was that there was only one church in Valandova, and it belonged 
to the Patriarchate and was reserved for the use of the Greek Orthodox 
community. Moreover, the people who lived in the vicinity of the church, 
like the majority of the village population, were Greek Orthodox, and the 
number of Exarchist households was only twenty. Yet the Greek Orthodox 
population had recently come under pressure to keep their school vacant 
81. BOA, TFR.I.SL 62/6171, Greek Metropolitan of Usturumca to the Inspectorate, 
January 12, 1905.
82. BOA, TFR.I.SL 62/6171, Prefecture of Doyran to the Inspectorate, January 15, 1905.
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and send their children to the Bulgarian school. Even though they had not 
been able to find any tangible proof suggesting that the Bulgarian brigands 
(“Bulgar eşkiyası”) had passed through the village, a police report had 
observed that the Greek Orthodox community had lately altered their be-
havior, which the report attributed to the committee or other “harmful indi-
viduals.” The prefect himself had received intelligence from an anonymous 
source that the inhabitants of Valandova had been severely threatened and 
pressured by a Bulgarian band forty days earlier. In his report, he emphati-
cally recommended that the village be sheltered from the pressure of the 
komites and that the Greek Orthodox teachers and priests be brought back. 
Finally, the prefect inquired whether legal action would be required against 
the Bulgarian priest who conducted service in Bulgarian in a church that 
belonged to the Patriarchate without official permission or authorization. 
The Inspectorate’s response sent to the prefecture on January 26 was that 
all necessary measures must be taken to prevent such unauthorized interven-
tions in churches belonging to the Patriarchate.83
It is interesting to note that the same village was mentioned again in a 
correspondence of the prefecture of Doyran to the Inspectorate, five months 
later during the census.84 It appears that the church had been restored to the 
Greek Orthodox community because the Exarchists were now asking for a 
license to build their own church. The local authorities had granted them 
a temporary building license until an imperial order could be issued. The 
prefect also recommended registering these twenty households as “Exarchist 
Bulgars” to prevent the complaints and hardships that were sure to follow 
if they were not granted this right, even though, having converted in 1900, 
they were not included in the older register of 1893 as “Bulgars.”85
The level of tension in such a small village must have been palpable. They 
had apparently shared one church and one school until five years earlier, 
sometimes using the church simultaneously and speaking the same language, 
but they were now split over who possessed the right to use the same build-
ings. It is also noteworthy, however, that there is no indication in any of the 
correspondence regarding Valandova that the church split resulted in any 
prior acts of conflict during the five years that the twenty households had 
turned Exarchist. The statements of the villagers to the investigators that 
they sent their children to the Bulgarian school instead of “leaving them 
ignorant” and because they all “spoke Bulgarian anyway,” and did not re-
fuse the Bulgarian priest for the same reason, were probably inspired by 
83. BOA, TFR.I.SL 62/6171, Inspectorate to Doyran Prefecture, January 26, 1905.
84. BOA, TFR.I.SL 74/7301, Doyran Prefecture; to the Inspectorate, June 3, 1905.
85. The population figures provided by Mishev for this village were 312 “Exarchist 
Bulgarians” and 560 “Hellenizing Patriarchist Bulgarians,” which, although slightly inflated, 
also correspond to the description in the Ottoman prefect’s report; Brancoff [Mishev], La 
Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne, 100.
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the Bulgarian komites in the region, who no doubt protected the twenty-
household Exarchist minority of the village.
We should not lose sight of the fact that the villagers were giving this 
statement to a committee of Ottoman officials, consisting of Muslims and 
Patriarchists, which suggests that there might have been a kernel of truth in 
their implied indifference to the presence of Bulgarian clergy and teachers in 
their midst. Between the komite and proselytizing Exarchist priests, on the 
one hand, and Ottoman officials and the overbearing Patriarchate, on the 
other, there is seemingly little hope that Valandova managed to maintain this 
delicate balance of coexistence for long, but, surprisingly, the name of the 
village does not appear at all in later reports of conflict between Patriarchists 
and Exarchists. This may, of course, be because of a hole in the archival 
record, but it also points to the likelihood that Valandova was spared the 
violence that afflicted similar villages.
Nevertheless, the feeling that violence was the imminent consequence 
of their communities’ being pulled apart by external forces beyond their 
control was increasingly accepted among the population, as exemplified by 
the statement, in unison, of a Patriarchist priest and an Exarchist council 
member from the mixed village of Ravna (Isoma) that their church dispute 
would not be resolved without bloodshed.86 The subgovernorate deemed 
the statement so explosive that they dispatched a significant gendarmerie 
force and infantry to this small village to prevent the gloomy forecast of 
the priest and the council member.87 Four years later, however, the dreaded 
resolution happened. A Bulgarian band of six entered the village on January 
12, 1908, and retreated, leaving behind four people dead and seven houses 
burned. The attack followed a typical church dispute: the Greek community 
had obtained a permit to build a new church that the Muslim half of the 
village was opposing. Because of their pressure, the subgovernor was hardly 
able to enforce the decision that guaranteed the right to build the church, 
but he finally managed, and construction started. This time, however, the 
Greeks did not want to abide by the arrangement that allocated the use of 
the existing church to the Exarchist and Patriarchist communities in rotation 
and insisted on their right to use both churches exclusively. Shortly after this, 
the Exarchist priest of the village was killed, and according to Major Foulon 
of the French gendarmerie stationed in the area, there was no doubt that the 
band that later attacked the village was avenging the killing of this priest.88
The village of Graçen/Gratsiani (Agiochori) is another example of a Slavic-
speaking Patriarchist village being more vulnerable to agitation by armed 
86. BOA, TFR.I.SL 52/5144, Subgovernor of Serres to the Inspectorate, September 11, 
1904; Inspectorate to the Subgovernorate, September 17, 1904.
87. BOA, TFR.I.SL 52/5144, Inspectorate to the Subgovernorate September 16, 1904; 
Subgovernorate to the Inspectorate, September 17, 1904.
88. MAE, no. 150, Rapport du Major Foulon, Serres, January 21, 1908.
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bands through their churches and schools. Graçen was a Patriarchist village 
of approximately 295. On August 18, 1906, the village Greek Orthodox 
priest (it is not clear from the report detailing the incident whether he was 
Slavic-speaking—which is very likely—or Greek-speaking Greek Orthodox) 
was killed by Bulgarian komitajis. The village presumably remained without 
a priest after this incident until October, when, according to the vice consul, 
a new priest from the nearby Alistrat (Alistrati) named Leonidas came and 
held services “with a rifle in his hand and a cartridge-belt over his shoulder.” 
The villagers must not have appreciated the new priest’s combative worship 
style, given that they immediately reported him to the military authorities. 
The vice consul reported that Father Leonidas was arrested, along with three 
Greeks (probably teachers from the Hellenic Kingdom), and that 3 Gras 
rifles and 109 cartridges were recovered from his possession. The villagers 
requested a priest and schoolmaster who understood their language to re-
place the ones who had just been apprehended, but to no avail.
At the end of January, a Bulgarian band of five took shelter in the village. 
A Greek band, apparently in pursuit, arrived after them and set some houses 
and the village bakery on fire. The komitadjis retaliated with bombs, and 
by the time a local detachment of soldiers and reinforcements arrived, three 
people were dead and three others injured. The next day, as the soldiers were 
searching the village for arms, they were met with fire from the komitadjis, 
who had been in hiding and who tried to flee as the soldiers closed in. Two 
of them were killed.89
It is certain that Graçen was a Patriarchist village—especially given that 
pro-Bulgarian sources of the period record it as such. It is quite remarkable 
that the village, at least according to the British vice consul, had remained 
Patriarchist until August or September 1906, quite late and well after the 
church disputes took a violent turn. In fact, it is not even clear that the vil-
lagers ever officially petitioned to join the Exarchate, but the vice consul, 
who related the incident, had reached that conclusion based on the villagers’ 
demands for a “priest and schoolmaster who understood their language.” 
As the case of the defrocked priest of Karlikovo reveals, the Greek Orthodox 
Church, thanks to its status as the older and more established ecclesiastical 
institution, included Slavic-speaking representatives even during the worst 
stages of the struggle for Macedonia. We have also seen that the Patriarchate 
could be accommodating in meeting demands for Slavic-speaking priests 
and schoolteachers as long as they did not preach for the Exarchate. Fol-
lowing the establishment of the Exarchate, conversions in the region did 
not occur en masse, and a good segment of the Slavic-speaking lower clergy 
remained within the ranks of the Patriarchate. Therefore, it is highly likely 
89. PRO, FO 195/2263, Vice consul Bosanquet to Consul Graves, February 16, 1907; 
MAE, Constantinople, Serie E Macédoine, no. 144, f. 179 A, Colonel Vérand to the French 
Ambassador in Istanbul, Serres, February 6 and February 19, 1907.
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that Graçen had remained among the followers of the Patriarchate, even 
though its priest and inhabitants were Slavic-speakers and, like many oth-
ers, opted to preserve the older local religious practices instead of getting 
involved in a dispute originating in the imperial center. This choice is not 
extremely surprising, given most people’s attachment to the spiritual tradi-
tion they were born into and the physical isolation of some of these villages, 
which made them more immune to (or detached from) calls to switch their 
Church affiliation. In either case, the communal decision to convert, or not, 
became a source of acute conflict only after these decisions became politi-
cized thanks to the violent means of coercion employed by the insurgents 
fighting to establish dominance.
There were no rules of conduct exempting the sacred, even though pre-
serving the sacred from encroachment was presumably what the insurgents 
were fighting for. The rifle and cartridges that Leonidas, the Greek priest, 
held close as he was overseeing the liturgy were a relatively minor effron-
tery and could even be seen as a necessity, considering that no church was 
safe from the physical assaults of the rival komites. Papa Dimitri of Baraklı 
Cuma/Dolna Djoumaya (Irakleia), who was shot dead on May 25, 1907, 
while he was conducting services in his church, and his wounded colleague, 
Papa Stoyan, might even testify that keeping a rifle next to the liturgical 
objects could have come in handy. According to the reports of the British 
vice consul, the band entered the church, which was enclosed in a yard, 
from its two entry points simultaneously. The cavass (guard) was caught 
unaware and killed. The band then proceeded inside and shot the two of-
ficiating priests and two women who happened to be attending services 
at the time. The vice consul’s inference was that the attack was in revenge 
for the killings of two Patriarchists of the same area earlier in the day by a 
Bulgarian band.90
Priests were held personally responsible not only for their own actions and 
affiliations, but also for the actions of their parishioners, which made them 
viable targets for disgruntled locals and bands clamoring to impose their 
own rules on the population. In Usturumca/Strumnitza in April 1904, the 
French consul general reported that the church dispute had agitated  people 
to such an extent that a “grécisant” (i.e., Patriarchist) named Zographos 
had been attacked by a Bulgarian, who had fled town after his failed murder 
attempt. Zographos, having survived the bullet wound, and certainly full of 
rage that his attacker was nowhere to be found, sought revenge by shooting 
the Exarchist priest Gerassimos, who, fortunately, was not harmed.91
As we have already seen, the general conduct of the priests did not con-
tribute much in the way of dispelling the common notion that they were 
90. PRO, FO 195/2263, Vice consul Bosanquet to Consul Graves, Serres, May 28 and 
June 7, 1907.
91. MAE, vol. 40, Consul General Steeg to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 12, 1904.
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the principal instigators of the conflict. Adherence to a national cause did 
have its detractors among the hundreds of priests serving in Macedonia, but 
those who did follow a nationalist agenda used everything in their power to 
make sure that their flocks followed suit, even if it meant going against the 
policies of the Patriarchate or the Exarchate. Consider a few more examples. 
The Bulgarian Exarch presented a letter to the Grand Vezir in November 
1903 about a Greek Orthodox priest and a muhtar in Serres who had been 
circulating the district. They were knocking on the doors of Exarchists, ac-
companied by a police officer, and telling them that they would be banished 
from their homes unless they attached themselves to the Patriarchate. The 
same letter alleged that the Greek priest of Rondi-i Bâlâ (Ano Vrondou), 
under orders of the Greek Metropolitan, had entered the Bulgarian church 
by force and, after conducting mass, had removed all the liturgical objects 
and taken them to the seat of the Metropolitan.92 Naturally, Exarchist clergy 
were the subject of similar complaints by their Patriarchist counterparts, es-
pecially concerning their collaboration with the komites in the region. Take, 
for instance, the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of Usturumca/Strumnitza, 
who intercepted a letter in February 1905 and immediately presented it to 
the local authorities as proof that the Exarchate was in cahoots with the 
“brigands.” The letter was written by Christo Gorki, the assistant of Cher-
nopeyef, the famous band leader, and addressed to the heads of komites in 
Patriarchist Christian villages. While the Russians were there, the villagers 
were told, they should go to the Bulgarian Metropolitan and declare their 
allegiance to the Exarchate.93 Although the Exarchist and Patriarchist clergy 
did not unanimously share the goals of the bands, much less condone their 
tactics, it is true that most of them harbored and protected the guerrillas 
when the situation called for it and that a smaller but more influential seg-
ment actually participated in masterminding the activities of both factions 
in the region.
It is also important to note that no matter what policy was dictated by 
Constantinople, the priests had to serve in areas where insurgent bands had 
either established control or were fighting to achieve that goal. Members of 
the clergy refusing to comply with the demands of the insurgent bands did 
not have much recourse other than asking for assistance from the Ottoman 
authorities or pleading with the representatives of the European Powers. 
Neither of these were effective measures against the immediate threat posed 
by the guerrillas, especially in the case of Exarchist priests, given the re-
luctance of the local Ottoman rank and file to protect anyone associated 
with the Exarchate, opposed as they might be to the revolutionaries’ tactics. 
Even though the Inspector’s office maintained at least the appearance of 
92. MAE, vol. 39, Petition of the Bulgarian Exarch to the Grand Vezir, November 21, 
1903.
93. BOA, TFR.I.SL 65/6434, Usturumca Prefect to the Inspectorate, March 8, 1905.
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 objectivity when dealing with Exarchist and Patriarchist clergy, the suspi-
cious attitude toward the Exarchate went high up the chain of command to 
the level of the officers and district governors, who reasoned that the persis-
tent presence of radicals among the priests and schoolteachers even after the 
wave of arrests and amnesties following the Ilinden Uprising compromised 
the entire Exarchist establishment. The French consul general in Salonika, 
M. Steeg, remarked in a report to the embassy in Constantinople, “Hilmi 
Pasha does not conceal the vivid repugnance he feels to let the functions of 
priests and teachers be filled with ex-agitators.” The consul found Hilmi 
Paşa’s reaction exaggerated because, as he put it, “the nominations of new 
priests and teachers done by the bishops of the Exarchate are dictated to 
them most often by the committees.” As a matter of fact, the bishop whose 
ceremonial robe was stolen right before Christmas mass was one of those 
who did not comply with the orders of the committee. Not only was he hu-
miliated in the eyes of his congregation because of the theft, but, he was also 
helpless in reopening the schools of his eparchy, which the revolutionaries 
kept shut down because of his infraction.94
Churches as Property, Disenfranchising the Exarchate
The Patriarchate certainly made good use of the suspicion of authorities 
toward the Exarchists—especially after the Ilinden Uprising—in presenting 
the cases of disputed churches from their point of view. It was convincing to 
argue that the communities in question were only recent converts and that, 
even if they were sincere in their claims of “Bulgarianness,” they had no le-
gal entitlement to property belonging to the Patriarchate through the Greek 
Orthodox community, such as churches. The ownership issue, articulated as 
a purely legal matter, did not simplify the resolution of the disputes. It did, 
however, considerably strengthen the hand of the Patriarchate because most 
of these churches had been constructed during a time when there were no 
Exarchists to speak of. Even in cases where the churches were built with do-
nations from communities, most of which had subsequently converted to the 
Exarchate, the Patriarchate could produce titles and records and formulate a 
convincing legal argument that the churches in question were Patriarchists’ 
property and thus could not be handed over to the Exarchist villages without 
their consent. This argument was presented as a legitimate reason to keep 
disputed churches under the control of the Patriarchate as late as 1910. 
When the Senate was holding discussions on the new kiliseler kanunu (Law 
of Churches), Deputy Alexander Mavrogenis concluded that the issue was 
simply one of “real estate” and that the Exarchists had no legitimate claim 
94. MAE, Constantinople E 147, Consul General to the Embassy in Constantinople, 
Salonika, January 28, 1905.
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to the churches built by the Greek Orthodox community for the “spiritual 
center.” Interestingly, Besarya Efendi countered that it was not the church, 
but the government, that had ultimate authority over such decisions, and 
his point of view ultimately prevailed in the drafting of the resulting law.95
Another factor in favor of the Patriarchists was that, even though villag-
ers were within their rights to present petitions stating that they wished to 
adhere to the Exarchate, in regions where the Exarchate did not officially 
have bishoprics, the local parishes that converted to the Exarchate were 
practically on their own and, at least in principle, still under the ecclesiasti-
cal jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. In the case of localities wishing to join 
the Exarchate where the Exarchate had a bishopric, the legal recourse for 
Patriarchists contesting church rights was more limited. But some overcame 
these hurdles through more creative methods that ensured the intervention 
of the Ottoman authorities against Exarchist communities. An example of 
this is a disputed lot in Usturumca, purchased by the Bulgarian community 
for the sum of 900 pounds to build a church. The lot remained vacant for 
a number of years because the Greek community successfully litigated to 
“prevent its being even enclosed.”96 The Exarchist community finally ob-
tained the official construction license for the lot on March 22, 1904. Not a 
week had passed after the work started when shots were fired into a Greek 
café in town. A Greek Orthodox man by the name of Vassil Christomanos 
claimed that he had been attacked by Bulgarian komitajis in the café, but his 
story was discredited because he was with friends at the time and no one re-
ported seeing any Bulgarians. It also appears that no injuries were reported. 
The alleged attack, however, served as a justification for Christomanos’s 
actions the next day, when he shot—and fortunately missed—the Bulgarian 
Metropolitan who was inspecting the construction. The consul mentioned 
the agitation that this event stirred up in town, especially considering “the 
approaching Easter Feasts.” This was yet another example of a religious 
holiday spoiled because of sectarian rivalry.
More complicated were cases involving small community churches in re-
gions exclusively under Patriarchate authority. In such cases, the outcome 
usually favored the Patriarchist side, given the propensity of the Ottoman 
authorities for holding up the claims and demands of the Greek Orthodox as 
a counterweight to Exarchist influence. The Ottoman officials largely shared 
with the Greek Orthodox clergy the belief that the most effective way to end 
revolutionary activity in the region was to keep as large a segment of the 
population as possible within the grip of the Patriarchate. In a report written 
for the British Blue Book on May 5, 1903, British Vice Consul Theodorides 
95. Kechriotis, “Modernization of the Empire,” 68.
96. PRO, FO 195/2182, Consul Graves to O’Connor, Salonika, April 5, 1904. The consul’s 
report does not make it clear exactly how long the lot had remained vacant. The Exarchate had 
obtained the bishopric in Strumnitza in 1889.
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opined that the villagers should be “encouraged” to return to the Patriarch-
ate because “Exarchist signifies comitadji and a real blow cannot be dealt 
the revolutionary organization except by making the Exarchists return to 
their original church.”97 In a subsequent report, the same vice consul pro-
nounced the type of encouragement he had in mind more clearly. After a 
skirmish in Baniçe/Banitsa (Karies) between the troops and an insurgent 
band, more than 500 arrests had been made in various districts of Serres, 
followed by petitions from 1,700 households to return to the Patriarchate.98 
Therefore, Theodorides noted approvingly, “there remains no village in the 
caza [Serres] to the Schismatics.”99 The subgovernor of Serres concurred 
with Vice Consul Theodorides in his report to the Inspectorate about the 
incident and the petitions that followed:
Owing to the military precautions implemented under the auspices of his maj-
esty the sultan, the Bulgarian evil-doers have been exposed. Some villages now 
come to understand that they were deceived [iğfal olunmuş] by the evil propa-
ganda of the Bulgarian priests and teachers installed in their midst, and those 
villages that have been inclined towards the evil-doers with the encouragement 
and threats of the Committees, even though they had been attached to the Pa-
triarchate since old times, have applied to the government and stated that they 
are Rum as in the past, and petitioned for the appointment of Rum teachers and 
priests to the Metropolitan, and their registry of under the Rum community.100
The resemblance in the expression of opinions describing the Exarchists as 
“evil-doers” and “schismatics,” and calling for their conversion back to the 
Patriarchate by all necessary means, is not merely a coincidence, given that 
the British Vice Consul Theodorides was a “respected consultant” of both 
the Greek Metropolitan and the Ottoman subgovernor.101 Alliances of this 
sort between the local Ottoman officials and the representatives of Greek 
Orthodox interests in the area undoubtedly multiplied the resentment of the 
population against the two sources of authority, the state and the church. 
Moreover, the accomplishments of the policy of what may be termed “con-
tainment by conversion,” so exalted by the vice consul and the mutassarrıf, 
did not last for very long.102 After the reestablishment of relative calm in 
 97. MAE, vol. 40, Appendix to the correspondence of French Consul in Salonika to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 10, 1904, excerpt from a report written by Theodorides 
on May 5, 1903.
 98. Gotse Delchev was among those killed at this battle.
 99. MAE, vol. 40, Appendix to the correspondence of French Consul in Salonika to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Theodorides’s report dated May 26, 1903.
100. BOA, TFR.I.SL 14/1317, Subgovernor Rükneddin to the Inspectorate, June 1, 1903. 
The mentioned villages were Fraştan-i Bâlâ/Dolna Frachtani, Diranova/Drianovo, Dutlu/
Doutlia, Baniçe/Banitsa, Hristos, Marhat/Marsena, and Lakos.
101. MAE, vol. 40, French Consul to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 10, 1904.
102. Shortly after writing this report, the Subgovernor was replaced by Hıfzı Recep Pasha.
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the Serres region and the sensible interventions of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha in 
favor of the Exarchists, acknowledged by the French consul in Salonika, 
some of the villages started going back to the Exarchate.103 Furthermore, the 
policy of “containment by conversion” would become impossible to sustain, 
despite the best efforts of the local officials and the Greek clergy, after the 
order of the Inspectorate to recognize the date of the Ilinden Uprising as a 
cut-off date for the official recognition of all conversions, including those 
asking to rejoin the Patriarchate. Finally and more important, this was a 
self-destructive policy in the sense that, by singling out the Greek Orthodox 
as the community to be preserved, it made the Slavophone Patriarchists a 
more attractive target for the wrath of the Bulgarian komitajis, who found a 
ready group of volunteers among the Exarchist peasants disgruntled enough 
to turn against their neighbors.
Despite the attempts of the office of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha at reconcil-
iation, the coercion of local Ottoman officials and the repression of the 
Patriarchate, from one side, and the guerrilla attacks, from the other, ir-
revocably polarized the Christian population. As the conflicts intensified to 
the point where going to church on Sunday might mean death, it became 
impossible for the two communities to use village churches alternately, let 
alone share them simultaneously, which had once been the accepted prac-
tice. After 1904, designating separate lots for each community to build its 
own church was advanced as another option in official correspondence.104 
Even that, however, would not resolve the problem because by this time the 
relative centrality of the location of the new church also became a source of 
conflict.105 Reluctance to compromise was such a blinding force that the 
parties would—at least in one case that we know about—rather burn down 
a church than share it.106
A Leap of Faith: Religion and National Identity
Macedonia is a place with plural geographies, borders, and pasts, cor-
responding to the national vantage point one takes. These divergent and 
contesting notions of space and identity became calcified behind national 
borders, stamping the people on either side as belonging to one and only 
one group, only relatively recently; and even today, they cannot mask the 
heterogeneity that once characterized these regions entirely. A visitor to 
one of the border towns of Macedonia on a market day before Easter will 
103. MAE, vol. 40, French Consul to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 10, 1904.
104. BOA, TFR.I.SL 52/5144, Subgovernor of Serres to the Inspectorate, September 
17, 1904.
105. MAE, vol. 40, French Consul to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 12, 1904.
106. MAE, Constantinople, Serie E Macédoine, no. 144, f. 191, Captain Sarrou to 
Colonel Vérand, May 23, 1907.
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witness a scene not that far removed from those a century ago, as I did a 
few years back in Demirhisar/Sidhirokastro (synonyms in Greek and Turk-
ish for “Iron Fortress”), a town mentioned several times throughout this 
book. True, there were some obvious differences: motor-driven cars had 
replaced the horse- and oxen-drawn predecessors, and instead of bijouterie 
from France, knick-knacks made in China dominated the stalls. The blar-
ing music and cries of ambitious vendors hawking their wares with the help 
of audio amplifiers made me nostalgic for the days without such modern 
amenities, but the produce was alluring even on an unseasonably cold and 
drab day. A shopper could find anything a household might need before the 
holiday, from vegetables to cooking utensils to children’s clothes. And the 
place was teeming with shoppers, exactly as it would have been a century 
ago, making it the best day of business for the nearby coffeehouses that 
served the exhausted shoppers and leisurely onlookers the same kind of cof-
fee that people have been drinking in the Balkans, Asia Minor, and a large 
part of the Middle East since the sixteenth century—although it goes by a 
different name in these parts nowadays: elliniko rather than tourkiko. I was 
on the Greek side of the border, but I could discern Greek mixing with Slavic 
dialects. A woman, the descendant of Asia Minor refugees and married to a 
Vlach, chatted with me, eager to seize the opportunity to practice her rusty 
mother tongue, a quaint dialect of Turkish that she had not spoken since her 
mother had passed away. A live performance by Roma musicians provided a 
respite from the skiladika emanating from the speakers. I could clearly hear 
the “whispers of assorted pasts,” to paraphrase Anastasia Karakasidou.107
It was hard to imagine, in such an environment, how people could decide 
where to buy the dill and parsley for their mageiritsa (Easter soup) based not 
on freshness and price but on the church the vendor would attend the next 
evening, as the bishop of Nevrekop had demanded of his flock during the 
Megali Evdomada (Holy Week) in 1903. As if to remind me of what I should 
not lose sight of, two women, who realized I must be a foreigner, stopped me 
on my way out of the market and insisted that I not leave town without visit-
ing “our monastery.” Making that monastery “ours,” and not “theirs,” was 
the same process that had created Greeks, Bulgarians, and Macedonians out 
of Orthodox Christians. The muted sounds I heard attested to the “assorted 
pasts,” but it seemed they were destined to fade into oblivion.
The Balkan elites were quick to embrace nationalism as a way out of the 
defunct and anachronistic political formations that dominated all aspects 
of their lives—political, social, religious, and economic. Nationalism was a 
secular ideology closely associated with the notions of mass political par-
ticipation and representative government, which made it attractive to the 
nascent bourgeoisie, and to the men and women of letters, who were not 
107. Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood, 5.
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content within the confines of the old imperial order, including the church. 
The ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution made a great 
impression on the pioneering nationalists of the Balkans as they adopted 
the concepts of scientific rationality, linear time, and teleological history to 
their circumstances. Religion did not occupy center stage in such bourgeois 
understandings of the world and their place in it. It may seem  paradoxical, 
then, that the development of secular—or perhaps “vernacular”—cultural 
movements in the Balkans in the nineteenth century subsequently spear-
headed national movements that consolidated religious identities into 
national ones, rather than entirely supplanting them. Considering the social 
realities of the human material that the elites needed to recruit for the ulti-
mate success of their national projects, however, the leap from a secular lit-
erary culture into a nationalist ideology, formulated and presented through 
the medium of a “national” church, does not seem that great. The imagined 
community provided by, and experienced through, the church was the only 
one that the peasants could make sense of as a union that extended far be-
yond their otherwise insular worlds. Therefore, for the Balkan nationalist 
elites, the course of action that had the best shot at success was to create na-
tional markers out of religious ones. Victor Roudometof, a historian of the 
Balkans, has called this plan of action “the redeployment of Orthodoxy,” 
which, he argues, was a direct response of the Balkan intelligentsias to the 
“articulation of the Greek ethnie as a secular nation.”108 But the centrality 
of religion to the project of nation-making in the Balkans leads me to con-
clude differently. Although the Greek model indeed pioneered the movement 
for bourgeois-secular national cultures, the impact of a secular Greek ethnos 
on the rest of the Balkan bourgeoisies and intelligentsias did not emanate in 
one direction, from the Greek elites to their peripheral Balkan counterparts. 
Especially after the second half of the nineteenth century, when the church 
struggle entered a course that would ultimately end with the schism and the 
formation of national churches in newly emergent Balkan states, religion 
became an issue of utmost importance also for the supposedly secular Greek 
elites.109 Despite its impressive accomplishments, the Greek national project 
was far from complete at this time, at least as far as the new generation 
of nationalist intellectuals and statesmen in Athens were concerned. The 
secular/classical model was insufficient as an ideological support capable of 
sustaining irredentism in Macedonia (and eventually Asia Minor) when it 
was confronted with a Slavic-speaking population asserting its collectivity 
through an alternative ecclesiastical organization. In a sense, rather than 
the Greek intelligentsia dictating the terms of secular nationhood to the 
108. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization and Orthodoxy, 235.
109. According to Kitromilides the “antinomy between Orthodoxy and nationalism” was 
overcome only after “nation-states had nationalized their churches.” Kitromilides, “ ‘Imagined 
Communities,’ ” 59.
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Bulgarians and religious Rum, they would redefine nationhood according to 
religious criteria. In the end, the threat of Bulgarian nationalism, propagated 
in Macedonia through the Exarchate, was an important factor embedding 
Orthodoxy at center stage in the newly cast definition of the Greek ethnos.
Although religion turned out to be the most potent device of nation- 
making available to the elites, there was more to this process than just the 
radicalization of sectarian differences. The evidence presented here dem-
onstrates that the mere provision of a new theological alternative that ap-
peased their social and cultural sensibilities did not guarantee mass par-
ticipation by the peasants, Exarchist and Patriarchist alike, and that the 
religion question in Macedonia was not solely a matter that followed the 
formation of an alternative Church. The Exarchate was originally a Church 
based in Constantinople, the imperial capital, rather than in a place more 
appropriate to Bulgarian national narratives, such as Tirnovo. It was not a 
logical consequence and embodiment of Bulgarian national awakening. On 
the other hand, Bulgarian nationalists would probably have created it by 
1900 if it had not already been instituted with an imperial ferman. For the 
elite and the nationalist visionaries on both sides, the Church was the next 
frontier in the battle for national sovereignty, and the schism was inevitable 
because of the political imperative of the nation. But the dispute had to be 
worked out also at a second level, the level of the people, and there expecta-
tions of a lasting solution became inextricably entangled with violence. As 
an Exarchist and a Patriarchist from the village of Ravna put it, there was 
no redemption until “blood was spilled.”
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Even in turbulent Macedonia peace and quiet are a normal condition and 
violence the exception, though the exception is frequent enough there 
to render the nerves susceptible to an atmosphere overcharged with the 
electricity of human emotions.
—Albert Sonnichsen, Confessions of a Macedonian Bandit, 1909
The photographs of Leonidas Papazoglou, saved from oblivion thanks to a selection published in 2004 by the Thessaloniki Museum of Photography, provide a rare panorama of life in 
Ottoman Macedonia, more specifically in the province of Monastir, during 
the time of the struggle for Macedonia.1 Through Papazoglou’s lens, we 
catch glimpses of newlyweds, street vendors, actors, and entertainers, the 
well-heeled and the modest, urban dandies and pastoral tradition, all, of 
course, mediated through Leonidas Papazoglou’s own sense of mise en 
scène. The album also is a sobering reminder of the extent to which violence 
was a part of the daily experience of the same people who were posing for 
the camera—the playful images of young lovers and dapper-looking youths 
are interspersed with those of guerrillas, real or aspiring, victims of the 
former, and more macabre compositions involving naked bodies in rigor 
mortis.
That violence was tenaciously present in the lives of ordinary people of 
Ottoman Macedonia at the turn of the twentieth century is not a surprising 
statement at all. The images captured by Papazoglou are starkly indicative of 
what we have already seen in the preceding chapters and relay through the 
camera lens what the Albert Sonnichsen, journalist, relayed through 
the words that open this chapter, taken from in his account of travels with 
the “Macedonian Bandits.” Life as usual went on through the violence; peo-
ple married, had children, and found ways to make a living and even have a 
little fun as the struggle for the territory that encompassed their homes was 
closing in and claiming lives by the hundreds, because that is what human 
beings are hardwired to do.
1. Leōnidas Papazoglou, Phōtographika Portraita apo tēn Kastoria kai tēn periochē tēs tēn 
periodo tou Makedonikou Agōna (Thessaloniki, 2004).
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In this chapter, I sharpen the focus on instances of violence for two rea-
sons: first, to separate violence from the struggle taking place and analyze it 
in its own right rather than write it off as a self-explanatory occurrence un-
der the circumstances, and, second, to look beyond the seemingly ubiquitous 
incidents of violence to understand what, if any, alternative modes of inter-
action were available to the warring factions. The relation between conflict 
and violence should not be considered a robust and self-evident mechanism 
but a context-specific process, the logic of which remains to be explored.
In an article that sets forth the desiderata for a new approach to ethnic 
and nationalist violence, Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin urge caution in 
making precisely this type of association between preexisting conflict and 
violence, arguing that violence “should not be treated as a self-explanatory 
outgrowth of such conflict, something that occurs automatically when the 
conflict reaches a certain intensity, a certain ‘temperature.’ ” The important 
distinction, according to Brubaker and Laitin is that “[v]iolence is not a 
quantitative degree of conflict but a qualitative form of conflict, with its 
own dynamics.”2
2. Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence,” Annual Re-
view of Sociology 24 (1998), 426.
6. Father and son with oxen.
7. Couple from Kastoria.
8. Peasant couple.
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Following this approach, I show that violence was a necessary condition 
for, and not a natural by-product of, a strong ethnonational consciousness 
among the rural population. In other words, violence played a role in engen-
dering that very same feeling of difference and boundaries that purportedly 
were its cause. The systemic, targeted, and (tragically) efficient violence, 
examples of which I describe in this chapter, was not simply an epiphenom-
enon but a prerequisite to the politicization of communal difference. Just the 
simple fact that both the perpetrators and the victims were Slavic-speaking 
in a majority of the cases discussed in this chapter should throw notions 
of ethnic warfare fought among clearly defined groups in doubt. The vio-
lence inflicted by the Ottoman military and paramilitary groups, on the 
one hand, and several factions of militias, on the other, worked in tandem 
to create the conditions under which the notion of national belonging pen-
etrated the consciousness of a large segment of the peasant population. This 
process functioned through two principal channels of boundary-creation 
and - activation mechanisms: first, it rendered impossible the option for in-
dividuals to remain bystanders by creating an atmosphere of inescapable 
terror, and second, it made people aware of their ties to a larger community 
outside their immediate vicinity—they were now tied by blood to an imagined 
community.
This should not, however, lead us to conclude that violence was an indis-
putably effective tool in disseminating an ideology and creating committed 
converts to one movement or the other. Although the utility of violence as 
both a tactical and strategic instrument was clear to those who wielded it, 
the results achieved were mixed at best in terms of winning the hearts and 
minds of the people on whose behalf the insurgents were fighting. Without 
discounting the dedication or the faith of the insurgents, we should not lose 
sight of the fact that as many people picked up arms out of an instinct to 
survive as did out of ideological commitment. This is not to suggest that 
most of the guerrillas were hapless tools without any agency of their own; 
nor should we attribute an idealized innocence to those who denounced 
their comrades, turned in their neighbors, or hid weapons in their barns. We 
need to exercise caution, however, in attributing purely ideological motives 
to individuals’ participation in episodes of violence carried out against the 
putative enemies of the nation.
The question of agency is implicitly linked to a problem with narration; 
more specifically, the problem of naming the members of different armed 
groups without setting off ideological alarm bells. Although I am not en-
tirely persuaded by the analytical utility (or even the possibility) of devising a 
normative terminology, I think it is necessary to clarify, or at least underline, 
a few keywords that appear repeatedly in the primary sources as well as sec-
ondary accounts, scholarly and popular, of some of the events in question. 
The arbitrariness of ascribing meaning to the difference between a brigand 
and a guerrilla is well encapsulated in the clichéd expression “one man’s 
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terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.” We have already seen the refusal of 
the Ottoman bureaucracy to assign any name other than “brigand to those 
who joined insurgent bands; doing so would have been an acknowledge-
ment of a substantive difference between highway robbers and members 
of the revolutionary organizations. Nevertheless, the Ottoman government 
did apply a similar distinction by trying the captured insurgents in differ-
ent courts; according to official reasoning, which court tried the case de-
pended on whether the crimes committed fell under the purview of criminal 
law or extraordinary regulations regarding state security. In practice, this 
usually translated into Greek insurgents being transferred to the criminal 
courts for trial and sentencing but their Bulgarian counterparts being tried 
in the “extraordinary courts.”3 It is worth noting that the term brigand was 
also used by foreign representatives of the international reform initiative 
in Macedonia in reference to the members of revolutionary organizations, 
despite the fact that they were often tacitly sympathetic to one side rather 
than the other.
Although I could avoid, if not entirely resolve, this issue by resorting to 
the relatively neutral term militia, this semantic strategy would not address 
the more problematic distinction from the point of view of a historian, the 
one between the categories “peasant” and “militia.” The struggle for Mace-
donia was fought not between sovereign states but as an insurgency.4 As in 
any other conflict of this nature, and as the Ottoman administrators read-
ily acknowledged, the majority of the fighters were not foreign agitators 
but locals, ordinary people, who had a frustrating ability to resume their 
daily work and blend into the peasantry as soon as there was news that the 
Ottoman military was getting ready to make a move. As in Mao Zedong’s 
famous metaphor, they moved among the peasantry as “a fish swims in the 
sea.” An Ottoman official put it more bluntly, they were simply “indistin-
guishable” from the general population.5
The source of frustration for the Ottoman administrator is the same thing 
that makes the task of the historian much more complex, namely, that the 
peasants were indistinguishable from the militia members simply because 
they sometimes were one and the same. This statement does not imply that 
every single peasant led a parallel life as an active combatant. Rather, it 
underscores the ambiguity of agency when it comes to the involvement of 
the peasants themselves in the fight to capture their bodies and minds. We 
should not forget that participation in the insurgency did not necessarily 
require an individual to pick up a rifle and join the roaming bands of men 
3. MAE Constantinople, Serie E 147, Macédoine, February 28, 1905.
4. The definition of insurgency adopted here is from James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin: 
“a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guer-
rilla warfare from rural base areas.” “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003), 79.
5. BOA, TFR.I.AS 62/6160, June 24, 1908.
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in the mountains. The bulk of the planning, coordinating, and enabling was 
carried out by noncombatant locals, who were more vulnerable to violent 
retaliation by the state or rival groups than their protectors at large. Even 
though the perils of an ex post facto attribution of political motives to the 
actions of the peasants are obvious, we cannot discount their involvement 
as a reflex response to propaganda or simply chalk it up to coercion. In 
other words, although the categories “peasant” and “militia” should not be 
conflated, the overlap between the two makes it imperative that we discount 
approaches that assume clear boundaries dividing them.
We need not distinguish between guerrillas and security forces based on 
the respective sources of legitimacy for their actions; this is immaterial in 
accounting for the mechanisms through which violence created, activated, 
and reinforced social boundaries. How, then, do we start to make sense of 
such a complex sociological picture where we cannot assign the actors into 
neat and self-contained drawers with labels such as “peasant,” “soldier,” 
“guerrilla”? I propose, as a starting point, to borrow a few conceptual tools 
from Charles Tilly’s work. Tilly argues that “no simple distinction between 
‘insurgents’ and ‘forces of order’ can possibly capture the complex social 
interactions that generate collective violence.” His emphasis is, instead, on 
intermediate political actors with a significant amount of overlap and col-
laboration (as well as contention) between them. Two such groups, whose 
interactions are especially significant in shaping collective violence, are the 
“political entrepreneurs” and “specialists in violence.”6
In the first group are those who “specialize in activation, connection, 
coordination, and representation.”7 In our case, the prime example for po-
litical actors in this group were the teachers employed at the village schools 
and gymnasiums across the region, who not only molded young minds and 
instilled “national pride” in their hearts but agitated the locals for the po-
litical committees or the nation-states they served. Politically active priests 
were also in this category. They were in a unique position to wield reli-
gious authority, a particularly mighty force in this context, to activate and 
 reinforce communal boundaries. They also acted as power brokers and ne-
gotiators between the people, the guerrillas, and state actors such as Otto-
man officials and the representatives of foreign powers. In addition to these 
“usual suspects,” the category “political entrepreneur” is flexible enough to 
include, for instance, the shepherds who transmitted information on behalf 
of the guerrillas, the village grocer who coordinated the “contributions” for 
provisioning of the same, and the sharecropper who got rid of an adversary 
by ratting him out as a government informer. Representation is another pur-
pose that political entrepreneurs serve, as in the example of the village head-
men who supposedly spoke for the interests and wishes of all  individuals 
6. Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge, 2003), 40.
7. Ibid., 34.
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in their community and who interfaced between them and agents of the 
government.
In the category “violent specialist” we have not only the coercive agents 
of the state, such as the troops, gendarmes, police, security guards of the 
Régie, and village guards, but also the guerrillas, thugs, and sundry bandits. 
It would be counterproductive to try to classify these agents according to 
their proclaimed source of legitimacy, political agenda, or lack thereof. It is, 
however, important to note that these two categories—“political entrepre-
neur” and “violent specialist”—sometimes overlap, creating great potential 
for the emergence of particularly effective warlords such as Sandansky and 
Enver Bey (later, Enver Pasha).
What follows is an account of the work of these actors, the political en-
trepreneurs and violence specialists, and my analysis. In the first part of the 
chapter, I take stock of their actions and formulate a taxonomy of violence 
as witnessed, experienced, and exercised by the people of Macedonia. This 
allows us to gauge the level of penetration of violence into daily life, its per-
formative aspect, its intimacy, its politicization, and the channels through 
which it rendered nonparticipation a defunct option. In the second part, I 
shift the emphasis to the logic of this violence: what distinguished it qualita-
tively from what preceded and what followed, what its escalation patterns 
and tipping points were, and how selective violence was gradually overtaken 
by violence of a more indiscriminate nature. My reading of these events has 
been strongly influenced by Stathis Kalyvas’s theory of violence in civil war, 
although my analysis is not strictly an application of his model. I have taken 
heed of his warning against seeing violence as an outcome rather than a 
process. Although there are many instances of violence presented here, and 
I do argue that violence should be treated as a category in its own right, my 
purpose is not to hone in on instances of violence in isolation and present a 
picture of a world “populated only by victims and perpetrators, combined 
with the flawed perception that victimhood and guilt are mutually exclu-
sive categories.”8 Victims can indeed also be guilty, and denying that would 
be denying the individuals who participated in this conflict their historical 
agency. Nevertheless, this is not a cynical take on the experience of violence; 
conceding that the line separating victims from perpetrators may be more 
porous than we tend to assume is not, of course, tantamount to suggesting 
that the priest had it coming or the informer deserved to be executed. It does 
require, however, that we engage with the inherent ambivalence of ascriptive 
categories and accept the uncomfortable truth that it was impossible to sus-
tain the kind of communal warfare we see in this region without significant 
participation on the part of the “civilians” in acts of aggression against their 
“friends and neighbors.”
8. Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, 2006), 21.
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Violence: A Post-Mortem Analysis
A man from the village of Eğridere (Kallithea) alerted the authorities 
about a multiple homicide outside his village in January 1906. The investi-
gators sent to the scene of the crime described it as “savage.” The victims 
were three Greek Orthodox men from Eğridere: Taşo and Koço, the sons 
of Mihal, the village headman; and Nikola Todor, another Greek Orthodox 
man from the same village. A fourteen-year-old who ran errands for an Ex-
archist man had been sent off to deliver animals to the three men for their 
return journey from the district center. The boy had disappeared without a 
trace, and the corpses of the party he was supposed to meet were found in a 
riverbed along the road between Graçen/Gratsiani (Agiochori) and Eğridere.
According to the investigators’ report, the shape and size of the entry and 
exit wounds on the twenty-four-year-old Taşo Mihal’s body suggested that 
the bullets had been fired from a Mannlicher rifle and from some distance 
above the victims—probably from an ambush position facing the direction 
of Skirçova/Skrijovo (Skopia).9 These wounds were not the cause of death, 
however. All three victims also had wounds consistent with a distinctly large 
knife commonly used by the “brigands,” and they had been “slaughtered” 
 after they were blindfolded with their hands tied in their backs. Nikola 
Todor’s detached head had been placed next to the feet of his corpse. 
The personal effects of the victims were found nearby, abandoned to give 
the  impression that the attackers had taken off in the direction of Iskirçova, 
but the report noted that the “tidiness of the pile” and the “discovery of the 
three men’s animals tethered in Eğridere” suggested this was a diversion-
ary trick. Heavy rains following the incident had cleared whatever tracks 
might have been left behind. Subsequent interviews with two shepherds who 
had been in the vicinity a few days earlier and the questioning of the vil-
lage guard as well as the victims’ parents yielded no results. Ultimately, the 
report revealed a motive that might link the murders to the Bulgarian 
 committees more strongly than the (rather impressive) forensic evidence col-
lected from the crime scene: the men had been returning from Serres after 
having  testified at the criminal court against a Bulgarian man from their 
village.10
The extraordinarily detailed crime scene investigation report distin-
guishes it from more common incident sheets, but the incident itself carries 
features shared by similar violent crimes registered by the authorities. The 
first is its performative aspect: the spectacular, almost ritualistic grisliness 
of the act, or its gratuitous “savagery,” to cite the inquiry report, that put a 
memorable mark on the murders. The second is the possible involvement of 
 9. Mannlicher rifles, state-of-the-art weaponry of the time, were used almost exclusively 
by Bulgarian bands.
10. BOA, TFR.I.SL 95/9494, January 31, 1906.
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neighbors, people who had been living within close proximity to each other 
regardless of their differences and who would continue to do so after the 
investigators left, in the planning of the attack and thus the blurring of per-
sonal and political motives. The third is the difficulty of gathering informa-
tion about the incident, the refusal of the victims’ relatives to collaborate and 
provide information, which was a problem faced not only by the state actors 
but by the guerrillas as well. And finally, there was the location of the incident 
as well as the origin of the victims: as it will become clear from the exam-
ples below, certain areas were more prone to violence than others. Eğridere 
was among the cluster of villages that also included Graçen/Gratsiani, 
Alistrat (Alistrati), and Iskirçova/Skrijovo, which were all within an ap-
proximately 15-mile radius and which witnessed a disproportionately large 
 number of violent incidents.
Violence as Spectacle
The human body provides a perfect medium for the display of power through 
humiliation. While alive, its integrity can be offended by relatively inane tac-
tile methods such as the removal of garments covering it, or by more inva-
sive ones such as shaving off facial hair, or through the infliction of physical 
pain and permanent damage such as the severing of a digit or an ear. The 
very act of draining life out of a body can be placed on public display for ef-
fect, as in public executions (killings carried out in view of bystanders). Even 
after it no longer has a pulse, the body can be dismembered or desecrated in 
myriad ways to deliver a message. The message of the examples presented 
in this section is one of territorial hegemony delivered through the human 
body. We have seen how the fight over territory in Macedonia was carried 
out on paper through cartography, in census figures through a body count, 
and in the spiritual realm through attempts to capture souls by rival sects. 
The ultimate terrain through which this struggle was dragged, it seems, was 
made up of mangled bodies.
The articulation of power through the medium of the (tortured) human 
body was practiced by “specialists in inflicting physical damage.” This group 
included state agents such as soldiers, gendarmes, and the police as well as 
executers of a certain ideology and the motley crew of brigands and simple 
thugs.11 Among the tools used by this group, public executions, which were 
essentially murders committed in plain sight and in defiance of accepted 
moral norms, carried a significance that was far weightier than their imme-
diate function as demonstrations of deterrence. They were shows of control 
and power meant to inspire fear among enemies and awe among supporters, 
deriving legitimacy through the sheer audacity of their commission.
11. Tilly, Politics of Collective Violence, 4.
14. Apostol Petkov. Courtesy Princeton University Library.
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In September 1904, Apostol, the notorious band leader, personally carried 
out such an execution. His victim was a man from Baravitçe/Barovitsa (Kas-
taneri) who had allegedly been hired by the government to spy on Apostol. 
His punishment was to have his head cut off in his house, in front of his 
wife and children. Lest the rumor mill mistake the author and motives of 
this grisly act, Apostol dispatched a letter to the governor of the province 
claiming full responsibility and daring the officials to enlist more informers 
to catch him: “Those who denounce will not be spared our knives and guns. 
Whether they are Muslim or Christian, we do not touch those who do not 
denounce, we give no harm to nice people, we kill the bad. [He] would sup-
posedly deliver my head to you in return for the gold he received. Instead of 
him handing over my head, here I am cutting his head off in front of his fam-
ily, those who see this, if it pleases them they can also continue to snitch.” 
The conclusion of the letter was even more defiant, warning the authorities 
not to crowd the village with soldiers to gather information because there 
was nothing to inquire about; he was confirming that the murder was his 
doing. “If the soldiers swarm in and abuse the villagers, it won’t be good, if 
you want to see us, we are always here, if you want to meet us, we are always 
in the vicinity,” were the last words of Apostol’s letter.12
A flurry of correspondence between military and civilian authorities fol-
lowed the receipt of Apostol’s message. The region of Mayadağ had been 
under this guerrilla leader’s sway for a while, and he had not only commit-
ted a crime and seemingly gotten away with it but was also challenging the 
government to seize him on what he was clearly claiming as his own turf, 
with the intended consequence of frustrating the local administrators to no 
end. Here was a man who had made numerous enemies while building his 
reputation as a ruthless warlord and yet seemed to evade arrest thanks to 
that very same reputation. The apparent shortcomings of the troops on the 
ground did not help the situation either. Interestingly enough, the victim, at 
least according to the authorities, was not even an informer.13
It is impossible to ascertain whether the man really was a government spy 
or not. When informants were killed, they were usually acknowledged in 
official records as such, and authorities demanded extra care in the pursuit 
and capture of those who had assaulted people working for the govern-
ment.14 In other words, there was no reason for the authorities to deny 
that this person indeed had been serving as an informer. It is more likely, 
however, that he was suspected of helping rival Greek bands because he had 
violated the ban against interacting with members of the Greek Orthodox 
12. BOA, TFR.I.SL 52/5169, September 1904.
13. Ibid., esp. Yenice prefect’s telegram to the General Inspectorate, September 19, 1904.
14. See, for instance, BOA, TFR.I.SL 13/1268, June 23, 1903.
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 community.15 Whether or not the man was indeed an informer, his execution 
clearly had the desired effect by demoralizing the local authorities, commu-
nicating to the locals who wielded real power in the region, and ultimately 
warning them to stay within the limits set by Apostol. Even the Ottoman of-
ficials who, we assume, would have been jaded by the damage and pain they 
witnessed (and inflicted) daily, repeatedly emphasized the heinousness of the 
crime, revealing the potency of the medium in which Apostol had chosen to 
deliver his message to bolster and assert his authority.
Having presented this sequence of revolting scenes, I add here a few words 
of caution about their interpretation: it is indeed possible to read too much 
into these deliberately staged acts of ghoulish murder, which can easily 
be viewed as instances of “expressive” or “ritualistic” violence. The first 
problem with this conclusion is that “ritualization of violence often serves 
instrumental purposes.”16 In other words, there is a larger purpose that 
the seemingly gratuitous cruelty serves—in this case, a claim to territory—
which implies that the very “gratuity” of the act is suspect. And although 
it is tempting to question whether any of this ritualistic violence could be 
the work of individuals with extreme personality disorders—especially after 
viewing Apostol’s studio photograph in which he is posing gloriously with 
a pal, rifle in hand and a human skull between his feet17—that turns out to 
be an unlikely scenario. The literature on comparative cases suggests that 
people such as Apostol do carry certain traits that enable them to rise to 
positions of prominence under extraordinary societal conditions but that 
they are hardly “abnormal in a clinical sense.”18
We also need to keep in mind that decapitations were part and parcel of 
the collective memory of punishment in this region, the apparent shock and 
horror of the Ottoman bureaucrats recording these incidents notwithstand-
ing. We can see this as an extension of Charles Tilly’s notion that societies 
have a “limited repertoire of social action,” and “people tend to act within 
known limits, to innovate at the margins of existing forms.”19 Execution by 
decapitation and the exhibition of the severed heads of the “enemies of the 
state” had a long tradition in the Ottoman Empire, providing emphatic ma-
terial for the histories of a cruel and arbitrary Ottoman yoke in the Balkans; 
however, we should note that the practice was not exclusively an Ottoman 
form of punishment and that its use did not necessarily distinguish among 
15. BOA, TFR.I.SL 52/5169, Prefect of Yenice to the General Inspectorate, September 20, 
1904. The Prefect reconfirmed that the victim had not been in the employ of the government, 
but there were rumors that he had been “in contact with the Rums.”
16. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 25.
17. This image can be viewed at “Apostol Petkov,” Wikimedia commons, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/File:Tane_Nikolov_Apostol_Petkov_jpg.jpg (accessed October 29, 2012).
18. See, for instance, Kakar’s work on the “wrestlers” in Hyderabad; Sudhir Kakar, The 
Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion and Confl ict (Chicago, 1996), 81.
19. Charles Tilly, The Contentious French: Four Centuries of Popular Struggle (Cambridge, 
1986), 390.
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regions or the ethnicity of the victims. What is important to note is that the 
act of decapitation itself, as offensive as it was even then, did not transgress 
an established norm. The transgression was, rather, in the appropriation of 
the authority to perform that act, by the “bandit” in this instance.
During the sixteenth-century French religious riots, Natalie Davis ob-
serves, “offi cial acts torture and offi cial acts of desecration of the corpses of 
certain criminals anticipate some of the acts performed by riotous crowds.”20 
We can argue that the examples presented here follow a similar pattern, but 
that should not give us an excuse to overlook the subtle (and sometimes not 
so subtle) shifts in the deployment of this macabre display of force. These 
shifts reflect a change in not only the medium but also the substance of 
the message it aimed to impart. To start with, we need to draw a distinc-
tion between public executions by decapitation (or other methods) and the 
display of post-mortem severed heads, a morbidly fascinating practice with 
apparently more uses than we might expect.
In the post-Tanzimat Ottoman Empire, public executions, including de-
capitations, were an all but extinct practice. What was more common, even 
as late as the turn of the twentieth century, was the display of the corpses 
or the severed heads of “bandits” killed in clashes with security forces (who 
were sometimes ex-bandits themselves), especially those of some renown, 
in a public place, ideally to those who were familiar with the deeds of the 
deceased. An obvious interpretation of this grim pageantry of post-mortem 
humiliation is that it was meant to strip the “bandits” completely of the 
power—moral as well as physical—they once wielded in challenging the 
authority of the state, ensuring that they were not only dead but were also 
denied the right to preserve somatic integrity as a minimal degree of dignity 
for the dead. It also confirmed the identity of the deceased to a large audi-
ence, who witnessed his inglorious end with their own eyes, lest the legend 
of the dead “bandit” outlast his biological life.
This state-centric interpretation is complicated by photographic evidence 
showing guerrillas posing with the cut-off head of one of their comrades, 
resting on a podium covered with a cloth and framed by a funerary laurel 
wreath. Here, the intended humiliation was completely displaced and the 
deceased was honored as a hero through the photograph of his desecrated 
remains.21 In either case, the image of a head without a body was an ex-
tremely potent one, capable of creating what seem to be contradictory paths 
of commemoration.
The Ottoman government was adamant in refusing any formal acknowl-
edgement of a distinction between militias fighting for political  independence 
20. Natalie Z. Davis, “The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France,” 
Past and Present 59 (May 1973), 59.
21. It is tempting to read this image as a neo-icon channeling the image of St. John the 
Baptist, with the guerrilla replacing the saint as a martyr to the just cause.
15. L’Illustration cover, February 28, 1903. Ottoman gendarmes and police with 
severed heads. Private collection of Edhem Eldem. Used with permission.
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and highway robbers or simple “brigands.” Despite the occasional overlap 
between these two categories and the Ottoman authorities’ hypocrisy in try-
ing Bulgarian and Greek guerrillas in separate courts, however, they were 
indisputably distinct from one another by the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury. The highway robbers might be harking back to the romantic tradition 
of “noble thieves” living in the mountains unencumbered by the norms of 
settled society and peasant submissiveness, but they did not carry the same 
moral clout accorded to independence fighters in liberal European public 
opinion. Moreover, the guerrillas themselves were committed, at least in 
principle, to maintaining that distinction.
It is not surprising, then, that the Ottomans found themselves in a pub-
licity nightmare that could not be undone, despite the deployment of the 
Hamidian “image management” machinery, following the publication on 
February 28, 1903, on the front page of L’Illustration of Paris, of an image 
of Ottoman gendarmes posing around what was captioned as the decapi-
tated heads of “Macedonian rebels.” Even though the officials in Monastir 
eventually identified the heads in the image as those of “Greek brigands” 
killed in Gorice (Goritsa) in 1891, and assured the palace that no such 
acts were carried out anymore, there were enough similar compositions in 
16. Guerrillas with severed head. From Leonidas Papazoglou, “Photographic Portraits 
from Kastoria and Its Vicinity at the Time of the Macedonian Struggle,” George 
Golobias Collection, Museum of Photography, Thessaloniki. Used with permission.
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 circulation to suggest that it was fairly common to have such photographs 
taken as “trophies.”22
That is, although the state was certainly willing to receive full credit for the 
capture and annihilation of its enemies, and was complicit in the desecration 
of their bodies, the resulting photographic compositions were not intended 
as a tool in its display of hegemony through human bodies. The moment the 
corpses or severed heads of guerrillas killed elsewhere were placed on public 
display in a town center the state mission was complete. When these images 
were captured by a photographic lens, however, they acquired an indepen-
dent meaning. As fascinating as it is, the pursuit of this meaning would be a 
digression from the main thread we have been following so far—the use of 
state-induced or state-endorsed violence to communicate territoriality. Suf-
fice it to say that the state was concerned with these images only to prevent 
their dissemination from infringing on its already shaky legitimacy.
The Ottoman government under Abdülhamid II went after those who 
opposed its authority with a vengeance, but for all its show of absolutism, 
its punishments were always juxtaposed with the paternalistic leniency of 
a regime that jailed entire villages following an uprising and yet pardoned 
“ex-bandits” who expressed their regrets, often honoring their requests to 
be enlisted in the gendarmerie.23 “His august majesty’s clemency” was ex-
tended not only to remorseful “brigands” who surrendered but to those 
already arrested and sentenced to death for involvement in the revolutionary 
committees. Consider the case of Konstantin Goroyif, for instance. Previ-
ously arrested and sentenced to death for leading a group of “bandits,” 
he was not only pardoned but also appointed as a teacher in the district 
of Yenice Vardar (Giannitsa), despite the general policy banning individu-
als associated with revolutionary committees (let alone leading one) from 
employment at schools, which were (fairly) viewed as staging centers for 
propaganda activities.24
A perusal of records on the death penalty suggests that it was mostly 
reserved for nonpolitical crimes and often commuted to life or long-term im-
prisonment. One convicted criminal, a certain Hüseyin Ali, apparently took 
notice of this asymmetry in the application of criminal law when he sent 
a petition asking to be pardoned, just like “Bulgarian and Rum  evil-doers 
22. BOA, TFR.I.A 4/380, March 1903. The same folder of correspondence reveals that 350 
copies of a similar photograph was found in Salonika in the photography studio of a German 
national by the name of Bader. The photographs were clearly intended as “souvenirs” from the 
region. I borrow the term Ottoman “image management” from Deringil, The Well-Protected 
Domains.
23. See, for instance, BOA, Y.A.RES 151/55, December 10, 1907; TFR.I. SL 13/1300, June 
28, 1903.
24. BOA, TFR.I.MN 52/5103, May 5, 1904.
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who have been set free despite being sentenced to death.”25 There was no 
indication, however, that this “me too” wish of the detainee was granted.
Two public executions that took place in the market square of Serres in 
1907 indicate a clean break from this established practice. The first of these 
must have been a shocking sight. Dimitri Trandafil and Yovan Gilo Mihal 
were brought before the gallows at 6:30 a.m. on October 31, 1907. Their 
incarceration had taken place only months before, thanks to the confessions 
of Giorgi Kiatibof, a “notorious comitadji” on the loose for many years, 
who had turned himself in to the authorities in Rondi/Vrondi (Vrondou) in 
June. Kiatibof’s confessions had inculpated a large number of Vrondi locals, 
among them Dimitri Trandafil, the village teacher, and Yovan Gilo Mihal, 
grocer and former muhtar (headman). Kiatibof had identified the two as 
the section chiefs of the revolutionary committee (presumably IMRO) in 
Vrondi, which was confirmed by another guerrilla who had surrendered 
to the authorities, as well as by witnesses from the village. They had coor-
dinated the storage of arms and munitions, coordinated the provision of 
shelter to the guerrillas, and, more important, delivered judgments on execu-
tions to be carried out by the bands. That their comrades attempted to assas-
sinate Giorgi Kiatibof and his associate after these arrests must have been a 
contributing factor in the harshness of their punishment. Whereas Kiatibof 
survived the plot and went up the social ladder, having been appointed a 
police officer, his friend was killed.26 After a trial at the extraordinary court 
of Salonika, Trandafil and Mihal were sentenced to death, and their execu-
tion took place soon after the sentencing.27 The following excerpt from the 
report of Major Foulon conveys in detail the theatrics involved:
Two gallows had been erected by gypsies who would proceed with the execu-
tion themselves. The two Bulgarians were made to climb on a stool on a table 
and after passing around their neck a rope coated with soap and oil they toppled 
the table and the stool, as a result of this fall from about a meter, death should 
be almost instantaneous, in any case, no convulsions were observed on either 
of the corpses. After a display of three hours, during which a large group of 
people—where the Christian element was scarcely represented—went around 
the gallows, the corpses were placed in caskets. The mutasarrif himself came 
to the place and lectured the crowd, essentially telling them that from that mo-
ment on, the imperial government which until then had shown much leniency 
toward the trouble makers was firmly resolved to let the people who had been 
convicted of crimes such as [these] be executed, and consequently in the future 
25. BOA, TFR.I.ŞKT 97/9654, March 31, 1906.
26. This assassination attempt is described in detail later in the chapter. Katibof initially 
requested a position at the tax office in Vrundi, but the position of police officer was deemed 
more suitable by the authorities. Kaitibof reportedly accepted the position with enthusiasm; 
BOA, TFR.I.AS 48/4798, July 13–15, 1907.
27. BOA, TFR.I.SL 161/16035, October 14, 1907.
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people would take care to refrain from such acts. Before the execution, the death 
sentence was read publicly, an excerpt from this sentencing, written in large let-
ters was attached to the chests of the condemned. After the public display, the 
corpses were transported to the Bulgarian church where a service was held.28
Shocking as it was, this public execution was not the real clincher; that 
took place less than two months later, again in a public square in Serres. This 
time, it was two Greek andartes who stood before the gallows. Nico Dimitri 
Panayiot, a Greek national, and Vano Orde Athanas, from the village of 
Homondos/Houmandos (Mitrousi), were hanged at 6 a.m. on December 
16, 1907, amid the shocked horror of the Rum community of the town, the 
Metropolitan, and staff of the Greek consulate. This was not only a break 
with the custom of pardoning political prisoners but also an open reversal 
of the policy of tacit collaboration with the Greek bands and turning a blind 
eye on their increasingly audacious activities. Despite the repeated pleas of 
the Greek consul in Serres to the subgovernor and, subsequently, the gover-
nor of the province, the executions were carried out as planned.29 The two 
men had been arrested during the course of an attack after they had killed 
the main commissioner of the locality, a police agent, and two soldiers, 
which may explain why the local authorities were less inclined to take the 
necessary steps to arrange a clemency hearing for the two. Nevertheless, this 
public execution, coupled with the growing tension between the subgover-
nor and the consul, denotes a significant shift in the attitudes of the Ottoman 
authorities toward Greek militia activities in the region.
Following these two incidents, there were other executions of death sen-
tences elsewhere in Macedonia during the first half of 1908.30 Although they 
were still quite few in number, this apparent shift in policy toward political 
prisoners, and especially the manner in which the executions were carried 
out—in full view of the public and with the bodies deliberately left on dis-
play for hours—raises the question “why?” The answer lies in the broader 
international context and the direction the Macedonian reforms were taking 
at that particular time. The speech of the subgovernor to the crowd (most of 
whom were Muslims, reportedly) watching the hangings, warning them that 
the imperial government would no longer tolerate the misdeeds of the com-
mittees, is a clear indication that these executions were staged more for po-
litical effect than for carrying out the rulings of the extraordinary court. The 
intended audience was not only the present crowd but the  representatives of 
28. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 144, October 31, 1907.
29. BOA, TFR.I.A 36/3581, December 17, 1907; MAE, Constantinople, Série E 144, De-
cember 16, 1907.
30. I was able to track a total of five, all but one of them carried out in Monastir: BOA, 
TFR.I.MN 152/15168, January 8, 1908; TFR.I.KV 187/18606, January 1, 1908; TFR.I.MN 
162/16153, April 4, 1908; TFR.I.MN 169/16855, June 6, 1908; TFR.I.MN 173/17248, June 
6, 1908.
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the European Powers responsible for supervising the reforms. The mandate 
allowing their presence was up for renewal at the end of 1907, but reciprocal 
foot dragging by Britain, the other powers, and the Ottomans had created 
a crisis. Britain was seemingly determined to take over leadership of the re-
forms from Russia and Austria-Hungary, and to impose more stringent mea-
sures on the Ottomans. Among the British demands from the Sublime Porte 
was an end to the complicity between the Ottomans and the Greek bands. 
The civil agents lent support to this demand, and by the end of the year, the 
Ottoman military had started a more energetic pursuit of the Greek bands.31 
The executions of Bulgarian and Greek fighters within a two-month period 
should therefore be seen as proof by the Ottoman administration of its com-
mitment to stamping out guerrilla activity, regardless of the side a particular 
band was fighting for.
Intimacy of Violence and the “Dark Face of Social Capital”
May 29, 1908. Early in the evening, a Greek Orthodox youth, approxi-
mately twelve years of age, walked into Nikola Trayko’s shop to buy some 
yogurt. Having made his purchase, he started toward his house. He was 
about 30 feet from the store when pandemonium erupted over the bowl of 
yogurt. Nikola Petre, identified by the report as fifteen years old, a sawyer 
by occupation, and a resident of the Hamidiye quarter in the vicinity of the 
Armenian church, had apparently been observing the transaction from his 
store. He walked out and stopped the child: “Why do you buy yogurt from 
a Bulgarian when there are Greek shops here?” he demanded. As Nikola 
Petre was attempting to spill the contents of the hapless child’s yogurt bowl, 
kalayci (tinner) Hasan ran up to them: “Why are you doing this?” he asked 
of Nikola. In response, Nikola claimed he had been declared the “despot”32 
and that he would prevent the Greek Orthodox from buying yogurt or other 
things from Bulgarians. He was wielding a knife and about to charge at 
Hasan when Çerkes (Circassian) Said Efendi, a market inspector, interfered 
and seized him and had him removed to the police station for questioning.33
This episode took place in Salonika, Macedonia’s largest port city and the 
“window into the world.” The narrative of this document partially reflects 
the ethnic and religious mixture that was the defining characteristic of the 
city—with the exception of the Jewish element, which was the dominant 
ethnic group in the city, we hear about all the major groups in the city 
and their intermingling. It also reveals that the practice of boycotting the 
31. At the same time, the European Powers started exerting more pressure on the Greek 
government to prevent Greek officers from crossing the border to organize and engage in the 
activities of armed Greek bands; Dakin, Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 314–20.
32. The term despot in this context means “person in charge.”
33. BOA, TFR.I.SL 184/18394, Salonika Police Bureau to the Inspector General, May 
30, 1908.
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 businesses of rival ethnic groups, long in effect in some provincial centers, 
had also spread to Salonika, whose cosmopolitanism was apparently erod-
ing under the new rules aimed at keeping different ethnic groups separate 
from each other.
Small-business boycotts relied on voluntary enforcers such as Nikola Pe-
tre, and their zealous participation should itself serve as a reminder that 
these boycotts were not always very effective—especially in a large port 
city such as Salonika where social pressures were considerably lighter. Their 
impact, however, should not be measured by the economic damage they 
were meant to impose on the other community but seen as part of a larger 
strategy that aimed to minimize intercommunal contact. This strategy in-
volved several methods to keep communities separate, such as orders against 
house visits, attending baptisms and marriages, and sharing sacred space, 
examples that we have seen in the previous chapters. Limiting the exchange 
of greetings and small talk in what should have been the “safe zone” around 
the marketplace was a far more destructive result of these boycotts than any 
material damage they might have caused because it served to make strang-
ers out of one’s neighbors and to make a threat out of the mundane and the 
familiar. This alienation was a significant (and necessary) element in the 
normalization of acts of violence against the separated “other” because it 
served the very human need to put a distance between an individual and his 
or her deeds that might result in harm to another person, by making that 
distance much greater than it used to be.34
The alienation or “dehumanization of the other” has been identified as a 
necessary step on the road to mass killings in a wide range of history, from 
sixteenth-century religious riots in France to the Holocaust.35 In his work 
on Hindu-Muslim riots in India, Sudhir Kakar follows this well-established 
notion that dehumanization of the victim is integral to the (social, ethical, 
and psychological) legitimation of violence.36 Even though Kakar’s focus is 
on a particular kind of violence, namely urban riots, which does not read-
ily present a parallel to the rural violence in Macedonia at the turn of the 
twentieth century, his ethnographic conclusions have broader applicability. 
Sarkar’s case studies reveal a process that runs parallel to the construction 
34. For a detailed analysis of the psychological processes that shape people’s behavior 
during ethnic conflicts, see Vamik Volkan, “Psychoanalytic Aspects of Ethnic Conflicts,” in 
Confl ict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, edited by Joseph V. Montville (Lexington, 
1991), 81–92.
35. Natalie Z. Davis, in articulating this notion, argues that the ceremonial accompanying 
acts of violence performs the function of hiding from sixteenth-century religious rioters “a 
full knowledge of what they are doing.” “Rites of Violence,” 85. Several studies following the 
culturalist approaches to ethnic and nationalist violence place the process of dehumanization 
at the center of their analyses, and they consider the “cultural construction of fear” to be a 
necessary part of it. For a discussion and an introductory bibliography, see Brubaker and Laitin, 
“Ethnic and Nationalist Violence.”
36. Kakar, Colors of Violence.
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of a dehumanized “other” from one’s neighbors, namely, the strategies de-
vised to deal with the guilt that accompanies participation in riots despite 
the early socialization vilifying members of the other community that each 
person goes through: “It is easier to kill men who are strangers, to obliterate 
faces which have not smiled on one in recognition. It is easier to burn down 
houses which have never welcomed one as a guest,” Kakar remarks, captur-
ing the essence of the dilemma any human being must face before causing 
harm and pain to another.37 This is why, he explains, it was more common 
for mobs to go foraging in distant corners of their town rather than attack-
ing their immediate neighbors: that task was left for a mob from another 
corner of the city.
It is not far-fetched to suggest, then, that for many who wound up “de-
nouncing” their neighbors by guiding a band to their house there must have 
been a great psychic distance between what they were doing and, say, par-
ticipating in a massacre; the guerrillas can be seen as the counterpart to 
the “mob from another part of town” in this version, assigned the task of 
“cleaning up” without compromising the larger public’s sense of decency. 
As Stathis Kalyvas puts it, “[C]ivil wars are bloody not so much because 
people are inherently violent, but because they are not: most are repelled 
by the prospect of acting violently, and so they will not, unless someone 
else handles the gory details while shielding them.” The ease with which 
violence can be outsourced, or the abundance of “opportunities for indirect 
violence,” is precisely what makes civil wars so unusually violent.38 On the 
other hand, we should also note that the guerrillas, whose job it was to 
“handle the gory details,” occupied a moral space separate from the rest 
of the members of society, just like the soldiers whose use of coercion was 
sanctioned and legitimized by the higher interests of the state. They knew 
their moral purity was compromised, but they had volunteered for this posi-
tion out of their commitment to a legitimate political cause (and no doubt, 
at least for some, out of less “noble” motives such as the lure of pursuing a 
romantic ideal of manhood).
Apostol, one of these self-declared “avengers” of the people, and his 
band were in action again in November 1904.39 They stopped by Garçişte 
(Grchiste) to look for a Greek band that had reportedly taken shelter there. 
Their search did not yield any results, but they did not leave without tell-
ing the villagers to convert to the Exarchate and expel their schoolmistress, 
Catherina Hadgi-Yorgi. Miss Hadgi-Yorgi, in her twenties and originally 
from Gevgeli (Gevgelija), had resided there for the past five years. Shaken 
37. Ibid., 29. The exceptions being, I assume, sociopaths or those suffering from similar psy-
chosocial anomalies—admittedly, unlike Kakar, I am entirely out of my area of expertise here.
38. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 14.
39. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 143, Macédoine, Vice Consul in Salonika to the Chargé 
d’Affairs in Istanbul, November 2, 1904.
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up by this event, she packed and left the village for her hometown. She came 
back several days later, however, apparently after being encouraged by the 
Greek notables in Gevgeli and given assurances by the elders of the vil-
lage. Only two days after her return, on a Saturday evening, a band of fifty 
men appeared in the village and went directly to Angos Kiros’s residence, 
where Catherina had been renting a room, and demanded to see the teacher. 
Clearly, their intention was not to have a casual conversation with her, so the 
landlord refused to open the door. The guerrillas then poured kerosene on 
the periphery of the house and on three adjacent ones and started a fire. The 
charred remains of Catherina were later found in the rubble of the house. 
Six others had also been killed in the conflagration, including two children.
The French consul who reported this incident noted that the village con-
sisted of some eighty households, which had been members of the Bulgarian 
Catholic Church until a few years earlier, when the Patriarchate managed to 
enlist them among its followers even though the village was entirely Slavic-
speaking. The Exarchists in neighboring villages were disturbed by this turn 
of events and did not approve of the presence of a Greek schoolteacher. The 
consul added that sources more sympathetic to the Bulgarian side claimed 
that there was a Greek band taking shelter in the house and differed in 
their accounts in insisting that the band had given the residents a chance to 
evacuate the premises before starting the fire. This version of events did not 
really hold up against the evidence because there had been no retaliatory 
shots from the house, and all the victims were unarmed residents. This type 
of justification was a common enough excuse presented to attenuate and 
possibly depersonalize the crime committed, but the truth remains that the 
guerrillas were rarely concerned about minimizing the collateral damage 
from their actions, often planned on the basis of information they gathered 
from the friends and neighbors of the targets.40 This brings us to one of the 
thorniest issues related to intercommunal violence, namely the involvement 
of neighbors and acquaintances in acts of aggression. Countless examples 
from archival sources suggest that this was a chillingly common occurrence.
Such was the fate, for instance, of Mr. Stephanos, the muhtar of Leşka 
(Leshko) in the district of Cuma-i Bâlâ (Blagoevgrad) near the Bulgarian 
frontier. The investigation after the man’s disappearance from his village in 
summer 1903 revealed that he had been kidnapped and killed by a band of 
eighty men acting on the orders of Donchev, a well-known guerrilla leader. 
Fifteen fellow villagers of Stephanos had guided the band to his home, from 
which he was taken to Lakadaş (Logodazh) and executed on a hill above 
the village church. The band reportedly stayed in Leşka for another two 
days after carrying out the order and then returned to Bulgaria. According 
to the mutasarrıf (subgovernor) of Serres, it was understood that Stephanos 
40. See, for instance, Captain Campocasso’s report: MAE, Constantinople, Serie E 144, 
Macédoine, Captain Campocasso to Colonel Vérand December 31, 1906.
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was killed because he had assisted the Ottoman troops as a “guide” for an 
ambush that had resulted in the “annihilation of 51 brigands.”41
The neighbors of Mr. Stephanos, as far as we can tell, retired to their 
houses after pointing out his residence to the band members, who carried 
out the execution of the “denouncer” at a distance from the village. There 
were also cases, albeit not as common, in which neighbors actively partici-
pated in the punishment of the offending party. We read about one such in-
cident thanks to the dutiful record-keeping of Captain Campocasso, one of 
the French gendarmerie officers assigned to the reform mission in the Serres 
district. The captain’s report vividly relates what transpired on the evening 
of December 25, 1906, in Klepousna/Klepouchna (Agriani), in the district 
of Zihna, but none of the details he includes addresses the problem of iden-
tifying the motive, other than self-evident animosity, of the behavior of the 
parties involved.42
Klepousna was a mixed village, consisting of approximately fifty Exarchist 
and one hundred Patriarchist households, both sides Bulgarian- speaking.43 
The Patriarchist community had been under pressure to switch its alle-
giance for some time. Bougdan Vanguel and Jovan Nicolas, two Exarchist 
men from the same village, took it upon themselves to warn Vanguel Papa 
Philippe, the Greek Orthodox priest, that he might soon meet the fate of his 
colleague in Kornitza, who had been killed in July, unless his congregation 
joined the Exarchate.
The two men’s warnings materialized on December 25, 1906. A large 
band of Bulgarians entered the village as darkness fell, took their positions, 
and then doused the Papa Philippe family home with kerosene and set it 
on fire. In addition to the residence of the priest and his three brothers, 
eight other houses were completely burned down. The death toll was seven 
people: Anton Angel’s parents, son, and wife; the priest’s wife; and the par-
ents of Caranfil Boujic. Caranfil Boujic was a teacher married to one of the 
brothers of the priest. The guerrillas had opened fire on the burning houses, 
and Caranfil caught a bullet in the knee as she was trying to flee the flames, 
yet she was luckier than the others in that she lived.
Vanguel Papa Philippe, who had miraculously survived the attack with 
slight injuries, was familiar enough with his attackers to identify five of them 
by name; two of these were Constantin Sotir, the Exarchist village teacher, 
and Dimitri Tchirka, the priest of İskirçova/Skrijovo, another village in the 
vicinity. Another man claimed that there were other people from Skrijovo 
41. Kılavuz (“scout” of “guide”) was the term the Ottoman administrators used for “in-
formers”; BOA, TFR.I.SL 13/1268, Telegram from the Sub-governor of Serres, June 23, 1903. 
This incident bears resemblances to another execution of an alleged Ottoman-troop scout in 
the same district; BOA, TFR.I.AS 8/751, June 25, 1903.
42. MAE, Constantinople, Serie E 144, Macédoine, Captain Campocasso to Colonel Vé-
rand, December 31, 1906.
43. Brancoff [Mishev], Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne, 203.
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in the band because he had heard their peculiar way of speaking. The cap-
tain also remarked that “surely some Bulgarian inhabitants of Klepouchina 
[sic] were accomplices and must have guided the band.”44 Indeed Athanas, 
one of the Papa Philippe brothers, had recognized four villagers among the 
attackers, one of whom was the Bulgarian kocabaşi [leader]. Dimitri Papa 
Philippe named five others: the Bulgarian schoolteacher; a tailor from Raz-
log; Bougdan Vanguel, who had conveyed the threat to the priest; a certain 
Guiorgui Cotcho; and a painter by the name of Jovan Todor.
The testimony of the survivors, abbreviated, translated, and recorded by 
the French gendarmerie officers, leaves the reader grasping for the dénoue-
ment that will mark the end of the story. Instead, we are left in suspense; we 
can only guess what it must have been like to see a familiar face hurling a 
torch into one’s house and speculate that the tailor from Razlog was easily 
recognized because the village folk sought his services when they needed a 
new pair of trousers for a wedding or had the old ones repaired before going 
to church on Easter. There is no moral to this story other than the ease with 
which former neighbors can turn into enemies and inflict pain on each other.
How then, do we make sense of the arson in Klepousna and countless 
similar others? Is it even worth dwelling on the details of incident reports 
trying to reconstruct what really happened from the imperfect information 
rendered even more problematic because it was conveyed through the idio-
syncratic verbiage of various military and civilian bureaucracies? My answer 
is yes, even knowing full well that perfect reconstructions may elude us, 
because those very details are germane to the questions of how and why 
violence becomes salient in the first place. Imperfect as they may be, these 
reconstructions are worth the effort because they occupy center stage in any 
endeavor to qualify the link between preconflict cleavages and post-conflict 
identities. Recent scholarship on ethnic and civil war violence has brought 
this presumed clear, linear connection under question.45 Studies covering a 
wide geographical and methodological range point to a major fallacy in the 
assumption that ethnic plurality, even in the presence of “ethnic rivalry,” 
is an indicator or a predictor of violent conflict.46 Moreover, understand-
ing violence at the grassroots level, with all its disturbing intimate details, 
rather than treating it in the stylized and sterilized form that commonly 
44. MAE, Constantinople, Serie E 144, Macédoine, Captain Campocasso to Colonel Vé-
rand, December 31, 1906.
45. See, for instance, Brubaker and Laitin, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence”; Stathis Kaly-
vas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’: Action and Identity in Civil Wars,” Perspectives on 
Politics 1, no. 3 (2003): 475–94.
46. For a comparative analysis, see Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil 
War.” See also Gagnon, Myth of Ethnic War; Georgi Derlugian, Bourdieau’s Secret Admirer 
in the Caucasus (Chicago, 2005). Present-day Macedonia, which, contrary to widespread ex-
pectations that it would “explode,” remained relatively calm and peaceful, constitutes another 
telling example refuting the notion that there is only a brief stage of separation between ethnic 
tension and violent conflict.
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 accompanies national “awakening” or “liberation” narratives, moves us 
one step closer to understanding its dynamics, which also means accepting 
the notion that much of this violence may be “endogenous” to war. That 
violence is endogenous to war is not a tautology, as it may initially sound, 
but, “a strong qualification of the view that violence arises exclusively from 
prewar cleavages,” to paraphrase Stathis Kalyvas.47
Another element that makes the task of revisiting the details of these inci-
dents extremely difficult is the fact that participation in acts of violence is, 
by definition, a subjective process. No amount of archival documentation 
and triangulation of that evidence can change this fact; this means that we 
can grapple with the questions surrounding people’s motives for killing and 
harming only to the extent that we are willing to tap into that subjectivity.
Consider, for instance, the fate of Anton Panteli, who was killed by his 
erstwhile friends and neighbors at the dinner table, and in front of his wife 
and five-year-old daughter, who was injured by a stray bullet. The story 
perfectly showcases the intimacy of communal violence and the indelible 
mark it imparts as it ravages established networks of kin, friendship, and 
neighborliness. The murder investigation report from July 1907 provides a 
rare, if incomplete, picture of that intimacy in relaying the preparation, the 
calculated gestures, and what looks like the final trepidations of an assassin 
before he participates in the execution of a former friend.
Anton Panteli, the victim, was a “Bulgarian” from the town of Rondi/
Vrundi in the district of Serres. He and a former associate named Georgi 
Katiboff had surrendered to the authorities after participating in the activi-
ties of the local revolutionary committee for some time.48 We do not know 
what prompted their surrender, but we can be certain that they must have 
provided useful information to the authorities because reportedly Katiboff’s 
testimony ultimately led to the arrest of Dimitri Trandafil and Yovan Gilo 
Mihal, revolutionary committee members, who, as we have seen, were ex-
ecuted in the Serres town square later that year. After giving their deposi-
tions in Serres at the provincial center, Panteli and Katiboff were released, 
and they asked to return to their hometown.
They were accompanied by a sizable detachment of soldiers for protec-
tion on the way home and reached their destination after an uneventful 
journey. A day later, on the evening of July 5, Anton Panteli was having 
dinner with his family when several men, initially unidentified, entered his 
house and opened fire, killing him. During the attack, a bullet scraped his 
daughter Katerina’s cheek, who, luckily, survived her wound. A neighbor, 
47. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 83.
48. BOA, TFR.I.AS 48/4798, correspondence, June–July 1907. The incident was also re-
ported in MAE, Constantinople, E 144, Crime report for the month of July, August 1, 1907.
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hallac (cotton-dresser) Dimitri, who was there for dinner, was also injured 
in his left arm.49
The investigation proceeded promptly after the incident, and the perpetra-
tors were seized within a matter of days. On July 7, Taşko, the miller, who 
was identified as the person who had pulled the trigger, was arrested, and 
three days later his accomplices Yovan Savati and Vasil, a shopkeeper and 
shepherd from the same village, were also captured, and all three were en 
route to the Serres prison. The speedy arrests were largely the result of prod-
ding by the Inspector General, who had recently come under attack from 
General Degiorgis for the authorities’ repeated failures to protect former 
guerrillas from revenge killings after they gave up their arms.50
The investigation report, dispatched by the district director of Rondi 
(Vrundi) on July 8 deflected some of the blame onto the victim, claiming 
that Anton had acted in a cavalier manner and not secured the door to his 
house properly—although further details clearly reveal that he would have 
opened up the door for his assailants, regardless, because they were acquain-
tances. The inquiry commission determined that Yovan Savati, the leader 
of the local revolutionary committee, had given the assassination orders. 
Yovan Savati was the recently elected successor to another Yovan, who had 
been arrested; the murder was retaliation for this Yovan’s arrest. The new 
leader had commissioned two men named Taşko and Vasil to execute the 
committee sentence.
According to several witnesses, Taşko was seen acting suspiciously on the 
day that Anton and Georgi arrived in the village. Even though he should 
have been at work, either at the mill or in his field, he idled around the vil-
lage all day, briefly went into Anton’s house, and came out. He then searched 
for Georgi and ran into him walking back home from the marketplace. 
He said, “I am coming too,” and joined Georgi on his walk. When they 
reached his home, Georgi said goodbye, but instead of leaving, Taşko stood 
by and waited in a bizarre manner, “twisting his moustache,” until Georgi 
finally went inside and closed the door. As he was going in, Taşko said “oh 
well, we’ll see each other tomorrow, right?”
Taşko reportedly went over to Yovan Savati’s store right after this inci-
dent. Savati then closed down his shop early and disappeared. Taşko was 
later spotted in the village walking about aimlessly. After sunset, he walked 
to Anton’s house, pushed open the unlocked door, and went up and joined 
the family at the table and had some raki. As they were still eating, he got 
up and “against established customs,” noted the report, left the family at the 
table. As he was departing he said something incomprehensible in Turkish to 
Anton. He went downstairs, but nobody heard the door open and close. The 
49. BOA, TFR.I.AS 48/4798, Subgovernor Reşid’s telegram to the Inspectorate, July 5 1907.
50. BOA, TFR.I.AS 48/4798, Degiorgis to Hilmi Pasha, and Inspectorate to the Subgover-
norate of Serres, July 5, 1907.
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attack took place while the family was still at the dinner table. The sequence 
of events suggests that Taşko had either let the other assailants in or left the 
door open for them to sneak, and that, while he was having raki with Anton 
and his family, the others were hiding, waiting for his signal to attack.
There is something cruel and unusual about this kind of violence that 
cannot be mitigated by widely acknowledged processes of distancing, de-
humanization, and finally rationalization. There is an inherent intimacy in 
these acts, an intimacy that clings to the victim and perpetrator no matter 
how salient their hatred of each other and that makes the shedding of blood 
all the more incomprehensible, distinguishing this sort of conflict from any 
other kind. “Intimacy is essential rather than incidental to civil war,” affirms 
Stathis Kalyvas, but this intimacy is “puzzling only because we tend to as-
sume the inherent goodness of intimate relations.”51 Tension is as likely to 
arise out of closeness as affection, however. As Kakar points out, “there is a 
special quality to the enmity I feel for a person who resembles me most but 
is not me. Next to my brother, it is my neighbor the Ten Commandments 
enjoin me to love as I do myself, precisely because my neighbor is the one 
I am most likely to consider as a rival.”52 It is this uncanny resemblance 
between neighbor and enemy that makes communal violence so disturbing. 
Stathis Kalyvas convincingly argues that violence is a “reflection rather than 
a transgression of neighborliness—though a perverse one.” The ultimate 
betrayal of trust, namely denunciation, in his words, amounts to “the dark 
face of social capital.”53 The examples from the close-knit rural communi-
ties we have seen so far constitute further empirical proof of this statement.
Polarization and the “Privatization of Politics”
Even some homicides that were demonstrably of a political nature, such as 
the quadruple murder and subsequent beheading cited earlier, might have 
been precipitated by personal vendettas. Remember that the victims had just 
given a deposition in court against their fellow villager, Pasko; although the 
report did mention that there long had been a mutual enmity between the de-
fendants and the victims, the nature of this enmity was nowhere made clear, 
raising the possibility that either the victims’ testimony or the calling in of 
the guerrillas to punish their behavior was motivated by nothing other than 
sheer spite. This opinion was also voiced by Consul Steeg, the representative 
of the French Republic in Salonika, when he wrote to the chargé d’affairs 
after a tour of the sancak of Serres that “personal vengeance” must have 
been the motive of at least some of the crimes committed by the bands.54
51. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 330–31.
52. Kakar, The Colors of Violence, 43.
53. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 332.
54. MAE, Constantinople, 143 E, Macédoine, Consul Steeg to the Chargé d’Affairs, Oc-
tober 5, 1904.
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Disputes that otherwise would have dragged on in court, perpetuate mu-
tual irritation, or perhaps cause a scuffle were now more likely to escalate 
into violent confrontation; old grudges harmlessly festering under the seal 
of social norms could now break free in cathartic bloodshed. It is very im-
portant to recognize the distinction between personal and political motives 
because this distinction ultimately calls into question common assumptions 
about the nature of preconflict differences in determining the course and 
intensity of communal violence. The fact that most of the attacks on life 
and property occurred within a particular physical and human geography 
of extremely close-knit yet distinct communities, often accompanied by the 
indifference (if not active involvement) of fellow villagers, requires a better 
analysis than one of mere condemnation on our part. The relationship be-
tween the personal and the political was all the more relevant in such com-
munities, where kinship networks and social interaction between neighbors 
played an important role in shaping all aspects of life.
We have already introduced the idea that the peasants, far from being pas-
sive pawns, could act in ways that accommodated multiple agendas, maxi-
mized their chances of survival, and, moreover, made them into political 
entrepreneurs. In their capacity as political entrepreneurs, they were com-
monly involved in the planning and execution of mechanisms that served 
to create and activate social boundaries and contribute to the increasing 
polarization of society. Polarization, in Tilly’s definition, is the “widening 
of political and social space between claimants in a contentious episode 
and the gravitation of previously uncommitted or moderate actors toward 
one or both extremes.”55 For our present purposes, the words previously 
uncommitted should be emphasized. In other words, polarization should be 
understood as being conflict-dependent rather than as the cause and defi-
nition of the conflict itself.56 That polarization occurred not only through 
the work of guerrillas, or specialists in violence, but through the actions of 
otherwise peaceful people who continued to participate in the functioning 
of the society that they were tearing apart is something that should give us 
pause; however, it becomes easier to understand when we consider the mix 
of motives that determined their actions.
Here, rather than concentrating exclusively on the politicization of pri-
vate life through polarization, it may be more useful to consider another, 
parallel process precipitated by intimate violence—namely the “privatiza-
tion of politics,” to borrow another explanatory concept from Kalyvas.57 
This process entails the transformation of otherwise isolated, interpersonal, 
55. Tilly, Politics of Collective Violence, 76.
56. This is one of the common explanations for the brutality of civil-war violence, especially 
found in macro-level accounts of conflict. Kalyvas points out that this approach, in effect, 
“reasons back from violence to the factors that are believed to have produced it” and that “po-
larization explains simultaneously the onset of a conflict, its content, and its violence.” Logic 
of Violence in Civil War, 65.
57. Ibid., 332.
242  Chapter 6
and even inane disputes and tensions into a basis of political mobilization 
that can subsequently serve as the basis of new collective identities. And it is 
quite common, as Kalyvas rightly points out, “for the trivial origins of these 
new identities to be lost in the fog of memory,”58 as the following example 
illustrates.
A massacre took place in Eğridere in summer 1905, a day before one of 
the most important holidays on the Orthodox Calendar, the Dormition of 
the Mother of God. The set of events that culminated in the massacre were 
initially set off by a dispute concerning the small chapel of Aghia Para-
skevi.59 The name Eğridere was a familiar one in the government records; 
this small “mixed” village had an unusual intensity of conflict. The Exar-
chist and Patriarchist communities both claimed stewardship of the chapel 
and demanded intervention by the authorities.60 The Inspectorate followed 
common procedure in response to the petitions of the two communities 
and demanded an inquiry to establish whether any “official” conversions 
had occurred in the village (i.e., a record of adherence to the Exarchate by all 
or part of the community, presented before summer 1903, that would entitle 
the Exarchists to a separate church and school). The initial response of the 
local authorities, which stated that the two communities shared the church 
and the school and that it was not clear whether any attempt at conversion 
had taken place, was not particularly helpful in resolving the dispute.61 Sent 
back for another round of inquiries, the local officials finally determined 
that the entire village had adhered to the Patriarchate before 1903. There 
was, however, a petition requesting official approval to join the Exarchate 
on June 5, 1904.62 The final decision was in favor of the Patriarchists, who 
were granted the right to appoint the headman for the village because the 
petition had been sent after the official cut-off date of August 1903.63
Nevertheless, the fiduciary rights over the chapel were still a contested 
issue not directly addressed by this decision. The construction of the chapel 
had started eighteen years earlier under the supervision of Marko Yorgi, 
who had incurred an expense of 4 liras, partially collected as donations 
58. Ibid., 351.
59. BOA, TFR.I.SL 73/7284, Metropolitan of Drama to the Inspectorate, May 18, 1905. 
See also TFR.I.SL 75/7409, Metropolitan of Drama to the Inspectorate, May 29, 1905.
60. BOA, TFR.I.SL 75/7409, Petition from the Exarchists of Eğridere to the Inspectorate, 
March 21, 1905; Inspectorate to the Subgovernorate of Serres, March 23, 1905; Subgovernor-
ate of Serres to the Inspectorate, April 17, 1905; Metropolitan of Drama to M. Muller, April 
14, 1905.
61. BOA, TFR.I.SL 75/7409, Inspectorate to the Subgovernorate of Serres, April 20, 1905; 
Subgovernorate of Serres to the Inspectorate, April 25, 1905.
62. BOA, TFR.I.SL 75/7409, Subgovernorate of Serres to the Inspectorate, May 2, 1905; 
Subgovernorate of Serres to the Inspectorate, May 8, 1905.
63. BOA, TFR.I.SL 75/7409, Inspectorate to the Subgovernorate of Serres, May 10, 1905; 
Subgovernorate of Serres to the Inspectorate, May 18, 1905; Petition of the Metropolitan of 
Drama to the Inspectorate, May 29, 1905; Inspectorate to the Subgovernorate of Serres, May 
30, 1905.
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from neighboring villages but not obtained a permit for the construction.64 
The Patriarchists claimed that the chapel was a much older vakıf, (or pious 
endowment) and that the current edifice had been built by repairing (tâmi-
ren) an extant one in 1888. They asserted that there were “no Bulgarians” 
in their village back then (“Bulgar namıyla kimse olmayub”). Moreover, the 
supervisor had been a man who had passed away six years earlier and not 
Yorgi, as he claimed. They also pointed out that there was an official rec-
ord showing that the chapel belonged to the Greek Orthodox community. 
They did, however, concede that Yorgi had been a trustee of the chapel. He 
had, however, joined the group that had decided to adhere to the Exarchate 
and to make the chapel available to them for Easter service the previous 
year. The Greek Orthodox Metropolitan had dispatched a priest to dismiss 
Marko Yorgi from his trusteeship following this incident.
Even though Yorgi had indeed continued to pay taxes as the trustee of the 
chapel, the authorities restored the chapel to the Orthodox community—not 
an unusual outcome, as we have seen, given the blatant partiality of Otto-
man officials for the Greek Orthodox side in intercommunal disputes.65 The 
disgruntled Exarchists, it seems, sought revenge. On the evening of August 
13, a Bulgarian band attacked the village and targeted the homes of Greek 
Orthodox notables. The attack followed the familiar script of gunfire and 
arson. Vasil Konboti, one of the notables, perished in the fire along with his 
wife and daughter. Their neighbor’s son, a fifteen-year-old boy who hap-
pened to be looking out the window as the guerrillas started the fire, was 
also killed.66 By the time the troops arrived on the scene, the band had had 
ample warning to escape. The report mentioned that the guerrillas had stood 
by watching the fire while the cries of the two women trying to climb out of 
the windows could be heard.67
The same band continued its mission in Melnikitch (Melenikitsi) a day 
later, where they killed two çiftlik guards, both Greek Orthodox and one of 
them a Vlach. Their mutilated corpses were found later by farm laborers.68 
While the band itself apparently did not consist of locals, according to some 
residents and relatives who were interviewed afterward, it was aided by a 
64. BOA, TFR.I.SL 73/7284, Report of the Deputy prefect and Mal Müdîri, May 23, 1905.
65. Ibid. The Subgovernor recommended, in an addendum to the report, that the petitions 
for changing sects should not be taken seriously.
66. BOA, TFR.I.SL 83/8221, To the Prefecture of Zihne, August 13, 1905; PRO, FO 
195/2207, Theodorides, the vice consul at Serres to the British Consul in Salonika, August 14, 
1905; MAE, vol. 46, Note by the Légation de Grèce en France, August 17, 1905.
67. BOA, TFR.I.SL 83/82221, Subgovernor of Serres to the Inspectorate, August 14, 
1905; PRO, FO 195/2207, Vice Consul Theodorides to the British Consul in Salonika, August 
16, 1905.
68. PRO, FO 195/2207, Vice Consul Theodorides to the British Consul in Salonika, August 
16, 1905.
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group of forty to fifty men from Eğridere. One of the village guards was 
subsequently found to be responsible for bringing in the guerrillas.69
Often attacks that clearly had political overtones in planning and execu-
tion started out as much smaller disputes over property, access to resources, 
or the payment of dues or taxes. Even disputes over churches, chapels, and 
parish schools sometimes fell under this category, despite their apparent as-
sociation with the much larger political conflict. Episodes of violence origi-
nating as such disputes over ecclesiastical property should be distinguished 
from other episodes on at least three distinct levels: (1) regardless of the final 
act of aggression, they usually originated in local disputes and not in two 
opposing camps clustered around universal and abstract political principles, 
(2) belonging in one particular sect or the other was not necessarily a condi-
tion of having access to spaces of worship, and (3) the fiduciary responsi-
bility was as significant a concern for the parishioners as the ecclesiastical 
authority presiding over their church.
What happened in Eğridere is representative of other small communi-
ties caught up in the spiral of violence. At the initial stage, when sectar-
ian  difference was an identifiable yet new and narrowly defined notion, 
the probability of a violent outbreak was slim. Despite the presence of two 
competing paths to spiritual salvation, potential disputes were contained 
through strategies such as the rotation of the churches for religious services 
between the two communities or the simultaneous use of the ecclesiastical 
space. When other considerations such as regulating the use of tangible re-
sources or sharing financial responsibility became pressing concerns, how-
ever, the dispute took another turn.
Yet, even in the presence of these preconditions of sectarian difference and 
communal tension we cannot argue that violent conflict is the necessary out-
come. We have already seen that mixed communities continued to function 
without major outbreaks of violence when left to their own devices. Even 
in cases where disputes did break out, such as fights over who would have 
the church building on which Sunday, the details suggest that these were as 
much an indication of the possibility of accommodation as of irreversible 
conflict.
An example from 1907, a year quite advanced in the “polarization” of 
the communities, illustrates this point further. The village of Karlikovo (Mi-
kropoli) (another familiar name from the archival records of conflict) was 
in the course of holiday celebrations on December 6, and the Greek Ortho-
dox and Bulgarian Exarchist communities, apparently having buried their 
hatchets in honor of St. Nicholas, or under the appeasing influence of tsi-
pouro, were dancing the horo together in the village square. Unfortunately, 
the festive occasion did not end well; the document that relates the incident 
69. BOA, TFR.I.SL 82/8221, Subgovernor of Serres to the Inspectorate, August 17, 1905.
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is unclear as to the nature of the argument that set off the chain of events, 
but there was a scuffle and Dimitri, the son of the Greek Orthodox village 
headman, assaulted Gorgi Hristo, an Exarchist, with a knife and injured him 
in the shoulder.70 In the melee that followed, Dimitri escaped. Bojik Hristo, 
Gorgi Bojik, and two small children named Hristo and Angel from the Ex-
archist side, and Angel Petre and Yovan Angel from the Greek Orthodox 
side, were slightly injured. It is interesting to note that the names of those 
who were involved suggest the possibility that this intercommunal fight had 
a tint of family feud, which is not surprising in that kin networks usually 
supplement, and even act like, ideological bonds in many cases.71
The lesson here is that violent communal conflict should not be seen as 
a foregone conclusion in the presence of sectarian differences. There were, 
however, several other factors, the combination of which made violence very 
likely. To start with, the institutional arbiters that might have helped to dissi-
pate the tension across the region that was home to numerous such villages, 
namely the Ottoman government and the representatives of European Pow-
ers, were quite far from being up to this task. The legal/institutional frame-
work was compromised not only by the divergent interests and agendas of 
the Ottomans and the Europeans but also by the lack of a robust security 
force that could have been deployed to enforce the law rather than ignore, 
violate, or flout it. Second, the proliferation of guerrilla strongholds in cer-
tain areas made their peripheries more violence prone, not only by simple 
logic of proximity but because it provided easy access to violence specialists 
who enforced an alternative order and could be brought in by political entre-
preneurs to settle local disputes with lethal effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) 
considering the pretext for revenge that such attacks prompted.
Brutalization and the Impossibility of Fence-Sitting
In August 1905, Komaina, a fifty-year-old widow of a certain Costadine, 
disappeared in Marikostina (Marikostonovo). A few weeks later, on Sep-
tember 8, “the Bulgarian Guerman Nicolas” of Livonovo (Levunovo) left 
for the market of Melnik and never returned.72 In Serres, Helen Giorgieva 
contacted the authorities in December 1905 and reported her husband had 
been missing for some time. Georghi Ferzi, the husband, was later found 
70. BOA, TFR.I.SL 129/12858, Zihne Prefect Halil Rifat to the Inspectorate, December 20, 
1906.
71. There is a significant body of literature supporting this point; see Kalyvas, Logic of 
Violence in Civil War, 95n. 11.
72. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, Captain Bouvet to Colonel Vérand, September 23, 
1905. It is interesting to note that, according to Mishev, both Livonovo and Marikostina were 
inhabited exclusively by Exarchists, and Zlatko, where another person had disappeared (he 
cites “Zlatkof-Tchiflik,” which is very likely the same place) had a population of 224 Slavic-
speaking Patriarchists. Brancoff [Mishev], La Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne, 192.
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by fishermen, his corpse had been stuffed into a bag found floating in the 
Karasu River. An investigation into the murder did not produce any immedi-
ate results.73 Pavlo Velo, a milkman originally from Kosovo, left his house in 
Serres at dawn on May 28, 1907, to go to the creamery where he purchased 
the milk he distributed daily to his clients. His daily routine was interrupted 
before he reached his destination, and he died after suffering multiple knife 
wounds at the hands of an unknown assailant(s). Even though the French 
gendarmerie officer hastened to remark that the attackers were probably “of 
Greek nationality,” they had left no clue as to the motive for their crime.74
As a matter of fact, countless telegrams and incident sheets in the archives 
attest to a large number of violent crimes that were presumed to be of a po-
litical nature simply because there was no other apparent reason for them. 
It is interesting to note that many of these victims were stabbed, rather than 
shot, suggesting a more personal motive for the crimes committed. Com-
parative evidence suggests it is more than likely that at least some of these 
were not of a political nature at all but were, rather, crimes of opportunity, 
committed with the knowledge that the mechanisms that would have at-
tached and exacted a high price for taking another person’s life no longer 
functioned normally, thus discounting the “opportunity cost” of murder.75
Consider another quadruple murder, for instance, that reportedly took 
place in sight of at least a dozen people early on the morning of October 31, 
1907. Four Catholic Bulgarians from the village of Todorak (Theodoritsi) 
were on their way to the village of Boursouk (Limnochori) in the district 
of Barakli Cuma (Irakleia).76 They were intercepted by a group of three 
“Turkish brigands,” who robbed the four men, tied them up, and then shot 
them. While this robbery-homicide was progressing, three Muslim couples 
were working in a field approximately 50 meters from the scene. Moreover, 
several people had seen the bandits shortly before the incident, including a 
group of armed Albanian men and another party of gypsies. None of them, 
however, was willing to offer official testimony, according to Major Foulon, 
who drafted a report to his superior, Colonel Vérand, about the incident in 
a style evoking a clumsy and bureaucratic harbinger to the “Chronicle of a 
Death Foretold.” Finally, a young shepherd stepped forward and stated that 
he had seen the bandits flee toward Lovichta (Kallikarpo) on the victims’ 
horses. He also identified one of them as a young Turkish man from Külahlı 
73. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, Excerpts of minutes drafted by Subgovernor Reşid 
Bey and Colonel Ali Rıza Bey, January 1905.
74. MAE. Constantinople, Série E 144, Macédoine, May 29, 1907. I was not able to locate 
any other record of this crime that might have allowed me to cross-check this information.
75. A superb fictional example for the possible consequences of a discounted price for mur-
der and predation are the characters Snoop and Chris (played by Felicia Pearson and Gbenga 
Akinnagbe, respectively) in the HBO television series The Wire. See Lorrie Moore’s review, “In 
the Life of ‘The Wire,’ ” New York Review of Books 57, no. 15 (October 14, 2010): 23–31.
76. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 144, Macédoine, Major Foulon to Colonel Vérand, 
 November 5, 1907.
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(Korifoudi). The shepherd was apparently a brave citizen not cowed by the 
grim statistics of abducted, killed, and maimed fellow shepherds, or perhaps 
he had a personal axe to grind against this violent man—this is not to say 
that these were two mutually exclusive possibilities.
Thanks to the testimony of the shepherd, the gendarmes had no trouble 
locating the man that day at home with his wife and mother. When ques-
tioned, he denied having left the house all day, but his wife failed to back up 
his alibi. Even though it is tempting to speculate about a fed-up wife finally 
seizing her moment to get rid of this wretched man, the holes in his alibi 
were not the only things that gave away the part-time bandit. The gendarmes 
also found cases of Gras bullets, identical to the ones used in the homicide, 
in the house, and further investigation revealed that his accomplices were 
two Albanian men who had already taken off toward Poroy (Ano Poroia).
Major Foulon was appalled by the witnesses’ callous disregard of a mul-
tiple homicide taking place within their sight. Their negligence was com-
pounded by their lack of civic responsibility in refusing to testify. The moral 
outrage of the French officer, although quite justified, did not take into ac-
count what, in my opinion, was the more striking moral conundrum posed 
by the incident: How did a local “family man” with a known address be-
come a part-time bandit who could kill and rob several people in the morn-
ing and then come back home to take a nap?
We could make an argument here that there had been a possible desen-
sitization of the public to violence through repeated exposure, although I 
would caution against taking this reading to its logical conclusion of a com-
plete societal breakdown. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the failures of 
law enforcement coupled with the presence of competing groups with access 
to the means of coercion engendered the conditions under which criminal 
activity became more common, but this is not to say that such activity be-
came normalized or ubiquitous. In other words, the desensitization should 
be seen as a context-specific deterioration of social norms rather than their 
general dissolution into a Hobbesian catastrophe.
Especially after the Ilinden Uprising, the inhabitants of the countryside 
were subject to a low level of daily violence, which was a constant reminder 
that their lives could change or end abruptly in a moment, that all-out 
war was just around the corner. These daily hardships were of a different 
order than the murder and mayhem we have discussed so far in that they did 
not always end in grave bodily harm; nevertheless, the cumulative effects of 
navigating this dangerous obstacle course to keep body and soul together, 
day after day, amounted to a trauma that was comparable to witnessing or 
being subjected to physical violence.
Much of this daily trauma could be attributed to the presence of a large 
number of troops, regular and reserve, mobilized in the region to counter 
the insurgency. The problem was not their numbers, which were clearly 
insufficient to patrol the countryside effectively, but the dearth of resources 
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to keep them fed and equipped. Further complicating the matter was the 
mutual hostility that characterized the interactions between the military and 
the Slav inhabitants of the region. A majority of the latter understandably 
viewed the troops as a threat to, rather than a protector of, their security. 
The soldiers, for their part, viewed the Slavs with suspicion as actual or 
potential collaborators with the guerrillas.
Thefts of food and livestock were common complaints made against the 
troops, and these were a direct result of the Ottoman Third Army com-
mand’s ongoing failure to make timely payments to the contractors and 
purveyors who supplied the military with foodstuffs. Frustrated with the 
arrears in payments, the contractors occasionally stopped delivering the 
food for the soldiers’ mess, which usually consisted of bread and beans with 
the occasional mutton.77 That the soldiers preyed on the local population, 
stole food and other goods, and got involved in the contraband tobacco 
trade should not come as a surprise given the conditions under which these 
men were deployed, often for years with no certain date of discharge, among 
a population they overwhelmingly despised. What is more surprising is that 
there were not even more incidents of abuse, looting, and general breaches of 
discipline—which we can attribute to the harsh punishments such breaches 
could result in, such as being dispatched to Yemen, which was seen as tan-
tamount to a death sentence.78
Searches for weapons and guerrillas hiding in villages constituted the most 
frequent pretexts for the abuse of villagers by the troops. To address this 
problem, the authorities required searches to be carried out only in the pres-
ence of the village headmen and the members of the village council—a rule 
that must have been violated as many times as it was observed, considering 
the frequency of the registered complaints and the assurances from local of-
ficials that it was indeed being followed. The nature and intensity of these 
abuses ran a wide spectrum from inconvenience and verbal and physical 
harassment to plundering, beatings, and unjustified arrests. Looting, rape, 
and torture were also not unheard of; they usually accompanied reprisals 
after uprisings or armed confrontations.
The investigations of allegations of abuse by the military seldom produced 
any substantive results that might assuage the fears of the locals or restore 
a degree of trust in official due process. In cases where there was an eas-
ily identifiable culprit acting without open endorsement from his superiors, 
the man, usually a low-ranking soldier, was court-martialed and punished 
77. The situation was indeed dire, and the threat of malnutrition-related diseases such as 
scurvy was constant. The soldiers not only lacked adequate food but also basic equipment and 
clothing such as socks and shoes. For more details on the effects of this problem on morale 
and relations within the security forces, see İ.K. Yosmaoğlu, “Marching on an Empty Stomach: 
Practical Aspects of Gendarmerie Reform in Ottoman Macedonia,” in Economy and Society on 
Both Shores of the Aegean, edited by Lorans Tanatar Baruh and Vangelis Kechriotis (Athens, 
2010), 277–96.
78. Many thanks to şükrü Hanioğlu for alerting me to weight of the “Yemen threat” (per-
sonal communication, March 2008).
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swiftly.79 When an entire detachment was implicated, and there were hints 
of acquiescence or participation at the officer level, however, abuses were 
more difficult to investigate and prosecute. It seems that the burden of proof 
was placed on the abused rather than the accused soldiers or officers. This 
applied even in cases where the allegations were made not by civilian locals 
but by the gendarmes, who also occasionally drew the ire of the troops.80 
This often resulted in the cases being dropped or in punitive measures that 
barely amounted to a slap on the wrist.
A number of events that took place in Cuma-i Bâlâ in late 1904 are il-
lustrative of the common type of brutalization of the locals by the troops. 
Cuma-i Bâlâ was in the northern part of the sancak of Serres, along the Bul-
garian border, and a significant number of its Bulgarian population had fled 
to the principality during the reprisals carried out by the Ottoman regular 
army units and militias in the aftermath of the Ilinden Uprising. A year after 
the uprising, many of the refugees had come back, but the situation was still 
very tense.81 The district had been a thoroughfare for insurgents going to 
and from the Bulgarian principality, and the Ottomans attempted to, and for 
a while managed to, control this traffic by intensifying the number of troops. 
Detachments from the Third Army were stationed in karakols across the 
district, some of them commandeered from the locals, such as the Bulgarian 
community school building in Selichte (Selishte) and the Bulgarian priest’s 
residence in Pokrovnik. The army could not, however, prevent the infiltra-
tion of two large bands of about 140 men from the Bulgarian principality 
in December.82
The committees had forbidden the keradjis (muleteers) carrying goods 
on caravans between Cuma-i Bâlâ and Demirhisar (Sidirokastro) to serve 
“Turks or Greeks of the region.”83 This ban was then expanded to include 
doing any kind of business with Muslims. The Muslim community retaliated 
by blacklisting the Christian merchants: the mufti proclaimed the order, po-
lice surveillance in the marketplace ensured its observation, and the troops 
apparently lent assistance to its enforcement through punitive measures.84 
Muslims who purchased anything from Christian vendors were forced to 
79. Civilian authorities, more sensitive to the locals’ grievances, tried to make sure that of-
fenses did not go unpunished. For instance, during a search in a village of Avrethisar on Janu-
ary 20, 1905, the soldiers broke icons in the Bulgarian church. When the villagers complained 
about what had happened, their officer was arrested; MAE, Constantinople E 147, Consul 
General to the Ambassador, January 28, 1905. Offenders at the bottom of the pecking order, 
such as the Régie guards were also quickly transferred to a criminal court; BOA, TFR.I.SL 
50/4970, August 8, 1904.
80. BOA, TFR.I.AS 54/5387, July 1907.
81. BOA, TFR.I.SL 48/4762, Inspectorate to the Prefecture of Cuma, August 6, 1904.
82. Dakin, Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 167.
83. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 143, Colonel Vérand to the Chargé d’affairs, Novem-
ber 1904.
84. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 143, Consul General to the Ambassador, December 9, 
1904.
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return it. The ban was revised soon afterward when the Muslim notables 
decided to exempt the Greek Orthodox vendors from the boycott, limit-
ing it to the Exarchists. There were reports of Muslims walking around at 
night, talking loudly about “killing the giaours [infidels].”85 The tension 
was sustained as a result of local agitation, and the state of the relations 
between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire did not help either. The antici-
pation of a war breaking out stirred up already heightened emotions.86 The 
kaymakam (prefect), who seems to have had an appeasing presence and who 
was regarded as a “perfectly fair man” by the Christian population, asked 
for leave in October, reportedly exasperated with the influence of Mirliva 
Salih Pasha, the commander of the forces in Cuma and his cronies.87 The 
prefect’s departure was unfortunate under the circumstances because he was 
the only government official who could be relied on to diffuse the tension 
and to monitor and report on the conduct of the troops to the Inspectorate.
The abuses took place at the end of November and beginning of Decem-
ber during searches for weapons and guerrillas in certain villages after the 
shootings and deaths of three soldiers in the vicinity.88 The complaints that 
followed were grave enough to prompt the authorities to reluctantly carry 
out an investigation—a task the officials sloppily completed in great haste, 
according to Colonel Vérand, the French gendarmerie commander.89 The 
following excerpt from the subsequent report lends credence to Colonel Vé-
rand’s claim that it was botched by design:
A majority of the inhabitants indicated that they were very happy with the 
 conduct of the soldiers in Pokrovnik. It is just that there were quite a few com-
plaints about officers in the karakols. As already mentioned, measures will be 
taken about these. We also asked the notables of the village of Pokrovnik if they 
had any other complaints. They responded that they did not, they only requested 
that the searches, while legitimate, do not take place during the night, in an 
arbitrary manner, and that officers and soldiers be always accompanied by the 
muhtar or an aza. This was all related to the commander and the kaymakam.
It would not be going on a limb to suggest that the villagers probably 
viewed the inquiry as an interrogation rather than an investigation. They 
wanted to give the “right answers” to the officials’ questions rather than talk 
about what actually had transpired, and they accomplished this with gusto, 
85. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 143, Colonel Vérand to the Ambassador, December 11, 
1904.
86. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 143, Colonel Vérand to the Ambassador, December 20, 
1904.
87. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 143, Consul Steeg to the Chargé d’affaires, October 5, 
1904.
88. BOA, TFR.I.SL 61/6046, January 8, 1905.
89. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, Colonel Vérand to the Ambassador, March 4, 1905.
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 providing a perfect quotation for the reporting official about the terms un-
der which “legitimate” searches would be carried out, as if they had memo-
rized the latest government memo on the subject.
The final remarks in the minutes acknowledged that the soldiers had 
gone into the village on their own, following tips that there were “among 
the inhabitants brigands and guns” and had carried out searches without 
the muhtar and the azas, and also “engaged in some excesses.” This was as 
far as the investigation could proceed, however. According to the official’s 
deposition, the obstacle blocking the inquiry was clearly insurmountable: 
“since the villagers do not know their [the abusive officers’] names, and 
many detachments passed through the village during that period, and these 
villagers cannot specify which detachment these officers belong to . . . it is 
impossible to inquire further.”90 This feeble excuse justified the decision to 
end the inquiry. Colonel Vérand’s remark that “the commission was not so 
much interested in finding out the truth as proving the allegations wrong . . .” 
was probably not far off the mark, but it neglected an even more pressing 
concern for the Ottoman officials handling the investigation, which was to 
keep the involvement of the European officers to a minimum.91
It is also worth noting that the same investigation commission dismissed 
as “completely unfounded” the allegations of rape, which they referred to 
as “attacks on women,” because, as their reasoning went, the women had 
not mentioned anything to their parents or anyone else from the village 
and their “husbands and elders of the village denied any knowledge of such 
assaults.”92 Therefore, the commission found the allegations unworthy of 
their time and consideration.
Note that rape, although certainly represented in the “repertoire of con-
tention” of the “violence specialists” in the region at the time, was not 
used as a systematic tool of suppression in the form of mass rapes.93 This 
was probably due to the fact that none of the groups—including the Ot-
toman government—competing for territorial supremacy included in their 
short-term plans a vision for the forcible removal or annihilation of a cer-
tain segment of the population.94 In other words, the stake they had in a 
stable government in the long term made mass rape a counterproductive 
90. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, minutes of verbal report by Subgovernor Rechid Bey 
and Major Ali Riza, ca. January 15, 1905.
91. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, Colonel Vérand’s report, March 4, 1905. Captain 
Enchéry, who filed the complaints, was the frequent target of allegations that he was not only 
partial to the Bulgarian side but also actively involved in subversive activities such as presiding 
over alternative “revolutionary” tribunals; see, for instance, BOA, TFR.I.SL 60/598, December 
30, 1904. The French consul dismissed these allegations as “absurd” in his report to the ambas-
sador; MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, February 28, 1905.
92. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, ca. January 15, 1905.
93. Both terms are borrowed from Tilly, Politics of Collective Violence.
94. It was, however, clearly on the agenda during and in the immediate aftermath of the 
Balkan Wars.
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tool.95 Anecdotal evidence suggests that this was an explicitly defined rule 
for members of IMRO, who did not dare stray from this injunction, and 
“[e]ven the old time brigands, who knew no laws but their own, were not 
only careful observers of women’s chastity themselves, but were ever ready 
to avenge such wrongs.”96 This observation was recorded by a journalist 
whose impartial observer status was compromised by his willing participa-
tion in several IMRO activities while “embedded” with the revolutionaries 
in 1906; nevertheless, the lack of substantial evidence from Ottoman and 
other archival sources attesting to the rape of local women by revolutionar-
ies corroborates his statement. The assignment of Catherine Tsilka as “chap-
eron” to Ellen Stone during the latter’s kidnapping by Sandansky’s band is 
another indicator of the lengths some IMRO men would go to prove their 
commitment to the protection of a woman’s honor. Mrs. Tsilka, a Bulgarian 
Protestant missionary and a minister’s wife, was kidnapped along with Miss 
Stone, the real target, apparently because it would have been inappropri-
ate for an unmarried woman to be alone in the mountains with a bunch of 
young men.97 Given the aspiration of IMRO to become a legitimate protec-
tor of the people, this principle and its strict observance made perfect sense.
Rape was more often used as a sporadic tool of oppression against the 
local population by Ottoman troops and irregulars, especially in the im-
mediate aftermath of uprisings or armed encounters, when male inhabitants 
tended to flee into the mountains, or during overzealous searches for weap-
ons in rural dwellings, when opportunities for abuse were abundant and 
were only perfunctorily curbed by the intervention of disciplined officers.98 
Incidents of rape were also reported after attacks by Greek bands whose 
95. This was unlike, for instance, the case of Ottoman Armenian women during World 
War I. Mass rape tends to accompany ethnic-cleansing operations, such as in Bosnia in the 
1990s, rather than the selective violence of civil war, which more closely characterizes what 
was happening in Ottoman Macedonia at this time. This is not to say that all ethnic-cleansing 
operations are accompanied by mass rape or sexual violence (a much broader category). On 
the rarity or complete absence of sexual violence in conflicts, see Elisabeth Jean Wood, “Armed 
Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?” Politics & Society 37 (March 
2009): 131–62.
96. Albert Sonnichsen, Confessions of a Macedonian Bandit (New York, 1909), 152.
97. Tsilka was not the intended person for this role, but the more matronly and hence suit-
able candidate had fainted during the actual kidnapping, forcing the guerrillas to make a spon-
taneous decision to take another married woman from the group. Unbeknownst to them, Tsilka 
was pregnant and would become a great liability during the hard marches across the mountains 
in the dead of winter as negotiations for the release of the hostages dragged on interminably. 
She delivered her baby girl while still in captivity, and the two women were not released until 
the baby was a month old; Sherman, Fires on the Mountain.
98. This is not to suggest that rape was a natural course of action whenever the opportu-
nity presented itself. I strongly disagree with the “substitution” arguments, which hold that 
there is a link between armed groups’ access to prostitutes or other forms of sexual gratifica-
tion (or lack thereof) and their propensity to rape. For a discussion of such approaches, see 
 Elisabeth J. Wood, “Variation in Sexual Violence during War,” Politics & Society 34 (Septem-
ber 2006): 307–41.
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members came from outside the region.99 In any case, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the reports of rape that did find their way to various authorities 
(and hence to us, through the archival records) represent only a portion of 
the actual cases that occurred given the reluctance of victims to speak out 
for various reasons, including social stigma and the difficulty (if not futility) 
of seeking justice, as this case adequately illustrates.100
The troubles in Cuma-i Bâlâ and the brutalization of the inhabitants of 
Pokrovnik, Selichte, Leshko, and Karasu Çiftlik present another important 
element in the polarization of the population as a result of violence that was 
determined from the top down, embodied in this instance by the District 
Commander Salih Pasha, who was a perfect example of the violent special-
ist with a significant resume in political entrepreneurship. Fluent in French, 
personable and approachable, Salih Pasha was known as a “military man 
of energy and action.” Obviously, this military man knew how to chan-
nel his reputed “energies” to more lucrative pursuits than commanding the 
Third Army regiments stationed in Cuma-i-Bâlâ, having amassed consider-
able wealth through the lavish use of his influence and not a small degree 
of opportunistic and predatory behavior. His first initiative was reportedly 
the purchase of a large çiftlik that was languishing by the barracks. Soon, 
he had set up a smooth-running operation, where “the manure from the 
cavalry fertilized the soil, the soldiers harvested the tobacco, maintained the 
roads, dug irrigation canals and lower level officers supervised the labor-
ers and the harvesters.”101 When the proprietor of the land adjoining his 
property fled to Bulgaria during the Ilinden Uprising, Salih Pasha acquired 
his land as well as the mill on the property through a tenuous legal transac-
tion. The sale of the property required an auction, but given Salih Pasha’s 
reputation no one else dared to bid on it. After this acquisition, he blocked 
access to the fields between the two farms, which was lifted only after the 
intervention of the Inspector General. It was through the same channel that 
the land and the mill were subsequently restored to its original owner—for 
the price of the sale.102 The hardships that the proprietor experienced to have 
restored what had essentially been illegally confiscated from him underscore 
 99. See, for instance, MAE, Constantinople, E 147, Salonika, French Consul General to 
the Embassy, January 28, 1905.
100. As discussed later in regards to the Kuklish affair, there is a simple explanation for 
why many women would refrain from adding to their agony by filing an official complaint—
they were simply convinced that their allegations would not be investigated thoroughly and 
objectively.
101. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 143, Consul General Steeg to the Chargé d’affaires, 
October 5, 1904.
102. The activities of Salih Pasha left a long paper trail; for details in addition to Consuls 
Steeg’s report, see BOA, TFR.I.SL 43/4266, May 23, 1904; TFR.I.SL 47/4662, July 30, 1907; 
TFR.I.SL 48/4744, August 6, 1904; TFR.I. SL 48/4762–4763, August 8, 1904. A resident 
composed an anonymous letter, which seems to have made an impression on the authorities; 
TFR. I.ŞKT 50/4920, August 28, 1904. The order restoring the mill to its previous owner was 
issued in January 1905; TFR.I.A 22/2112. And Salih Pasha was finally replaced by Osman 
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a  different kind of violence that the survivors of the uprising endured even 
when they were not being beaten up by troops or assassinated by guerrillas. 
It was a violence of the mundane, such as a Sisyphean battle with the Otto-
man bureaucracy. Fortunately for the proprietor, who probably had more 
access to authority than the typical dispossessed peasant (although this is 
not to suggest that the typical peasant did not know to speak the language 
of the bureaucracy), the matter was resolved, but only after intervention at 
the level of the Inspectorate.
To be fair to Salih Pasha, I must note that he was obviously an equal-
opportunity oppressor in the sense that the victims of his chicanery and 
strong-arming included several Muslims as well as Christians. This we find 
out from a report by an Ottoman officer and from an anonymous letter 
sent to the Inspectorate.103 In many cases, people whose property had been 
usurped or confiscated were forced to pay for the privilege of accessing their 
own land or its yield, adding insult to injury. Naim Ağa, for instance, had to 
buy the produce grown on the land seized from him. Salih Pasha’s animals 
were pastured on land belonging to a certain Ahmed Ağa, the other half of 
which was leased to the army at an exorbitant rate for pasturing its animals. 
The proceeds from this operation, needless to say, went not to Ahmed Ağa 
but to Salih Pasha. Again at the expense of the army, using the soldiers as 
free labor, the resourceful Pasha had had irrigation canals dug to water his 
property. These canals diverted water to the detriment of Karaca Mahalle, 
whose inhabitants now had to pay 1 mecidiye to Salih Pasha per dönüm 
they watered, essentially paying for the water he was stealing from them. 
The laborers of the neighboring fields, who were not able to pay this amount 
had lost their tobacco crop. In the Varouch Mahalle, he installed sentries to 
block the villagers’ access to free water. Even the mufti had his share of the 
Pasha’s exactions when his stock of 1,500 okkas of hay was pilfered one 
night by the soldiers.104 The muscle Salih Pasha employed in these opera-
tions included a sergeant named Boşnak Süleyman and a cavalry gendarme 
Boşnak Mustafa, hinting at some form of ethnic solidarity network in Salih 
Pasha’s dealings as a violent specialist turned political entrepreneur.105
Pasha, the commander of the reserves in Serres later in the same month; TFR.I.A 22/2153, 
January 30, 1905.
103. BOA, TFR.I.ŞKT 50/4920, August 28, 1904; MAE, Constantinople, E 147, appendix 
to Colonel Vérand’s report: “Faits reprochés au Général Salih Pasha,” March 4, 1905.
104. These examples are among the more odious drawn from a long list that also includes 
items such as the removal of furniture from the office of the commander to be placed in Salih 
Pasha’s çiftlik. MAE, Constantinople, E 147, appendix to Colonel Vérand’s report: “Faits re-
prochés au Général Salih Pasha,” March 4, 1905.
105. Ethnic-regional solidarity in professional networks, including networks of crime and 
coercion, was common in the Ottoman Empire from the early modern era into the twentieth 
century. Ryan Gingeras’s work on the role of these networks in the South Marmara region in 
the aftermath of World War I argues that shared ethnicity, although important, was only one 
among many elements that shaped them; Ryan Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, 
and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912–1923 (New York, 2009), 56–65.
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The abuse of villagers in Cuma-i Bâlâ was clearly part of Salih Pasha’s lo-
cal reign of terror in the territory he had carved out as a personal fiefdom. 
Under the pretext of a search for weapons and “bandits,” the inhabitants 
were beaten, tortured, arrested and raped. The extensive search apparently 
produced only three guns, one of them belonging to a village headman, 
who in all likelihood was authorized to carry it, suggesting that cowing the 
peasantry was the motivation, not uncovering a cache of weapons.106 The 
institutional and political climate provided Salih Pasha an opportune situ-
ation for expanding his own sphere of influence by terrorizing people with 
impunity.
“When it comes to government-led deployment of coercion against chal-
lengers,” Charles Tilly notes, “collective violence increases further to the 
extent that violent specialists’ organization offers opportunities for private 
vengeance and incentives to predation. Where participation in organized 
violence opens paths to political and economic power, collective violence 
multiplies.”107 Indeed, one of the immediate consequences of Salih Pasha’s 
exactions was a large number of people leaving their homes and families 
to join the bands.108 The mechanism at work here was one with a built-in 
momentum, gaining traction from the multiple incentives present for opting 
into the armed struggle and the barriers making it increasingly difficult, if 
not impossible, to remain a fence-sitter.
Even so, we should still keep in mind that picking up arms and joining a 
band was not an irreversible decision. As the story of Hristo, a young man 
from the village of Karacaköy (Monokklisia) in Serres shows us, life as a 
guerrilla, although not without its rewards, was tough and not always as 
adventuresome as the aspiring warriors may have hoped.109 Furthermore, 
there was no guarantee that the chance for vengeance would ever material-
ize. Hristo, along with eleven other men from his village and thirteen others 
from the neighboring Kalendra (Kala Dentra) had joined a revolutionary 
band in winter 1903–1904. After five months of wandering in the moun-
tains, crossing the border into Bulgaria, meetings in Sofia and the Monas-
tery of Rila, and even a brief stint as a farmhand under the supervision of a 
band leader named Koço in Tatarpazarcık (Pazardzhik), Hristo, apparently 
stricken with buyer’s remorse, decided to end his tenure as a guerrilla. After 
the band had crossed the border back into Ottoman territory, he managed to 
ditch his handlers and turned himself in to the authorities in Barakova (Bara-
kovo). In his testimony to the pardon commission, Hristo was talkative 
106. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, Colonel Vérand to the Ambassador, March 4, 
1905.
107. Tilly, Politics of Collective Violence, 41.
108. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 143, Consul General Steeg to the Embassy, December 
21, 1904.
109. BOA, TFR.I.SL 34/3316, Fezleke sureti, Serres Subgovernorate, March 17, 1904.
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when revealing the names and describing the movements of the leadership 
cadres he had traveled with, but he was careful to add that he had never en-
gaged in armed confrontations with Ottoman forces. Hristo was also smart 
enough to claim that it was the senior guerrillas’ responsibility to arrange 
for provisions, dodging questions about specific villages, which might then 
be held responsible for aiding and abetting the guerrillas. As for why he and 
his friends had decided to join the guerrillas in the first place, Hristo was 
clear: “out of fear that the soldiers who had arrived in the village would beat 
[us] up,” invoking one of the main pitfalls of counterinsurgency, on the one 
hand, and reminding us about the inherent problems in assuming motives 
based on observed action, on the other.110
The Logic of Violence
If the residents of Ottoman Macedonia started to question the benevo-
lence or the existence of the god they worshipped in their (now segregated) 
churches, mosques, and synagogues and to invoke his name with despair 
(if not irony) in the winter that connected 1904 to 1905, no one could 
have blamed them. The worst was yet to come in terms of political turmoil, 
but that year human-made disasters were compounded by what looked like 
the ire of higher forces. Not only was the winter exceptionally harsh, with 
snow blanketing the villages into isolation and frost hanging over the fields, 
orchards, and vineyards with extraordinary persistence, but a flu epidemic 
was also running rampant.111 The one-two punch of winter and the flu was 
followed by a spring when the activities of the Greek committees started to 
intensify, with the apparent complicity and even support of Ottoman au-
thorities, adding momentum to the spiral of attacks and reprisals. After the 
Ottoman security forces dealt a large blow to Apostol’s band in the spring, 
rumors spread that the leader himself had been killed. The jubilations of the 
authorities on the occasion turned out to be premature—Apostol was alive 
and well and getting ready for revenge. Despite the unrelenting pressure of 
110. Kalyvas points out the need to “distinguish between reasons for joining an organiza-
tion and reasons for remaining in it” and proposes that we “bracket the question of individual 
motivations and . . . adopt minimal, yet sensible, assumptions about support.” Logic of Vio-
lence in Civil War, 100–101. The minimal and (I think) sensible assumption I make throughout 
this chapter about individual reasons for peasant participation in insurgency is that, although 
these reasons ran the whole gamut from complete ideological commitment to coercion, mini-
mizing damage to oneself and one’s loved ones was the principle factor in shaping this behav-
ior. Cf. James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New 
Haven, 1985).
111. We could add to the list of natural catastrophes the earthquake in April 1904, which 
did not claim a significant number of lives but caused enough damage to leave many homeless. 
Luckily, the snow had just melted, but the weather was still not very clement in the high alti-
tudes; BOA, TFR.I.SL 35/3452, April 4, 1904; TFR.I.AS 13/1289, April 6, 1904.
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the guerrillas, constant abuse of Ottoman security forces and other militias, 
and endless vagaries of life caused by a seemingly angry god, the people of 
Macedonia moved on with the business of living and even having some fun. 
Archival records, by their very nature, rarely hold clues to the diversions 
that people enjoyed, and when they do, they more often than not describe a 
festive occasion gone sour, such as a wedding or dance ending in bloodshed, 
or a less tragic run in with the law, such as complaints about a tax collector 
trying to get a cut of the proceeds from a traveling magician’s show, or the 
raunchy content of a popular play by a theater troupe that continues to be 
performed despite “repeated warnings” by the authorities.112 However in-
complete, these snippets of information hint at the way life was experienced 
under “normal” conditions and should remind us that not all was murder 
and mayhem, even during these depressing times, and make us reconsider 
the conditions under which people inflicted harm on each other. In Captain 
Sarrou’s words, “These murders or score settling did not prevent the local 
population from living, working, and having fun. They did not do without 
holidays celebrated with enthusiasm. My childish eyes keeps the sight of 
costumes for carnival, the continuous farandole [dance?] of the red devils, 
of the evzones, of Karagöz (Punch), of clowns, of porters, of harlequins, of 
colombines, and the shower of confetti and streamers falling from balconies 
or windows of houses with one floor. The cries of joy did not bother the 
people eating grilled corn from the cob.”113 So far, we have looked at several 
cases that exposed the dynamics of communal conflict at the micro level and 
demonstrated that we cannot speak of an unqualified, straight path that 
links sectarian difference and tension with outbreaks of violence. In this 
section, I ask broader questions of similar case studies, this time turning our 
attention to the logic of communal violence and its limits.
Violence as a Universal Tool of Communication
In June 1904, Chief Jane Sandansky, the legendary leader of the left wing of 
the IMRO dispatched an “open letter” to the population of the subprovince 
of Serres and the representatives of the European Powers stationed there. 
The letter was about several murders in the district of Melnik, approxi-
mately halfway between the center of Serres subprovince and the Bulgarian 
border. The region was claimed by Sandansky and his men as the base for 
their operations. The issue in the letter was not that Sandansky’s band was 
accused of murders they had not committed—they were indeed responsible, 
and the letter proudly owned up to this fact. The targets of Sandansky’s 
112. See, for instance, MAE, Constantinople, E 143, October 5, 1904; BOA, TFR.I.SL 
5/429, Subgovernor Rükneddin to the Inspectorate, Serres, February 19, 1903.
113. Auguste Sarrou (ed.), Le Capitaine Sarrou, un Offi cier Français au Service de l’Empire 
Ottoman (Istanbul, 2002), 50.
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 vituperation were those who had the audacity to call these killings “murders” 
because they were the ones, in Sandansky’s words, who “use force, and who, 
in order to augment that force and keep it in their hands, commit the great-
est illegalities, the most arbitrary acts . . . and those who, hand in hand with 
the creators of this tyranny, protected and covered by it, commit the greatest 
pillages, suck off the last drop of blood out of the people. . . .” 114
It may seem specious, or even ironic, that an outlaw living in the moun-
tains off the spoils of robbery and exactions would protest “illegalities” and 
“arbitrary acts,” but there was nothing ironic here as far as Sandansky and 
his comrades were concerned because their authority stemmed from the will 
of the “people.” The money and resources they “collected” from the people 
were not exactions but “taxes.” Likewise, there was nothing arbitrary about 
the summary executions they performed because they were the result of due 
deliberations and the just punishment for crimes committed by the perpe-
trators—not victims. In this regard, their moral logic was irreproachable. 
What prompted Sandansky to write the letter, however, suggests a problem 
in the dissemination of the guerrilla leader’s broader message; the target 
audience—the representatives of European Powers and the inhabitants of 
the region they aimed to liberate—were obviously not entirely convinced 
that Sandansky and his mates were carrying out the requirements of the 
law, or that the revolutionary “penal code” that Sandansky insisted he was 
enforcing had any more legitimacy than the laws of the state they were rising 
against, for that matter.
Sandansky’s apparent concern with the perceived legitimacy of the pun-
ishments meted out by his organization should not, however, be read as 
the leader’s ambivalence about the destructive consequences of the methods 
pursued by the guerrillas as the only road to success; like any movement 
that embraces the principle of “freedom or death,” the Macedonian revo-
lutionaries rationalized the killing of civilians as a necessary sacrifice and 
could not see beyond the false dichotomy of dying as a victim versus dying 
as a hero. The misgivings Sandansky had about the publicity that their ac-
tions generated did not stem from remorse over the glib cruelty with which 
they were executed but from a determination to ensure that the message 
was delivered to the right address. This kind of publicity was precisely what 
they were after, and Sandansky was sanguine about the lengths they would 
reach for to achieve it: “Finally they accuse us of being cruel, of being fero-
cious, without pity. Yes! We are cruel and ferocious; without pity against 
informants and our enemies. Often we punish not only the latter, but also 
their wives, their children and their sons to give an example to others, in 
case they want to follow the way of the condemned. Mercy! Forgiveness! 
These words are strange and unknown to us. We are without mercy. We 
114. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 143, Macédoine, July 16, and August 22, 1904.
Logic and Legitimacy in Violence  259
have but one punishment, only one suffering for the guilty. Death! Death to 
the snitch! Death to the traitor! Death to all who give us trouble!”115 Before 
writing off Sandansky’s public relations strategy as one of a mad man’s 
misguided attempt, we should remember that this self-declared cruelty was 
quite calculated and instrumental in that it aimed to exert coercive power 
for a specific goal: to prevent denunciations and collaboration to establish 
complete control over the targeted region. The same rhetoric formula was 
repeated endlessly in letters to communities, emphasizing that noncompli-
ance with directives would spell destruction not only for the “men” the let-
ters were addressed to but also for women and children.
One such letter, drafted by Captain Zakas, who considered it his “duty” 
to tell the residents of Bomboki (Stavropotamos) to forget “the stupid idea 
that Greek Macedonia can possibly become a Bulgarian country” and to 
warn the entire village (including its canine population) of what might hap-
pen if they did not reconsider their decision to attach themselves to the 
Exarchate, put it this way: “Come to your senses, and convert and become 
Greek Christians like before, because if you do not revert back until April 
20, I will come into your village outraged, and I will not spare anything, 
not women, not children, not dogs. There is still time to think and act.”116
Such threats were not merely empty rhetoric. The same message was deliv-
ered loud and clear, most commonly through mutilated corpses, sometimes 
accompanied, in a gesture of overkill, by a note identifying the purpose the 
victim’s death was supposed to serve. Village raids targeting total destruc-
tion were relatively rare occurrences, but the annihilation of an entire family 
for a “crime” committed by one of its members was not uncommon, as the 
French Consul General Steeg observed in a report to his superior in Istan-
bul: “Very often the band’s revenge [is not limited] to the person accused 
of having laid an obstacle to their plans. They also aim the extermination 
of his family. . . . A few days before my transit through Nevrekop . . . three 
brothers had been attacked the same day. One was killed, the other gravely 
injured. . . . The third one having managed to escape, his wife had been 
killed. A few months earlier the father of the three brothers had been killed. 
A letter sent in the name of the committee had previously informed his [the 
father’s] and all his relatives’ condemnation.”117
115. There are two translations of this letter, originally drafted in Bulgarian, and they differ 
slightly.
116. From the letter of Captain Zakas to the Bomboki community: “Valete mialo eis to 
kefali sas kai gyrisate palin eōs kai prin Ellēnes Christianē[oi], dioti ean mechri esis tas 20 
Apriliou den gyrisēte tha emvō orismenos [sic] mea eis sto chorgio [sic] sas kai den tha aphēsō 
tipote, oute gynaika, oute paidia kai oute skylia. Einai kairos akomē skephtēte kai kamēte.” 
The peculiar spelling and barely legible handwriting suggest that Zakas was not among the 
better-educated fighters; MAE, Constantinople, E 144, enclosure, ca. March 1907.
117. MAE, Constantinople, E 143, Consul Steeg to the Chargé d’Affairs, Salonika, Octo-
ber 5, 1904.
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This and other examples we have seen in the previous section follow an 
easily distinguishable pattern of attacks and assassinations carried out to 
punish a deed, such as defection or collaboration with the enemy, denounc-
ing, or simple failure to comply with orders. Although the collateral damage 
might include completely innocent children or the adult relatives of the con-
demned, these acts were largely “selective”; that is, they targeted a specific 
person or anyone associated with him for a reason. They served both as 
punishment for something that had already occurred and also as a deterrent 
to prevent further lapses.118
We also need to consider a separate set of cases here that seemed to be less 
“selective” and more “indiscriminate” to have a better appreciation of the 
full range of violent acts experienced during the struggle and of the tipping 
points in the escalation of communal violence. A striking set of cases illus-
trating such indiscriminate violence were attacks targeting migrant workers, 
who did not have any ethnic or kinship ties to their places of work, where 
they were killed; they were apparently murdered simply because of who 
they were.
A large number of migrant workers were employed in Ottoman Mace-
donia, mostly in public projects such as road and railroad building and 
 maintenance but also as seasonal agricultural workers. Bulgarian-speaking 
communities scattered throughout the region supplied a significant portion 
of this workforce, but employing members of a community that was in-
creasingly associated with disobedience if not outright insurgency against 
the government caused concern for some officials, who argued that projects 
of strategic importance, such as railroad maintenance, should replace Bul-
garian workers with Muslims and Greeks. This point of view did have its 
opponents among the Ottoman administrators such as the governor of 
Salonika, Hasan Fehmi Pasha, who was dubious about its feasibility and 
 advised against its adoption.119 After the Ilinden Uprising, however, the com-
missioner for the Salonika-Monastir railroad recommended that the work-
ers employed by the railroad company should consist of at least 70 percent 
Greeks and Muslims and that the current force of Bulgarian workers should 
be culled to reach the desired ratio.120 This recommendation was evidently 
adopted in principle by the railroad company.121 Implementation, however, 
turned out to be problematic simply because of the difficulty of recruiting 
workers from among the Muslim population, the majority of whom had 
118. Stathis Kalyvas notes that the former is the tactical use of coercive violence, whereas 
the latter has a strategic goal; Logic of Violence in Civil War, 27.
119. BOA, TFR.I.SL 9/858, April 25, 1903.
120. BOA, TFR.I.SL 17/1682-2, August 29, 1903.
121. BOA, TFR.I.M 2/163, January 1, 1904.
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been drafted into the army.122 As a result, projects requiring large amounts 
of migrant labor continued to rely on the Bulgarian population.123
These groups made an easy target for the Greek bands, especially in the 
southern part of the province of Salonika.124 In one instance, three work-
ers (two Bulgarians and a Vlach) were kidnapped by a Greek band from 
the road construction site about 10 kilometers outside Salonika. The two 
Bulgarian workers were later found dead, but the Vlach worker remained 
missing, presumably having been spared thanks to his less offensive ethnic 
affiliation.125 In 1907, there were at least three such incidents, and this time 
the death toll was much higher; again, all three of these took place in the 
vicinity of Salonika.126
One of these attacks occurred in December 1907, when a group of 125 
workers, originally from Razlog and Nevrekop (Gotse Delchev) in the 
northeast part of the province, were on their way back home from Salon-
ika.127 The group, accompanied by two gendarmes, was ambushed by a 
Greek band outside the village of Limpsasa (Olimpiada) in the district of 
Cassandra. The band was led by two men known by the noms de guerre of 
Yorghaki and Korici and was reinforced by Greek youths from villages in 
the vicinity, specifically Stano. The two gendarmes were overwhelmed by the 
attackers, and even though they started to retaliate, after someone shouted 
“sauve qui peut,” they dispersed. Twenty-five of the workers were killed, 
three were gravely injured, and three others were unaccounted for after the 
attack.
122. BOA, TFR.I.AS 45/4409, April 4, 1907.
123. These projects required a considerable workforce, which was difficult to source lo-
cally. Sometimes entire populations of certain villages were employed in the construction of 
roads in their districts; BOA, TFR.I. SL 192/19112, July 17, 1907. Nevertheless, their num-
bers were not enough to meet the demand. The construction of the road between Drama and 
Nevrekop, for instance, required the employment of eight hundred workers in June 1906; 
TFR.I.SL 211/21007. Some of the migrant workers came from Istanbul or as far as the eastern 
provinces of the empire; TFR.I.SL 28/2766, March 13, 1909; TFR.I.SL 214/21380, July 29, 
1909. They were not entirely content with their working conditions, however, and it seems 
that authorities had a difficult time “persuading” them to remain at their site of employment; 
TFR.I.SL 208/20792, May 10, 1909.
124. According to the records of the General Inspectorate of Rumeli, there were two such 
incidents, in 1905 and in 1906, and both took place in the district of Langaza; BOA, TFR.I.SL 
91/9003, December 13, 1905; TFR.I.SL 112/11180, July 11, 1906. Salonika was the province 
where Greek activity was most intense. For 1905, French records indicate another attack that 
occurred on January 13, 1905; MAE, Constantinople, Sèrie E 147, Salonika, Report of the 
Consul General to the Embassy, January 28, 1905.
125. MAE, Constantinople, Sèrie E 147, Salonika, January 28,1905.
126. BOA, TFR.I.SL 135/13499, March 4, 1907; TFR.I.SL 36/ 3520, October 10, 1907; 
TFR.I.SL 54/5389, December 12, 1907. The other year for which such incidents are mentioned 
is 1908, when one man was killed en route from Poroiy to Todoric, two neighboring villages in 
the district of Demirhisar (TFR.I.SL 175/17483, March 8, 1908) and eight others were killed 
in a field in Gaskar, one and a half hours from Salonika (TFR.I.SL 62/6101, June 13, 1908). 
Both of these incidents involved agricultural workers, however.
127. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 144, Macédoine, December 3, 1904.
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What distinguishes this and other attacks against migrant laborers, is 
that they were carried out in areas where the Greek Orthodox were the 
 uncontested majority among the Christian population against nonlocals 
who were targeted for no reason, it seems, other than their ethnoreligious 
affiliation. Nevrekop, where most of the workers came from, and Cassandra, 
where they were killed, were located at two opposite sides of the prov-
ince, and under normal circumstances, people from these two regions would 
not even come in contact or give much thought to one another’s existence. 
But they were now connected through an act of violence. When the resi-
dents of Nevrekop and Razlog found out where, how, and why their kin 
were killed, it would not take a complicated thought process, but only in-
stinct, to form a mental map that located Cassandra on the other side of the 
fence, a place one ventured to at the risk of death, rather than an extension 
of the home base where a person could temporarily locate to make a living. 
This was an effective method of boundary building, and exactly what the 
Greek andartes aimed to achieve. They were not interested in expanding 
their base of operations to the northernmost part of the province, to regions 
where the Slavic-speaking population was the majority among the Chris-
tians (and we should not lose sight of the fact that these areas were also 
heavily populated by Muslims); the fight was carried out in areas where the 
allegiance of the population could still be contested.128 As for places where 
Greek speakers were the majority among the Christians, such as Langaza 
(Langadas), they were now out of bounds for members of the rival ethno-
religious group.
Both categories of attacks introduced in this section—those selectively 
targeting a person and his loved ones, and the seemingly more random acts 
simply based on ethnoreligious affiliation—raise the question of why the in-
surgents would follow such ruthless tactics if they aimed to replace Ottoman 
authority with a more legitimate one based on the loyalty and the consent 
of the ruled. In other words, was it not counterproductive to exert violent 
force on a population when the ultimate purpose was to win their “hearts 
and minds”? The short and cynical answer is that this was not a fight for 
“hearts and minds” but for territory, above and before all. Although not 
necessarily untrue, this is an incomplete answer that discounts one of the 
most complicated puzzles in civil war violence—the issue of popular sup-
port. Furthermore, it overlooks the conditions under which the insurgency 
broke out in the first place and the overriding need of all parties involved 
in the fight to ensure control over the population through whatever means 
necessary.
We have seen in the first part of this chapter the extremely complex ma-
trix of motivations that determined how the locals acted in response to the 
128. The boundary was the Monastir-Gevgeli-Demirhisar line.
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demands of the guerrillas and the Ottoman authorities, and the unpredict-
ability of their behavior from any given attribute. Likewise, it would be 
naïve to assume that the support they did or did not lend to the guerrillas 
was dependent on a particular ideological agenda they subscribed to, either 
because one group made a better case for it through appeasement or because 
they did not agree with the unfair and brutish methods used by the other. 
More important, however, coercive violence was the most effective tool at 
the disposal of warring factions given the institutional parameters within 
which they were operating. This is not to condone their methods, of course, 
or even make a case for their effectiveness; this merely emphasizes my point 
that the participants in the insurgency had taken up weapons not only to 
fight against the Ottoman forces for abstract principles but also to establish 
their own territorial hegemony, which implied controlling the population 
that inhabited that territory, through force when necessary.129 Targeting a 
group of workers based on their ethnic affiliation was certainly a different 
(and arguably more odious) kind of violence than targeting an alleged in-
former, but both were instrumental in much the same way—they aimed to 
establish boundaries, declare turf, and deter opposition.
Retaliations and Escalation of Violence
A sizable Greek band appeared in Garçişte on January 13, 1905. After 
the Greeks destroyed the Slavonic prayer books of the community and de-
manded that the village adhere to the Patriarchate, they left. This was the 
same village where the Greek schoolteacher, Catherina Hadgi-Yorgi, and 
six others had been killed by Apostol’s band in November 1904. The same 
band had moved on to Mravintza (Moravintzi) on January 17, and this 
time they did not leave simply after making threats: they rounded up the 
men of the village, twenty-six in total, marched them out of the village, 
and shot them all. Ten died instantly, one died of his wounds later, and 
five were gravely injured. The remaining ten managed to escape.130 One 
of the survivors, Risto Constandi, said in his testimony that the band con-
sisted of about thirty men, some of them “dressed like Turkish soldiers.” 
When they told the kocabaşı to round up the villagers in front of the church, 
the people were first resistant, but they ultimately complied, assuming 
that these individuals were “with the government.” The men asked for the 
key to the church, which the villagers could not (or would not) locate. They 
then said Mehmed Bey, the owner of the çiftlik, wanted to have a word with 
129. Or, as Charles Colson, Nixon’s adviser, put it, “When you have them by the balls, their 
hearts and minds will follow.” Jung Chang, Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China (New York, 
1992), quoted in Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 115.
130. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, Macédoine, Consul General to Ambassador, Sa-
lonika, January 28, 1905.
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them, which was apparently a pretext for marching the men out of the vil-
lage. After the shooting, the band went in the direction of Kazim Daouli, a 
Turkish village. Risto did not recognize any of the assailants except for “An-
ton Dintze who was among the seven Greeks arrested in Bogdantzi [Bog-
danci] and later released.” Constandi added that his wife had been raped 
by the “Greek comitas” while the villagers “were gathering in front of the 
church.”131
The timing and the proximity of the village to Garçişte immediately brings 
to mind the possibility that the attack was retaliation for Apostol’s earlier 
assault. In fact, according to the Greek consul’s version of events, this was 
precisely the motive because there were suspicions that the Mravintzans had 
not only provided shelter to Apostol and his men before the attack but that 
some of them had actually participated in it. Although Greek Consul Cor-
omilas was probably being fanciful in adding that the guerrillas intended to 
“arrest” the men so that witnesses in Garçişte could confront and identify 
them, there is no doubt that this was a retaliatory assault.132
This act of retaliation stands out from other acts of selective violence we 
have seen because of two peculiar details: the involvement of men “dressed 
like Turkish soldiers” and the time of the day that the attack occurred. Al-
though it is not entirely inconceivable that these men were Greek guerrillas 
in Ottoman military disguise, the more likely explanation is that they were 
Ottoman deserters who had joined the roaming bands in Macedonia, some 
of which were organizing for a rebellion against the Hamidian regime.133 
Even though the Ottoman authorities repeatedly denied the existence of 
Muslim bands operating in the region and averred that the government pur-
sued Greek “brigands” with the same vehemence applied to Bulgarian “evil 
doers,” there was a mounting body of evidence contradicting both of these 
assurances.134 The audacity of such a large-scale attack in broad daylight 
reveals that the complacency of Ottoman officials was coupled with the 
131. MAE, Constantinople Série E 147, Macédoine, “Verbal Deposition,” January 28, 
1905.
132. The consul also alleged that the deaths were the result of an ambush by a Bulgarian 
band as the “detainees” were being led to the neighboring village, but the Ottoman authori-
ties had no record of this incident; MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, Consul’s report, Janu-
ary 28, 1905.
133. The Committee of Union and Progress tapped into this potential by organizing the 
already existing Muslim bands into their network and modeling their activities after tactics 
used by IMRO; Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution, 222–27. This particular incident is 
also cited by Douglas Dakin in his encyclopedic account of armed Greek activity in Macedo-
nia. Dakin mentions that the band consisted of some forty men and included Albanian village 
guards from Vodena; Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 232.
134. See, for instance, BOA, TFR.I.AS 49/4846, Third Army Command to the Inspectorate, 
July 27, 1907. The earliest reports of Turkish bands in the Struma Valley date to autumn 1904; 
MAE, Constantinople, Série E 143, Colonel Vérand’s report, October 27, 1904. In November 
1906, a band attacked Karadjovo (Kirdjovo), a small Exarchist village in the Cuma-i Bâlâ 
district, and killed twenty-five people. During the investigation, the survivors reported that the 
çetecis were speaking Turkish and Greek; BOA, TFR.I.AS 40/3954, November 8, 1906.
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complicity of local Muslims in attacks against Exarchist Christians.135 The 
testimony of Bulgarian Uniate villagers from the neighboring Pirava under-
score this point:
In our kaza there are only Bulgarian and Turkish villages, Greek bands can 
wander in broad daylight with impunity into Bulgarian villages where Bulgarian 
bands cannot attack them without being chased by the troops. They pass the 
nights in Turkish villages, the one that killed the peasants of Mravintza came 
from the Turkish village of Kazim-Daouli, they departed from there at dawn and 
returned after finishing their job. We were told that there were Turks with them, 
but we’re not sure, not having seen them ourselves. What is obvious to us is that 
the Turks are in agreement with the Greek bands and watch them with pleasure 
fight the Bulgarians.136
What becomes clear from this and other examples is that, starting in win-
ter 1905, the violence was not limited to targeted attacks against informers 
and their associates but had spilled into a more indiscriminate form sim-
ply based on ethnoreligious distinctions. In June 1905, two shepherds were 
killed outside Petriç (Petrich); a note left by the bodies said that all Bulgari-
ans working for Turks would meet the same fate.137 Another incident, which 
took place in the fall of the same year, illustrates the double bind faced by lo-
cals caught between the conflicting agendas of the multiple groups of violent 
specialists, which tested the limits of their considerable skills in fence-sitting 
or hedging their bets for survival. On September 11, 1905, two shepherds 
were minding the Belevis community flock. Accompanying the shepherds 
was Nicolas Zlatkov, a twelve-year-old boy who was the only survivor of 
the attack. They were attacked and killed by four Muslims, at least one of 
whom was from the nearby village of Slave. Nicolas told the investigators 
that the assailants had “accused them [the shepherds] of refusing to guard 
herds belonging to Turks.” When the shepherds heard this, they responded 
they had been banned from tending the Turks’ animals by the Bulgarian 
komitadjis under pain of death and that “they would surely be killed if they 
did not obey this order.” The assailants, obviously not satisfied with this 
explanation, dragged the hapless men to a riverbed and shot them.138
135. This should not be taken to imply that the mistrust between Muslims and Slavic-
speaking Christians characterized their relations exclusively and throughout the region. The 
French consul noted in October 1904 that in the extreme northern parts of the subprovince of 
Serres the Muslim and Christian population lived on good terms; MAE, Constantinople, Série 
E 143, Consul Steeg to the Chargé d’affairs, October 5, 1904.
136. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, Macédoine, Consul’s report, January 28, 1905.
137. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, Macédoine, Colonel Vérand’s report, Serres, June 
26, 1905.
138. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, Macédoine, Captain Bouvet to Colonel Vérand, 
September 23, 1905.
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As the snow melted in the Struma valley, it also removed the natural 
barrier against armed activity, giving way to a particularly violent spring 
and summer in 1905. The escalation was directly related with the increased 
involvement of Greek bands in the region, which were now on the offensive 
and collaborating with local Turks and Albanians.139 The presence of mixed 
Turkish-Greek bands in the region had firmly been established by spring 
1905.140 More surprising than the participation of local Muslims in these 
guerrilla groups was the degree of their proximity to the Ottoman military 
authorities, who apparently lent assistance to the Greeks routinely as a mea-
sure of counterinsurgency. A “reliable local source” alleged that an emissary 
of the Greek consulate had given the bands in the Yenice area a “password” 
to be shared with the Ottoman troops in pursuit of Bulgarian bands.141
The increasing involvement of armed groups supported and organized by 
Greek officers and consular staff served to accelerate the violence, not only 
through the common route of retaliations but also because the activities of 
these groups consolidated the notion that one could become a target sim-
ply for crossing into the wrong side of the (until then) invisible boundary 
of ethnic turf. Moreover, as the French consul pointed out, the unabashed 
tolerance of these bands by Ottoman authorities provoked the ire of the 
Bulgarians, who in turn redoubled their efforts against the Greek Orthodox 
civilians.142 The increased involvement of state actors at the local level and 
the diminished hopes for a diplomatic way out of the impasse were two prin-
cipal factors that caused the violence to escalate into unprecedented forms 
and levels after winter 1904–1905. In 1906, the violence spread into Bul-
garia, where Greek communities were targeted in retaliation for the actions 
of the Greek committees in Macedonia. The first reactions in Bulgaria had 
come in the form of protest demonstrations after a particularly brutal at-
tack that killed seventy-eight Bulgarians in Macedonia, but in summer 1906 
there was a full-blown, violent, “anti-Greek movement” in Bulgaria, largely 
instigated by a group called Bâlgarski Rodoliubets (Bulgarian Patriot).143
139. The Greek guerrilla organizations were following the plan of Konstantinos Mazarakis 
(aka Kapetan Akritas), which limited the areas where armed activity would be pursued to 
preserve the limited military sources that the Greek side could devote to the cause. This meant 
that centers with significant Greek Orthodox populations in the north, such as Krusevo, would 
initially be left to their own devices while mobilization concentrated in the south. For further 
details see Dakin, Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 214–15.
140. When one such band, consisting of eight Greeks and two Turks, was captured—by 
mistake, according to the Russian gendarmerie major in the area—in March 1905 in Doyran, 
the local Ottoman administrator was so embarrassed by the situation that he would have 
released them all had it not been for the intervention of the same Russian officer; MAE, Con-
stantinople, Série E 147, Consul’s Report, Salonika, April 3, 1905.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid.
143. The anti-Greek movement of 1906 caused a quarter of the Greek population of Bul-
garia to flee the country; Dragostinova, Between Two Motherlands, esp. 35–75.
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The reforms had already proven to be only a temporary fix, and the 
chance of an all-out war between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire con-
stantly occupied the rumor mills while the Ottoman security forces were 
adopting a new counterinsurgency plan based on deployments in smaller 
zones and units.144 Bands organized, equipped, and often led by Greek of-
ficers were on the offensive in a campaign to save Macedonia and its Greek 
Orthodox population from absorption into a large Bulgarian state.145 The 
left-wing of IMRO, led by Sandansky, meanwhile, was fending off the at-
tacks of Vrhovists, who were more in line with the agenda of the Bulgarian 
state than local revolutionary committees. The convergence of these trends 
spelled catastrophe for the region. The lull in armed activity following 
the Ottoman constitutional revolution of 1908 proved to be only a brief re-
spite from the violence that would finally be expressed in totally destructive 
force during the Balkan Wars.
Clusters of Violence: Cyclical and Geographical Patterns of Attacks
On May 10, 1908, the village head of Taşirince/Tristenitza (Kriopigi) sent a 
petition directly to Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, complaining that the villagers were 
living in fear, not even able to go to the fields around their village because 
of the crimes and murders committed by the komitadjis harbored by their 
Bulgarian neighbors in Skrijova.146 This was not the first time the name Skri-
jova was mentioned in relation to band-related activity and violence. In fact, 
one of the most striking features of the body of evidence from 1904–1908 
documenting disputes and violence in the Struma Valley is the constant rep-
etition of certain village names. In addition to İskirçova/Skrijova, the names 
Klepousna, Graçen, Alistrat, Eğridere, and Karlikovo surface so many times 
(and in a dizzying array of alternative spellings) in these documents that 
those who are not familiar with the region may assume they form nodes 
along “a corridor of violence” or represent centers of intense armed activity 
in the region. Both guesses are only partially true, however; these villages 
actually form a tiny cluster in the northeast of the district of Zihna and cover 
an area no larger than a large suburb of a North American city.
These specific villages did not, of course, constitute the only locations 
for violent attacks in the region, but this peculiar clustering pattern alone 
should make us reconsider any assumption that violence was endemic across 
144. MAE, Constantinople, Série E 147, Consul’s Report to the Ambassador, Salonika, 
January 28, 1905.
145. Volunteers from Crete made up a significant portion of the fighting force, and because 
they were Ottoman subjects, they could deny charges that they had been sent by Greece. There 
were also numerous local bands, some composed of klephts (bandits).
146. The original petition was drafted in Greek, apparently by an educated person; BOA, 
TFR.I.ŞKT 153/15236, May 22, 1908. Mishev lists Tristenitza as a village of 240 Greek Ortho-
dox “Bulgarians.” Brancoff [Mishev], Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne, 203.
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Macedonia during the decades before the Balkan Wars. This general obser-
vation is based on anecdotal evidence derived from a wide array of sources 
over a five-year period; nevertheless, a more targeted approach based on 
a complete data set covering violent crimes committed in the province of 
Serres during 1907 reveals a similar conclusion.147 Consider these examples 
from just the first six months of the year:
• On January 25, five Patriarchists were killed by a Bulgarian band in 
Graçen.
• About a month later, on February 23, two Exarchists from Skrijovo were 
killed outside Graçen by unknown assailants.
• On March 8, an Exarchist from Karlikovo was killed in Alistrat by the 
cavas of the Greek Metropolit.
• On April 28, an Exarchist from Skrijova was assassinated outside Graçen.
• On May 9, four Greek Orthodox shepherds from Karlikovo were killed by 
“Bulgarian comitadjis.”
• On June 2, a Greek Orthodox from Alistrat was killed in his village by a 
Bulgarian band.
The cycle of attacks follows a predictable pattern. When marked on a map, 
the locations of violent crimes, in the entire Serres district, also tend to clus-
ter around specific areas rather than being scattered around in an ad hoc 
manner. Nor do they encompass the entire map. The resulting picture is 
even more striking than the repetition of certain village names because it is a 
visual representation of the absence, rather than the presence, of violence in 
large areas where we might expect to see it. It goes without saying that what 
is missing from the picture is at least as important as what is represented by 
the dots indicating locations of violent crime.
What the villages İskirçova/Skrijovo, Alistrat, Graçen, Klepousna, 
Eğridere, and Karlikovo had in common was, first, their proximity to moun-
tainous terrain and marshlands, facilitating access and mobility by roaming 
bands. Such topographic features are closely related to how prone a loca-
tion is to civil war violence.148 Second, the inhabitants of these villages were 
Bulgarian speakers whose allegiance was contested by the Patriarchate and 
the Exarchate. Even according to the pro-Bulgarian work of D. M. Brancoff 
(Dimitar Mishev), these villages were divided in terms of their affiliation.149 
147. I used the French gendarmerie command monthly incident reports from December 
1906 to January 1908, the period for which all monthly reports were extant, to form the 
data set.
148. Fearon and Laitin find that rough terrain is one of the conditions strongly related to 
the onset of civil war violence, whereas ethnic and religious composition (and even prewar 
grievances) was not; “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”
149. Mishev’s figures do not mention groups of households in these villages, such as in 
Eğridere, whose attachment to the Exarchate was far from final. Even so, he did not manipu-
late figures where the entire village was still loyal to the Patriarchate, although his assertions 
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Such locations were open to propaganda from both sides in the conflict and 
were more prone to violence, especially in regions within reach of the Greek 
andartes, such as the district of Zihna; easily accessible from the Gulf of 
Orfano; and considered to be part of Greek Macedonia by the Greek side. 
Areas under the control of certain warlords such as Apostol or Sandansky 
were also more prone to attacks, not because these leaders had complete 
sway over their territories but because they had to contend with other, al-
ternative sources of political power and legitimacy in the same areas. For 
Sandansky, this challenge came as much, and sometimes more, from the 
Bulgarian side as from the Ottoman. In 1907, most of the violence in the 
about linguistic uniformity should be viewed with caution. The number of households he cited 
are 480 “Patriarchist Bulgarian” in Gratchen; 2,488 “Exarchist Bulgarian” in Skrijova; 880 
“Exarchist Bulgarian” and 320 “Patriarchist Bulgarian” in Klepouchna; 5,200 “Patriarchist 
Bulgarian” in Alistrat; 1264 “Exarchist Bulgarian” in Egridere; and 1,440 “Patriarchist Bulgar-
ian” in Kirlikovo. Brancoff [Mishev], Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne, 203.





















































Map 1. Map of Ottoman Macedonia. The Provinces of Salonika, Uskub, and Monastir, 
ca. 1904.
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Melnik area could be attributed to the rivalry between IMRO left wing and 
the Vrhovists (or centralists), who tried to eliminate Sandansky’s influence.
Similarly, violence was rampant in places where the Ottoman officers felt 
they were losing their grip and where the locals did not recognize state au-
thority. Sightings of large armed bands on the move and reports of villagers 
sheltering bands were followed by searches by the military, which used a 
disproportionate force against the civilians, especially if the troops sus-
pected that they had information about the killings of soldiers. Even when 
the searches did not turn up any incriminating evidence, the Slavic-speaking 
peasants were treated as if they were guilty until proven otherwise. The logic 
behind these exactions, which made the peasants resent Ottoman authority 
even more than they already did, was summarized by a high-level Ottoman 
officer, Mareşal İbrahim Pasha, the commander of the troops in Serres, who 
reportedly told Colonel Vérand, “There is but one method to control the 
population, and that is to inspire even greater terror among them than that 
exercised by the bands.”150
“Inspiring terror” would be an understatement when used to describe 
the conduct of the Ottoman soldiers and gendarmes in February 1905, a 
few months after the commander uttered these words, during a nightmar-
ish series of events in the village of Kukliş/Kuklish after the local military 
authorities received word that a band associated with Chernopeyef had been 
taking shelter in the village. This event was arguably one of the worst atroci-
ties committed against Slavic-speaking peasants in Ottoman Macedonia 
since the suppression of the Ilinden Uprising and is worth relating in some 
detail here. The accounts found in French and Ottoman sources converge 
 regarding the onset of the events. The accounts of what followed later, how-
ever, and the attribution of responsibility and blame after the village was left 
a smoldering ruin, has widely divergent versions, as we might expect, in the 
various sources.151
During their interrogation by the General Inspectorate officials, army Sec-
ond Lieutenant Mahmud Efendi and gendarmerie First Lieutenant Hasan 
Efendi concurred that the district commander’s office in Usturumca/Strum-
nitza ([Strumica) had dispatched them to Kuklish on the morning of  February 
150. MAE, Constantinople, Série E, Macédoine, Colonel Vérand’s report, no. 16A, Octo-
ber 1904. Almost four decades later, his statement was echoed in a German army order: “the 
population must be more frightened of our reprisals than of the partisans.” Otto Heilbrunn, 
Partisan Warfare (New York, 1967), 150, cited in Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 150.
151. Records in the French archives concerning the “Kouklish affair” include detailed re-
ports by the Russian gendarmerie captain who happened to be in the area when the incident 
occurred; MAE, Constantinople, E 147, February 28, 1905; Constantinople, E 147, March 10, 
1905. This officer’s reports can also be found in BOA, TFR.I.A 19/1828, which includes com-
plaints about the conduct of troops in the Serres region from December 1904 to February 1905. 
The largest dossier about the incident in the Ottoman archives is in BOA, TFR.I.SL 96/9540, 
February, 1905. which includes inquiry questions posed by the Austrian General Schostak, Ot-
toman military investigation reports, autopsy records, and testimony by survivors.
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16, 1905, after the commander had been alerted about the possible presence 
of a band in the village. The forces they commanded consisted of soldiers 
from the First Company of the Second Battalion of the 36th Troops and of 
the gendarmes from the post in Usturumca, and totaled about 120 men. 
They were also accompanied by a policeman named Kostaki.152 After the 
soldiers and gendarmes surrounded the village, the lieutenants Mahmud and 
Hasan, and Kostaki, the policeman, proceeded into the village with twenty 
men. Hasan Efendi told one of the gendarmes to talk to the villagers and 
summon the village head and members of the council of elders. When the 
village head and two council members came by, Hasan Efendi asked them 
whether there were “brigands” in their village, to which they replied no, and 
agreed to sign a statement to that effect, also agreeing to the consequences 
if there were indeed “brigands” hiding there. The gendarmes and soldiers 
were then divided into four groups led by lieutenants Mahmud and Hasan, 
Kostaki, and Corporal Seyfeddin and started to search the village. Shortly 
after the groups had separated from each other, Hasan Efendi heard one of 
the soldiers at a distance shouting, “they are firing,” at which instant bullets 
started whizzing about him; gunfire was coming from the school building 
as well as several houses. After he managed to meet up with Mahmud 
 Efendi’s group, they decided they had to evacuate and sent word to the ma-
jor. They started slowly withdrawing behind walls surrounding the village 
and tried to prevent the “brigands from escaping until the Major arrived.”
At approximately 5 p.m., Captain Cimetierre, the Russian gendarmerie 
officer, whose presence and testimony to the events would be of importance 
in the aftermath of the incident, arrived at the scene.153 He had arrived in 
Usturumca earlier that day and had heard about the battle and spoken with 
one of the injured, Second Lieutenant İsmail Efendi, who gave him an ac-
count of the day’s events; this coincided with the later testimony of lieuten-
ants Mahmud and Hasan. İsmail Efendi also stated that they had made an 
announcement to the villagers to separate themselves and come forward if 
they were not armed, so that the troops could pursue the “bad ones.”154 
When Captain Cimetierre reached the village with his translator, an intense 
gun battle was going on and smoke was coming out of the village from 
several locations, suggesting, according to Captain Cimetierre, that the fires 
had broken out simultaneously in several places.
What Captain Cimetierre saw that evening and described in his report 
to General Schostak was a somber scene, but things would get even worse 
after his departure late in the evening, as was revealed the next day when 
152. Interviews with Lieutenants Mahmud and Hasan were conducted and transcribed on 
February 19, 1905; TFR.I.SL 96/9540.
153. Lieutenant Hasan Efendi mentions the arrival of a certain “French officer”; he was 
probably confused by the language spoken by Captain Cimetierre, who was of French origin.
154. MAE, Constantinople, E 147, March 10, 1905.
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the soldiers withdrew and a final tally of the damage was taken. About a 
quarter of an hour after Cimetierre’s arrival, the first of the reinforcement 
troops arrived from Usturumca under the command of Major Arif Bey. The 
prefect told Captain Cimetierre that night would be falling soon and that 
he was afraid the komitadjis might escape; he wanted to know what Cim-
etierre’s opinion was on launching an attack on the house. Cimetierre, ob-
viously hesitant to assume responsibility, first refused to state his opinion, 
but then he conceded that launching an attack on a “barricaded and well-
defended house might cost many lives.” His answer, which can be deemed 
ill-advised by the benefit of hindsight, seems to have given the prefect all the 
pretext he needed to not continue with this risky mission on a frigid night.
Captain Cimetierre, worried about those still trapped in their houses, in-
sisted on making another announcement to the “honest” villagers to sur-
render. Apparently in agreement, the prefect, Ahmed Faik Bey, made an 
attempt to send two of the villagers who had been arrested earlier into the 
village on the mission. When Captain Cimetierre suggested having them 
escorted by soldiers, the prefect refused, explaining that they had already 
lost three soldiers who had tried to pick up the corpse of one their own but 
that the “brigands” had stopped firing when they sent in some of the villag-
ers to retrieve the body. Cimetierre reluctantly agreed to sending the villag-
ers unescorted. The two villagers returned from their foray into the village 
a little later  unaccompanied. He then noticed some soldiers had detained 
seven more villagers and were in the process of pushing and hitting them 
with rifle butts.
It was getting dark at this point, and fires continued to burn at several 
locations in the village. The shooting was concentrated in the upper part of 
the village, but its intensity was tapering off. Some of the women and chil-
dren who had left for the plains started coming back toward the village; their 
lamenting cries mixed with the dogs’ howling and an intense smoke rising 
from the now raging fire would have unnerved even a seasoned soldier. The 
young Captain Cimetierre, who described the scene as “grim,” was obvi-
ously shaken. He twice attempted to leave their shelter behind a wall to take 
a look at the other side of the village, but he was stopped by the prefect and 
Hasan Efendi. The prefect concluded that there was not much they could do 
and suggested that they call it a day: “you can send your report from town,” 
he told Cimetierre; “why stay here?” Because we know that at least a couple 
of the soldiers suffered frostbite that night, it is not hard to understand why 
the prefect, who obviously was not the most dedicated official on the (unreli-
able) payroll of the Ottoman state, was so eager to leave the scene of a battle 
in which two hundred soldiers were engaged and three had already died.155 
More surprising, and rather appalling, is the company he had during his trek 
155. BOA, TFR.I.SL 96/9540, February 19, 1905.
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back to a warm dinner and bed: Major Arif Bey, the highest-ranking military 
commander in place, and Mehmed Efendi, the captain of the gendarmes. 
They all took off for the night, leaving behind a horde of hungry, scared, and 
freezing soldiers and gendarmes, with only a lieutenant, a second lieutenant, 
and several ill-disciplined sergeants in charge. Quite conveniently for the 
authorities, this made it easier to pin the blame for what ensued on several 
low-ranking soldiers and gendarmes.156
Captain Cimetierre stayed on long enough to overhear Lieutenant Hasan 
Efendi ask one of the gendarmerie sergeants what had happened to the house 
of Petre; his response was “we burned it.” He also witnessed the arrival of 
reinforcements from Yenice, about fifty soldiers and two gendarmes under 
the command of a lieutenant.157 He and Hasan Efendi then left their shelter 
to join Lieutenant Mahmud Efendi as he was patrolling the village, and they 
saw two corpses on the ground. One of the gendarmes indicated there was 
another one not far from these two, but before they could proceed, Mahmud 
Efendi escorted them back. Around 9 p.m., because it was pitch dark and 
the sound of gunfire had diminished to an intermittent shot or two, Captain 
Cimetierre also left for the town.
The next morning, Captain Cimetierre left town accompanied by two cav-
alrymen named Nicolas and Arif. On their way, they ran into several groups 
of soldiers wrapped in blankets and rugs and carrying sacks that appeared to 
be filled with stolen effects. On arriving in the village, they found Lieutenant 
Mahmud writing (presumably a report) in the shelter of a house while his 
subordinates were busy roasting two chickens in the courtyard. There was 
also a group of soldiers gathered around a pile of looted property, sharing 
the spoils. Cimetierre and the two cavalrymen left the scene, following a 
patrol going along the periphery of the village to find the other lieutenant, 
Hasan Efendi. The scenes they saw did not produce optimism about what 
had happened during the night. All along the way, houses were still burning, 
and there were several groups of soldiers gathered around piles of linens and 
other goods looted from the houses. They did not seem to mind the pres-
ence of a lieutenant and the two gendarmes. In fact, one of the gendarmes 
was also sporting a strange cap fashioned out of a towel. When Cimetierre 
inquired about it, he claimed he had found the towel on the ground and 
wrapped it around his head because it was cold. It was certainly cold, but 
Cimetierre noticed that this gendarme also had an overcoat with a hood. 
They next turned a bend on the road and saw two soldiers wringing the neck 
of a chicken; they took off after the lieutenant yelled at them.  Cimetierre and 
156. It is worth noting that, during the investigation after the incident, the soldiers and 
gendarmes of sergeant and lower ranks were addressed in the second person singular and were 
often confronted with their contradicting accounts, whereas the lieutenants were addressed 
with the more respectful second person plural. The major, on the other hand, was not even 
directly addressed but given a set of general questions; ibid.
157. According to one of the corporals interviewed, this number was forty, not fifty; ibid.
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his companions followed these soldiers into a house where they discovered 
the destination of the chicken; a group of soldiers was fixing up a cauldron 
over a brazier, obviously getting ready for a feast. Among them was a gen-
darme, Mehmed Çavuş, who had been spotted the day before beating one 
of the villagers.158 As they continued looking for Hasan Efendi, they ran 
into the partially burned body of a man who was later identified as Gligor 
Nicola, a shepherd from Popchevo, who had come with his flock to stay 
with his sister and brother-in-law. Gligor Nicola’s pants had been torn where 
a bullet had penetrated his left thigh, and his hands were tied behind him 
with a rope. He appeared to have been thrown into the burning house while 
he was still alive.
Cimetierre’s party eventually found Hasan Efendi, who indicated that the 
bugler had already sounded assembly and they were all getting ready to leave. 
Cimetierre asked to be shown the scene of the battle and the house where 
the komitadjis had been barricaded. As Hasan Efendi led them through the 
village, they saw a couple of corpses lying about, not far from one another; 
one of them had burns on the soles of his feet, possibly from a brazier they 
noticed nearby. When they reached the stone house that had been turned 
into a makeshift fortress the night before, Cimetierre wanted to observe the 
scene for himself. As they were inspecting the house, they heard cries “aman 
aman” (mercy) followed by gun shots. The translator asked whether there 
were still komitadjis in the areas who could be shooting, but Hasan Efendi 
assured him that the only armed people in the village by that time were the 
soldiers. He was concerned that the soldiers might actually shoot at them. 
He started shouting, “soldiers, soldiers here, don’t shoot,” as they came out 
of the house. They soon found the target of the shots: a few steps away lay 
the still warm and quivering corpse of Pande Traiko. Nearby was the corpse 
of Velko Poiras, also still warm, and an open purse with just a seal in it that 
had been left on the ground. When Cimetierre’s party had taken this same 
path only a few minutes earlier there had been no sign of a disturbance. The 
two men had clearly been killed recently, which also explained the cries fol-
lowed by gunshots. The open and empty purse suggested that the motive for 
the crime was robbery.
As Cimetierre and his companions were inspecting the crime scene, they 
heard more shots nearby. When they looked in the direction that the shots 
had been fired, they saw “soldiers fleeing through the trees and houses.” 
Cimetierre urged Hasan Efendi to send a couple of gendarmes in pursuit to 
stop further attacks. Then, he noted:
The shots went on for some more minutes, and in the direction of the shots new 
fires set by criminal hands spread rapidly. Rushing and trying not to lose time 
158. He denied all these charges during his questioning; ibid.
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needlessly so that we could immediately see everything for ourselves, we made 
our way, from one corpse to another pointed out by women who looked wild 
with terror. We were accompanied by Lieutenant Hassan Effendi, Nicolas, our 
souvari, and the villager called Nicoli, who our souvari had arrested shortly 
before. Few steps away from the body of Velko Païras, was lying the body of 
Risto Bekiar, near which Nicolas, our souvari, picked an empty mauser car-
tridge belonging to the army; an exhibit that we took the liberty of putting in 
the pocket, while showing it to Hassan Effendi. As we were walking at a brisk 
pace, we didn’t have the time to look for more empty cartridges; as we kept 
walking we heard heartbreaking cries of women; we entered the yard of a house 
where we found the body of Helen, daughter of Jone Parode who—according to 
the mourning women—had been killed the day before when she tried to flee her 
home. A house was burning nearby; it is the school and the fire has just been set; 
in front of the school a villager called Tonce Pande, born in Strumnitza but living 
in Kuklitch since he was a child, had just been killed by the soldiers by four shots, 
according to the women sitting not far from there; we noted that the corpse was 
still warm. Some steps away from there, curled in a haystack, an old peasant Ilo 
Pehlivan, was lying down groaning; he had been beaten by the soldiers with rifle 
butts a few minutes earlier. As we followed our way, on the left, near a house 
that had started to burn, [was] the corpse, still warm, of Georghi Dulgher killed 
by a bullet, further in the middle of the road a very young man was lying dead; 
he was killed by a bullet and his corpse was cold; he was probably killed during 
the night, his identity has not yet been established.159
Even though it had been hours since assembly had been called, there were 
still soldiers walking about the village, apparently not quite done with their 
looting. Cimetierre learned from a group of lamenting women that several 
of them had been raped and robbed by the soldiers. Civilian marauders 
from neighboring Svidovica, Hamzali, and Bansko followed the soldiers, 
picking over any of the villagers’ worldly belongings that had miraculously 
survived the battle, the fires, and the previous round of looting. Cimetierre 
had five of these arrested and their weapons seized. They noticed some of 
them were herding cattle and oxen from Kuklish to Svidovica. A lieutenant 
of the military happened to be passing by the scene with twenty soldiers on 
the way to their barracks in nearby Kolesh (Koulechino), and told Captain 
Cimetierre that he would have the stolen animals returned. Observing that 
all the  soldiers under his command had also been carrying what appeared 
to be sacks of booty, Cimetierre did not find the lieutenant’s words quite 
reassuring.
159. The villager, Nicoli, had specifically asked to be arrested by the gendarmes accompany-
ing Cimetierre because one of them was a Christian and Nicoli apparently estimated that he 
was better off arrested by a Christian gendarme and a foreign officer than left at the mercy of 
the soldiers terrorizing the village; MAE, Constantinople, Serie E 147, March 10, 1905.
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Captain Cimetierre’s testimony and the reports he filed surely contributed 
to the detailed investigation that followed (which, alas, did not result in 
anything other than a denial of responsibility on the part of the military 
authorities). Among the most damning details of his testimony concerned a 
man named Eftim Poiras, whom Cimetierre had seen alive and well on the 
morning of February 4/17. Later on the same day, this man was discovered 
by Cimetierre and the prefect, dying of gun wounds, leaving no doubt that 
he had been shot well after the guerrillas had already left the scene.160 Some 
of the questions posed to the accused gendarmes and soldiers, such as the 
origin of the fires, were inspired entirely by Cimetierre’s findings, but ques-
tions about other breaches of discipline, not to mention the use of excessive 
force and cruelty, were also based on events that Cimetierre was not even 
aware of, such as the killing of a three-month-old by a soldier who, the 
mother alleged, had tossed the infant on the floor as they were ostensibly 
searching for weapons. The damage would have been difficult to contain 
even if the Russian officer had not been there. As convinced and smug as 
Cimetierre was about his role in preventing an even worse degree of abuse, 
there was not much in the interview transcripts of the soldiers and the gen-
darmes to suggest that they had paid any degree of attention to Cimetierre’s 
presence or attenuated their actions accordingly, assuming that they even 
knew about it.161
One of the rather unexpected conclusions to be drawn from comparing 
Cimetierre’s notes with the interview transcripts and post-mortem reports 
compiled by the Inspectorate is that the transcripts and post-mortem reports 
actually contained more inculpatory evidence against the military than the 
Russian officer’s testimony because they contained eye-witness accounts and 
first-hand testimony obtained from the gendarmes and the soldiers, some of 
whom were questioned several times because of the inconsistencies in their 
accounts; from the villagers who survived the ordeal; and from the bodies of 
those who did not. Given the weight of this evidence produced by no other 
authority than the Ottoman state, it is hard not to be flabbergasted by the 
speed with which the same evidence was spun into a cynical narrative exon-
erating the military from any wrongdoing in the matter.
In contrast to Captain Cimetierre’s report, the evidence compiled by the 
Inspectorate does not constitute a coherent narrative related by one person: 
it is choppy, it does not provide a linear chronology, and the events are de-
scribed by people who have good reasons to leave out some of the details. 
Second Lieutenant Mahmud Efendi, who, according to Captain Cimetierre, 
had displayed an extraordinary neglect of his duty, and carried most of the 
blame for what had happened, was one such person. His interview was 
160. Ibid.
161. See, for instance, the statements of Corporal Mustafa of Ankara; BOA, TFR.I.SL 
96/9540, February 19, 1905.
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relatively brief considering the role he played (or rather did not play) in 
the encounter between the troops and the guerrillas and its aftermath.162 
He gave an account of how the troops went to the village, received the 
village council’s assurances, and then engaged in a battle after they were 
fired on as they were searching the village. The time he gave for the start of 
the fire approximately coincided with Captain Cimetierre’s account, but he 
claimed that they also heard some bombs go off at this time. When asked 
if they made any attempt to control the fire, he explained that they could 
not because it was impossible for the soldiers to get into the village because 
guerrillas were shooting “from all the houses in the village.” He was not 
questioned at all about the most glaring blunder (from a military, rather 
than a humanitarian, perspective) about the operation—namely, how the 
guerrillas had managed to slip out of a village that had been cordoned off by 
hundreds of troops. Mahmud Efendi’s insistence that there were no troops 
left inside the village once the shooting started must have been true because 
they figured out that the “bandits” had already fled only when the shoot-
ing stopped and some of the soldiers started going about, yelling “they are 
fleeing.” The question, of course, is what the soldiers positioned outside the 
village had been doing at this moment, which was not directly posed to any 
of the three officers questioned after the incident.
Gendarmerie Lieutenant Hasan Efendi, questioned after Mahmud Efendi, 
volunteered the only statement that might explain why nobody detected the 
guerrillas’ exit; he claimed that the descending fog had given the bandits an 
opportunity to get out to the hills. Both affirmed that they saw armed peo-
ple from neighboring villagers come onto the scene of the battle; Mahmud 
Efendi mentioned that the majority were Muslims but that there were also 
some Jews among them. He vehemently denied that any of the soldiers or the 
gendarmes had taken part in the looting, but neither he nor Hasan Efendi 
provided a sound statement as to what precautions they had taken to keep 
these armed and dangerous individuals outside the perimeter of the village. 
One rather disturbing detail provided by Hasan Efendi was that these vil-
lagers were milling about because it was Kurban Bayramı (the Feast of Sac-
rifice), one of the most important religious holidays of Islam. It appears 
that these people had no qualms about stealing their neighbors’ property, 
including their sheep, which they conceivably intended to “sacrifice” for the 
occasion.
It is also interesting to note that neither Mahmud nor Hasan Efendi were 
asked detailed questions about the time that had elapsed between the con-
clusion of the battle and the sounding of the assembly the next day, which 
would have been critical in understanding why and how the operation had 
veered so widely off course, assuming there had been a planned course of 
162. BOA, TFR.I.SL 96/9540, Mahmud Efendi’s statement, February 19, 1905.
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action to begin with. The scattered details in the accounts provided by the 
interrogated soldiers and gendarmes suggest that this was not the case and 
that, once the soldiers realized that the enemy had escaped, they turned their 
ire on the villagers who had apparently given the guerrillas shelter. Hasan 
Efendi, when questioned about the people found dead after the conclusion 
of the battle, claimed that he did not have any information about these be-
cause it had been impossible to enter the houses at the time of the encounter, 
and he added, “In any case, these [the villagers] are allied with the bandits. It 
could be that there were those who were killed in order to have some losses 
for putting blame [on the government]. Just as they first said there are no 
bandits, and then it turned out this way.”163
The notion that all the villagers were allied with the guerrillas and 
deserved what had happened was shared across the ranks of the military 
present during the incident in Kuklish. Major Arif, during his “interview,” 
revealed without a doubt that the engagement was viewed as an “uprising” 
when he was talking about how the church and school buildings were set 
on fire; he was adamant that the soldiers had had no part in this: “I cannot 
say whether the church was burned down because of a bomb or not. How-
ever, it is said that it was burned by the rebelling locals and the bandits who 
came from outside and were under their protection.”164 Nor, according to 
the major, were the soldiers involved in any act of looting or abuse of the 
villagers. The soldiers had made every effort to protect the village from pil-
lage by their neighbors. Those who had somehow managed to steal property 
despite these measures had been apprehended and handed over to justice. 
As for the presence (or not) of weapons in the houses where there were dead 
bodies, the major was rather vague in stating that they had found several 
guns, including some Mannlichers (typically used by the guerrillas), but he 
was not sure how many had been found. The guns had already been handed 
over to the district commander’s office, conveniently making it impossible 
to match them with the houses where they had been found and thus refute 
or support the theory that all the dead villagers had been killed in combat. 
The number and position of the bodies, and, more important, their time 
of death, were in fact sufficient to dismiss this theory. When the issue was 
raised that some of the corpses found the day after the encounter were still 
warm, the major stated that he had not personally seen these corpses but 
that it was quite possible that they had been injured the night before and had 
only passed away recently.
163. “Bunlar zaten eşkiya ile müttefi kdirler. Olabilir ki: itham içün bazı tazyiat olmak 
üzere öldürtülenler bulunsun. Nitekim evvela eşkiya yoktur dediler sonra da böyle çıktı.” BOA, 
TFR.I.SL 96/9540, Hasan Efendi’s statement, February 19, 1905.
164. The first page of this transcript does not mention the name of the person being inter-
viewed, and the last page does not contain a seal and oath, which are present on all the other 
statements. But, judging from his narrative of events, it is safe to conclude that the person was 
Major Arif Efendi; BOA, TFR.I.SL, 96/9540 (undated).
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Playing the three wise monkeys was the dominant theme in the interroga-
tion transcripts of lower-ranking soldiers and gendarmes: they saw nothing, 
heard nothing, and said nothing. Mito Kostadi, one of the gendarmes who 
had accompanied the detachment that first arrived on the scene with Hasan 
Efendi, however, volunteered more information than the formulaic denial, 
probably because he felt he did not have anything to hide. The first part of 
his testimony was in agreement with Hasan Efendi’s and Mahmud Efendi’s 
accounts telling of the ambush they found themselves in after entering the 
village. Concerning the fires and the presence of marauders from neigh-
boring villages, on the other hand, Mito Kostadi had other things to say. 
Hordes of these marauders had already appeared and had been going in 
and out of the village in the evening soon after the shooting was over and a 
bugler came by to tell the soldiers and gendarmes to stay where they were 
for the night. It was the marauders, Mito said, who had set the kocabaşı’s 
house on fire. Most of these people were from Svidovica and Mito recog-
nized the ex-convict Hüseyin among them.165 Mito also testified that the 
soldiers had burned the other houses, on the side of the village where they 
were positioned. He was not sure who had set the church on fire. When the 
investigator demanded to know whether Mito and his fellow gendarmes had 
informed the officers about these arsons by the soldiers and the marauders, 
Mito Kostadi’s response was utterly convincing in its naïveté: “No sir, I did 
not inform. We were already stupefied by the terror of the situation. What 
information should I present while the soldiers themselves were burning the 
houses?”166
The majority of the soldiers and gendarmes vehemently denied so much 
as stepping into the village all night, when it was freezing outside.167 Many 
of their narratives had large blocks of time when they could not reasonably 
explain what they were doing, and some verged on the absurd. One of them 
creatively argued that it took him six to seven hours to go from the town to 
the village because he proceeded “lying in ambush, very slowly, observing 
and resting.”168 Another one claimed that he had been singled out by the 
village women (presumably as one who had abused them) because he had 
chased one woman into her house to retrieve a cartridge she was hiding 
and that, after successfully seizing it, he informed the soldiers of what he 
had done but did not show them the cartridge. The mysterious cartridge 
165. Significantly, some of the pillagers came from muhacir mahallesi (the neighborhood of 
refugees), probably from Bulgaria.
166. BOA, TFR.I.SL 96/9540, Mito Kostadi’s statement, February 23, 1905.
167. One of them admitted that they had entered a house to warm up around the fire but 
denied that they had kicked the family’s children outside.
168. “Ben köye gittikten sonra pusu ala ala, yavaş yavaş, seyir tutarak, dinlene dinlene gez-
dim. . . . ” BOA, TFR.I.SL 96/9540, Statement of Borizan Halil of Karahisar, February 23, 1905.
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was never found.169 One of the most salient features that emerges out of 
these disparate narratives is that the soldiers and gendarmes had been let 
loose entirely without command, without directive, and without any kind of 
restraint or structure with regard to their conduct, in and around a village, 
the residents of which they held responsible for killing three of their own, 
not to mention supporting an “uprising” against the government, which was 
the sole reason for their deployment in the dead of winter.
As soon as the botched military operation was over, another one conducted 
by the civilian authorities was underway to minimize the consequences. The 
post-mortem reports, interviews with survivors, medical examinations of 
the injured and the raped women carried out by the district attorney’s as-
sistant and municipality’s physician illustrate that the motive was to de-
flect blame onto the guerrillas rather than identify those responsible for 
the carnage that took place after the guerrillas left. It is telling that the gun 
wounds were almost invariably identified as the work of “either a Mauser 
or a Mannlicher rifle,” the two weapons of choice favored by the Ottoman 
military and the revolutionary bands, respectively, with the implication that 
the deceased could have been killed by either side. It is curious how the bul-
lets all seemed to penetrate and then exit the different body parts they ripped 
apart; not one of them was left behind to be extracted and identified by the 
medical examiner.
The medical examination reports of the raped women are not for the 
faint-hearted to read, and their details present a compelling case for the 
locals’ mistrust of any initiative from the Ottoman government that was 
ostensibly meant to improve their lot. Not one of the cases was officially 
declared “rape” by the physician, who would only go so far as to say that 
the findings were “inconclusive.”170 His conclusion about one case that “the 
presence of blood could also be attributed to the said woman’s menses” 
gives new meaning to the term “expert opinion,” leaving us cold in aston-
ishment. The survivors, most of whom displayed signs of their testimony to 
the events, either on their persons in the form of bruises, burns, and wounds 
or in their missing possessions and smoldering dwellings, could describe 
clearly and in detail what had transpired and were almost unanimous in 
their statements that most of the damage had been done after the battle by 
pillaging soldiers and marauders. They were equally unanimous, however, in 
their insistence that they would not be able to identify these soldiers if they 
were confronted. Given that these were the same soldiers who would still be 
stationed in their region, and that they had little hope of assistance from the 
169. “Kadını evin içine kadar kovaladım. Kadın içeri girdi, ben bu fi şengi alarak geri 
döndüm, askerin yanına geldim, askere ben bu Hristiyan kadından bir fi şeng aldım dedim ama 
fi şengi askere göstermedim.” BOA, TFR.I.SL 96/9540, Corporal Mustafa’s statement, Febru-
ary 23, 1905.
170. BOA, TFR.I.SL 96/9540, Physician’s report, February 19, 1905.
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government in case the same soldiers sought revenge, now that their village 
had been branded as “rebellious,” it is not hard to understand why they 
were reluctant to identify the soldiers and gendarmes, some of whom they 
probably even knew by name.171
The final tally of the “Kuklish incident” is sobering, to say the least. The 
Ottoman forces lost three members as the encounter started. In the village 
thirty-six corpses were found, and two others died later of wounds sus-
tained. It was not clearly determined how many of those dead had actually 
been killed in combat, but only three of them had been taken out of the 
house where the guerrillas were barricaded. At least twelve of the victims 
had been killed on Friday, and seven had been killed on Thursday evening, 
after the battle was over. One woman who had been raped suffered a mis-
carriage—the medical examiner, needless to say, determined that the miscar-
riage could have been due to other factors. Sixty-seven houses, including 
the church building, had been entirely burned. The survivors were without 
shelter and food in the middle of winter. The resulting scene, extraordinarily 
chilling even by the standards of the time and place, should not have come as 
a shock to the military authorities, who had unleashed the reprisal through 
their criminal neglect of duty and willful blindness to the “rowdiness” of 
their subordinates. Informed about his soldiers’ acts of looting, Lieutenant 
Mahmud Bey’s comment was that they were terbiyesiz (ill-behaved), as if 
he was speaking about a bunch of anti-social teenagers.172 These events 
were not simply about lack of discipline or training (although they certainly 
had to with this lack) but about counterinsurgency. The Ottoman military 
authorities were draining the sea to get to the fish swimming in it. Their ef-
forts to contain the insurgency thwarted, the activities of the bands on the 
rise, and the (justifiable) fear that Rumeli was indeed slipping away with no 
real rescue plan in sight becoming real, the Ottoman authorities were trying 
to improvise as they went along. Punishing the population that harbored 
and supported the guerrillas, and giving the Greek committees free reign to 
intimidate the Bulgarian element were the two cornerstones of this ad hoc 
strategy of counterinsurgency. Although this strategy was certainly coun-
terproductive, it was by no means unique, repeated as it had been count-
less times in similar experiments of counterinsurgency.173 It even seemed to 
work, at least in the short run, as the examples of Smardesi and Mogila, vil-
lages in western Macedonia illustrate. In April 1903, these villages had been 
the target of troops and başıbozuks after the troops failed to capture the 
large bands of guerrillas taking shelter there. Seeing the ruins and the dead 
after these attacks, locals were less willing to harbor the guerrillas, which 
171. It is clear from the interviews that some of the gendarmes had been sent into the vil-
lage before.
172. MAE, Constantinople, E 147, Captain Cimetierre’s second report, March 10, 1905.
173. Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, 146–61.
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made it very difficult for the bands to move.174 This was a short-lived vic-
tory for the Ottoman troops, however, because the bands moved back in as 
soon as the threats were over and the peasants, tired of the exactions of the 
guerrillas, on the one hand, and of the reprisals they suffered, on the other, 
naturally split their ire between the two. Their frustration and despair are 
captured in the words of the inhabitants of Leshko, a village in the district 
of Cuma-i Bâlâ. A group of IMRO guerrillas had entered the village on July 
20, 1907, set four houses on fire, and shot two women escaping from the 
conflagration, leaving one dead and the other seriously injured. The act was 
apparently carried out to punish this Exarchist village for failing to comply 
with the demands of the Organization and not paying their “taxes.” The 
French officer reporting on the incident heard the following plea over and 
over: “We pay high taxes to the government, even higher taxes to the co-
mitadjis, we are beaten by soldiers, and pillaged by the başıbozuk, we don’t 
know any more what [will] happen.”175
In August 1907, an encounter between Ottoman forces and IMRO guerril-
las took place in Dere Müslim, a village located not far from Melnik.176 The 
series of events leading up to and following the encounter formed a familiar 
pattern and almost duplicated the Kuklish incident. According to the report 
drafted by Captain Sarrou, the French gendarmerie officer in charge of the 
Melnik district, on August 12, a gendarme and twelve soldiers who were on 
patrol duty paid a routine visit to Dere Müslim. While the soldiers waited 
outside the village by a stream at the bottom of a ravine, the gendarme spoke 
with the village elders and the muhtar (headman). The gendarme noticed an 
uneasiness as they affirmed that all was calm in the village and, his suspicions 
raised, asked the muhtar whether he would be willing to provide a written 
and sealed statement attesting that there were no “brigands” in the village. 
The muhtar could not turn down this demand and produced the document, 
as had his counterpart in Kuklish. This time, however, the gendarme took 
the muhtar’s word, and the patrol left without further inquiry. Only a few 
hours later, local officials alerted military authorities that three bands might 
be hiding in Dere Müslim. A detachment of 150 soldiers and 9 gendarmes 
was immediately dispatched to the area. Gendarmerie Lieutenant Salih Ağa, 
who was in charge of the operation, went into the village accompanied by a 
policeman, a gendarme, a few soldiers, and a civil official. They called on the 
elders to reassemble and asked them to tell the truth. When they reaffirmed 
that there were indeed no “bandits” hiding in the village, Lieutenant Salih 
Ağa said they knew this was not the case and that the village had already 
been put under siege so as not to allow the bandits to escape. He wanted to 
negotiate their surrender, he said, because there would be much bloodshed 
174. Dakin, Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 97–98.
175. MAE, Constantinople, E 144, List of crimes committed in July 1907, August 1907.
176. MAE, Constantinople, E 144, August 1907.
Logic and Legitimacy in Violence  283
on both sides otherwise. When they repeated that they knew nothing, Salih 
Ağa had his subordinates ask the villagers to leave their dwellings. As they 
were gathering, Salih Ağa noticed that an old man seemed willing to help. 
With this man as the guide, they started knocking on doors, and when they 
reached the second house, shots were fired from inside.
The battle and the ensuing explosions and fire consumed the village al-
most entirely.177 Six peasants were killed, two of them by the guerrillas, 
including the old man who had been guiding the troops. There were three 
casualties on the Ottoman side, two soldiers and a gendarme. The injured 
included a certain Mehmet Sadık, ex-Stoianoff, a former bandleader, who 
apparently had changed his religion to go along with his political transfor-
mation.178 In his report, Captain Sarrou noted that Mehmet Sadık not only 
had managed to shoot Mitza Vranali, one of the guerrilla leaders, but also 
had saved Salih Ağa’s life as he caught a bullet from the guerrillas himself. 
Sarrou was able to see some of the documents seized from the dead guerril-
las. These included orders issued by Mitza Marikostinali, carrying the seal 
of the Interior Committee for the killings of five individuals.179 Two of the 
orders had already been executed; among the luckier three was the Bulgar-
ian priest of Ploska, a “village that was hostile to the Committee.”180 Ac-
cording to the lieutenant, the three bands had assembled in preparation for a 
major attack that involved the burning of several villages while they blocked 
the narrow passes of Demirhisar region. Another source, whom Captain 
Sarrou esteemed as “very well informed” said that Sandansky himself had 
been waiting with eighty men under his command to meet with the three 
bands that had been ambushed for some “flashy act.”181
The Dere Müslim incident was in many ways a smaller-scale version of 
the events in Kuklish, but there were also significant differences between the 
two. The most important distinction was in the way the authorities dealt 
with the situation after the event. Captain Sarrou’s assertion that the con-
duct of the police, gendarmes, and soldiers was stellar should be considered 
177. BOA, TFR.I.A 37/3649, August 16, 1907.
178. Although it was not uncommon for former bandits to enlist with the Ottoman gen-
darmerie, Stoianoff seems to have gone one step further by converting to Islam. I was not able 
to locate more specific information about Stoianoff, but Draganoff mentions a certain Petre 
Stoianoff who was the member of a Bulgarian band in the province of Üsküb. This person 
reportedly declared himself Serbian after disagreements with his comrades and then turned 
himself in to the Ottoman authorities, denouncing and causing the arrest of a large number of 
Bulgarians; Draganoff, Macédoine et les Réformes, 176.
179. Marikostina and Vrana were both located in Menlik district, not far from Dere Müs-
lim; BOA, TFR.I.A 37/3649, Serres Prefecture to Menlik Subprefecture, August 14, 1907; 
MAE, Constantinople, E 144, Captain Sarrou to Colonel Vérand, August 19, 1907.
180. This is probably one of the two villages named Ploski in Menlik. Mishev mentions that 
both villages, made up of 456 and 448 households, were entirely Exarchist; Brancoff [Mishev] 
La Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne, 192.
181. MAE Constantinople, E 144, Captain Sarrou to Colonel Vérand, August 19, 1907.
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along with the fact that he arrived at the scene after the battle was over.182 
We do know, however, that the authorities reacted to his investigation im-
mediately after the incident took place with unusual sangfroid, in sharp 
contrast to the defensive spin campaign that followed the attack on Kuklish. 
In fact, when the Prefecture of Serres asked the local authorities in Menlik to 
prevent Sarrou from taking photographs of the burned houses “in a suitable 
manner” and copied the Inspectorate on the correspondence, the response 
they received did not follow the routine procedure of damage control. In-
stead, the memo recommended that the French captain be allowed to pro-
ceed as he pleased because there was nothing of “harm or significance” in 
taking photographs.183
More significantly, the investigation report prepared immediately after 
the incident by gendarmerie Lieutenant Tayyar Bey and the Demirhisar Dis-
trict Commander Colonel Hamdi Bey recommended that “aid” should be 
provided to the owners of twenty-six houses that had been burned down in 
the form of government grants based on the value of their houses. The pair 
did not officially acknowledge that the fire had been started by the mili-
tary, instead choosing deliberately vague language as to the source of the 
first fire and emphasizing a fatal combination of high winds, tightly built 
structures, large amounts of raki and grain alcohol kept in the houses, and 
finally the countless explosions set off by the brigands. Nevertheless, they 
did note that of the twenty-nine houses that had been incinerated, three had 
been deliberately set on fire by the “brigands,” and because their owners 
were “unworthy of mercy” having been in cahoots with the brigands, they 
should not benefit from financial aid, implicitly conceding that compensat-
ing for the damage done to the other houses was the responsibility of the 
government.184 They added that hay depots had been converted to tempo-
rary dwellings for the victims, where they were distributed food, and that 
“thanks to the beneficence of his Excellency the Sultan” they were ensuring 
the rest and recovery of the wounded through all means necessary. The be-
neficence of his excellency could only go so far, apparently, considering Sar-
rou’s observation that the provisions sent for the victims were inadequate. 
Be that as it may, the list detailing the names of homeowners and the value 
of the property they lost in the fire was prepared with great expedition and 
182. Ibid. In his report, Sarrou relates several acts of courage by the police and the gen-
darmes, which he could not have witnessed personally. Although it does not mean that these 
were entirely made up by the Ottoman officials he interviewed, the record about similar inci-
dents calls for a note of caution.
183. BOA, TFR.I.A 37/3649, Copy of Inspectorate’s letter to the Serres Prefecture, August 
14, 1907. The mentioned photos indeed reached their destination. They can today be found 
in the same folder that contains Captain Sarrou’s report to Colonel Vérand; MAE, Constanti-
nople, E 144, Captain Sarrou to Colonel Vérand, August 19, 1907.
184. It is interesting to note that the word they used for the financial assistance to be offered 
to the victims was iane (“aid”) rather than tazminat (“compensation”).
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presented to the Inspectorate by August 1907.185 The list itself obviously 
did not mean much in the absence of funds to allocate for the purpose, 
estimated at 84,700 guruş. It is a testament to the importance placed on 
carrying through with the aid plan that on September 11, 1907, the Grand 
Vezir notified the Inspectorate that the Council of Ministers had authorized 
the release of the necessary funds from the aid earmarked for flood victims 
and that an imperial decree had been issued to that effect.186 Furthermore, 
in March 1908, the Sublime Porte extended the three-year tax exemption to 
victims of attacks by Greek bands in Melnik, Zihna, and Serres, including 
the residents of Dere Müslim who had lost their houses.187
What had happened in the course of two years that inspired the Ottoman 
administration to adopt a different policy in dealing with the aftermath of 
an attack on a village harboring guerrillas? First of all, following the bad 
publicity following previous similar encounters, the Ottomans were strongly 
motivated to preempt critical reports before they surfaced. This point was 
explicitly stressed several times in the correspondence of the Inspectorate 
with the Sublime Porte. “If there are measures the government would need 
to take,” one such letter noted, “initiative should be taken before the claims 
and complaints of outsiders and malicious [people].”188
“Damage control” was obviously the primary motive behind the changed 
and relatively more benevolent state attitude. And, we might expect, this 
change in attitude was in no small degree enabled by the declining strength 
of the revolutionary bands in the region as the Ottoman forces increased 
their efforts to eradicate them. Thanks to a new strategy relying on smaller 
flying columns, adopted in 1907, the Ottoman military had achieved consid-
erable success in curbing insurgent activity in summer 1907.189 The region 
of the Struma Valley was still host to numerous bands, but, as the Dere 
Müslim incident revealed, these were small groups under the control of local 
men that were limited in their capacity to enforce committee orders or stage 
impressive attacks unless they joined forces under the guidance of leaders 
such as Sandansky, which was getting progressively harder as a result of 
185. BOA, TFR.I.A 37/3649, Serres Prefecture to the Inspectorate, August 17, 1907.
186. BOA, TFR.I.A 37/3649, Grand Vezir to the Inspectorate, September 11, 1907.
187. BOA, TFR.I.A 37/3649, Grand Vezirate to the Inspectorate, March 6, 1908.
188. “hükümetce ittihâzı lazım gelecek tedâbir var ise agyâr ile bedhahâtın müracaat ve 
şikayâtından evvel mukteziyâtına teşebbüs edilmek üzere. . . . ” BOA, TFR.I.A 37/3649, Inspec-
torate to the Grand Vezirate, August 21, 1907.
189. MAE, Constantinople, E 144, Colonel Vérand’s Report, August 26, 1907; Dakin, 
Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 340–41. Among the leaders captured and killed that summer 
was the notorious Mitros Vlach, who had long been fighting against the Greeks in the region 
of Kastoria and was rumored to be responsible for the death of Pavlos Melas, the legendary 
young martyr of the Greek struggle in Macedonia. Melas had been killed in an ambush by Ot-
toman forces that was intended for Mitros Vlach, who had set up the trap for Melas; Dakin, 
Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 190. In the end, it was the information and guides provided by 
Bishop Karavangelis, another champion and hero of the Greek cause in Macedonia, that led to 
the capture and killing of Mitros Vlach by the Ottoman forces.
286  Chapter 6
increased surveillance in the countryside, on the one hand, and the presence 
of Greek bands, on the other. It might well be that their progress in coun-
terinsurgency made the Ottoman authorities adopt a more positive outlook 
about the future of the region, which was manifested in their dealings with 
the inhabitants of Dere Müslim. The band in Kuklish had escaped but not 
their comrades in Dere Müslim.
Violence and Political Power
In this chapter, I have analyzed violence as a historical force in its own right 
and established its role in the creation of something that was presumably 
its cause—national identity. The conflict in Ottoman Macedonia at the turn 
of the twentieth century is an important chapter in the histories of national 
liberation in Bulgaria, Greece, and Macedonia. It created national heroes 
for all parties involved—including the Ottomans, who ended up losing not 
just any territory, but Rumeli, the lands that had transformed the small 
principality established by the followers of a warlord named Osman into an 
empire and once a world power. It was indeed a formative event for all the 
nation-states mentioned, not only as a struggle to redeem what rightfully 
belonged to the nation, as official histories would have it, but for placing 
the inhabitants of Macedonia into national molds in the first place. In other 
words, it was not the people who fought for the nation, but the nation-states 
that fought for the people.
Analyzing violence at the local or micro level allows the disaggregation 
of events collectively defined as ethnonationalist violence from the broader 
narrative of national liberation. The range of circumstances that motivated 
people to take up arms, as we have seen, was not limited to ideological 
commitment or animosity against members of the other group. There was 
no single explanation for collaboration or resistance, nor was the distinc-
tion between victim and perpetrator as clear as we might assume. The way 
people were subsumed by this fight did not follow a linear script of rebel-
lion against the government and reclaiming territory for the nation. The 
contingencies in the way the events unfolded, people’s ambiguities about 
what course of action to take, and the ease with which they went from be-
ing noncommittal to participatory and back, become visible elements of 
this episode in history only after we take a closer look at the presumably 
ubiquitous acts of violence. References to tyranny, murderous campaigns of 
destruction, and calamities that people suffered just as a result of the group 
they belonged to constitute center stage in “heroes and traitors” style of his-
tories of the struggle for Macedonia. Political histories, on the other hand, 
follow the interaction of states and assume that people’s actions to mimic 
those of the political actors that made the decisions for insurgency or war. 
The mundane details of the experiences of the masses that were claimed by 
the fighting parties do not figure prominently in these accounts, and when 
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they do, they are stylized to fit the master narrative. There is no place for the 
uncertainty, the messiness, and the contradictions of actual human experi-
ence in macro narratives of national emergence, and that is exactly why it 
is important that we bring them to light. The examples we have seen here 
demonstrate that violence contributed to the process of nation-building as 
a marker of boundaries and a means of consolidating disparate groups of 
people into members of a community that they knew extended well beyond 
their immediate environment. What compounded that effect was its simul-
taneous action as a mechanism for mass mobilization, without which there 
would not be a nation. This is not to argue that violence was the uniquely 
generative force in nation-making. Nation-making relies on other forces, 
forces that derive, above all, from the social and political changes that are 
mutually constitutive with the emergence of the modern state, forces such 
as new technologies of government, industrialization, and new mechanisms 
of legitimation that made mass political participation (which should not be 
confused with pluralist democracy) not only possible but also necessary. 
Violence, however, should not be explained away as a by-product of this 
process; it functioned more as a cause than a result of the hardening of na-
tional boundaries.
Was Hanna Arendt right, then, in suggesting that violence is utterly in-
capable of creating power?190 Or should we conclude with a nod to Mao 
Zedong, who asserted that political power comes from the barrel of a gun? 
What we have seen about the capacity of violence to change people’s world-
views and actions might make it seem that Mao was right on this subject, 
but I would argue differently. Nor do I completely agree with Arendt’s dic-
tum. It is true that violence is not real power; it is just an instrument of 
coercion. Nevertheless, it is in fact capable of helping create something that 
has actual power—in this case, the nation.
190. “Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it.” Hannah Arendt, 
On Violence (New York, 1969), 56.
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The conditions described in this book were to a large extent shaped by the vacuum left by a failing state. It is a challenge to gauge the degree of that failure, however, because the ac-
tions of the Ottoman government did not exactly duplicate those of a com-
pletely defunct state nor was its legitimacy, eroded as it was, entirely absent 
in the minds of its subject populations. This was a state that had a difficult 
time feeding its army, half of which happened to be stationed in Macedonia, 
but that still had officials who prepared detailed post-mortem reports after 
an attack on a village and undertook ambitious projects such as a detailed 
population count in the middle of an insurgency. The erosion of its legiti-
macy, especially in the eyes of its Christian population, was a process that 
had started much earlier and that was more the result of shifts in the fiscal/
military administrative system and the concomitant abuse of rights over the 
peasantry than of that peasantry’s evolving national consciousness.
This is not to argue that the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire had 
already started on a course that would inevitably result in irredentist state-
seeking movements as early as the eighteenth century and finally had found 
in nationalism an ideal cause around which to rally the masses. No one 
with a scholarly interest in the Ottoman Empire would nowadays think of 
its Christian subject populations as religious or ethnic minorities primarily 
occupied with preserving the privileges accorded to them by the sultan until 
they could strike out on their own. Nevertheless, this assumption held sway 
for so long that it is still necessary to pause and reconsider the complex ma-
trix that defined the relationship of the Ottoman center with its subjects—
Muslim and non-Muslim—for most of the history of the empire. It is also 
necessary to remember that the framework formed by parallel alignments 
of religiously defined communities linked by separate threads to the center, 
known as the millet system, was a product of the Tanzimat era and even 
then was not an all-encompassing model that explained the nature of the 
relationship of the Ottoman state to its subjects. The key point here is that 
maintaining and managing difference—between religious groups, between 
men and women, between tax payers and collectors, between those with 
access to the means of coercion and those without, and, most important, 
between center and periphery—are the activities that define an empire and 
distinguish it from other forms of rule, especially those whose legitimacy 
Conclusion
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is predicated on an imagined sense of belonging to a greater community 
of co-nationals. That the transition from the one form of rule to the other 
would occur only through convulsions of the social and political order is 
perhaps obvious. But exactly how deep those convulsions would be and 
what horrors they would bring to the surface before subsiding, not even the 
most perceptive visionaries of the Age of Revolution could have foreseen.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the notion that mass political participation 
was the principal tool of legitimation had become the norm, not only in the 
(geopolitical) core of Europe but also among the emergent political dissi-
dents in its periphery. Nationalism was an exceptionally suitable ideological 
framework for expanding the political base without necessarily challenging 
relations of economic production or dominant class structures. At the same 
time, defining and classifying the demographic base according to national 
criteria worked harmoniously with the apparatuses of the modern state, 
such as statistical approaches to population management, cartography in 
the service of governance, huge armies of draftees, and bureaucracies and 
workforces emanating from unified school curricula, to name a few. The 
modern nation-state not only was the product of these new technologies of 
rule but also contributed to their development and proliferation in a mutu-
ally reinforcing process.
The societal balance the Ottomans had maintained through the cultiva-
tion of heterogeneity across their territories and communities was irrevo-
cably unsettled as the combined momentum of mass politics and the needs 
of state modernization rendered obsolete established methods of associa-
tion, alliance building, and derivation of legitimacy. This process, more than 
the mediation of intellectuals, be they the Young Ottomans or the Philiki 
Etaireia (who were ostensibly disseminating ideas sourced from Europe), 
destabilized the Ottoman social order. A new set of internal dynamics chal-
lenged the status quo of the state elites and, for the first time, demanded that 
they be held accountable.
This book has focused on the period that followed this initial challenge 
to empire. The events that eventually culminated in the resolution of the 
Eastern Question were set in motion, and the tension between empire and 
the formation of nation-states came to a head, not only for the Ottomans 
but also for the neighboring empires. Between 1850 and 1918, the “key 
dilemma of empire,” as Dominic Lieven put it, was how control over vast 
territories could be squared with the “demands of nationalism, democracy 
and economic dynamism.”1 While the geopolitical realities of Europe were 
shifting as a result of these challenges, one of the fundamental changes that 
took place was the redefinition of the relationship between territory and the 
people. That relationship now favored the political and the national unit 
1. Dominic Lieven, “Dilemmas of Empire: 1850–1918. Power, Territory, Identity,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 34, no. 2 (1999), 165.
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being the same and emphasized the use of new technologies of state power 
that favored a more homogenous population. These notions clashed with 
the agendas of hegemony of the European Powers, on the one hand, and 
gave political actors at the periphery of the European state system hope 
that they could achieve political and economic modernization through the 
nation-state model, on the other.
The Ottoman Empire entered this era as a defeated power with con-
siderably less prestige and limited means in the face of vicious economic 
and territorial competition. The efforts to redirect power from the hands 
of provincial powerbrokers to the center, such as the move against semi-
autonomous warlords in Rumeli, had uneven levels of success, with this 
“success” arguably deepening the tensions it aimed to resolve. The efforts 
to address social inequality, streamline tax collection and expand the draft 
army met with resistance both from Muslims, who viewed themselves as 
bearing the burden of reforms that mainly benefited the “infidels,” and from 
non-Muslims, who were not satisfied with unsubstantiated rhetoric about 
government sensitivity to their plight. This is not to say that there was no 
intercommunal conflict before the Ottoman state started making efforts to 
implement modern methods of statecraft and redefine its source of legiti-
macy, but these conflicts were now linked to politics on a larger scale and 
had a significance that went well beyond the local. In fact, the growing 
dependency of the Ottoman Empire on the European Powers for the preser-
vation of its territorial integrity and its gradual transformation into an out-
post of European capitalism meant that local conflicts became international 
matters, with each power treating a chosen community as its proxy in the 
Ottoman Empire.
Mark Mazower identifies the decade from the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) 
to 1922–1923 as “the catalyst for genocide, ethnic cleansing, and massive 
forced population movements for the first time in history.”2 I propose that 
the starting date of this long period be moved back even further in time, to 
1878, when the Congress of Berlin sought to repair the European status quo 
while leaving the resolution of the knotty Eastern Question to the future, 
thereby ensuring that the unresolved tensions would prove ever more dif-
ficult to contain. Revolutionary movements in southeast Europe and eastern 
Anatolia were directly influenced by the rivalry among the Great Powers, 
which alternated between pressure and appeasement in their dealings with 
the Ottoman Empire. After 1914–1918, when this diplomatic rivalry spilled 
over into a devastatingly prolonged war, the consequences were tragic for 
the entire continent, and especially for the people scattered throughout the 
territory stretching from Eastern Europe, through the Black Sea littoral and 
2. Mark Mazower, “Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century,” American 
Historical Review 107, no. 4 (2002), 1175.
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Asia Minor, and into the Fertile Crescent.3 The messy confluence of state 
modernization, imperialism, and nationalism indeed heralded an epoch of 
unprecedented levels of violence.
During this period, which witnessed a novel instrumentality of violence 
that distinguished it from older expressions of imperial hegemony, the Ot-
toman polity lurched further and further away from an imperial framework 
at pivotal moments, even as its statesmen were deploying those very same 
instruments of state violence to save the empire. The expiration date of 
the Ottoman Empire was 1923, but the Young Turk revolution of 1908 
should be considered one of those moments that signified the end of empire 
before its life was officially over. This is not because the revolution osten-
sibly brought back the constitution and the parliament, turning the sultan 
into a figurehead, but because one of the trademarks of the new constitu-
tional era (even including the brief interlude when the Ottoman Committee 
of Union and Progress, CUP, was in opposition) was its leaders’ willingness 
to abandon former policies that had accommodated difference in favor of 
those that enforced uniformity, such as ending the old practice of allowing 
the rotation of church space among Christian communities of different sects. 
The paternalism of the Hamidian period was replaced with the presumably 
more “modern” and impersonal rigidity of bureaucratic rules and ostensible 
attachment to legalism. Soon enough, the Young Turk leadership proved to 
be at least as authoritarian as (if not more authoritarian than) the arbitrary 
rule of Abdülhamid II. The crisis in the Balkans was sufficient to abandon all 
pretense of parliamentary government, and the leadership cadre of the CUP, 
which had never completely abandoned its formative identity as members 
of a clandestine network, steered the empire to its demise, which, by that 
point had become all but inevitable. No vestiges of imperial heterogeneity 
were around after 1908: the fate of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 should be 
a clear indication that national uniformity had indisputably prevailed. The 
ethnically cleansed and heavily militarized nation-state of Turkey, built on 
this foundation, is still a work in progress, not having made its peace with 
its past or with the ethnic complexity of its population. Lately, the Otto-
man past has experienced a revival after decades of languishing in oblivion, 
although it is hard to say whether the scholarly debates about the empire 
have any chance of influencing public perceptions when pitted against the 
growing obsession of the popular media with the opulence and grandeur 
of the Ottoman palace. Most worrisome is the recent fascination in Turkey 
with empire, not out of an interest with cultural plurality but out of a thinly 
disguised desire for restored hegemony.
3. One of the worst consequences of this clash was the near-total annihilation of Ottoman 
Armenians. On the role of Great Power competition in the development of the Armenian 
genocide, see Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism and 
the Destruction of Ottoman Armenians (Oxford, 2005).
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What happened in Macedonia in the period between the Congress of Ber-
lin and the Balkan Wars directly influenced the subsequent CUP policies. 
This is not simply because the 1908 revolution itself was organized and 
initiated in Macedonia but because the lessons that the CUP cadres drew 
from the process through which Rumeli was taken away from the empire 
informed the steps they would take to contain that damage and make sure 
that the same scenario did not play out in Anatolia. The same process also 
shaped the aggressively territorial and ethnically exclusive nation-states that 
replaced the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, with consequences that rever-
berate to this day. This is not to suggest that it was the same ethnic fault line 
that collapsed in the Balkans in the 1990s—to the contrary, one of the main 
lessons of this study is that it is not a static ideology based on an immutable 
ethnic core that drives people to kill their neighbors but the instrumental-
ity of violence in the service of politics that turns the illusion of hard ethnic 
boundaries into reality.
Years ago, as I was completing work on the dissertation project that 
later became the basis of this book, I spent a summer in Oxford, England. 
I quickly settled into a routine: days spent reading and writing at the Rad-
cliffe Camera usually concluded at one of the many pubs in town, eating and 
drinking with friends, old and new. At the end of one such evening I climbed 
into a taxi, told the driver my destination, and was immediately greeted with 
the question, “Where are you from?” I regretted my answer to him because 
I was certain that my “exotic” place of origin had brought my chances of a 
quiet ride back home to nearly zero. The driver was silent for a second and 
his gaze, fixed on the rearview mirror, was one of confusion or, I feared, 
anger. As I was contemplating the possible subsequent conversations, each 
more uncomfortable than the other, he broke his silence. “Really?” he said. 
“You’re Turkish? I could swear you’re Macedonian!” Now it was my turn 
to stare in bemusement. I knew I had not drunk enough to hallucinate, and 
even a vivid imagination would be hard pressed to come up with such—at 
least, as I saw it—an absurd exchange. Soon the source of his speculation 
became clear. As he was waiting in line, he had seen me saying good-bye to 
my friends (all of whom happened to be from lands that used to be part of 
the Ottoman world); he could not hear what I said, but my intonation, ges-
tures, and the way I looked, he explained, made him think that I was Mace-
donian for sure. Historians, unlike anthropologists, rarely go “local,” and I 
am not even sure how I could project a Macedonian “look” as opposed to, 
say, a “Bulgarian” look with my obvious lack of a knack for appreciating 
the subtle differences in Balkan morphology. In fact, his guess about which 
specific Balkan national group I belonged to did not have much to do with 
the way I looked but everything to do with his own background—Slobodan, 
my chatty taxi driver, was a Serb from Croatia.
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I doubt it was serendipity that made a stranger tell me I “look Macedonian” 
while I was spending days preoccupied with the fates of the residents of that 
region a century earlier, but in a way it encapsulated what nation-ness is all 
about: belonging to a community that is imagined but by no means imagi-
nary. Slobodan and I had our separate sets of assumptions about each other’s 
backgrounds, and certain cues he was conditioned to read as signs indica-
tive of belonging to a specific nation had led him to conclude that I must be 
Macedonian. To him, my appearance was uncanny, familiar but not quite 
known, close yet somewhat distant. In his imagined system of associations, 
this pegged me as Macedonian. Imaginary as the roots of these associations 
may be, his having been born a Serb in Croatia had had extremely real 
consequences. He had been displaced during the war, had quit his studies, 
and had started a new life as a refugee. All national groups rely on myths 
of shared culture, history, and common descent. People’s sense of who they 
are and where they belong is shaped from an early age by the allegory of 
belonging to one big family, the nation. But the ties that bind them together, 
it seems, are not in the blood they imagine they share but in the blood that 
spills in the name of the family.
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——. Bŭlgarskata Ekzarhiya, 1870–1879. Sofia: BAN, 1989.
Marriott, John A. R. The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European 
 Diplomacy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947.
Marx, Anthony. Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003.
Matalas, Paraskevas. Ethnos kai Orthodoxia: Oi Peripeties mias Schesēs apo to 
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